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ABSTRACT

The following study investigates how Catholics in the southwestern German state
o f Baden reacted to German unification in 1871. Although Baden had a Catholic
majority, during the Second Empire the state was governed by Protestant liberals, who
often discriminated against the state’s Catholics. To understand how Badenese Catholics
participated in the nation-building project from 1871 to 1914, this work analyzes Catholic
reactions to the commemorative discourse that surrounded unification. This discourse
was often tinged with anti-Catholic sentiments that alleged that Catholics had been
opposed to the unification and that they harbored stronger loyalties to the Pope in Rome
than they did to the German Emperor in Berlin. Despite being politically and
economically disadvantaged, Badenese Catholics successfully contested this ideological
message and instead created an alternative discourse that better represented their own
version o f Germanness. M y analysis illustrates that these Catholics subscribed to a multi
faceted version o f German identity. Instead o f being subsumed into a Protestantdominated national identity, they were able to maintain certain pre-1871 elements o f their
identity, which included loyalties to the Pope, Baden, their fellow Germans in Catholic
A ustria, as w ell as E m p ero r W ilhelm I.

This study also displays how central confessional elements were to the
construction o f German national identity during the Second Empire. Religious affiliation
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to a large extent determined how Germans lived their lives, and confessional loyalties
became one o f the key components in the new German national identity. Moreover, this
work also demonstrates that Catholic and Protestant integration into the new German
nation-state should be viewed as an ongoing debate about what constituted German.
Although during the last two decades before the First World War, Catholics and
Protestants did not clash as frequently over the definition o f Germanness as they had
during the first two decades of the Kaiserreich, they never completely agreed on the
exact nature o f their national identity. Thus, despite facing numerous political,
economic, and social obstacles, Badenese Catholics were able to manifest successfully
their own version o f German identity throughout the Second German Empire.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Although many German Catholics and Protestants went to war in both 1870
and 1914 filled with nationalist sentiments, they did not concur on the nature o f the
German nation at either time. Indeed, though they lived side by side in the Second
German Empire, they were never able to come to a consensus on what it meant to be
German. Analysis o f their differing perceptions o f national identity highlights the
multifaceted nature o f the German nation in which Catholic and Protestant versions o f
Germanness coexisted, sometimes very uneasily. By the 1890s, Catholics and
Protestants had reached a contentious agreement on what German could constitute, but
this did not mean that either group had been able to convince the other o f the exact
nature o f national identity. Rather, what emerges here is a complex construction of
national identity in which Protestants and Catholics interacted with each other to
determine the nature/s of Germanness.
In this work, I analyze how Catholics in Baden viewed the commemorations of
the wars o f unification to provide insights into how Catholics shaped national identity
during the Second E m pire. A lthough confessional sentim ents play ed an im portant

role in determining the personal experience o f Germans during the Kaiserreich,
historians long neglected to consider religion one o f the important societal forces in
the nineteenth century. Until the mid-1980s, most scholars viewed the history o f
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nineteenth-century Germany as one o f linear secularization, in which religion played
an increasingly minor role in society.1 During the early and middle parts o f that
decade, the publications of Jonathan Sperber, David Blackboum, Thomas Nipperdey
and others signaled a shift in how scholars viewed religious life in Germany. Their
research confirmed that while secularization o f society occurred, religion and
confessional sentiments constituted a major part o f everyday life for Germans during
the nineteenth century.2 As they revised the standard interpretation o f the “long”
nineteenth century as one o f slow decline in religious influence, historians recognized
how important confessional sentiments were to Protestants, Catholics, and Jews as
they negotiated their existence in an increasingly modernizing and urbanizing nation

1Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Das deutsche Kaiserreich 1871-1918 (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht,
1973) best represents this view. Exceptions include Christel Kohle-Hezinger, Evangelisch-katholisch:
Untersuchungen zu konfessionellem Vorurteil und Konflikt im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert vornehmlich
am Beispiel Wilrttembergs (Tubingen: Guide, 1976); Rudolf Lill, “Kirche und Revolution: Zu den
Anfangen der katholischen Bewegung im Jahrzehnt vor 1848,” Archiv fu r Sozialgeschichte 18 (1978):
565-575; and Wolfgang Schieder, “Kirche und Revolution: Sozialgeschichtliche Aspekte der Trier
Wallfahrt von 1844,” Archiv fur Sozialgeschichte 14 (1974): 419-454.
2 Work highlighting the Catholic experience includes: Margaret Lavinia Anderson: Windthorst: A
Political Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981); idem, Practicing Democracy: Elections
and Political Culture in Imperial Germany (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); David
Blackboum, Class, Religion, and Local Politics in Wilhelmine Germany: The Centre Party in
Wurttemberg before 1914 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980); idem, Marpingen: Apparitions
o f the Virgin Mary in Nineteenth Century Germany (New York: Knopf, 1994); Olaf Blaschke and
Frank-Michael Kuhlemann, eds., Religion im Kaiserreich: Milieus—Mentalitaten—Krisen (Giitersloh:
Kaiser, 1996); Wemer K. Blessing, Staat und Kirche in der Gesellschaft: Instutionelle Autoritat und
mentaler Wandel in Bayern wdhrend des 19. Jahrhunderts (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht,
1982); Wilfried Loth, Katholiken im Kaiserreich: Der Politische Katholizismus in der Krise des
Wilhelminischen Deutschlands (Diisseldorf: Droste, 1984); Thomas Nipperdey, Religion im
Umbruch:Deutschland 1870-1918 (Miinchen: Beck, 1988); Anton Rauscher, ed., Katholizismus,
Bildung und Wissenschaft in 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoningh, 1987);
Ronald J. Ross, The Failure o f Bismarck’s Kulturkampf: Catholicism and State Power in Imperial
Germany, 1871-1887 (Washington: Catholic University o f America Press, 1998); Wolfgang Schieder,
ed., Volksreligiositat in der modernen Sozialgeschichte (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1986);
Helmut Walser Smith, German Nationalism and Religious Conflict: Culture, Ideology, Politics, 18701914 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); and Jonathan Sperber, Popular Catholicism in
Nineteenth Century Germany {Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).
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state. Despite ongoing secularization, confessional identities still played a large role
in determining how citizens lived their lives. Religious affiliation affected where
Germans lived, shopped, attended school, what they read, whom they married, and
whom they considered their friends.
Scholars like Helmut Walser Smith, Margaret Anderson, and Wolfgang
Altgeld now agree that religion was not a by-product o f other forces in society, but
rather a force that shaped cultural, political, and social actions. The study o f German
nationalism has been no exception to this trend, though the central role o f confessional
elements in national identity is still underappreciated. With the exception o f Smith’s
path-breaking study, German Nationalism and Religious Conflict, and recent studies
by Kevin Cramer, Michael Gross and Roisin Healy, there has been little research on
•

how confessional sentiments affected the construction o f German national identity.

3

Historians traditionally asserted that Prussian and Protestant values strongly
influenced this identity. The Prussian (Protestant) victories over Catholic Austria and
France in 1866 and 1870-1871 confirmed for many Germans that Protestantism should
play the dominant role in the new nation-state. Consequently, earlier scholars often
assumed that German national identity was largely Protestant, and thus relatively little
research was conducted into the confessional nature o f national identity or how
Catholic sentiments affected the construction o f this identity. To be sure, Altgeld,
3 Kevin Cramer, “The Cult o f Gustavus Adolphus: Protestant Identity and German Nationalism,” in
Protestants, Catholics and Jews in Germany 1800-1914, eds. Chris Clark and Helmut Walser Smith
(New York: Berg, 2001), 97-121; Michael Gross, The War Against Catholicism: Liberal Identity and
the Anti-Catholic Imagination in Nineteenth Century Germany (Ann Arbor: University o f Michigan
Press, 2004); Roisin Healy, The Jesuit Specter in Imperial Germany (Boston: Brill, 2003); and Smith,
German Nationalism and Religious Conflict.
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Horst Griinder, Rudolf Lill, George W inded and others have addressed various aspects
o f Catholic attitudes towards the nation-state.4 However, none o f them analyzed in
detail how Catholics shaped and influenced the construction o f their own national
identity. Instead, these scholars have focused on how Catholics sought to fit into the
unified Empire, without really investigating how or to what extent Catholics helped
form a new national identity. M y work attempts to fill this scholarly void.
My analysis o f how Catholics in Baden viewed the commemorative discourse
surrounding the wars o f unification illuminates how these Catholics helped shape the
construction o f a German national identity. Building on Smith’s research, my work
reinforces the assertion that confessional sentiments constituted an important element
o f national identity. When Badenese Catholics and Protestants debated the nature o f
their identity, they often employed confessional terms. Confessional sentiments are a
key component of understanding the multifaceted nature o f German nationalism. My
research demonstrates that Catholics exercised a greater influence on the construction
o f national identity than previously thought. I contend that these Catholics
successfully challenged the Prussian-Protestant hegemony on the construction of
identity, suggesting the need for reevaluating Catholic effectiveness at infusing
national identity with their own version o f Germanness.

4 Wolfgang Altgeld, Katholizismus, Protestantismus, Judentum: Ober religids begrundete Gegensatze
und nationalreligiose Ideen in der Geschichte des deutschen Nationalismus (Mainz: MathiasGriinewald Verlag, 1992); Horst Griinder, “Nation und Katholizismus im Kaiserreich,” in
Katholizismus, nationaler Gedanke und Europa seit 1800 ed. Albrechet Langer (Paderbom: Ferdinand
Schoningh, 1985), 65-88; Rudolf Lill, “Die deutschen Katholiken und Bismarcks Reichsgrundung,” in
Reichsgrundung 1870/71: Tatsachen, Kontroversen, Interpretationen, eds. Ernst Duerlein and
Theodor Schieder (Stuttgart: Seewald, 1970), 345-366; and George Windell, The Catholics and
German Unity, 1866-1871 (Minneapolis: University o f Minnesota Press, 1954).
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Although scholars have long assumed that Germany was an incomplete nation
state in 1871, it is only during the last decade that historians have begun to understand
exactly how Germans negotiated local, regional, confessional, and social identities in
the postunification period.5 Alon Confmo and Celia Applegate have demonstrated the
importance o f Heimat as a vehicle for understanding how Germans cemented a
national identity, showing how veneration o f Heimat enabled Germans to interpret and
understand the “National.” Today, most historians subscribe to the notion that
Germans in the Second Empire did not abandon their local and regional identities as
Wurttembergers, Bavarians, or Badeners, but that they instead used these identities as
means o f becoming German. Simply put, one was a German because one was a
Badener. These sentiments were not exclusive but rather constituted central
components o f German identity. Although Prussia certainly played a dominant role
first in the unification process and subsequently in the Second Empire, this research
rejects the notion that an overarching Prussian identity subsumed other Germans o f the
Empire. Instead, while they were indeed loyal to the new nation-state and its

5 See for example: Celia Applegate, A Nation o f Provincials: The German Idea o f Heimat (Berkeley:
University o f California Press, 1990); John Breuilly, ed., The State o f Germany. The Nationallidea in
the Making, Unmaking, and Remaking o f a Modern Nation state (London: Longman, 1992); Alon
Confino, The Nation as a Local Metaphor: Wiirttemberg, Imperial Germany and National Memory,
1871-1918 (Chapel Hill: University o f North Carolina Press, 1997); Abigail Green, Fatherlands:
State-Building and Nationhood in Nineteenth-Century Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2001); James Retallack, ed., Saxony in German History: Culture, Society, and Politics, 18301933 (Ann Arbor: The University o f Michigan Press, 2000); and James J. Sheehan, “What is German
History? Reflections on the Role o f the Nation in German History and Historiography,” Journal o f
Modern History 53 (1981): 1-23.
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Emperor, Germans maintained elements o f their local and regional identities as vital
ingredients o f their new national identity.
Research on Heimat and other forms o f local and regional identity permits a
better understanding o f how Germans constructed their new national identity. What
has largely been missing from this picture is analysis o f how confessional sentiments
affected this process. Although Smith and others have enhanced our understanding of
how important religion was to the construction o f national identity, much work
remains to be done, especially concerning the Catholic experience o f the Second
Empire. To be sure, there is a voluminous literature on different aspects o f Catholic
life during the period. The works o f Blackboum, Sperber, Ronald Ross, and
Wolfgang Schieder have ensured that Catholics are no longer perceived simply as
passive and marginalized victims in the Empire.6 Despite these advances, however,
we still do not fully understand how Catholics located their identities within the newly
constructed Germany. Although Altgeld, Windell, Lill, and Griinder have enhanced
our understanding o f Catholic attitudes towards the nation-state, their work fails to
take into account some o f the newer approaches, especially how central confessional
aspects were to the creation o f national identity. While Griinder and Altgeld have
hinted that Catholics maintained a different type o f identity than Protestants, they have
not analyzed in detail exactly how Catholics constructed German identity nor how

6 See for example: Anderson, Windthorst: A Political Biography, Blackboum, Marpingen:
Apparitions o f the Virgin Mary in Nineteenth Century Germany, and Ross, The Failure o f Bismarck’s
Kulturkampf.
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successful Catholics were at maintaining their own identities in the postunification
period.
M y analysis o f public commemorations o f German unification as a vehicle for
understanding identity formation adds to a large body o f existing research. Over the
past two decades, scholars have addressed the importance o f public commemorations
to the construction o f identity, establishing that public ceremonies and
n

commemorative monuments were an important means o f helping construct identity.
Because Protestants in Baden had most o f the provincial economic and political
power, they controlled most o f the construction o f these monuments and the
ceremonies connected with them. Prominent local Protestants who often rejected the
Catholic interpretation o f their shared history comprised the majority o f members of
committees that organized and planned these events and monuments. Especially
during the first few years o f the Empire, and particularly during the Kulturkam pf most
o f these ceremonies and monuments contained a strong anti-Catholic message.

7 On this process in Germany, see for instance: Reinhard Alings, Monument und Nation. Das Bild vom
Nationalstaat im Medium Denkmal-zum Verhaltnis von Nation und Staat im deutschen Kaiserreich
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1996); Confino, The Nation as a Local Metaphor, Dieter Diiding, Peter
Friedemann, and Paul Munch, eds., Offentliche Festkultur. Politische Feste in Deutschland von der
Aufklarung bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg (Rheinbeck bei Hamburg: Rohwolt, 1988); Wolfgang Hardtwig,
“Der bezweifelte Patriotismus-nationale BewuBtsein und Denkmal 1786 bis 1933,” Geschichte in
Wissenschaft und Unterricht 44, (1993): 47-75; Reinhart Koselleck and Michael Jeismann, eds., Der
Politische Totenkult: Kriegerdenkmaler in der Moderne (Munich: FinkVerlag, 1994); Rudy Koshar,
From Monuments to Traces: Artifacts o f German Memory, 1870-1990 (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2000); Wilfrid Lipp, Natur, Geschichte, Denkmal: Zur Entstehung des
Denkmalbewufitsein der burgerlichen Gesellschaft (Frankfurt: Campus, 1987); Ute Schneider,
Politische Festkultur im 19. Jahrhundert: die Rheinprovinz von der franzosischen Zeit bis zum Ende
des Ersten Weltkrieges (1806-1918) (Essen: Klartext, 1995); and Charlotte Tacke, Denkmal im sozialen
Raum. Nationale Symbole in Deutschland und Frankreich im 19. Jahrhundert
(Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1995).
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Reflecting their interpretation o f recent history, Badenese Protestants employed a
commemorative discourse that labeled Catholics antinational and highlighted their
alleged opposition to unification. However, rather than accepting the Protestant
version o f national identity, Badenese Catholics challenged the ideological message
inherent in this discourse. They created an alternative commemorative discourse that
manifested their own version o f national identity by boycotting commemorative
events, by keeping their children home from school on days when events such as the
Battle o f Sedan were commemorated, by employing the press to debate the merits o f
these celebrations, and by using Catholic religious holidays and symbolism to
manifest their own view o f the German nation.
Baden constitutes a useful case study because it was the only state in Imperial
Germany with a Catholic majority governed by liberals and Protestants. I employ the
term “liberal” in this work to signify citizens who voted for liberal political parties. In
Baden, the National Liberal Party was the most dominant political force during the
Second Empire. Although the Fresinnige Party came into existence in 1881, it failed
to attract much support. Thus, the overwhelming majority o f liberals in Baden voted
for the National Liberal Party. These Germans generally supported policies
advocating economic development such as free trade and commerce, a decrease in the
power o f the Catholic Church, an emphasis on interconfessional education, and an
electoral franchise that privileged property owners at the expense o f the working class.
Although a minority in Baden, liberals controlled most o f the political and economic
power. The overwhelming majority o f them were Protestants, which meant that they
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were more often inclined to support a modernization o f society, particularly if it meant
a decrease in the power o f the Catholic Church. In the post-1871 period, most
Badenese Protestants also subscribed to the notion that Protestantism had been a
driving force in the process o f unification, which placed them in direct conflict with
the state’s Catholics. Moreover, the fact that the Protestant church was organized at
state levels meant that they regularly criticized Catholic loyalties to Rome, which they
considered anti-German. The less hierarchical formation o f the Protestant church also
meant that Badenese Protestants considered themselves more independent and
“modem” citizens. They alleged that the centralized structure o f the Catholic Church
mired the development o f a modem German society and prevented Catholics from
realizing their cultural, economic, and political potential. The Protestant milieu in
Baden was relatively homogeneous. The vast majority o f Protestants voted for the
national-liberals and generally supported liberal attacks on the Catholic Church.
Although Protestants in many other areas o f Germany sometimes divided over the
extent and severity o f the Kulturkam pf and other instances o f anti-Catholic actions, in
Baden, the Protestant camp remained quite unified in their anti-Catholic attitudes. To
be sure, there were differences within the Protestant community, but they were minor
compared to most other areas in Germany.

o

t

In Baden, Protestants overwhelmingly

supported the national-liberals, while only a small number voted conservative. The
Protestant loyalty to the National Liberal Party constitutes one o f the main reasons

8 Frank Michael Kuhlmann, “Protestantisches Milieu in Baden: Konfessionelle Vergesellschaftung und
Mentalitat im Umbmch zur Modeme,” in Religion im Kaiserreich, eds. Blaschke and Kuhlemann, 317349.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

10
why the party controlled most o f the political and economic power for the duration o f
the Second Empire, which frequently caused conflicts with the more conservative
Catholic part o f the population.
Baden’s often fiercely anti-Catholic state government frequently issued
discriminatory legislation aimed at excluding Catholics from the national community.
M y investigation into how Catholics negotiated these obstacles as they became
German helps illuminate how Catholics throughout the Second Empire were able to
maintain their traditional identities as part o f the new national consciousness. I argue
that Catholic integration into the Empire should not be viewed as a gradual
acquiescence to a dominant Protestant and Prussian identity, but rather that Catholics
instead were successful in maintaining large parts o f their pre-1871 identities. In the
same way that historians have illustrated how Germans were able to maintain many
different local and regional loyalties within their national identity, I contend that
Badenese Catholics preserved numerous layered identities as they became members of
the new nation-state. Rather than being subsumed into a new official national identity
that was based solely on Protestant and Prussian values, these Badeners preserved
class, local, regional, and religious loyalties while at the same time being devoted
German subjects.
Baden constitutes an ideal study o f how Catholics negotiated their national
identity not only because it had a Catholic majority and was governed by a liberal and
Protestant minority, but also because its location on the fringes o f the Empire enabled
Badeners to maintain a large part o f their regional identities in unified Germany.
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Badeners were keen to stress the important roles the state and its Grand Duke had
played in the unification process. They used this commemorative discourse to help
preserve their traditional identities while negotiating their new national identity. In
addition, the provincial conflict between church and state during the 1860s provided a
model for the national K ulturkam pf and its attempt to create a national identity along
confessional lines. The relationship between Catholics and Protestants was tense
throughout much o f the period o f this study, which provides insights into how the
confessional conflict affected the creation o f national identity.
The Badenese confessional camps were not, however, monolithic. The
Catholic community was not entirely cohesive, as evidenced during controversy
surrounding the declaration o f papal infallibility in 1870. Although I devote some
attention to the divisions within the Catholic Church, my investigation centers on the
Catholic community composed o f those who supported the doctrine o f infallibility in
1870, which the Protestants generally labeled ultramontane. These Catholics
identified closely with the Pope and the international structure o f the Catholic Church.
They were often conservative, staunch supporters o f the Center Party; especially
during the first few decades o f the Kaiserreich, they were predominantly farmers,
small artisans, and factory workers. They frequently attended church and were often
quite influenced by local clergy and Catholic intellectuals in their economic, cultural,
social, and political opinions. While the majority o f Baden was ultramontane, a
sizeable number o f so-called liberal Catholics lived there as well. They were
generally more successful politically and economically than the conservative Catholics
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and sometimes voted for the national-liberals. Although liberal Catholics exercised
some local political influence, particularly during the first two decades o f the Second
Empire, I focus on conservative Catholics, who constituted the majority o f the state’s
citizens. It should also be noted that most o f my subjects were part o f the educated
middle and upper classes. These Catholics, often local clergy and lay leaders, also
exercised a degree o f influence on the opinions o f lower class Catholics. Although I do
not subscribe to the frequent Protestant accusations that Catholic clergy controlled the
lives o f the members o f their congregations, it is clear that there was a certain degree
o f homogeneity to the conservative Catholic milieu. However, the Catholic voices that
emerge in this study belonged primarily to the educated upper and middle classes.
I have chosen Heidelberg, Konstanz, and Freiburg as case studies because they
represent a cross section of Badenese society that enables an analysis o f different
aspects o f Catholic life during the Second Empire. Both Konstanz and Freiburg are
located in the southern part o f the state, a stronghold o f pro-Austrian sentiments in the
period leading up to unification. Since the eleventh century, Konstanz had been one
o f the most powerful sites o f the Catholic Church in Central Europe. Although Rome
transferred much o f this power to Freiburg, which became the site o f the new
archdiocese in 1821, in the wake o f the territorial reorganizations at the Congress o f
Vienna, the Catholic Church remained powerful in Konstanz. The creation o f the
Freiburg Archdiocese transformed that city into a Catholic clerical stronghold. The
church’s position in these two cities meant that the local, largely Protestant, urban
elites struggled to wrestle power from the church as they strove to modernize the
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cities. Hence, the relationship between Catholics and Protestants was often very tense,
which affected the construction o f national identity. Konstanz and Freiburg shared
characteristics that distinguished them from Heidelberg in northern Baden, which had
a majority o f Protestants and had never been a Catholic stronghold. The relationship
between Catholics and Protestants there tended to be more amicable, which provides a
useful counterpoint to the conditions in the southern part o f the state. Furthermore,
there were more kleindeutsch supporters in Heidelberg than in the heavily
grossdeutsch southern part o f the state. Although they were among the largest cities in
the state, and therefore at the forefront o f political, cultural, and economic
developments, their histories were different enough to provide for useful comparisons.
During the late nineteenth century, there was much interaction among the
three cities. City councils in these three cities often discussed among themselves how
to commemorate unification. Although the cities did not celebrate every occasion
similarly, their communications still illustrate their cooperation in producing a
Badenese commemorative discourse. Moreover, Catholics in these cities often
conferred as they decided how to approach certain commemorations. Particularly with
the development o f a Catholic press, the level o f interaction between Catholics around
the state increased and aided them in their attempts to create a stronger statewide
Catholic community.
Although scholars have analyzed some aspects o f nineteenth- and twentiethcentury Badenese society, there still are gaps in the provincial historiography. In the
late 1970s, Gert Zang’s edited volume addressed the Catholic-Protestant relationship,
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the actions and attitudes o f liberal Catholics, and some o f the roots o f anticlerical
sentiments in Baden.9 Despite the fact that his and others’ work enhances our
understanding o f the relationship between conservative and liberal Catholics as well as
between Catholics and Protestants, none o f them have applied their theories to the
study o f confessional interaction during the process o f national identity formation.
Although Lothar Gall, Josef Becker, and Manfred Stadelhofer have published
valuable, if dated, studies on the Badenese Kulturkam pf and the National Liberal Party
in Baden, there is a need to apply new research tools to these topics.10 Oded
Heilbronner’s work on liberalism and the Catholic bourgeoisie in Baden and Ulrich
Baumann’s stimulating research on the relations between Christians and Jews during
the late nineteenth and the first part o f the twentieth century represent such attempts.11
Two other relatively recent works that incorporate newer methods o f analysis are
Irmtraud Gotz von Olenhusen’s study o f the deviant behavior o f Catholic priests in the

9 Gert Zang, ed., Provinzialisierung einer Region: regionale Unterentwicklung und liberale Politik in
der Stadt und im Kreis Konstanz im 19. Jahrhunderts (Frankfurt: Syndikat, 1978).
10 Josef Becker, Liberaler Staat und Kirche in der Ara von Reichsgrundung und Kulturkampf (Mainz:
Matthias-Griinewald Verlag, 1973); Lothar Gall, D er Liberalismus als regierende Partei. Das
Grofiherzogtum Baden zwischen Restauration und Reichsgrundung (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag,
1968); idem, “Die Partei und Sozialgeschichtliche Problematik des badischen Kulturkampfes,”
Zeitschrift fur die Geschichte Oberrheins 113 (1965): 151-196; and Manfred Stadelhofer, Der Abbau
der Kulturkampfgesetzgebung im Grossherzogtum Baden 1878-1918 (Mainz: Matthias Griinewald
Verlag, 1969). Becker’s view o f the Kulturkampf as a political tool that national liberals used to curtail
the Catholic Church is a good example o f this slightly outdated treatment o f this period.
11 Ulrich Baumann, “The Development and Destruction o f a Social Institution: Flow Jews, Catholics
and Protestants Lived Together in Rural Baden, 1862-1940,” in Clark and Smith, Protestants, Catholics
and Jews, 297-315; Oded Heilbronner, “In Search o f the Catholic (Rural) Bourgeoisie: The
Peculiarities o f the South German Burgertum,” Central European History 29 (1996): 175-201.
Heilbronner., Catholicism, Political Culture, and the Countryside: A Social History o f the Nazi Party
in South Germany (Ann Arbor: The University o f Michigan Press, 1998) constitutes another useful
study, but it is outside the immediate scope o f my work.
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Freiburg Archdiocese and Winfried Haider’s work on Catholic associations in Baden
and Wiirttemberg.12 Haider’s study o f Catholic associational life provides useful
insights into the Catholic embrace o f modernity as well as how associations helped
create a stronger, more cohesive Catholic community. Olenhusen’s study challenges
us to reevaluate our view o f the Catholic clergy, but it has relatively little relevance to
the national identity o f Catholics. Last, Dagmar Herzog’s fascinating study on the
nature o f Badenese religious politics during the 1840s, despite its insights into the
relationship between Protestants, Catholics, and Jews and the split between liberal and
conservative Catholics, is outside the scope o f m y work.

1^

None o f these scholars has,

however, looked specifically at the experiences o f Badenese Catholics as they
negotiated a complex web of loyalties during the Second Empire. Much o f the
historiography o f Baden during the Kaiserreich still needs revision. My work
attempts to fill this lacuna.
I employ the concept o f collective memory as an analytical tool to understand
better the construction o f Catholic and Protestant identities during the Second
Empire.14 Assessing how Catholics and Protestants formed different collective

12 Irmtraud Gotz von Olenhusen, Klerus und abweichendes Verhalten (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck &
Ruprecht, 1994); Winfried Haider, Katholische Vereine in Baden und Wiirttemberg 1848-1914. Ein
Beitrag zur Organisationsgeschichte des sudwestdeutschen Katholizismus im Rahmen der Entstehung
der modernen Industriegesellschaft (Paderbom: Ferdinand Schoningh, 1995).
13 Dagmar Herzog, Intimacy and Exclusion: Religious Politics in Pre-Revolutionary Baden (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1996).
14 The literature on collective memory is vast. See for example: Alon Confino and Peter Fritzsche,
eds., Work o f Memory: New Directions in the Study o f German Society and Culture (Urbana:
University o f Illinois Press, 2002); Paul Connerton, How Societies Remember (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1989); John Gillis, ed., Commemorations: The Politics o f National Identity
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Maurice Halbwachs, The Collective Memory (New
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memories o f the unification and how these memories interacted with and influenced
each other will allow a deeper understanding o f the creation o f national identity.
Because collective memory enables individuals to remember events in which they
themselves did not take part, it aids them when constructing an identity. However,
what emerges in the analysis o f Catholic attitudes towards the commemorations o f the
unification is that Protestants and Catholics created different collective memories o f
these events. Moreover, collective memory can also be applied to understand how
Badenese Catholics adapted to the new national identity. When they constructed an
alternative commemorative discourse to the wars o f unification, they were also
creating a collective memory that reflected their own identities. This collective
memory, which differed from the Protestant one, enabled these Catholics to infuse the
new national identity with many familiar elements, which made it easier to accept.
This discussion also suggests that Catholics were quite successful at creating
and maintaining a collective memory o f the unification that differed from the
Protestant one. Pierre Nora was the first scholar to point out that collective memories
function in different ways; place a memory in a different context, and it will assume a
different shape.15 Because different groups create memories o f events that reflect their
social, cultural, political, and economic status, it is vital to consider the contexts in
which these memories were constructed. Catholic memories were created in a
York: Oxford University Press, 1980); Eric Hobsbawn and Terence Ranger, eds., The Invention o f
Tradition (Cambridge: Verso, 1983); and Pierre Nora, ed., Realms o f Memory: The Construction o f
the French Past, translated by Arthur Goldhammer, 3 volumes (New York: Columbia University Press,
1995-1997).
15 Nora, Realms o f Memory, 28.
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different milieu than the Protestant ones, and therefore the two often contained
different components. Consequently, for the most part o f the Second Empire, these
collective memories and identities reflected different notions about what it meant to be
German. This suggests that the German nation should be viewed as a contested
discourse where these memories interacted with and influenced each other.
One o f the key reasons why the Protestant and Catholic versions o f national
identity were so different is their contrasting memories o f events o f the nineteenth
century. Especially in Baden, which had for many years witnessed a fierce struggle
between church and state, Protestants and Catholics nourished different memories o f
the last few decades prior to unification. Protestants based much o f their new national
identity on the notion that their faith was one o f the main reasons why Germany had
been able to unify and was now ready to assume one o f the most powerful positions in
Europe. Thus, Protestant historical memories and identities enabled a positive outlook
on both the past and the future. O f course, a large part o f this identity was invented. It
is now well accepted that “invention” plays a large part in the creation o f collective
memories and identities.16 Until 1866, Badenese Protestants had opposed Prussian
Minister Otto von Bismarck and Prussia’s policies almost as strongly as their Catholic
counterparts. In the Austro-Prussian war o f 1866, Badenese Protestants sided with
Austria, which they conveniently forgot in the postunification representations o f the
past. On the other hand, Catholics nourished different memories. In part due to the
fierce struggle between the church and state in Baden during the 1860s, Catholics had

16 The seminal work on this topic is Hobsbawn and Ranger, eds., The Invention o f Tradition.
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a very different and much more negative set o f memories of the years leading up to the
unification. The vast majority o f Catholics had long been strongly pro-Austrian,
which complicated their acceptance o f the new nation-state. Finally, the fact that
Catholics now were in a minority increased their fears about the unified Empire.
Thus, it was difficult for Catholics and Protestants to use these experiences and
memories o f the recent past to construct a cohesive national identity. Instead, the
differing memories o f the decades leading up to unification ensured that the two
confessions used the wars o f unification to construct and strengthen their own views of
German national identity.
Throughout the Second Empire, these memories and identities coexisted and
clashed with each other, sometimes resulting in their renegotiation. Hence, it is
crucial to consider Catholic and Protestant identities in conjunction with each other.
They did not exist in a vacuum but rather interacted with each other, which created a
different set o f circumstances at different points throughout the Empire. Major events
such as the K ulturkam pf shifts in political power, the turn to colonialism, and an
aggressive foreign policy all triggered a reevaluation o f collective memories and
identities, reflecting the fluidity and instability o f their construction. Although
towards the end o f the nineteenth century there were fewer public Catholic-Protestant
disagreements about what constituted Germanness, this did not mean that they had
reached a consensus on their national identity. Neither Protestants nor Catholics were
able to convince the other o f the correct view o f the nation. Because o f this fact, it is
to some extent misleading to speak about integration into the Empire. The term
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“integration” suggests that the different versions o f Germanness, whether Catholic or
Protestant, somehow melted with the other one, which is to misunderstand this
process. Instead, by the 1890s, Catholics and Protestants had negotiated an agreement
that, though they shared certain elements o f their identity that made them all German,
revealed there were still many differences between how a Protestant and a Catholic
defined Germanness.
These sentiments also serve to reinforce some o f the latest research that has
been conducted on the German life in the Second Empire. Following the lead o f
Smith, scholars have begun to view the interaction among different confessional
groups as central to a clearer understanding o f how Germans shaped their identity.
They have moved away from the traditional model o f analyzing confessional groups
separately, with rewarding results as they have shown that the interaction between the
different confessions significantly shaped the experience o f the other.
M y work builds on theirs, though I do not look specifically at the Protestant
experience in Baden during the Kaiserreich. However, analysis o f how Catholics
reacted to the Protestant-dominated official discourse that surrounded unification
provides insight into how Catholics used the Protestant Other to shape their own
identities. Indeed, one o f the most important means for Catholics to manifest their
own identities was the use o f a Protestant Other. After analyzing the Protestant
version o f Germanness, Badenese Catholics most often presented themselves as the
opposite o f everything Protestant. By labeling Protestants materialistic and accusing
them o f using nationalism to gain political and economic power, Catholics asserted
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their own better understanding o f patriotism. Commemorations frequently constituted
opportunities for Catholics to employ the Protestant version o f nationalism to create
their own. Naturally, these Catholics were not always fair in what they attributed to
the Protestant version o f Germanness, but the content o f this interaction is not as
important as the interaction itself. After all, Protestants employed similar tactics with
their accusations o f how Catholics were ready to abandon Emperor Wilhelm for the
Pope or how Jesuits were poisoning the German national character. The point here is
not so much what was attributed to each confession but rather the interaction between
the two.
Catholic distrust o f the Second Empire was not solely due to conflicting
memories o f unification. Catholics were less convinced about the absolute value o f
the nation-state than their Protestant counterparts. Large parts o f their identities were
tied into concepts such as kinship, region, religion, and religious community, all of
which predated the nation-state.17 Catholic loyalty to the Pope exemplifies these
sentiments. Catholics insisted on maintaining strong loyalties to the Pope in the new
nation-state, showing great concern for his well-being, especially in the tumultuous
few years following his ousting from Rome in 1870. Although Protestants often used
Catholic allegiances to the Pope as “p ro o f’ o f the Catholic anti-German feelings, they
misinterpreted these sentiments. Protestants rejected the notion that Catholic loyalty
to the Pope and loyalty to their nation-state were not exclusive emotions but rather
complementary. Catholics believed it was indeed possible for them to be fiercely

17 Smith, Nationalism and Religious Conflict, 61.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

21
loyal to the Pope while at the same time having the same sentiments for Emperor
Wilhelm. Although Protestants were intent on removing these loyalties from the
national identity, my research demonstrates that they were unable to do so. Instead,
Catholics maintained these loyalties as part o f their new national identity. This
example o f the different composition o f Catholic and Protestant identities helps
explain why it was difficult for the two to agree on what constituted Germanness.
I view the German nation as a cultural construct. Although a national
community is based on material-historical realities, the bonds among its members are
'

1o

largely imagined, as Benedict Anderson has pointed out.

Thus, to quote Smith, “a

nation is primarily a matter o f culture.” 19 To be sure, culture does not exist in a
vacuum, and political developments certainly affect cultural identities. However,
cultural features o f a nation are in many instances more important for identity
formation than political ones, which has important implications for how Germans
created their identities. Although access to power is crucial in ensuring the
construction o f a particular type o f national identity, the success o f politically
disadvantaged groups such as Catholics to manifest their own sense o f identity should
not be underestimated. Many scholars have assumed that because Protestants
possessed most o f the political and economic power in the Kaiserreich, they were able
to impose their view o f national identity on the Catholics. Closer examination o f the
process o f constructing identities, however, makes it evident that Badenese Catholics
18 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread o f Nationalism
(London: Verso, 1991), 6-7.
19 Smith, Nationalism and Religious Conflict, 7.
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were successful in preserving and manifesting their identities despite political and
economical disadvantages during the first two decades o f the Second Empire. They
used various means, among them the press and associational organizations, to combat
the Protestant version o f recent history that was so important to the construction of
identity. That so many o f these activities occurred in the cultural realm suggests that
cultural activities were instrumental in the Catholic construction o f national identity.
Scholars have traditionally viewed nationalism primarily as a political force,
which proclaimed that groups that share certain common bonds such as culture,
language, history, and territory should have a right to govern themselves. Emphasis
on cultural elements o f nationalism illustrates that it could at times be a divisive force
rather than a unifying one. To be sure, most Catholics and Protestants in Baden
accepted the creation o f the new nation-state and were unfailingly loyal to Emperor
Wilhelm I. Thus, in a purely political sense, they shared a limited kind o f German
nationalism. Analysis on the cultural effects o f German nationalism, however,
produces a more variegated picture o f its effect on Germans. Because Catholics and
Protestants viewed the composition o f their German nation differently, they employed
nationalism differently. Especially during the first couple o f decades o f the
Kaiserreich, Protestants and Catholics used nationalism to propagate their own view
o f the nation, which often differed from their confessional counterpart. Their actions
reflect the use o f nationalism by different societal groups to serve their own ends,
which sometimes conflicted with others. What emerges from such an analysis is a
multifaceted picture o f nationalism that helps explain how it sometimes unified while
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at other times divided the nation. Too often, German nationalism has been interpreted
as a homogenizing force that made society more cohesive.20 In fact, it makes more
sense to consider German nationalism a space o f conflict where Protestant and
Catholic versions o f Germanness clashed and interacted with each other. The creation
o f a German national identity was not smooth; instead, it was filled with different
components where Catholics and Protestants tried to find space for their respective
versions o f Germanness.
This insight also calls for a reevaluation o f how nationalism worked at the
local level. To be sure, nationalism in the Second Empire served as a unifying force,
but perhaps not to the degree previously assumed. My research in Baden indicates
that in many instances, nationalism preserved and sometimes even intensified alreadyexisting conflicts. Because Baden experienced a very fierce Kulturkam pf during the
1860s, it strained the relationship between Catholics and Protestants. The first few
years o f the Empire witnessed an intense focus on strengthening national identity
through various commemorative efforts, and it was against this backdrop o f a fixation
on national sentiments that Catholics and Protestants negotiated their place in the
Second Empire. Hence, the nationalist vocabulary that had been popularized during
the Franco-Prussian War and the first few months o f the Empire served as new tools
that both Catholics and Protestants in Baden used to conduct their struggles.

20 The classic statement here is Wolfgang Sauer, “Das Problem des deutschen Nationalstaates,” in
Moderne deutsche Sozialgeschichte, ed. Hans Ulrich Wehler (Koln: Kipenhauer & Witsch, 1966),
407-436. Although he notes that different societal groups could employ nationalism for different ends,
Anderson’s work assumes that nationalism served to make societies more cohesive.
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Not until the late 1890s did nationalism and national sentiments in Baden
begin to serve as more o f a unifying force for all residents. During the 1890s, the
political and cultural climate in the Kaiserreich and Baden began to change, causing a
transformation in how Catholics and Protestants used nationalism. As local and
national Catholics grew more politically, culturally, and economically powerful, they
began to support German colonialism and a military build-up, thus establishing
Catholics as more “trustworthy” in Protestant eyes. The growing power o f Catholic
associations and the slow but steady inroads that Catholics made into the cultural and
economic arenas forced Protestants to broaden their notions o f the nature of
Germanness. In addition, the ever more hostile European diplomatic climate after the
turn o f the century resulted in a gradual shift where nationalism became ever more
exclusive. Because o f these facts, Catholics and Protestants were more in agreement
on how to use nationalism— to strengthen Germany in the face o f some o f the
challenges they faced on the European diplomatic and military scene. O f course, this
did not mean that the two confessions were in complete agreement on what constituted
the German nation. However, it did mean that they had reached an uneasy agreement
that although they constituted different kinds o f Germans, nationalist sentiments were
used to battle external enemies rather than internal ones. To be sure, there still existed
many instances o f religious conflict, but these instances were not as frequent as they
had been during the first two decades o f the Kaiserreich.
Because German nationalism was often a divisive rather than a unifying force,
m y work illustrates the need to examine further the effects o f the Kulturkam pf on the
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creation o f German national identity. While most scholars now agree that the
Kulturkam pf ultimately failed, and indeed actually strengthened the Catholic
community, a better understanding o f how the Kulturkam pf affected the creation o f
German national identity is still needed.21 Although the Kulturkam pf was in part an
attempt to create a more homogeneous national culture, it actually divided the German
nation rather than unifying it.
M y analysis o f Sedan Day, which in Baden served as a vehicle to promote the
Kulturkam pf illustrates how Badenese Catholics used opposition to this holiday to
fight anti-Catholic legislation as well as to construct their own version o f national
identity. The initiating o f Sedan Day coincided with some o f the fiercest aspects o f
the Kulturkam pf and both Catholics and Protestants in Baden viewed it as a means o f
anti-Catholic agitation. Confmo and others have documented how national-liberals
and Protestants failed in their attempt to use Sedan Day as a unifying vehicle, but
scholars have neglected to consider fully how important confessional attitudes were to
the demise o f this holiday.22 During the debates over the meaning o f this celebration,
especially during the first few years o f the Empire, Catholics argued that the
ideological message o f Sedan Day celebrations was intended to exclude Catholics
from the national community. Catholics often cited Kulturkampf \eg\s\at\on, which
they argued aimed at eliminating Catholic influence in the new nation-state. By using

21 See Ross, The Failure o f Bism arck’s Kulturkampf.
22 Confino, The Nation as a Local Metaphor, 27-51. An important exception is Claudia Lepp,
“Protestanten feiem ihre Nation-Die kulturprotestantsichen Urspiinge des Sedantages,” Historische
Jahrbuch 118 (1998): 201-222.
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the nationalist rhetoric popularized during the Franco-Prussian W ar and its various
commemorations, Catholics were able to oppose not only the commemorative
discourse but also the injustices o f the Kulturkam pf laws. Furthermore, the failure o f
the Kulturkam pf and the fact that the Sedan Day celebrations did not resonate well
with the population both strengthened Catholics in their attempts to infuse German
national identity with their own sentiments. As a result, the K ulturkam pf and more
specifically the nationalist rhetoric used in the conflict, served as a divisive force
rather than a unifying one. Although scholars have analyzed many aspects o f the
Kulturkam pf the divisive effect that it had on German national identity still remains
relatively unexplored, and my work attempts to fill part o f this void.
M y analysis also encourages closer examination o f how Catholics embraced
various aspects o f modernity. Although work has been done to revise the traditional
view o f Catholics as backward and anti modem, many historians still consider them to
have lagged behind other Germans in their acceptance o f modernity.23 My research
highlights Catholic employment o f many features associated with a modem society
such as associations and the press, thus casting doubt on their “backwardness.”
Badenese Catholics became adept at using the press to strengthen their community,
both before and after unification. They long utilized newspapers not only to report on
political developments, commemorations, and other important events, but they also
used them to ensure that Catholics throughout Germany were aware o f any injustice to
23 For a good discussion o f this literature, see Oded Heilbronner, “From Ghetto to Ghetto: The Place of
German Catholic Society in Recent Flistoriography,” Journal o f Modern History 72 (2000): 453-495.
Haider’s work on Catholic associations in Baden and Wurttemberg illustrates some o f the modern ways
that Catholics used these associations.
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Catholics in Baden. This was especially important during the Kulturkampf, where
Catholics in one location could read about the poor treatment o f Catholics elsewhere,
and it served to strengthen their sense o f community.
Catholic awareness o f the importance o f the public sphere also casts doubts on
their allegedly anti modem attitudes. In anticipation o f the twenty-fifth anniversary o f
Pope Pius IX ’s election as Pope in June 1871, Catholic papers around the state were
keen to inform their readership that they needed to take control o f the streets on June
16. This very powerful political manifestation also served as an exercise in nation
building, and it provides further illustration that Catholics were not only reactionary.
Moreover, Catholic embrace o f selected elements o f modernity also corroborates their
ability to manifest their collective identities publicly. Their determination to control
the public sphere, their use o f the press, and the growing influence o f their various
associations all served as important means to influence the construction o f national
identity.
Over the course o f the late nineteenth century, Catholics straggled with
Protestants in Baden over what constituted their shared German national identity.
Despite political and economical disadvantages, including an often fiercely antiCatholic public sphere, Badenese Catholics influenced the construction o f their
national identity through the application o f familiar loyalties to region and religion to
the Protestant version o f Germanness. The following chapters analyze exactly how
Catholics constructed an alternative commemorative discourse o f unification and how
this discourse enabled them to manifest their version o f German national identity.
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CHAPTER 2
SETTING THE STAGE: THE CREATION OF A “LIBERALES MUSTERLAND”

W ith unification in 1871, Badenese Catholics, the majority o f whom had
supported the grossdeutsch solution to the German question, confronted the difficult
prospect o f integration into a nation-state largely constructed on Protestant and
Prussian values. Rather than being subsumed by the official national identity,
Catholics developed their own interpretation o f Germanness based upon a past that
differed considerably from the Protestant-Prussian teleological view o f the process of
unification. Most Catholics imagined a different Germany than that offered by the
official nationalist discourse, one more rooted in past traditions and memories than in
promises o f future glory. They criticized official commemorations, pointing out that
such ceremonies did not properly acknowledge “their own past.” By offering their
own interpretation o f history, they indicated that their identities were rooted in
different traditions, customs, memories, and histories. In so doing, they questioned
and criticized the official picture o f the new German nation-state.1
In the ongoing debates over the value and meaning o f monuments and public
cerem onies, B adenese C atholics rep eated ly referred to their ancient religious heritage

and culture, which had long served as the basis o f their identity. By stressing

1 See, for instance, Freie Stimme, March 15 and June 6, 1872.
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the old cultural and religious components o f their identities, they tried to reinforce the
compatible nature o f Catholicism and Germanness, and they proudly embraced a
German identity that emphasized the value o f their confession.

These ideas bolstered

the political and cultural legitimacy o f other forms o f identity that had been prevalent
prior to the nation-state, such as region and religious community, which Catholics
considered timeless and much too valuable to forsake.
Baden constituted something o f an anomaly among the states comprising the
Second Empire. Although Catholics made up two-thirds o f the state’s population,
liberals, whose political program to a large extent focused on reducing the power of
the Catholic Church, governed Baden. Intense church-state conflict characterized the
decade following the unification o f Germany in 1871. Baden constituted a state that
conducted one o f the fiercest Kulturkdmpfe in Central Europe. Although relations
between them improved slightly towards the end o f the nineteenth century, the
struggle between the liberal state and the Church dominated much o f Badenese society
during the Second Empire. When Baden entered the Kaiserreich, it did so with a
powerful National Liberal Party, but also with a Catholic population growing
increasingly determined to maintain its identity despite a fervent Kulturkam pf that was
partly aimed at consolidating the German national identity along confessional lines.
Because o f the particular status o f Baden in the Second Empire and the
2 Smith, German Nationalism and Religious Conflict, 61. A substantial literature offers a general
treatment o f Catholic attitudes towards the German national state. See Altgeld, Katholizismus,
Protestantismus, Judentum; Lill, “Die deutschen Katholiken und Bismarcks Reichsgriindung”; Griinder,
“Nation und Katholizismus im Kaiserreich”; Rudolf Morsey, Die deutschen Katholiken und der
Nationalstaat zwischen Kulturkampf und Ersten Weltkrieg,” Historisches Jahrbuch 90 (1970): 31-64;
and Windell, The Catholics and German Unity.
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importance o f its history to the Catholic population, it is necessary to identify the
major historical developments o f the Grand Duchy during the nineteenth century.
This overview will facilitate a better understanding o f the choices that Badenese
Catholics made when faced with a complex web o f old and new identities in the post1871 period.

The Creation and Consolidation of the Grand Duchy, 1806-1848
The consolidation o f the future Grand Duchy o f Baden began in 1771 when
Margrave Karl Friedrich o f Baden-Baden incorporated the Duchy o f Baden-Durlach
into his own territories. Before the French Revolution, Karl Friedrich, inspired by
enlightened absolutist rulers Maria Theresa and Joseph II in Austria, initiated reform.
Labeling him self an “enlightened despot,” he attempted to modernize agriculture,
improve education, and create religious toleration.3 Because o f the scope o f these
reforms, the political and social changes that accompanied the French Revolution
served more as an intensification o f innovations already underway in the Duchy than a
sudden break with the past. Even before the dismantling of ancien regimes elsewhere,
the southwestern comer o f Germany had established the foundations o f a strong liberal
tradition.
The Grand Duchy came into existence largely due to Karl Friedrich’s
opportunistic alliance with Napoleon. The Margrave was fortunate to have as his

3 Willy Andreas, “Badische Politik unter Karl Friedrich,” Zeitschrift fur die Geschichte des Oberrheins
26(1911): 415-445.
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main advisor Sigismund von Reitzenstein, an ambitious and well-respected diplomat
whose policies were based on the understanding that Karl Friedrich could not afford to
challenge the French. Because Reitzenstein conducted all negotiations with France,
occasionally agreeing to conditions without prior approval o f the Margrave, historians
have labeled him the founder o f Baden.4
Karl Friedrich profited mightily from the secularization that followed the
Reichdeputationshauptschluss o f 1803. To compensate for territories lost to France
after the peace at Luneville in 1801, Napoleon secularized various church lands,
abolished monasteries, and transferred religious property from the Catholic Church to
the Margrave, who was subsequently elevated to Elector in 1803.5 These events were
difficult to accept for the Church, which had already been under attack for the
previous few decades, beginning with the religious reforms o f Joseph II.6 The
Reichdeputationshauptschluss constituted a dramatic dismantling o f a long-existing
societal order. Before 1803, most bishops, as well as other members o f the high

4 Franz Schnabel, Sigismund von Reitzenstein. Der Begrunder des Badischen Staates (Heidelberg:
Homing, 1927).
5Lothar Gall, “Griindung und politische Entwicklung des GroBherzogtums bis 1848,” in Badische
Geschichte. Vom Grofiherzogtum bis zur Gegenwart, ed. Landeszentrale fur Politische Bildung BadenWiirttemberg (Stuttgart: Theiss, 1979), 14-20; Wolfgang Hug, Geschichte Badens (Stuttgart: Theiss,
1992), 194-199; Hansmartin Schwarzmeier, ed., Handbuch der Baden-Wurttembergischen Geschichte.
Dritter Band. Vom Ende des alten Reiches bis zum Ende der Monarchien (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1992),
27-29; Karl Stiefel, Baden 1648-1952, Volume I (Karlsruhe: Badische Neueste Nachrichen
Badendruck, 1978), 50-56.
6 Peter Hersche, “Der osterreichische Spatjansenismus,” in Katholische Aufklarung und Josefmismus,
ed. Elisabeth Kovacs (Munchen: Oldenbourg, 1979), 180-193; Charles Ingrao, The Habsburg
Monarchy 1618-1815 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Eduard Winter, Der
Josephinismus. Die Geschichte des osterreichischen Reformkatholizismus 1740-1848 (Berlin: Riitten
und Loening, 1962).
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clergy, had not only been religious leaders but sovereigns as well. In addition, one o f
the most vital functions o f the Church and its agents had been to serve as the backbone
o f the educational system, and their dismissal triggered angry responses from both
clergy and laity. Thus, many communities were deprived o f the financial and social
stability that monasteries had provided.7 To complete the process o f secularization, in
1807, the newly formed Badenese government issued an edict that regulated the
relationship between state and church. It reflected the new circumstances as the state
established firm control over most o f the activities o f the Catholic Church. Among
other provisions, it determined that clergy were considered employees o f the state,
o

which always gave precedence to civil over canonical law.
The final territorial consolidation o f the Badenese lands took place after the
Treaty o f Pressburg in 1805, when Napoleon transferred ownership o f the Breisgau
region from the Habsburgs to Karl Friedrich to reward his loyalty during recent wars.
In 1806, the electorate was transformed into a Grand Duchy and incorporated in the
Rhineland Confederation, where it served as a buffer between France and the
Habsburg Monarchy. Napoleon elevated the Margrave to Grand Duke. A major
beneficiary o f the Napoleonic reorganization o f Europe, Karl Friedrich extended his
territory from 3,900 to 14,000 square kilometers and increased its population from

7 Two very detailed accounts o f this process are Hermann Lauer, Geschichte der katholischen Kirche im
Grofiherzogtum Baden. Von der Grundung des Grofiherzogtums bis zur Gegenwart (Freiburg: Herder,
1927), 12-38; Heinrich Maas, Geschichte der katholischen Kirche im Grofiherzogtum Baden. Mit
besonderer Beruucksichitigung der Regierungszeit Hermann von Vicari (Freiburg: Herder, 1891), 1-7.
8 Lauer, Geschichte der katholischen Kirche im Grofiherzogtum Baden, 78-81.
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some 165,000 to 900,000 people between 1796 and 1806.9
Comprising different types o f territories such as feudal fiefs, small states,
independent cities, and religious domains, most o f which had no or few previous ties
to each other, the Grand Duchy was initially plagued by grave internal tensions. To
many, the recent drastic political, religious, and social changes constituted an
unpopular and traumatic break with the past. This aversion stemmed both from the
fact that they suddenly had a new ruler and from the taxes that Karl Friedrich collected
and passed on to Paris. More importantly, the new Grand Duke had agreed to supply
Napoleon with troops if needed. Consequently, in 1812, about 7,000 Badenese
soldiers participated in the attack on Russia, o f whom only some 100 returned.10
The fact that many o f the new subjects were hostile towards the new state was
o f immense importance for Baden’s future development. Because the Grand Duchy
contained a variety o f people with different traditions, histories, and pasts, there was a
need for some means o f integration. Both Karl Friedrich and his son Karl, who
succeeded him in 1811, were ahead o f their time in recognizing the need for statesponsored nondynastic means o f integration. A new generation o f liberal public
officials who had been educated in the spirit o f the Enlightenment spearheaded these
ideas. M any were convinced that a reorganization o f the state administration would
dissolve old loyalties and cement a new common identity. Although they launched
9 Hug, Geschichte Badens, 199; Marion Wierichs, Napoleon und das “dritte Deutschland. ” Die
Entstehung der Grofiherzogtiimer Baden, Berg und Hessen (Frankfurt: Lang, 1978), 175-177.
10 Martin Glaser, “Die Badische Politik und die deutsche Frage zur Zeit der Befreiungskriege und des
Wiener Kongress,” Zeitschriftfur die Geschichte des Oberrheins 43 (1928): 268-317.
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two separate attempts, in 1803 and 1809, they were unable to increase people’s sense
o f identification with the new Grand Duchy.11
Thanks to a secret treaty with the Habsburgs in 1813, Karl received a
guarantee that if he deserted his French ally, his territories would remain intact.
However, after a timely switching o f sides immediately after the battle o f Leipzig in
1813, Baden still faced heavy pressure from Austria and Bavaria, both o f which
wanted the return o f lost territories. Even after the post-Napoleonic Congress of
Vienna had confirmed Baden’s borders in 1815, the Badenese state remained in flux.
Grand Duke Karl had no male heir, and both the Habsburgs and Bavarians watched
closely to see how the question o f legitimacy would unfold.

19

Still facing the threat of

disloyal subjects, especially in the Breisgau, the Grand Duke began considering the
demands for constitutional reform in a more favorable light.
Signed by Grand Duke Karl on August 22, 1818, the Badenese constitution
was celebrated by contemporaries as the most liberal one in Central Europe, though it
still provided for a political system closer to enlightened absolutism than to a modem
democracy. Many Germans had already begun to refer to the Grand Duchy as
“liberales M usterland,” and for most o f the nineteenth century, Baden remained at the
•

forefront o f the German liberal movement.

IT

The constitution granted citizens certain

11 W illy Andreas, “Friedrich Brauer und die Entstehung des ersten badischen Organisationsediktes vom

4. Febraar 1803,” Zeitschriftfur die Geschichte des Oberrheins 24 (1909): 628-672; idem, “Zur
Beurteilung der badischen Verwaltungsorganisation vom 26. November 1809 und ihre Weiterbildung,”
Zeitschrift fu r die Geschichte des Oberrheins 25 (1910): 308-332.
12 Glaser, “Die Badische Politik,” 306-312.
13 Gall, Der Liberalismus als regierende Partei, xi-xii.
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inalienable rights, including equality before the law, freedom o f press, religion, and
profession. Restrictions applied to many o f these freedoms, however, which
significantly reduced their value. The constitution confirmed Baden as a monarchy,
with all powers invested in the Grand Duke, who would use them according to the
constitution. An upper and lower house (or first and second chamber) constituted the
representative part o f government. A limited franchise allowed for representatives to
be elected to the second chamber. Voting citizens had to be over twenty-five years o f
age and possess either a public office or Biirgerrecht. Consequently, in 1819, only
about seventeen percent o f the population passed the franchise restrictions. The first
chamber primarily consisted o f members o f the nobility and clergy who had been
given seats by the Grand Duke. This system ensured that the ruling strata could
employ the first chamber as a check on the power o f the “popularly” elected second
chamber.14
The constitution proved to be a success in consolidating a common Badenese
identity. Many historians have labeled the 1820s as the decade when Badeners
discovered something resembling national consciousness. The liberal Karl von
Rotteck spoke for many when he stated that the constitution was Baden’s birth
certificate.15 Consequently, already at an early stage in the nineteenth century, many
Badeners constructed their identities around notions o f liberalism and progress that

14 For detailed descriptions o f the Badenese constitution, see Hans Fenske, Der liberate Sudwesten
(Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1981), 40-42; Stiefel, Baden 1648-1952, Volume I, 237-264.
15 Hug, Geschichte Badens, 212
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were reinforced both by themselves as well as other Germans.
Taking advantage o f increased opportunities to influence the political process,
a new generation o f liberals led by Theodor Welcker, Karl von Rotteck, and Johann
Adam von Itzenstein emerged in the early 1830s. Many o f them were tied closely to
the rising fortunes o f the bourgeoisie and placed most o f their efforts on providing
more ample conditions for industrialization. Simultaneously, more radical liberal
leaders such as Friedrich Hecker and Gustav Struve appeared on the political scene,
demanding a quicker, more radical approach to the modernizing project, complete
with demands for social and economic reform.16 During much o f the 1840s, the
liberal camp was engulfed in conflicts between moderates and radicals, and after 1845,
they were informally split into two separate factions. The latter argued for a more
confrontational approach towards the Grand Duke and his ministers, whereas the
former advocated limited cooperation as the best way o f achieving reform. Hecker
and Struve led the radical faction while Friedrich Bassermann and Karl Mathy
spearheaded the constitutional, or moderate, liberals.17
While political life stabilized rather quickly during the pre-March period, it

16 Fenske, “Baden 1830 bis 1860,” in Handbuch der Baden-Wiirttembergischen Geschichte, ed.
Schwarzmeier, 83-88. For biographical information on some o f Baden’s leading politicians in the preMarch period, see Franz Dor, Freiherr Hinrich Bernhard von Andlaw, ein badischer Politiker und
Vorkampfer des Katholizismus (Freiburg: Herder, 1910); idem., Franz Joseph Ritter von Bufi, in
seinem Leben und Wirken geschildert (Freiburg: Herder, 1911); Julius Domeich, Franz Joseph Bufi
und die katholische Bewegung in Baden (Freiburg: Herder, 1979); Gustav Freytag, Karl Mathy.
Geschichte seines Lebens (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1888); Hermann Kopf, Karl von Rotteck. Zwischen
Revolution und Restauration (Freiburg: Rommel, 1980); Heinz Miiller-Dietz, Das Leben des
Rechtlehrers und Politiker Karl Theodor Welcker (Freiburg: Albert, 1968); and Franz Stegmann, ed.,
Franz Joseph von Bufi (Paderbom: Ferdinand Schoningh, 1994).
17 Gall, D er Liberalismus als regierende Partei, 45-48.
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took some time for the Roman Catholic Church to adjust to the new order. Internal
divisions in the Church complicated the situation. Following the
Reichsdeputationshauptschluss, the existing dioceses had been dissolved, and the
question o f how to reorganize Church administration became a hotly contested issue.
After years o f discussion, in 1821 Pope Pius VII published the Bull “Provida
sollersque,” in which he proclaimed the foundation o f the Oberrheinischer
Kirchenprovinz with five bishop seats: Rottenburg, Mainz, Limburg, Fulda, and
Freiburg. The Badenese diocese coincided with the borders o f the state, with the
addition o f two small Prussian territories, Hohenzollem-Sigmaringen and
Hohenzollem-Hechingen.

1 o

Having resolved this problem, the Catholic Church and the Badenese
government now had to elect a new archbishop for Freiburg. The ensuing conflict
over this issue involved fundamental questions regarding the degree o f state
involvement in religious affairs. Before proceeding to the question o f a potential
candidate, the two sides had to establish how to conduct the election process. After
drawn-out negotiations, they agreed that the Catholic Minster Chapter should choose a
candidate, who then had to be endorsed by the government before the Pope confirmed
him as Archbishop. This arrangement was to cause many conflicts and an occasional
deadlock in the future, as both state and church politicized the election process.
Between 1821 and 1827, for example, neither side could settle on a suitable

18 Erzbischoflichen Ordinariat, ed., Das Erzbistum Freiburg, 1827-1977 (Freiburg: Herder, 1977), 7577; Lauer, Geschichte der katholischen Kirche im Grofiherzogtum Baden, 113-124.
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candidate.19
The failure to appoint an archbishop not only reflected the hostile relationship
between state and church, but also indicated a split within the Church itself. The
southwestern comer o f the German lands constituted a liberal enclave within the
Catholic Church. Led by one o f the best-known clergy members o f the early
nineteenth century, Ignaz Heinrich von Wessenberg, this faction advocated
liberalization o f the Church and closer cooperation with the state, ideas that were
unacceptable to many Catholics.20 Wessenberg, the vicar-general o f Konstanz from
1802 to 1827, whose religious outlook had been shaped by Joseph II’s religious
reforms, worked diligently to modernize the Catholic Church. He sought to translate
the liturgy into German, establish synods to democratize the Church, increase
cooperation with Protestants, and reduce the formal stmctures o f the Church to enable
a more immediate religious experience. Wessenberg also argued for a closer
cooperation with the state, since the Church would not survive a confrontation.
Although these theories alienated conservative Catholics, Wessenberg had many
supporters, and his activities in the seminary in Meersburg influenced an entire
generation o f Catholic clergy. W essenberg’s ideas and the relatively strong tradition
o f liberal Catholicism would be very important for the future development o f the
state.

01

•

As the Badenese bourgeoisie developed, most o f its Catholic members

19 Maas, Geschichte der katholischen Kirche im Grofiherzogtum Baden, 23-30.
20 Lauer, Geschichte der katholischen Kirche im Grofiherzogtum Baden, 51-71, 88-94, 125-131.
21 For a good introduction to Wessenberg’s ideas, see Karl-Heinz Braun, ed., Kirche und Aufklarung
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adopted W essenberg’s ideas wholeheartedly, which provided for a more confidently
Catholic bourgeoisie than elsewhere in Germany. Moreover, by establishing a
relationship, albeit an uneasy one, between liberalism and Roman Catholicism,
W essenberg’s philosophies were instrumental in preparing for the later success o f the
Badenese national-liberals during the Kaiserreich.

22

The position o f Archbishop in Freiburg remained vacant until 1827, when state
and Church agreed on Bernhard Boll as their choice. Both Boll and his successor,
Ignaz Anton Demeter, were feeble religious leaders who commanded little respect
from the clergy and lacked the courage to oppose the state’s attempts to undermine the
position o f the Church further. On numerous occasions, Pope Pius VIII reprimanded
the two for failing to defend the interest o f the Church. Archbishop B oll’s weak
character enabled the Badenese state to make many inroads into the Church’s power.
Most importantly, the Department o f Religious Affairs possessed rights o f supervision
over the Church’s finances as well as over how they educated new priests.

23

Ignaz Heinrich von Wessenberg (Mtinchen: Schnell und Steiner, 1989); for a more complete treatment
o f his character and ideas, see Konstantin Grober, “Heinrich Ignaz Freiherr von Wessenberg,”
Freiburger Didzesen Archiv 55 (1927): 362-609 and 56 (1928): 294-435.
22 The relationship between liberalism and Catholicism has been discussed by, among others, Thomas
Mergel, Zwischen Klasse und Konfession (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1994). His study
centers on the Catholic part o f the bourgeoisie in the Rhineland, which according to Mergel became less
Catholic as they became more immersed in the bourgeois culture. The Catholic bourgeoisie in Baden
differed from their confessional brethren in the Rhineland, however, in that they were better able to
combine a strong Catholic faith with a bourgeois lifestyle. Mergel has noted this in “Fur eine
biirgerliche Kirche: Antiultramontanismus, Liberalismus und Biirgertum 1820-1850. Rheinland und
Siidwestdeutschland im Vergleich,” Zeitschrift fu r die Geschichte Oberrheins 144 (1996): 1-31; Oded
Heilbronner has made similar observations. See Heilbronner, “In Search o f the (Rural) Catholic
Bourgeoisie.”
23 Lauer, Geschichte der katholischen Kirche im Grofiherzogtum Baden, 151-152.
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Throughout the 1830s, the Church did not challenge the state’s activities, in part
because o f the listless leadership o f the two archbishops, but also because
W essenberg’s ideas attracted much support.
Conditions began to change for the Badenese Catholics only in 1837 as they
were swept up in the popular religious revival that surfaced throughout the German
lands following the Cologne events. Also in 1837, Franz Josef BuB and Freiherr
Fleinrich von Andlaw were elected as the first two Catholic representatives to the
provincial parliament. Both BuB and Andlaw were conservative Catholics, skilled
politicians, and accomplished agitators, which brought them to the forefront o f the
Catholic revival. Largely as a result o f these developments, the Siiddeutsche
Katholisches Kirchenblatt was founded in Freiburg in 1840. It provided Catholics
with a small, but effective public forum for their views. BuB often contributed to this
paper, which helped further boost his popularity.24 Well aware o f his talents as a
speaker, he traveled throughout Baden and Germany during the 1840s, organizing
large mass meetings, where he encouraged Catholics to remain strong and defiant in
defense o f their faith. When the revolution o f 1848-1849 erupted, BuB was the most
well-known and popular Catholic in Germany. 25
Another important event that carried major implications for the revival o f the
Catholic Church in Baden was the appointment o f Hermann von Vicari as Archbishop

24 Becker, Liberaler Staat und Kirche, p. 20; Haider, Katholische Vereine in Baden und Wurttemberg
1848-1914,21.
25 Haider, Katholische Vereine in Baden und Wurttemberg 1848-1914, 35.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

41
in 1842. In contrast to his two predecessors, Vicari was a staunch opponent o f state
involvement in religious affairs. Already from the outset o f his tenure, he proved that
he was not afraid to contest the government, and he immediately replaced many liberal
members o f the high clergy with more conservative ones, such as A dolf Strehle and
Heinrich Maas. Vicari also limited and strictly regulated the political activities o f the
clergy, which made it difficult for the latter to support the state. The new Archbishop,
BuB, and Andlaw led the ultramontanization o f Badenese Catholics.26
After the relative peace and stability that characterized the political life during
the 1830s and early 1840s, relations between the Grand Duke and the liberals
deteriorated quickly in the middle o f the 1840s, culminating in the revolution o f 18481849. Many historians focus on the poor economic conditions during the middle o f
the 1840s as the primary cause o f the revolution. Although both urban and rural areas
suffered the consequences from meager harvests, the latter were especially vulnerable
to economic depressions. From 1815 to 1848, the Badenese population, the majority
o f which still lived in rural areas, had increased by thirty-six percent. Peasants often
complained that there was not enough land for everybody. Because Baden did not
employ primogeniture, fertile land had become increasingly divided, causing a
significant drop in productivity. The failed harvests o f 1845 and 1846 had devastating
consequences for many peasants, who were forced to rely on inadequate poor relief.

27

26Lauer, Geschichte der katholischen Kirche im Grofiherzogtum Baden, 176-178; Maas, Geschichte der
katholischen Kirche im Grofiherzogtum Baden, 133-140.
27 Hugo Ott, “Die Wirtschaftliche und soziale Entwicklung von der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts bis zum
Ende des Ersten Weltkrieges,” in Badische Geschichte, ed. Landeszentrale fur politische Bildung
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Although the majority o f the population still farmed at mid-century, Baden was
undergoing a slow transformation from an overwhelmingly agricultural state to a more
mixed economy. The first surge o f industrialization occurred after the Grand Duchy
joined the Customs Union in 1835. Textile industries were the first to take advantage
o f improved infrastructure and a deregulation o f trade and commerce. During the
1830s and 1840s, increasing numbers o f people found their employment within the
industrial sector. In 1847, however, industrial development came to a sudden halt
when the largest banking house in Baden, Haber, went bankrupt. As a consequence,
Baden’s three largest industries went under, leaving almost 6,000 people unemployed
and desperate for economic and social reform.28 Consequently, though the economic
crisis o f the 1840s was primarily agricultural, the failure o f some o f the recently
founded industries also contributed to the worsening economic and social conditions.

The Revolutions of 1848-1449 in Baden
As news o f the February days in Paris spread across the Rhine in 1848, both
moderate and radical liberals were quick to take action. At several mass meetings,
most notably in Mannheim on February 27 and Offenburg on March 19, they
demanded the abolition o f feudal privileges, unrestricted freedom o f the press, the
right to bear arms, and the formation o f a German national parliament. On March 2,
the Badenese parliament granted many o f the liberals’ demands. Most importantly,
Baden-Wiirttemberg, 104-106.
28 Ibid., 106-107.
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feudal privileges were lifted, which had been the major concern o f the large agrarian
population.29
After the passage o f the March 2 decrees, which stilled most o f the
revolutionary fervor among the peasantry, radical leaders Friedrich Hecker and Gustav
Struve were forced on the defensive, and neither was elected to the pre-parliament in
Frankfurt. Both men realized that if their revolution was to succeed, they had to take
it to the streets. On April 13, Hecker gathered radicals in Konstanz and boldly
declared the republic.30 He intended to march on Karlsruhe, rallying support along the
way. He attracted a number o f sympathizers, although fewer than he had anticipated.
Eventually, about 4,000 joined the so-called Hecker-march. However, he soon
realized that after the removal o f feudal privileges, most peasants had no immediate
interests in continuing the revolution. After a few skirmishes, state troops finally
defeated Hecker and his men at Kandem on April 24, 1848.31
Hecker and Struve’s defeat did not weaken the revolutionary cause. After
Hecker fled the country, Struve continued the struggle. Following the generally
unpopular Treaty o f Malmo in September 1848, he attempted another unsuccessful
armed uprising. Both Hecker and Struve clearly miscalculated the degree o f popular

29 Excellent accounts o f the events in Baden in 1848-1849 include Wolfgang Dreflen, ed., 1848-1849:
Biirgerkrieg in Baden (Berlin: Dragenbach, 1975); Willy Real, Die Revolution in Baden 1848/49
(Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1983); Franz Vollmer, Offenburg 1848/49. Ereignisse und Lebensbilder aus
einem Zentrum der badischen Revolution (Karlsruhe: Braun, 1997).
30 Alfred Diesbach, “Konstanz im Re volutions jahr 1848,” Konstanzer Blatter fur Hochschulfragen 40
(1973): 97-99.
31 Real, Die Revolution in Baden 1848/49, 56-59.
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support for the radical liberals. Although aware o f the split among the liberals, they
believed that once subsumed in the revolutionary atmosphere, the moderates would
join their cause. Contrary to their hopes, however, socialist slogans that accompanied
much o f the radicals’ rhetoric alienated most moderates.
Despite the departure o f the two most important leaders o f the radical liberals,
the movement did not fade.32 When Frederick Wilhelm IV refused to accept the
imperial crown in March 1849, the radicals struck anew. Since it was now evident
that the tactics o f the constitutional liberals had failed, revolutionaries rallied support
by tapping into the dissatisfaction that many people voiced at the failure o f the
Frankfurt Parliament. Large numbers o f people gathered in Offenburg and Rastatt on
May 12 and 13, and many government soldiers joined the revolutionaries. The
situation became so threatening that Grand Duke Leopold fled to France, calling for
Prussian troops to assist him in defeating the rebels. Led by Lorenzo Brentano,
revolutionaries on May 14 replaced the old government with civil commissionaires, all
o f whom were radical liberals. They abolished the first chamber and called elections
to a new parliament, which Brentano opened on June 10. Despite this apparent
success, the revolutionaries were in a precarious position with little prospect of
ultimate victory. Prussian troops were threatening the state, and though the rebels
attracted much popular support, they stood little chance against the superior Prussian
forces. On July 23, the revolutionaries capitulated at Rastatt, signaling the quelling o f

32 Hardtwig Gebhardt, Revolution und liberate Bewegung. Die nationale Organisation der
konstitutionellen Partei in Deutschland 1848/49 (Bremen: Scheunemann, 1974), 68-70.
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the last revolutionary movement in Germany. On August 18, Leopold returned,
accompanied by Prussian soldiers, who subsequently occupied Baden for the next two
years. 33

Creation of a New Liberal Order and the Catholic Response 1850-1871
The revolutions o f 1848 temporarily improved the relationship between the
Badenese state and church. Faced with sometimes very radical rhetoric, both
remained on the side o f tradition and shared a desire to avoid drastic changes.34
Although the Catholic Church played only a minor role in the revolution, it proved to
be o f great importance for Catholics in several respects. Most importantly, the eased
restrictions on freedom o f association enabled Catholics to found organizations that
contributed to their mobilization. In July 1848, BuB and Andlaw formed the
Katholische Verein Badens with the explicit intent o f protecting Catholic interests
around the state. Utilizing his personal popularity, BuB traveled throughout the state,
calling upon good Catholics to found local chapters o f the Verein. Despite limited
support from the clergy, BuB’ rhetorical skill ensured mass mobilization o f Catholics
and rapid development o f the Verein. During the summer o f 1848, the Parliament in
Frankfurt received 1142 petitions demanding a guarantee o f the Church’s rights in
case o f a new constitution; 434 o f these petitions came from Baden—the highest
33 Real, Die Revolution in Baden 1848/49, 136-144.
34 For two general accounts o f the role o f the chinch during the upheavals, see Wolfgang Hug,
“Katholiken und ihre Kirche in der Badischen Revolution von 1848/49,” Freiburger Didzesan-Archiv
118 (1998): 283-311; and Clemens Rehm, Die katholische Kirche in der Erzdiozese Freiburg wahrend
der Revolution 1848/49 (Freiburg-. Alber, 1987).
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number (in proportion to population) o f any German state. At the first general
assembly o f the Katholischer Verein in Mainz in October 1848, BuB was the logical
choice as president.35
Amidst the talks o f restructuring the German Bund, the leaders o f the Catholic
Church met in Wurzburg in the fall o f 1848 to coordinate their policies. The decisions
made at this meeting served as guidelines for Badenese Catholics in their struggle
against the state during the last half o f the nineteenth century. Catholics wanted to
restore much o f their lost independence vis-a-vis the state. Church and state were to
be separated and permitted to conduct their respective affairs without interference
from the other. At the conclusion o f the conference, participants presented a list o f
demands: to regain control over much o f the educational system, to be able to appoint
priests without state supervision, the removal o f the placet (formal state approval of
certain church actions), complete control over their finances; and the right to found
monasteries. Although none o f these demands was fully met, these declarations had
symbolic value. The Wurzburg conference represented the first occasion in the
nineteenth century that the most prominent members o f the Catholic high clergy took a
collective stand against the secularizing policies that had been prevalent in many parts
o f Germany.36
The failed revolutions o f 1848-1849 caused a temporary halt to most o f the

35 Haider, Katholische Vereine in Baden und Wurttemberg, 27-38. For a general account o f the activities
and importance o f Catholic organizations during the revolution, see Heinz Hiirten, Kurze Geschichte
des deutschen Katholizismus 1800-1960 (Mainz: Matthias-Griinewald Verlag, 1986), 79-109.
36 Becker, Liberaler Staat und Kirche, 24-25.
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activities o f the Badenese liberals, and conservatives dominated politics throughout
the 1850s. Although the time o f reaction did not last as long, nor was it as harsh as
elsewhere in Germany, it was almost a decade before the liberals fully re-emerged on
the political stage. One o f the primary reasons for the relatively mild reaction in
Baden was Friedrich I ’s accession to the throne in 1852. Although he was not
officially crowned until 1856, because his brother Leopold II was mentally ill,
Friedrich I effectively ruled Baden since the death o f Leopold I in 1852.
The importance o f Friedrich I to the politics o f Baden during the second half o f
the nineteenth century can hardly be exaggerated.37 Married since 1856 to Luise, the
daughter o f the future Wilhelm I, the liberal Grand Duke was immensely popular with
his subjects. Friedrich had received a very broad education, in which liberal historians
Ludwig Hausser and Friedrich Dahlmann played important roles. Both Dahlmann and
Hausser were admirers o f Prussia’s history, and as they lectured the young prince on
the achievements o f Frederick the Great and other famous Prussians, they quickly
made him aware how important Prussia was to the future o f German politics. During
the 1840s, Friedrich attended the universities in Heidelberg and Bonn together with
the future generation o f leading liberal politicians such as Franz von Roggenbach,
Julius Jolly, and August Lamey. They became part o f a tightly knit circle, many o f

37 For a biographical account o f the Grand Duke’s life, see Alfred Dove, Grofiherzog Friedrich von
Baden als Landesherr und deutscher Ftirst (Heidelberg: Winter, 1902). Excellent insights into the
character o f the Grand Duke can be drawn from Hermann von Oncken, ed., Grofiherzog Friedrich I.
von Baden und die deutsche Politik von 1854-1871. Briefwechsel, Denkschriften, Tagebucher 2 Vols.
(Osnabriick: Biblio, 1966).
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whom were Duzfreunde.

oo

Roggenbach and Lamey emerged as leaders when the liberal movement began
to regroup during the 1850s. Their political program stressed the need to clarify the
relationship between church and state, to decentralize administration, and further
deregulate trade and commerce. Most importantly, they emphasized finding a solution
•

to the German question.

39

The liberals rallied public support by exploiting the growing tension between
the Catholic Church and the conservative government. After the revolution, political
life had come largely to a standstill, and it was not until 1853, when Archbishop
Herman von Vicari demanded that the Catholic Church be allowed to conduct its
affairs without state involvement, that political activity truly resumed. This first major
conflict o f the 1850s was triggered by the death o f Grand Duke Leopold I in 1852.
The Senior Consistory in Karlsruhe demanded that the Catholic clergy hold Seelenamt
for the Protestant Grand Duke. Vicari, abiding by canonical law, refused and ordered
local clergy to hold a simple funeral service with a funeral speech. This constituted a
true test of Vicari’s power as he asked his clergy to defy the state. In the end, only 60
priests, out o f about 1,100, followed the state’s directives. Even more importantly,
after the event, Vicari punished the ones who had not heeded his orders, while the
state did nothing to protect them. The state’s inactivity signaled the fact that it was
unable to support liberal Catholic priests who faced retribution from the ultramontanes
38 Gall, Der Liberalismus als regierende Partei, 66.
39 Ibid., 63-80.
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in Freiburg and only served to increase the ultramontanization o f Badenese
Catholics.40
Emboldened by his success, in 1853, Vicari declared that the state did not
possess the right to interfere in religious affairs, and he began to disregard the
stipulations that the state had placed on the church. The Archbishop now appointed
priests without state approval, opened a new seminary without prior agreement with
the government, and completely ignored the placet. When the department o f religious
affairs reprimanded him, he excommunicated all o f its members. The state then
placed Vicari under house arrest, which caused an uproar among Catholics, not only in
Baden but throughout Germany. In many towns, the situation grew so tense that the
government had to dispatch troops to maintain order. The reactions to the
Archbishop’s imprisonment signaled the revival o f political life in Baden. August
Lamey, who later became one o f the leaders o f the liberal struggle against the Church,
defended Vicari at his trial in 1854 41 The trial was a much publicized event and
helped re-establish the liberals as a legitimate political force after the failures o f 18481849. By defending the Archbishop, Lamey rallied popular support as he and the
liberals appeared as defenders o f individual rights. During the 1850s, liberals
maintained an uneasy alliance with the Roman Catholic Church, which contributed
greatly to their return to the political mainstream.
This controversy also had serious foreign policy implications for Baden. In
40 Lauer, Geschichte der katholischen Kirche in Baden, 206-210.
41 Ibid., 211-217.
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1855, Austria, seeking to strengthen its ties to the south German states, offered to
negotiate in this conflict. The Prussians did not appreciate this proposal and sent a
young man by the name o f Otto von Bismarck to visit Grand Duke Friedrich I.
Bismarck, who was very impressed by the pro-Prussian views o f the Grand Duke, told
the latter that he was going to have to be at the forefront o f the battle that Protestants
were about to launch against the Catholic Church.42 Despite Bismarck’s efforts,
however, Vicari achieved his goal as he forced the conservative government to initiate
negotiations with the Vatican to regulate the relationship between state and church in
Baden.
The negotiations concerning the Concordat constituted an important turning
point in Badenese politics. Had it come into effect, the Concordat would have
significantly altered the relationship between state and church, since it was based upon
the premise that canonical law provided the Church with the right to negotiate any
proposed secular legislation on religious matters. The Concordat furthermore lifted
the placet and enabled clergy to communicate freely with Rome; it removed state
supervision from the education o f the clergy and abolished state control over much of
the Church’s finances.43 This represented the fulfillment o f many o f the demands o f
the Wurzburger conference, most o f which were unacceptable to liberals.
These much-debated propositions provided an excellent opportunity for the
liberals to seize political power. Encouraged by the recent Italian success against the
42 Gall, Bismarck. D er weisse Revolutionar (Frankfurt: Propylaen, 1980), 212-213.
43 Becker, Liberaler Staat und Kirche, 35-56.
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Austrians in 1859, they initiated a public and political campaign against the
Concordat. Liberals argued that not only did this agreement provide the Catholic
Church with too much freedom vis-a-vis the state, but because the Concordat would
regulate domestic policies, it had to be ratified by the Second Chamber. Since the
conservative government had originally not intended to have the Concordat debated,
liberals argued that the agreement was unconstitutional.44 As debates intensified in
late 1859 and early 1860, Franz von Roggenbach utilized his personal ties to the
Grand Duke, as well as the latter’s resistance to a document that many interpreted as
too conservative and pro-Austrian, to convince him to dispose o f the conservative
government.45 Meanwhile, in the weeks leading up to the vote in the Second
Chamber, Archbishop Vicari collected signatures in favor o f the Concordat that was
presented to the Grand Duke immediately prior to the last debates in the Parliament.
More than 80,000 people signed the petition—illustrating the growing mass
mobilization o f Catholics.46 Despite this effort, the Second Chamber rejected the
Concordat in February 1860, which led to the dismissal of the conservative
government. To take its place, a new liberal government under August Lamey came
into power, signaling the beginning o f a new era in Baden.
The new government constituted the most liberal regime in any German state
to that date. W ith majority support in the Parliament, liberals dominated political life

44 Gall, Der Liberalismus als regierende Partei, 94-108.
45 Ibid., especially 98-100.
46 Ibid., 40.
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during the next five years and passed a number o f laws that significantly altered the
fabric o f Badenese society. Intent on modernizing, they simplified state
administration and bureaucracy, reformed the judicial system, created a Department of
Commerce, emancipated the Jews, removed the remains o f the guild system and
created provisions for free trade.47 Perhaps most importantly, after the installation of
the new liberal government, Friedrich I and his ministers spent several months
discussing how to regulate the relationship between state and church. On October 9,
the Grand Duke presented a set o f laws, which remained largely intact until 1918.
These provisions established that though the Church would receive a certain amount
o f freedom, it would not be able to conduct its affairs without state interference. The
freedoms o f the Church were always regulated to various degrees. For instance, the
Church had the right to try its members under canonical law, but only if the defendant
agreed to it and if the case did not pertain to the defendant’s wealth or personal
freedom. Officially the Church had the right to manage its own affairs, though the
state had a say in important areas such as education, social policies, and marriages.
The main difference compared to the suggested Concordat was that secular law always
held precedence over religious.48
The first two years o f the “New Era” in Baden were relatively peaceful.
Negotiations over how to manage the Church’s finances jointly were concluded
without much disagreement. In a report to the Pope in late 1861, Vicari stated that
47 For a very thorough description o f these reforms, see ibid., 171-207.
48Lauer, Geschichte der katholischen Kirche in Baden, 230-237.
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though the Concordat had not been passed, he was still hopeful regarding the current
situation.49 Despite V icari’s cautious optimism in 1861, however, the liberals’
determination to reform society meant that the prospect of conflict was never far
removed. Already from the outset o f their rule, liberals declared their intention to
reduce the Church’s influence over the educational system. Anticipating
modernization, liberals argued that schools needed to prepare children better for
society, rather than focus so much on preparing them for heaven. Catholics, on the
other hand, considered the state’s interference in the educational system as just one
more step towards a degenerate and immoral society.50
In 1863, Lamey appointed the liberal Protestant Karl Knies director o f the
newly founded Oberschulrat. In July o f the same year, he published his forty-four
Kniesischen Thesen, which outlined the future organization o f the schools. Among the
most controversial suggestions were a reduction o f religious education from four to
two hours per week, the current confessional schools should be turned into inter
confessional ones (there would still be separate religious education), and the geistliche
Ortschulinspektion was to be replaced by a local Ortschulrat. These proposed
changes outraged Vicari and the Catholic clergy.51 To add fuel to the fire, the
government did not include the Church in any type o f discussions, which left the
Catholics with an even stronger resolve to fight these proposed reforms.

49 Maas, Geschichte der katholischen Kirche im Grofiherzogtum Baden, 480.
50 Gall, D er Liberalismus als regierende Partei, 127.
51 Becker, Liberaler Staat und Kirche, 120-127.
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The debates in the parliament over Knies’s propositions grew increasingly
hostile during 1863-1864, and it became evident that the two sides were heading for
open conflict. As the Parliament passed the Schulaufsichtsgesetz in 1864, the lines o f
battles had been clearly drawn. This set o f laws removed the Ortschulinspektion,
which had consisted only o f clergy, and replaced it with a local Oberschulrat, where
clergy, teachers, the mayor, and a few elected members would supervise the schools.52
Roman Catholics interpreted this measure as the first step towards a complete removal
o f the Church in schools. Vicari published a pastoral brief in which he used extremely
sharp language to criticize the latest liberal initiative. In October 1864, Vicari forbade
Catholics to partake in these new Oberschulrate, even if elected. He furthermore
ordered Catholics not to participate in the upcoming elections to the Oberschulrate.
This passive resistance proved successful: in over 400 o f 1,800 election districts, no
votes were cast. The state responded by calling a second round o f elections, with the
added stipulations that there would be a significant fine for people who refused to take
an elected position and that only three votes were needed for an election to be
considered valid. Although many o f these elections still were not conducted according
to proper procedure, 1,679 Oberschulrate were eventually formed.53
Despite its failure to prevent the initiation o f the Oberschulrate, Catholic
resistance increased. The publication o f the Papal Encyclia “Syllabus Eronum” in
December 1864 bolstered Catholic confidence. In it, Pope Pius IX condemned most
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid., 132-133.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

55
every phenomenon of the new liberal era.54 Ridiculed by liberals as reactionary and
backward, this papal stance against modernity strengthened most Catholics in their
resolve to fight the onslaught o f secularization. Also, in 1865, in conjunction with the
disputes regarding the elections to the local Ortschulrat, the Heidelberg Catholic
Jakob Lindau founded the Casino Movement, which mobilized and politicized large
parts o f the Catholic masses. Originally, Lindau had no other intention than to provide
Catholics with a safe haven where they could meet and discuss how to approach the
injustices that the state levied upon them. He soon proved to be both a skilled orator
and organizer who could rally great numbers o f Catholics. A salesman by profession,
one o f the reasons Lindau attracted so much support was that people considered him a
popular leader o f the Catholic opposition.55
After witnessing the local success o f the Casino, Lindau decided to transform it
into a “traveling association.” During the spring and summer o f 1865, he organized
Casinos in many cities around the state, assembling hundreds and sometimes
thousands o f Catholics.56 The importance o f the Casino Movement for the
politicization o f the Catholic masses cannot be overstated. Especially in smaller towns
and rural areas, Lindau’s agitation concerning the evils o f the liberal government met
with almost unanimous support. Most Catholics welcomed the opportunity to display
54 Hilrten, Kurze Geschichte des deutschen Katholizismus, 127.
55 Franz Dor, Jakob Lindau. Ein badischer Politiker und Volksmann in seinem Leben und Wirken
geschildert(Freiburg: Herder, 1909), 31-35.
56A good discussion o f this phenomenon can be found in Dorneich, “Die Entstehung der badischen
‘Katholischen Volkspartei’ zwischen 1865 und 1869 im Tagebuch von Baurat Dr. Karl Bader,”
Freiburger Diozesan Archiv 84 (1964): 315-317; see also Becker, Liberaler Staat und Kirche, 142-143.
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their aversion to the state’s policies. Despite periods o f temporary religious revival,
Roman Catholics had been on the defensive for most o f the century. They were
keenly aware that their majority status was decreasing (in 1828, the state contained
sixty-seven percent Catholics; in 1900, they were down to sixty-one percent), and the
fact that they were underrepresented among the emerging bourgeoisie placed a heavy
burden on them.57 The growing presence o f Catholic organizations in the public
sphere strengthened the Catholic case as well as escalated the hostility between
Catholics and liberals. Communities became increasingly divided as confessional
issues dominated local politics.
In addition to the unpopularity o f the liberals’ confessional policies, their
economic reforms met with resistance as well. To be sure, the new decrees spurred an
intense period o f industrialization. However, it often took place at the expense o f the
lower middle and lower classes. As an increasing number o f people suffered in the
transition to a more industrialized society, contemporaries frequently accused liberals
o f only being interested in aggrandizing their own profits. One o f the more important
consequences o f the hostility towards this economic policy was that it alienated many
from other aspects o f the liberal movement, which carried grave implications for
Roggenbach’s foreign policies.
Closely associated with the kleindeutsche solution to the German problem, the
liberals were well aware o f the pro-Austrian sentiments o f most Badeners. The state
57 The classic statement on the relationship between Badenese Catholics and the development o f the
modern industry is Martin Offenbacher, Konfession und soziale Schichtung. Eine Studie tiber die
wirtschaftliche Lage der Katholiken und Protestanten in Baden (Tubingen: Mohr, 1908).
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was divided into three uneven camps on the German question. The kleindeutsche
group centered on Heidelberg and Karlsruhe and, though relatively small in size,
included many significant politicians and business men. The middle areas o f the state
contained many people who were initially undecided on this issue. After Otto von
Bismarck’s increasingly aggressive behavior in the Prussian Parliament and in the
Schleswig-Holstein affair, however, most adopted a grofideutsch position. Finally, the
overwhelmingly Catholic southern part o f the state contained a very strong proAustrian contingent. Because o f this complex situation, the liberal government could
not afford much discontent on domestic issues since it would eliminate any possibility
o f reaching consensus on the German question. This is an excellent illustration o f the
main political problem that the Badenese liberals faced: the intricate ties between
domestic and foreign politics. None understood this dilemma better than Roggenbach,
who centered his political program on this premise. When he became foreign minister
•

in 1861, his main concern was to unify the German states under Prussian leadership.

58

Because o f the prussophile sentiments o f the Grand Duke, Roggenbach had
Friedrich’s unequivocal support.
Although the liberals initially enjoyed popular support, many o f their reforms
eventually alienated large segments o f the population. There were primarily two
reasons why Roggenbach and his associates failed to implement their political
program. First o f all, they underestimated the political power o f the Catholic Church.
When they began reforming the educational system to reduce the influence o f the
58 This is discussed in painstaking detail by Gall, D er Liberalismus als regierende Partei, 208-279.
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Church, an immediate mass mobilization and politicization o f Catholics followed.
Second, the refusal o f both the Grand Duke and many o f the liberals to accept the
proposed changes that Austria presented at the meeting o f princes and electors in
Frankfurt in 1863 on how to reform the German Confederation isolated Baden from
the other middle states.59 Not only did this decision place the state in a vulnerable
position in case of war, but it also alienated the regime from large parts o f its Catholic
constituency. Although some liberals supported Friedrich’s actions in Frankfurt, his
and Roggenbach’s rejection o f the Austrian proposals constituted a turning point for
the liberal government. For his remaining two years as foreign minister, Roggenbach
had almost no popular support.
In 1865, the hostility towards the liberal government’s economic, educational,
and foreign policies had grown so strong that the Grand Duke was forced to remove
Roggenbach. His successor, Ludwig Freiherr von Edelsheim, focused on revising
Baden’s foreign policy. Edelsheim wanted to end Baden’s self-imposed isolation by
allying more closely with the middle states, which in effect meant a more pro-Austrian
policy.60 As Prusso-Austrian relations turned increasingly hostile, it became apparent
that despite the growing number o f liberals who advocated neutrality in an armed
conflict and the Grand D uke’s efforts to mediate a peaceful solution to the dispute,
Baden would have to fight on the Austrian side. Facing pressure from every German

59 Ibid., especially 239-241.
60 Friedrich Koeppel, “Baden und die deutsche Entscheidung des Jahres 1866,” Zeitschrift fu r die
Geschichte Oberrheins 88 (1936): 451-453.
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state on its borders, Baden joined Austria as the Austro-Prassian War erupted in July
1866. The government’s agony in choosing sides had no equivalent among the
majority o f the population. The Catholics, comprising two-thirds o f the population,
almost unanimously supported Austria, and after Bismarck’s belligerent behavior over
the previous years, many Protestant liberals identified with Habsburg Emperor Francis
Joseph as well. When the war began, people o f all classes and confessions called for a
defense o f their German brethren in Austria, who now faced Bismarck’s imperialist
ambitions. Among large segments o f the population, the outbreak o f war triggered a
dramatic increase in anti-Prussian sentiments, which did not easily fade with time.61
Baden played a minor role in the Austro-Prussian War.62 Its army was only
involved in a few minor skirmishes, all o f them following the battle o f
Koniggratz/Sadowa. The soldiers were in a peculiar situation because though they
identified strongly with the Austrian cause, many o f their high-ranking officers had
been openly pro-Prussian up to the onset o f war, which certainly affected the army’s
performance. One indication o f how uninterested many officers were in fighting was
Bavaria’s frequent accusations that the Badenese troops were deserting “the noble
cause o f the Austrians.”63 After the Prussian victory at Koniggratz, the Badenese

61 Newspapers o f all political ideologies and religious confessions were filled with tirades against
Bismarck’s behavior. See for instance Freie Stimme, July, 24, 1866.
62 Gall, D er Liberalismus als regierende Partei, 364-368; Koeppel, “Baden und die deutsche
Entscheidung des Jahres 1866,” 218-259.
63 See for instance Karl du Jarry de la Roche, Aktenmafiige interessante Enthullungen iiber den
badischen Verrat an den deutschen Bundestruppen in dem soeben beendigten preufiisch-deutschen
Kriege (Miinchen, 1866). The Badenese government composed an answer, authored by Robert von
Mohl, D erA nteil der badischen Felddivision an dem Kriege des Jahres 1866 in Deutschland (Lahr:
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government’s attitude towards the war changed quickly. Realizing that Austria was
now excluded from the German question, it took appropriate measures. On July 21,
the government approached King Wilhelm I o f Prussia, asking for a peace treaty, in
which Baden agreed to pay a large indemnity. The Prussian General Armin von Beyer
was appointed head o f the Badenese war ministry and quickly reformed the Badenese
military according to Prussian standards. The two states also signed a secret alliance,
in which both were guaranteed assistance from the other in case o f attack.
The signing o f this treaty represented the end o f the liberal era in Baden. As
the government resigned, the liberals remained the dominant party in the Parliament.
However, from now until the unification o f the Reich, Friedrich I essentially ruled
above the party system. The Grand Duke enlisted his trusted associate, the
philoprussian Karl Mathy, to form a new government. Mathy, who died in office in
1868, and his successor Julius Jolly, sought to minimize the influence o f the
Parliament.64 The Grand Duke, Mathy, and Jolly were all intent on making Baden a
member o f the North German Confederation. Bismarck, however, fearing the
reactions o f the other southern states, would not comply with their wish. Although
Friedrich I and other leading politicians were convinced that it was only a matter o f
time before Baden joined the North German Confederation, large segments o f the
population remained strongly opposed. Many voiced their displeasure with the
“Prussianization” o f Badenese society that took place after the signing o f the peace
Geiser, 1867).
64 Hermann Baumgarten, Staatsminister Jolly. Ein Lebensbild (Tubingen: Laupp, 1897), 21-22.
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and alliance treaties o f 1866. The government was apparently aware o f these
sentiments, as it often stressed the need to watch for “internal enemies” who were
attempting to undermine the interests o f the fatherland.
The elections to the new Customs Union in 1868 provided an indication o f the
resistance that the Prussian-oriented policies encountered. Led by Jakob Lindau,
Catholics organized a successful election campaign, which provided stunning results.
Although the liberals won the popular vote with 89,000, the Catholics with 78,000
were close behind.65 Because people interpreted this election as a referendum on the
national-liberal policies, the results were disheartening to the government. Not until
the escalation o f the conflict between France and Germany in 1870 did much o f the
population, albeit only temporarily, adopt a more friendly attitude towards Prussia and
Bismarck.
In the midst o f their popular mobilization in 1865-1866, Badenese Catholics
had been somewhat taken aback by the Austrian defeat in the war o f 1866. To many,
the swift (Protestant) Prussian victory and the realization that Austria was now
essentially excluded from the German question was difficult to accept.66 Immediately
prior to the war, Catholic opposition to the government had steadily grown stronger,
and as the liberals sensed the growing discontent with their domestic and foreign
policies, they had begun to test the waters for a possible compromise with the Church.
65 Excellent accounts o f these elections include: Becker, Liberaler Staat und Kirche, 208-214;
Domeich, “Die Entstehung der badischen ‘Katholischen Volkspartei,’” 349-370.
66 Many examples o f these sentiments can be found in Catholic newspapers. See for instance Freie
Stimme, December 28, 1866; January 17, 1867.
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The outcome o f the war, however, removed any such possibility. Although not all
Catholics were disillusioned by recent events, the Grand Duke’s selection o f Jolly as
the successor to the deceased Premier Karl Mathy in 1868 signified the beginning of
their most difficult time. Jolly, who according to contemporaries was the most
dedicated o f all German “Kulturkam pf ministers,” made the relationship between state
and church his primary concern. Considered the personification o f all negative traits
o f liberalism, Jolly became utterly despised among Catholics.
One o f the first Catholic experiences with the fierce stubbornness o f the new
premier was in conjunction with the election o f a new archbishop to succeed Vicari,
who died in 1868 at the ripe age o f ninety-five. In light of the steadily deteriorating
relations between Karlsruhe and Freiburg, the inability to unite behind a new
candidate should have come as no great surprise. Considering the many reforms that
the liberal government was trying to implement, they could not accept an ultramontane
archbishop, who would offer resistance to their ideas. Likewise, Catholics would
never tolerate anyone whom they suspected o f being too government friendly. After a
few unsuccessful attempts at nominating a suitable candidate, both sides realized that
under present circumstances, no successor to Vicari would be found. This led to a
peculiar situation, where the current Dean Lothar von Ktibel, from 1868 to his death in
1882, remained auxiliary Archbishop.

Although never appointed to the position,

Ktibel possessed the same powers that he would if elected Archbishop. Kiibel, who

67 For a detailed, though slightly biased, account o f Kubel’s life, see Joseph Schofer, Bischof Lothar von
Kiibel. Sein Leben und Leiden dargestellt (Freiburg: Herder, 1911).
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for a long time had belonged to the most well-respected and influential members o f
the ultramontane clergy, successfully led Badenese Catholics through the
Kulturkampf
Between 1866 and 1871, the liberal government made several key decisions
that indicated that a Badenese Kulturkam pf was well underway. In 1867, the
Parliament issued a law requiring all newly examined priests to pass a state-supervised
exam—the Kulturexamen—before they were appointed to a parish. The exam covered
the fields o f philosophy, world history, German literature since Klopstock, and
z ro

perhaps most importantly, German history since the Reformation.

The liberals

argued that the knowledge required to pass this test was necessary for a priest in his
role as educator on the local level. Vicari and Kiibel both refused to recognize the
legitimacy o f this examination and forbade Catholics to take it. That only two priests
took this test is testimony to the power o f Kiibel. In response, the liberal government
did not recognize and later arrested newly appointed priests who were working in their
parishes without having passed the exam. Similar to the strong reaction to Vicari’s
house arrest in 1854, Catholic communities rallied around their threatened clergy.
They hid priests, and if the Badenese state arrested one, mass demonstrations often
erupted. A clergy member released from prison was met with a hero’s welcome when
he returned to his parish.69

68 Becker, Liberaler Staat und Kirche, 239-243.
69 For a good discussion o f these events, see Schofer, Sperregesetz und Sperrlingslos. Ein Auschnitt aus
dem badischen Kulturkampf fiir das Volk (Karlsruhe: Badenia, 1930).
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In the next step towards reducing religious influence in the schools, the
government in 1868 ordered the establishment o f interconfessional schools. This
decree stated among other things that in communities where both confessions were
somewhat evenly represented, the community had to abolish confessional schools and
educate Catholics and Protestants under one roof. This was another instance where
the government had overestimated its power. Few communities abided by these
provisions, and when they did, it was accompanied by confrontations between
Catholics and Protestants.70
In 1869, Jolly introduced civil marriage, which forced couples to conduct a
marriage ceremony at city hall. Catholic clergy especially resented this decree since
the institution o f marriage had always been closely related with religion and the
church.

71

Immediately before the outbreak o f war in 1870, Jolly passed another law

that stripped the Church o f all financial resources that could not be directly linked to
religious purposes. This law, which was one o f the most significant ones during the
Kulturkampf, prevented the Church from conducting any type o f social activities and
drastically reduced its capacity for benevolent work. Scholars have estimated that this
decree cost the Catholic Church over twenty million Goldmark.72 To add further to
the now extremely hostile relationship between church and state came the conflicts
70 Baumgarten, Staatsminister Jolly, 104-108; Becker, Liberaler Staat und Kirche, 243-251; Hans
Farber, D er Liberalismus und die kulturpolitischen Fragen in Baden 1850-1870 (Freiburg: Herder,
1959), 286-301.
71 Becker, Liberaler Staat und Kirche, 251-255; Dor, Jakob Lindau, 59; Schofer, Bischof Lothar von
Ktibel, 106-118.
72 Becker, Liberaler Staat und Kirche, 265.
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regarding the 1870 Vatican council and the declaration o f papal infallibility.

7T

In May 1869, as a logical outgrowth o f the increased mobilization and
politicization o f the Catholic masses, Lindau and three other leading Catholic
personalities—Ferdinand Bissing, Reinhold Baumstark, and Albert Lender—founded
the Katholische Volkspartei (Catholic People’s Party), which represented a completely
different view o f the current domestic and foreign policy situation than the liberals.
The People’s Party advocated the formation o f a South German Bund, which would
strive to unify all German states, including Austria, in a loose federation. It also
demanded that the Church be given complete freedom to conduct its affairs. The party
scored an immediate success, securing four seats in the parliament elections in 1869.
Although the liberal government did not consider the four Catholic representatives a
threat, the presence o f these high-profile Catholics served to further consolidate and
unify the Catholic opposition.74
Despite the fact that Catholics were able to increase their political
representation, the three-class voting system ensured that liberals would maintain most
o f the political power. In Baden, until the electoral reforms o f 1905, the franchise was
divided into three classes based on paid income tax. The first class usually contained
about one twelfth o f the enfranchised population; the second class contained the next

73 For a good discussion o f German responses to the declaration o f papal infallibility, see Karl Josef
Rivinius, Bischof Wilhelm Emmanuel von Ketteler und die Infallibilitdt des Papstes (Frankfurt: Lang,
1976).
74Domeich, “Die Entstehung der badischen ‘Katholischen Volkspartei,’” 373-375.
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two twelfths. Thus, the third class contained anywhere from eighty to ninety percent
o f the electorate. All three classes carried equal weight in the election process, which
meant that a vote in the first class usually carried about fifteen to twenty times as
much weight as a vote in the third class. The fact that many people in the third class
often failed to exercise their voting rights on election days only helped to underline
further the unequal nature o f this election system. City council elections were carried
out in the same fashion, which ensured that Protestant liberals, who vastly
outnumbered everybody else in the first two voting categories, were able to maintain
most o f the municipal and state political power throughout the Second Empire.

75

Protestant liberals benefited greatly from possessing most o f the municipal political
power. Although the state maintained a certain control on municipal politics, cities
could and did exercise a great deal o f influence over their own jurisdictions. Thus, for
the most part o f the Kaiserreich, these liberals enjoyed a great deal o f local political
power. Although the Catholic political party gained a significant amount o f political
power during the last two decades prior to the First World War, they never were as
politically powerful as the liberals, which played an important role in determining the
nature o f their relationship.
Although suffering persecution throughout the first half o f the nineteenth
century, Badenese Catholics displayed signs o f increasing strength, particularly since
the 1850s. The ultramontanization and politicization that had taken place especially

75 Dieter Hein, “Badisches Burgertum. Soziale Struktur und Kommunalpolitische Ziele im 19.
Jahrhundert,” in Stack und Burgertum im 19. Jahrhundert, ed. Lothar Gall (Munich: Oldenbourg,
1990), 85-86.
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during the past decade strengthened Catholic resolve to resist the pressure to accept
Protestant-Prussian-based national identity after 1871. To be sure, conservative
Badenese Catholics were about to face a new challenge from liberal Catholics, who
used the controversy surrounding the Vatican Council o f 1870 and the declaration o f
papal infallibility to secede and form their own church, the so-called Old Catholic
Church. Although life in certain communities was marked by harsh conflicts between
Old Catholics and Catholics, this only bolstered the latter’s determination to remain
true to their understanding o f Germanness, largely based on Roman Catholic values.
At the beginning of the Franco-Prussian War, Baden constituted a state with a
population o f one and a half million, o f which about sixty-four percent were Catholic
and thirty-five percent were Protestants. As the relationship between France and
Prussia deteriorated, the political and religious situation in Baden was reaching
unprecedented levels o f tension. Attempting to reap the benefits from a long tradition
o f liberalism, Jolly and his ministers were intent on maintaining a fast pace o f
modernization, which caused frequent clashes with the state’s Catholic majority.
Although the seeds o f this conflict had been sown during the past half-century, not
until the 1860s and 1870s did the two sides engage in open conflict. Although the
liberals had a firm grip on political power, the increasing mobilization,
ultramontanization, and politicization o f Baden’s Catholics had transformed them into
worthy opponents. When Germany finally solved its national question based on a
kleindeutsch alternative, many Catholics hesitated to accept the new nation-state.
Drawing upon the increasing strength that they had displayed during the two previous
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decades, Baden’s Catholics were not simply subsumed by the new ProtestantPrussian-based national identity, but offered their own interpretation o f German
national identity, which was largely derived from their earlier experiences.
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CHAPTER 3
CELEBRATING UNIFICATION ON THE FRINGES OF THE EMPIRE:
KONSTANZER CATHOLICS AND THE COMMEMORATION OF UNIFICATION

When the citizens o f Konstanz celebrated the foundation o f the Second
German Empire in January o f 1871, many expressed hope that the new nation-state
would bring peace and harmony to a society that had been characterized by intense
conflicts for the past few years. Especially since Max von Stromeyer had been
elected mayor in 1866, the atmosphere in Konstanz had been marked by confessional
and political tensions. Stromeyer, one o f Baden’s leading liberals, had been
determined to end Konstanz’s economic woes by rapidly modernizing most aspects o f
local society. More importantly, his modernizing efforts centered on stripping the
Catholic Church o f many o f its economic and cultural resources. Although many of
Konstanz’s leading businessmen (most o f whom were Protestants) supported these
endeavors, the majority o f Catholics were opposed to the attempts to limit
significantly the role o f the Church. These reforms had also highlighted the difficult
position that Konstanzer Catholics faced during the 1860s and early 1870s. Caught
between old regional and religious loyalties and the growing presence o f Protestant
liberals who stressed the need to integrate the city into Baden, the North German
Confederation, and the Kaiserreich, these Catholics were forced to reevaluate and
renegotiate their identities in a most public manner. Consequently, despite
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constituting the overwhelming majority in the city, in 1871, Konstanzer Catholics
expressed doubts about entering a nation-state dominated by Prussian nationalliberals. Having experienced firsthand the effects o f nation-liberal rule, both liberal
and ultramontane Catholics were hesitant about the prospect o f becoming the kind o f
Germans envisioned by the Prussian Protestant elites.
This chapter will trace the initial reactions o f Konstanzer Catholics to the
foundation o f the Second Empire. Around the time o f unification, Konstanz was a city
caught in the midst between Protestant liberals and Catholics as well as between two
religious traditions. On the one hand, the city had for several centuries been the site o f
one o f the most important Archbishoprics in Central Europe, which had left a strong
legacy o f ultramontanism. On the other, during the last decade o f the eighteenth
century, Konstanz had been greatly affected by Josephine religious reforms and the
efforts o f Ignaz Heinrich von Wessenberg, one o f the most important German Catholic
reformers o f the nineteenth century. H alf a century later, the effects o f W essenberg’s
reforms were still evident as Konstanz housed a sizeable contingent o f liberal
Catholics. Because o f these often conflicting traditions, it is necessary to trace briefly
the recent history o f the city in order to better understand some o f the responses o f the
Catholics to the unification o f the Empire.

Turning Konstanzers into Badeners 1806-1871
Following the treaty o f Pressburg in 1805, Konstanz was transferred to what
was soon to become the Grand Duchy o f Baden. Having previously enjoyed the
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autonomous status o f a provincial city in the Habsburg Empire, Konstanzers were now
forced to adjust to life under new Grand Duke Karl Friedrich o f Baden-Baden.
Initially, most locals, especially the older generation, still identified with Austria while
many younger inhabitants wanted Konstanz to be incorporated into Switzerland.
Because o f the city’s location on the Swiss border, many were attracted by the relative
economic success o f their neighbors. Although citizens were not openly hostile to
their new ruler, it was still evident that there existed no widespread support for the
Badenese state. When the city was officially handed over to Baden on March 27,
1806, most Konstanzers treated the grand ceremony with indifference.1
In 1806, Konstanz had 4,419 inhabitants, most o f whom made their living from
a combination o f farming and some form o f trade or craft.2 Even by contemporary
standards, the local economy was underdeveloped, and since the Badenese state did
not employ primogeniture, fertile land was becoming increasingly scarce. Konstanz
was heavily Catholic (almost ninety percent), and similarly to most south German
cities, the Church played a dominant role in society. For several centuries, the city
had been the seat o f one o f the most powerful Archbishops in Central Europe, and
though their powers had diminished over the last hundred years, the Konstanzer high
■5

clergy still enjoyed substantial prestige at the beginning o f the nineteenth century.

1 Gert Zang, Konstanz in der Grossherzoglichen Zeit. Vol. 4.1. Restauration, Revolution, Liberate Ara
1806 bis 1870 (Konstanz: Stadler, 1994), 9. See also Ludwig Mathy, Wie Konstanz badisch wurde:
Szenische Bilder aus dem Jahr 1806 zu Erinnerung an der Vereinigung Konstanz mit dem
Kurfurstentum Baden (Konstanz: Presseverein, 1906).
2Zang, Konstanz in der Grossherzoglichen Zeit. Vol. 4.7,10.
3 For an in-depth treatment o f the conditions o f the Catholic Church in Konstanz during these turbulent
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For most of the Napoleonic wars, Konstanz remained outside the immediate
war scene. Only once, in 1809, did Austrian soldiers enter the city, but after tearing
down the Badenese coat of arms displayed on city hall, they quickly left. Although
not directly affected by the wars, locals still suffered from having to lodge both French
and Badenese soldiers at various times. In a city with an already strained economy,
the task o f supplying food and ammunition to soldiers was difficult to bear.
Consequently, inhabitants accused the new government in Karlsruhe o f imposing too
many demands on them. These sentiments constituted a recurring theme throughout
the nineteenth century, as locals often complained that government officials neglected
Konstanz because o f its status as a city on the margins o f the state.4
While other parts o f Baden slowly embarked on the industrialization process
during the first decade o f the pre-March period, little headway was made in Konstanz.
Instead o f gradually increasing the percentage o f people employed within trade and
industry, Konstanz witnessed the opposite development during the 1820s and early
1830s. One o f the most important reasons for the poor economic growth was the
reorganization o f the Catholic Church in Baden. Prior to the 1821 transfer o f the
Erzbischoflichen Ordinat (EO) to Freiburg, Konstanz received about 10,000 Gulden in
annual religious fees. In addition, the loss o f a number o f well-paid positions
negatively affected the economy. M any members o f the high Catholic clergy had
times, see Franz Xaver Bischof, Das Ende des Bistums Konstanz. Hochstift und Bistum Konstanz im
Spannungsfeld von Sdkularisation und Suppression (1802/03-1821/27) (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1989).
See also Helmut Maurer, Das Bistum Konstanz: Das Stift Sankt Stephan in Konstanz (Berlin: Walter de
Gruyter, 1981).
4 These sentiments dominate much o f the discussion in Zang, ed., Provianzialisierung einer Region.
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earned salaries that were among the highest in Konstanz, and their absence slowed the
local economy.
During the discussions concerning the reorganization o f the Catholic Church, it
soon became evident that Konstanz would not be the seat o f the new Archbishop,
despite the city’s strong Catholic tradition. Following the death o f Archbishop
Dalberg in 1817, the Badenese government endorsed Wessenberg, who lived and
worked in Konstanz, as their candidate. Attempting to convince the curia that he was
the most appropriate choice, Wessenberg spent five months in Rome in 1817,
answering to various accusations o f unchristian behavior. The Pope and his advisors
were primarily concerned about W essenberg’s attempts to translate the liturgy into
German and his attempts to democratize the Church. The controversy surrounding
Wessenberg affected all aspects o f society as the Pope was determined to strip the city
o f all religious power and importance, including moving the EO to Freiburg, which
had dire financial consequences.5
Konstanz’s slow industrialization impaired the development o f a local
bourgeoisie, and entrepreneurs only began to play a very modest role in city life in the
1830s. Because o f the city’s location on the Lake o f Constance and the Rhine,
members o f the bourgeoisie focused their initial efforts on the steamboat industry,
founding several steamboat companies and shipyards. Locals also began exploring

5 Lauer, Geschichte der katholischen Kirche im Grofiherzogtum Baden, 49-70. For a more general
treatment o f Wessenberg’s life and ideas, see Braun, Kirche und Aufklarung and Carl Radlspeck, Die
Nationalkirchliche Idee Ignaz Heinrich von Wessenbergs im Urteil der Flugschriftenliteratur 18031821 (Koln: Hansel-Hohenhausen, 1992).
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tourism as a means o f stimulating the economy. Throughout the first part o f the
century, the efforts to make Konstanz attractive to outsiders increased incentives to
develop infrastructure and public services.
When Baden joined the Customs Union in 1835, citizens were confident that it
would be the turning point for the economy, especially considering Konstanz’s status
as a border city. In addition, people were convinced that the emerging railroad
network would serve to further integrate Konstanz into the Badenese economy.
However, despite attempts o f local elites to persuade the state government to extend
the railroad to the shores o f the Lake o f Constance, it would be another twenty-five
years before the railroad was completed. During this period, few other topics attracted
more public attention. Proponents o f the railroad argued that there were two main
reasons why construction was never started: the Badenese government consciously
slighted Konstanz, and more importantly, city elites did not do enough to convince the
Grand Duke and his ministers o f the importance o f this issue.6 This reflected a
growing split among elites in the city as liberals became increasingly frustrated with
what they considered the reactionary and antimodem views o f most o f the ruling
strata. To complicate matters further, most o f the former were liberal Catholics and
Protestants, whereas the majority o f the latter belonged to the ultramontane faction,
which brought confessional politics into the realm o f city development.
Although the period between 1835 and 1848 witnessed modest economic

6 Zang, Geschichte der Stadt Konstanz im Grossherzoglichen Zeit. Vol. 4.1, 97, 113, 148-149, 197198,256-257.
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growth, primarily within the textile industry, the improvements did not match the
expectations o f locals, who began to voice publicly their dissatisfaction. To add
further to the tense atmosphere in the city, several religious conflicts took place in the
1840s, all o f which were increasingly tied to political issues. In the pre-March period,
most conservative Catholics supported the reactionary views o f Count Mettemich
while the majority o f liberal Catholics advocated a democratization o f society more in
line with the ideas o f Badenese liberals such as Karl von Rotteck and Adam von
Itzenstein. Although Konstanz, primarily due to the presence o f Wessenberg, housed
a relatively large contingent o f liberal Catholics, the proximity to Austria helped
strengthen the conservative camp. Combined with the increasing dissatisfaction with
the lack o f economic development, the religious revival that originated in the late
1830s created an explosive atmosphere.
The first major religious controversy emerged as several high-profile liberal
Catholics, utilizing their increased popularity after the revival, became more
aggressive in their attempts to reform and democratize the Church. When faced with
this development, in addition to the growing importance o f the city’s bourgeoisie, the
vast majority o f whom were liberal Catholics, ultramontane Catholics realized the
need to engage in public polemic with their liberal foes. The beginning o f the 1840s
witnessed the increasing consolidation o f liberal and ultramontane camps, which
remained for several decades. In 1845, a controversial visit by Archbishop Hermann
von Vicari triggered a full-blown conflict between liberals and ultramontanes. While
in Konstanz, Vicari refused to meet with any liberal clergy members, though some of
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them headed parishes o f considerable size. The Archbishop’s action caused an uproar
among liberal Catholics and several hundreds took to the streets, where they clashed
with ultramontanes. This event further reinforced the liberal Catholics’ conviction
that drastic measures were necessary to ensure their religious freedom, and in October
1845, they subsequently founded a chapter o f the deutsch-katholische church, which
opposed the perceived dogmatism within both the Catholic and Protestant churches.
Although the deutsch-katholische church attracted both Protestants and Catholics, in
Konstanz, the vast majority o f its members were Catholic. In response, ultramontanes
collected names for a petition demanding that all members o f the new church be
barred from public office, effectively illustrating how closely religious conflicts were
tied to local politics. The conflict surrounding the founding o f the deutsch-katholische
church demonstrates the importance o f confessional issues to the development o f a
public sphere.7
During the revolutions o f 1848-1849, Konstanz played a significant role.
Housing a large number o f radicals, the city served as the stage where Friedrich
Hecker allegedly proclaimed the republic and began his march on Karlsruhe. The
widespread revolutionary sentiments can mainly be attributed to the poor economic
situation and the inhabitants’ growing political awareness. Notwithstanding that some
progress had been made since 1835, the city’s economy was still underdeveloped, and
locals were keenly aware that they were not matching the progress o f other areas o f

7Alfred Diesbach, Die deutsch-katholische Gemeinde Konstanz, 1845-1849 (Mannheim: Freireligiose
Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1971).
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the state. Although an increasing number o f people derived their main income from
business or industry, most still had to resort to farming to make ends meet. The mood
in the city grew tense after 1845, especially since failed harvests marked the last two
years preceding the revolutions. In 1847, over 1/3 o f the local population depended on
charity to survive, and the city remained in a very agitated state in the months leading
up to the revolution.8
When the news about the Paris days arrived in Konstanz in March 1848,
citizens were convinced that drastic change was imminent. On March 4, the city
council published a long list o f demands, including complete freedom o f press and
religion, the right to bear arms, abolition o f all feudal dues, and the election o f a
national parliament. In addition, they formed a large representative body—the
permanent committee—which was to hold a weekly meeting until all o f its demands
had been met. Comprising the majority o f this committee, Konstanzer republicans
were able to determine the political agenda in the initial stages o f the revolution. One
of their first actions was to nominate a delegation for the Offenburg meeting.
However, the Konstanzers’ initial revolutionary fervor was temporarily taken aback as
they discovered that representatives from the rest o f the state were not nearly as
radical. Following intense deliberations in Offenburg, they refrained from declaring
the republic, something that leading revolutionary Joseph Fickler had promised his
fellow Konstanzers before leaving.9

8 Zang, Geschichte der Stadt Konstanz im Grossherzoglichen Zeit. Vol. 4.1, 151-153.
9For general accounts o f the revolution(s) in the southern part o f Germany, please see Franz Vollmer,
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In late March, fivehundred Konstanzers armed themselves in response to
(false) rumors that the French were about to attack the city. When the French threat
did not materialize, these armed citizens remained on the streets to “uphold law and
order.” Although this represented a significant intensification o f the revolution, it was
not until the arrest o f Fickler on April 8 that sentiments for an armed uprising began to
spread. When Hecker arrived in Konstanz a few days later, he found the city in an
uproar. However, despite their brash rhetoric, most Konstanzers were in the end
unwilling to join Hecker’s march on Karlsruhe. On April 12, when Hecker called on
the crowds to form an army, several people openly opposed him, arguing that a
military revolt would not solve their problems. Even the most radical leaders such as
Nepomuk Katzenmayer and Eduard Vanotti refrained from officially supporting
Hecker. As Hecker surveyed his troops in the pouring rain on April 13, only about
thirty people followed him out o f the city. To be sure, in the following days, a few
hundred more joined his army, but he never attracted the number o f supporters he had
envisioned. Locals were discouraged by the Prussian troops that were waiting outside
the state’s border, providing a limited prospect for success. In addition, most o f the
revolutionary sentiment in and around Konstanz stemmed from the countryside, and
once the Badenese government abolished feudal dues, a major reason for revolting

D er Traum von der Freiheit. Vormarz und 48er Revolution in Suddeutschland in zeitgendssischen
Bildern (Stuttgart: Theiss, 1983); idem, Offenburg 1848/49 For discussion o f the events in Konstanz,
see Diesbach, “Friedrich Hecker verktindete am 12. April 1848 vom Balkon des Stadthauses Konstanz
aus die deutsche Republick-Wahrhiet oder Legende?” Konstanzer Almanack, 1974, 39-46, and Elmar
Fetscher, D er Konstanzer Bilrgermeister Karl Hiletlein und seine Zeit (Konstanz: Verlag der Siidkurier,
1987), 152-156.
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was removed.10
Although Bavarian troops occupied Konstanz after Hecker’s defeat,
revolutionary sentiment did not disappear. Arrests, persecutions, and trials o f
supposed revolutionaries were constant features and served to maintain the tense
atmosphere. Konstanz’s location on the Swiss border also contributed to keeping the
revolution alive as many radicals escaped across the border, where they continued
their activities.11 During the winter o f 1848-1849, in a similar fashion to many other
German states, revolutionaries improved their organization at the grass-root level.
Numerous local associations were founded, o f which the Vaterlandischen Verein
became the most important one. Members were especially successful in awakening
the small but vocal local proletariat, which came to play an important role in the
uprising in 1849.
On May 15,1849, members o f the Vaterlandischen Verein met to discuss the
desertion o f government soldiers at Rastatt and Grand Duke Leopold’s flight to
France. They initiated a barrage o f criticism o f Mayor Karl Hiietlein, accusing him o f
having been too conservative in 1848, causing the first revolution to fail. Many
argued that if he was allowed to remain in office, this second uprising would fizzle as
well. For the next three weeks, Konstanz was a flurry o f political activity as citizens
prepared for mayoral elections. Despite the criticism, Hiietlein survived the most
democratic election in the history o f the city. The result indicated that the radical
10 Diesbach, “Friedrich Flecker,” 41-43.
n Fetscher, Der Konstanzer Biirgermeister, 156-158.
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faction, though still very vocal, was quickly losing support. Voters were likely
influenced by the fact that at the time o f the election, it was becoming increasingly
evident that the Badenese revolution would not be able to withstand the force o f
Prussian and Hessian troops. When Prussians invaded the state, Brentano and his
democratic government fled to Konstanz in a last attempt to delay the inevitable.
After only sporadic fighting, Prussian soldiers entered the city on July 11 and a few
days later placed the entire region under military occupation.12
Following the defeat o f the revolution, the Grand Duke and his ministers
appointed a new local government and restricted political activity to a minimum.
Hessian and Prussian troops occupied the city, placing a considerable burden on the
local community. In addition to the financial strain, soldiers imposed heavy
restrictions on everyday life. The often abusive treatment locals received at the hands
o f Prussian soldiers created much animosity, which remained long after the troops had
departed.13 In light o f the recent spread o f radicalism, in 1852, the Badenese
government awarded Konstanz a garrison. Locals expressed delight at this decision,
which helped stimulate the economy. However, a repressive political climate and an
economic recession characterized most o f the 1850s. Largely as a result o f
widespread emigration to America, the population decreased between 1852 and 1858.
The 1850s ended on a positive note as the Badenese government finally decided to

12 Gustav Konig, ed., Konstanzer Licht-und Schattenbilder seit 1848. Bearbeitet nach den personlichen
Schilderungen des Giirtelmeisters Josef Wirth in Konstanz anlafilich seines 80. Geburtstages
(Konstanz: Konig, 1911), 17-21.
13 See for instance, Konstanzer Zeitung, 14, 16, 30 July, 1,4,5 October 1849.
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extend the railroad to Konstanz in 1858. This news caused an eruption o f joy in the
city, as citizens were convinced that their economy would finally improve. To a
certain extent, they were correct. Although the abolishing o f the guilds in 1862 also
helped considerably to stimulate the economy, the most important incentive for
growth in the 1860s stemmed from the railroad, which was finally completed in 1863.
During the 1860s, Konstanz underwent a slow but steady economic growth.
Highly important to the city’s development was the foundation o f the Gewerbeverein
in I860.14 Comprised o f the most prominent members o f the city’s bourgeoisie, this
organization proclaimed as their specific goal to alter the attitudes o f locals towards
work and leisure. Members spread leaflets and organized meetings where they
stressed that Konstanzers could no longer blame outside circumstances for their
problems. Inherent in this discourse was a heavy criticism o f the Catholic Church and
its allegedly negative views o f industrialization and modernization, which placed
almost insurmountable obstacles on Konstanz’s road to a modem society. Members of
the Gewerbeverein also tied this discussion to the controversy surrounding the
Badenese Concordat. Immediately prior to the debates in the Second Chamber,
Konstanz was heavily polarized as locals presented petitions for and against the
Concordat to the Grand Duke. It is noteworthy that in their criticisms o f the proposed
agreement, liberals argued that the Concordat would place an insurmountable obstacle
on the road to German unification. Sensing the growing force o f German nationalism,
they argued that if the Grand Duke signed this agreement, it would alienate the
14 Zang, Die Geschichte der Stadt Konstanz im Grossherzoglichen Zeit. Vol. 4.1,231.
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northern states to such an extent as to make unification impossible.15 Once again,
these conflicts effectively illustrate how intricately tied confessional issues were to all
aspects o f Konstanzer society, including major issues such as modernization and the
German question. Confessional attitudes largely determined attitudes in political,
economic, and cultural questions.
The death of Wessenberg in 1860 provided Konstanz’s liberals an opportunity
to display publicly their increasing strength. Immensely popular with the local
population, W essenberg’s funeral was an event o f great magnitude. Controversy
ensued when the EO refused to send a representative to the ceremony, which,
considering that the current Archbishop Hermann von Vicari had worked together
with Wessenberg for over half a century, was regarded a tremendous insult. Indicating
the importance o f the deceased reformer, though the Grand Duke did not personally
attend the funeral, he placed an elaborate wreath on W essenberg’s grave a few days
later. Liberals took full advantage o f all these ceremonies, portraying Wessenberg as
an ideal citizen who had always attempted to modernize the Church as well as the
city.16 This discourse illustrates how the discussions on modernization encompassed
all aspects o f society, from the German question to the future character o f the city.
Taking place just a few months after the liberals had replaced the conservative
government in Karlsruhe, this increasingly aggressive criticism o f ultramontanes

15 Konstanzer Zeitung, 29 February, 16 March, 6, 11 April 1860. For a more general treatment o f this
conflict, see Becker, Liberaler Staat und Kirche, 35-55.
16Konstanzer Zeitung, 10, 16, 22, 23, 25 August 1860.
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indicated that the city was entering a new era.
As was evident in conjunction with the death o f Wessenberg, German
nationalism had started to take root in Konstanz in the beginning o f the 1860s. In
1861, the local singing society participated in the first all-German singing festival in
Nuremberg. Upon their return, members reported excitedly about the fellow Germans
they had met and the growing sense o f unity that was spreading around the German
states.17 In 1862, a local chapter o f the Nationalverein was founded, though it initially
did not attract too much attention. Also in 1862, newspapers encouraged locals with
“the right amount o f patriotism” to participate in the first commemoration o f the battle
o f Leipzig.18 This popular ceremony serves as an illustrative example o f an invented
tradition as contemporaries failed to note that Baden had actually fought on the French
side in the battle. This celebration sparked more intense debates regarding the
German question. In 1863, members o f the grossdeutsche camp founded the
Bodensee Zeitung, arguing that the increasingly liberal Konstanzer Zeitung
misrepresented facts in this and other discussions. Not surprisingly, the founding o f
the former caused the latter to become even more openly liberal as the two papers
engaged in intense polemics in the years leading up to the war o f 1866.
The intricate ties between local and national politics was demonstrated as it
became increasingly evident that the two factions in the German question represented
two different attitudes towards the future character o f the city. Most o f the supporters
17 Zang, Die Geschichte der Stadt Konstanz im Grossherzoglichen Zeit. Vol. 4.1, 270.
18 Ibid.
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o f the kleindeutsche solution viewed Prussia as their ideal. Just as Prussians had over
the years transformed their state into one o f the most powerful entities in Europe,
locals envisioned that hard work and the right amount o f sacrifices would turn
Konstanz into an important city. Adopting the term Groflhungern as their method o f
changing the nature o f the city, they argued that no sacrifice was too severe on the
road to success. However, until 1866, Konstanzer liberals were in a difficult position.
Often criticized for being too “Prussian,” many o f their ideas alienated the local
population. The majority of Konstanzers still remembered vividly the events o f 18481849 and the subsequent Prussian occupation, and hostile sentiments were still
widespread. The supporters o f the grossdeutsche solution also advocated
modernization, but at a more reasonable pace. Despite the changing political climate
in the state, the grossdeutsche camp dominated city politics until the war o f 1866. The
majority o f Konstanzers championed the plans for unification, but only a relatively
small number could envision a German state without Austria.19
Following the Austrian defeat in the war o f 1866, liberals essentially forced the
grossdeutsche Mayor Joseph Stadler into resignation. Stromeyer, who had been one
o f the city’s leading and most vocal liberals for the past decade, succeeded him.
Determined to modernize the city at all costs, his policies became a source o f great
conflicts for the next decade. He first centered his attention on removing Church
control o f the Spitalstiftung. The long-time presence o f archbishops and other
members o f the high clergy had enabled the Church to generate a considerable wealth,
19 See for instance, Konstanzer Zeitung, 28 December 1863, 23 February, 23, 27 March 1864.
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much o f which was located in the Spitalstiftung. The Spital constituted a powerful
institution as it provided citizens with several different welfare services. Ever since
1865, liberals had frequently brought the issue o f the Spital to the forefront o f public
discussion, attempting to sway public opinion in their favor. After an intense
campaign where he made repeated overtures to the Grand Duke and his government,
Stromeyer achieved his goal in 1867 as the Badenese government awarded the city
complete control over the Spital. This decision caused an outrage from the
ultramontane Catholics, who claimed that the poor would suffer tremendously from
this change.

0(\

Emboldened by this success, in 1868, Stromeyer abolished confessional
schools, which made Konstanz the first Badenese city to initiate interconfessional
schools.

21

Since 1864, liberals had occupied the majority o f important posts in the

newly founded Oberschulraten, and they placed much emphasis on altering the
educational system. Following the controversial manner in which Stromeyer had
acquired the Spital from the Church, this decision made the mayor one o f the most
despised men in the area. Many conservative Catholics argued, not without right, that
a small minority was making decisions that significantly altered the lives o f all
Konstanzers. To make matters worse, this small minority initiated policies that were
completely contrary to the desires o f the population. This time, the Church was
20Zang, “Die Bedeutung der Auseinandersetzung um die Stiftungsverwaltung in Konstanz (1830-1870)
fflr die okonomische und gesellschaftlihce Entwicklung der lokalen Gesellschaft,” in Provizialisierung
einer Region, ed. Zang, 307-373.
21 Werner Trapp, “Volksschulreform und liberales Burgertum in Konstanz,” in Provizialisierung einer
Region, ed. Zang, 375-434.
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determined to offer some resistance. After several weeks o f intense debates, the EO
excommunicated Stromeyer in 1868, an event that echoed throughout the German
lands.22
The last two years before the outbreak o f the Franco-Prussian War witnessed
an increased hostility between liberals and Catholics in the city. At this time, Konstanz
contained about 12,000 inhabitants, with Catholics numbering almost 10,000. The
polarization o f local society became clearly evident in the mayoral elections in June
1870. Known as the dirtiest in city history, the elections served as a referendum on
the future character o f the city. Few citizens on either side o f the political spectrum
would have denied that they were facing a choice as to how Konstanz should
modernize. The liberals argued that the changes that they had implemented since
1866 had already brought some significant economic progress, while Catholics
claimed that liberal reforms had been too drastic and that though modernization was
necessary, it had to be conducted in a more gradual manner. On June 23, 1870,
Stromeyer won the election by a small margin, largely because the opposition had not
been able to coordinate their forces. Catholics and Democrats were only united in
their opposition to Stromeyer and had failed to form a coherent political program.

22 Ibid
23 Zang, Geschichte der Stadt Konstanz in der Grossherzoglichen Zeit. Vol. 4.2: Aufschwung im
Kaiserreich (Konstanz: Stadler, 1993), 15-19.
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The Franco-Prussian War and the Development of a Commemorative
Discourse
Consequently, as relations between Prussia and France grew increasingly
hostile in the summer o f 1870, the majority o f Konstanzers were preoccupied with
local politics. Throughout the spring and early summer, newspapers almost
exclusively focused on the election and many citizens seemed almost surprised when
relations between the two states rapidly deteriorated in mid-July. However, when the
city’s regiment left on July 17, papers centered their attention on the impending
conflict, and the atmosphere in the city changed drastically.24
For Konstanz’s ultramontanes, the outbreak o f war signaled a temporary
respite from the misfortunes o f local politics and provided them with an opportunity to
reestablish themselves as an important societal force. Already on July 19, the Catholic
Freie Stimme assured its readers that the unjustified belligerence o f Napoleon III had
caused the war and that the south German states were determined to support Prussia.25
Reflecting the current political conditions, the papers also stressed that they hoped that
the war would bring some unity to Konstanz and the rest of Germany. Citizens
quickly became absorbed by the events in the west. Catholics and Protestants alike
expressed fears that a French victory would mean disaster for the city, and politicians
called upon all men and women, regardless o f confession and political opinion, to
serve the fatherland, w h ich now incorporated n ot only the local and regional b u t the

24 See for instance Freie Stimme, July 19, 1870.
25 Ibid.
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national as well.26
Despite these official sentiments o f unity, events o f recent years had created
deep-seated resentments that would not easily disappear. Even when expressing
support for the war, Catholics remarked that at least this time, all Germans would be
fighting on the same side, which constituted an improvement compared to 1866. Still
smarting from that defeat, local Catholics predicted that all German soldiers would
battle in an “honest and determined” manner, which apparently had not been the case
in 1866. They even offered some renewed criticism o f the Bavarian effort in the last
war, assuring that the German troops would have no difficulties locating the battle
fields in France, unlike the Bavarians in 1866, who had claimed that they “could not
find the enemy.”27
Notwithstanding these tendencies, Catholics and Protestants alike celebrated
the first few victories. Both camps interpreted these triumphs as signs o f better things
to come, and though initially not too aggressive in their nationalist rhetoric, they soon
began calling for annexation o f Elsass and Lothringen.28 The victory at Sedan caused
the most public excitement as people gathered in the streets to celebrate the capture o f
Napoleon III. Although both Catholics and Protestants greeted the news o f early
victories with great relief and excitement, it soon became evident that the two groups
viewed this conflict in different ways. Already after a few days o f war, Konstanzer
26 Freie Stimme, July 21, 1870; Konstanzer Zeitung, July 21, 1870.
21 Freie Stimme, July 21, 1870.
28 Konstanzer Zeitung, October 2, 1870.
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Zeitung claimed that though internal peace should be protected, locals must not turn a
“blind eye” to the activities o f the Catholic clergy. Several liberals had been quoted as
stating that this war had little to do with the Prussians and the French; instead the
Jesuits and their actions at the Vatican Council were to blame for the current
hardships. Liberals also claimed that the Catholic hatred o f all things Prussian had
convinced Napoleon III that he could provoke war without having to face a united
German army.

9Q

These accusations reflected the hostile local political climate prior to

war, though it is doubtful how much attention Napoleon paid to Catholic demands to
“throw the Prussian [Stromeyer] out o f City Hall.”
As it became increasingly evident that Germany would win the war, most
Konstanzers turned to the issue o f the future character o f the nation-state. Liberals
were especially active in this debate, pointing out that they had finally been proven
correct about the inherently flawed character o f a South German Federation. They
ridiculed Catholics for having supported this idea, and some claimed that this proved
how ignorant Catholics were about foreign policy matters, which in the end would
justify banning them from local politics.
One o f the most severe conflicts between Catholics and Protestants in
Konstanz during the war emerged in mid-November. At a banquet celebrating the
conquering o f Metz, the Protestant city council member Ernst Zogelmann proclaimed
what he labeled a new version o f “The Lord’s Prayer.” Modeled on the famous prayer,
29 Konstanzer Zeitung, July 24, 26, 28; Freie Stimme, July 26, August 2, 1870.
30 Konstanzer Zeitung, November 5, 20, 1870.
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Zogelmann’s version, entitled “A Pious German’s Wish,” was not directed to God, but
to the King o f Prussia. Zogelmann pleaded with the King to grant Germans what they
had so long been striving for: a unified nation-state. This request in itself would not
have offended Catholics, but Zogelmann continued by asking Wilhelm to destroy the
power o f the “blacks,” who were attempting to divide and weaken the German
nation.

T1

During the following days, Zogelmann’s blasphemous speech became the

topic o f conversation among locals, and Catholics expressed their outrage in a variety
o f ways. They claimed that to ask Wilhelm to destroy Catholic power was not only
futile but also constituted a grave insult o f the King’s character. Although not a
Catholic, Wilhelm had often proven him self to be a man o f proper religious
convictions. Judging from his frequent praise o f God after German military victories,
it was evident that he was a pious man who would never deliberately hurt his Catholic
subjects. By suggesting otherwise, Zogelmann had insulted the King and should be
punished accordingly.

'K ')

As we shall see later, Catholics, though critical o f the official

commemorative discourse, strove to stress their respect for and loyalty to the future
German Emperor, providing additional evidence that Wilhelm on many occasions was
located outside the official canon o f nationalism. In a similar fashion, the Emperor
was also never truly associated with the K ulturkam pf though “his” politicians were
the ones instigating the legislation.

31 The poem was published in its entirety in Freie Stimme, November 9, 1870. The banquet took place
on October 29, 1870.
32 Freie Stimme, November 9, 1870.
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Catholics also argued that Zogelmann’s demands for complete disempowerment o f the Catholics proved that he and his fellow Protestants were creating
divisions among Germans. In addition, his blasphemous speech made clear that he
had little or no respect for religion, which was so important to all Germans, whether
Catholic or Protestant. Catholics stressed that their clergy members displayed a better
sense o f patriotism when refusing to support the demands for execution o f Napoleon
III.

33

Only a German without a deeper understanding o f nationalism would call for

further punishment o f Napoleon III, a man who had already lost everything. This was
one o f the earliest instances where Catholics displayed a different perception o f their
national identity. Contrary to most official canons o f nationalism, Catholics often
stressed the humane aspects o f their patriotism. As nationalism grew increasingly
populist, they often complained that it appealed to the worst aspects o f people,
encouraging greed, intolerance, and ignorance. Catholics argued that their ability to
display compassion for the fallen enemy made them better Germans.
All Konstanzers greeted the news that Wilhelm had been crowned German
Emperor with enthusiasm, and locals again united briefly around success.34 Towards
the end o f February, district council (Gemeinderat) members began contemplating
which types o f festivities would be appropriate to celebrate the recent events.
Members were acutely aware o f the divided nature o f the city, as they naively stressed
that if celebrated in the appropriate manner, the peace celebration on March 3-4
33 Freie Stimme, November 12, 1870.
34 See for instance Konstanzer Zeitung, January 19, 1871; Freie Stimme, January 21, 1871.
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should be a major step towards unifying the community. Consequently, they decided
to be quite strict in their guidelines for this festival, emphasizing the need to display
Konstanzers as unified and much supportive o f the new Reich. Alongside school
children o f all ages, they invited a wide variety o f associations and organizations to
participate.35 They hoped to present a representative cross section o f Konstanzer
society, in which people from different political and confessional groups would
partake in the festivities. In a rather unusual move, they specifically stressed that
women were invited to attend the banquet at night, though the latter were informed
that they would have to dress properly, otherwise they might be refused entry.36 In
their invitation, which was published in all major newspapers, members o f the district
council also declared that at the banquet everyone who wished to propose a toast
would be able to do so. It was not clear whether this offer extended to the women as
well. These initiatives suggest that liberal elites attempted to present these
celebrations as emerging from below. By encouraging extensive personal
participation, they wanted to display how excited Konstanzers were at the prospect o f
becoming Germans. In addition, by allowing regular citizens to partake actively in the
festivities, they hoped to strengthen their grip on the commemorative discourse and to
increase personal identification with the ideological message that they hoped to instill
in locals. By establishing the framework for these commemorations, liberals
35 Stadtarchiv Konstanz (St. AK hereafter), S II 5375. Militar und Kriegssachen: Den deutschfranzosischen Krieg 1870-1871. Friedensfeiem und Erinnerungsfeiern. Protocol from district council
meeting, February 24, 1871.
36 The invitation can be found in St. AK, S II 5375.
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attempted to solidify their hegemony on this public discourse. If they were able to
control the context in which patriotism and nationalism were expressed, they would be
in a better position to control the construction o f the new German identity.
As for the religious aspect o f the ceremony, organizers wanted to eliminate any
potential conflicts. On February 24, they approached the Catholic and Protestant
parishes with the request that they would ring the church bells in the manner
prescribed by the council. They furthermore outlined the contents o f the religious
celebrations, determining which prayers should be said as well as how long the service
would last. Aware o f how unusual these demands were, they repeatedly stated how
important it was that this celebration presented the city and its inhabitants as
supportive citizens o f the new Reich.37 All parishes replied that they would conduct
their services according to the wishes o f the district council.38 Organizers were keenly
aware of the confessional tensions in the city, and by streamlining the services, they
hoped to avoid any possible controversies. They had most likely observed some o f the
conflicts that had occurred around Baden in the wake o f similar celebrations. Often,
both Protestant and Catholic clergy members used these occasions to further their own
agenda rather than commemorating the sacrifices made by their soldiers. There were
frequent reports o f especially Protestant clergy who delivered sermons more aimed at

37 See note no. 47.
38 St. AK, S II 5375, replies from the three Catholic and one evangelical parishes that they would oblige
by these directions.
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re-launching the Kulturkam pf than promoting unity.

-2Q

Aware o f the already

fragmented nature o f their city, organizers wanted to avert a similar scenario. Catholic
clergy members appealed to members o f the district council to visit their service, but
this request was refused on the basis that people could choose to attend whichever
service they wanted.40
As is often the case around the Lake o f Constance in the wintertime, March 3
was very foggy with poor visibility. Initially upset at the fact that the weather did not
cooperate, locals soon discovered that the fog actually enhanced the almost
transcendental atmosphere in the city. Public buildings were lit up during the day, and
many commented that it seemed as if the celebration took place in magical
surroundings. Some locals displayed banners that stressed the unity and future success
o f the German Reich. The train station was decorated with a painting o f Germania
with accompanying text: “On the ground lays the poisonous dragon/Which Germania
defeated with a strong hand/This was the victory for the just cause/God bless our
German Fatherland.” The two-day celebration ended with a banquet in Konzilsaal, in
which one of the walls was decorated in a suitable manner: Germania offering
protection to two figures, representing Rhein and Konstanz 41 This symbolism made it
evident that leading Konstanzers were keen to emphasize the city’s place within the
newly founded Reich. Liberals viewed these sentiments as a logical continuation o f
39 See the discussion pertaining to the celebrations in Freiburg.
40 St. AK, SII 5375, correspondence between the district council and the parish o f St. Stephan.
41 Konstanzer Zeitung, March 6, 1871, contained extensive coverage o f the festivities.
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their own efforts to economically and culturally integrate the city into Baden. They
believed that their efforts to rid Konstanz o f its marginal status had finally been
rewarded. Stromeyer’s “Prussian” behavior was no longer something to criticize, but
instead was deemed necessary for the future success o f the city. However, not all
inhabitants agreed with the messages displayed on the banners. Many Catholics were
especially offended by the one that hung on one o f the major schools in the city:
“Looking ahead/building on the school/what we cannot see/we trust to the future.”42
By referring to the initiation o f the interconfessional school as one o f the reasons why
the war effort had been so successful, liberals attempted to legitimize their reforms in
the best possible way: by linking these reforms to the strength and success o f the
German Reich. This issue was especially sensitive to Catholics since they considered
the liberal views on education to be particularly harmful to German society. Many
sermons contained references to the important role that Catholics and the Church had
to play in the educational realm. Catholics also tied this issue to the new nationalist
discourse as they often argued that young men and women could only learn the true
notions o f patriotism within the confines o f the Church since the Bible constituted the
best source on how to love one’s fatherland.
Although many people participated in the celebration, and liberals deemed it a
great success, the peace celebration had not created the much-hoped-for unity. One
reason for the failure was the local national parliamentary elections that had been held
in late February, which had hardened divisions in the city. Although this election at
42 Ibid.
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first glance might not seem to be relevant to our discussion, a closer examination of
the rhetoric employed during the campaign reveals that it served as one o f the first
instances in which Catholics and Protestants began to construct the memory o f the
recent war. Taking advantage o f the current political climate, liberals in Baden and
around Germany conducted a very aggressive election campaign in which they used
the military victory and the unification as proof o f the superiority o f their policies-all
expressed through vocabulary and discourse adapted from the war.43 The Protestantliberal campaign focused to a great extent on portraying their opposition from the
Catholic People’s Party as traitors who had not contributed to the war effort and in
some instances even prayed for French victory. The traitorous clergy member became
a prominent theme in the election campaign as liberals used the nationalist discourse
to promote their political agenda. Most o f the topics discussed pertained to the war,
and liberals often pointed out that prior to 1870, the Catholic candidate, Franz von
Bodman, had advocated a decrease in military spending, which had it been passed,
certainly would have led to the demise o f the Badenese fatherland.44 In his campaign,
von Bodman was frank about his past policies, admitting that though he was ecstatic
that Germany had been unified, he would have preferred the unification process to
involve Austria as well. However, he was keen to stress that these sentiments did not
prevent him from being a true German and that if elected he would ensure that the

43 Zang, Konstanz in der Grossherzoglichen Zeit. Vol. 4.2, 24.
44 Konstanzer Zeitung, February 14, 21, 1871.
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unified fatherland would become strong, just, and powerful.45 This was an important
statement since it clearly displayed that Catholics subscribed to different notions o f
Germanness. When von Bodman admitted that he was still very much tied to the
Austrian cause, he expressed publicly what many Catholics thought privately.
Unfortunately for von Bodman and his fellow Catholics, their assertions that these
sentiments did not mean that they were any less German than their liberal and
Protestant opponents fell on deaf ears. In a postwar period characterized by
heightened nationalist sentiments, any allusions to loyalty to the recently defeated
Austrians were sure to provoke accusations o f treason and anti-Germanness.
As the election drew nearer, local Protestants intensified their efforts of
portraying Catholics as poor Germans who had contributed little, if anything to the
war effort. A few days before the election, auxiliary Bishop Lothar von Kiibel
published a pastoral letter in which he only briefly discussed the recent military and
political events, instead focusing on the debate over papal infallibility.46 Liberals
claimed that the pastoral letter proved that Rome was the true Heimat o f the Catholics.
They accused Kiibel o f being wholly unaware o f what the majority o f Germans
wanted: to continue to celebrate unification. Liberals repeatedly returned to this
pastoral letter, emphasizing how it displayed just how alienated Catholics were from
the German nation and how important it was that voters take note o f Catholic attitudes
toward the recent historical events. Political opponents stressed the notion that
45 Freie Stimme, February 23, 1871.
46 Konstanzer Zeitung, February 21, 1871.
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Catholics could not be trusted with political power, since they obviously did not have
sufficient knowledge o f what Germans considered to be the most important issues of
contemporary society. Consequently, not only were Catholics accused o f being
traitors, but they were also declared unfit to hold political power.
The outcome o f the election proved disastrous for the Catholics. Despite the
heavily Catholic nature o f Konstanz, the liberal candidate received more than twice
the votes o f his Catholic opponent. This was not an abnormal result, as liberals
received twelve out o f the fourteen Badenese mandates to the national parliament.47
Local politicians were quick to utilize this election result as yet another piece o f
evidence that Konstanzers were tired o f the poor Catholic leadership and that the
people had faith in the national-liberals to integrate properly the city into the new
Reich. Most o f their election analyses were framed in nationalist terms, and the fact
that the results were celebrated in conjunction with the peace celebration indicates
how keen liberals were to tie their political victory to the emerging nationalist
discourse. They consistently stressed that people had cast their votes based on
patriotic and nationalist sentiments and that voters had recognized their efforts during
the past decade to integrate Konstanz into Germany.48
The arrival o f the troops in the city on March 29, 1871, constituted the last
major celebration in the immediate aftermath o f the war. Similarly to the previous

47 See for instance Konstanzer Zeitung, March 6, 1871. For a complete treatment o f election results in
Baden during the Kaiserreich, see Fred Sepaintner, Die Reichtagswahlen im Groflherzogtum Baden.
Ein B eitragzur Wahlgeschichte im Kaiserreich (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1983).
48 Konstanzer Zeitung, March 11, 1871.
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commemorations, Konstanzers displayed different attitudes towards this ceremony. A
committee comprising the leading men o f the city met the soldiers just outside the city
and accompanied them to the Marktstatte, where a gigantic triumphal arch complete
with flower decorations had been built. On the arch, a poem heralded the great
sacrifices made by the soldiers. The poem, in a similar fashion to the one on the
school, hinted at national-liberal policies as the reason for this great success. The first
few lines read: “A people skilled with weapons/skilled in science/can create
wonders....”49 Although not addressing any specific liberal policies, it was clear that
the reference to science indicated that the national-liberal program had paved the way
for the military victories. Several houses were decorated, and many people appeared
in the streets to greet their local heroes. The rhetoric employed at the celebration was
heavily laden with nationalist symbols, and speakers lauded the troops as saviors o f
the fatherland. Still suffering from the dreadful election result, conservative Catholics
maintained a low profile both prior to and after the celebration.
While Konstanzer Zeitung covered the event in detail, often quoting speeches
verbatim, Freie Stimme was more reserved in its treatment o f this celebration.50
Although they agreed that this was a memorable day, they were not as excited as their
liberal colleagues. Instead, they used this occasion to offer a subtle challenge to the
liberal control o f the commemorative discourse as they criticized the liberal use o f the
term “fatherland.” They reminded their readers that in 1866, liberals had been quite
49 Konstanzer Zeitung, March 30, 1871.
50 Freie Stimme, March 30, 1871.
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confused about the nature o f their fatherland, and it was inconsistent to claim now that
they all along had advocated this specific solution to the German question. Catholics
were becoming increasingly concerned about how liberals construed the previous war
to fit the official commemorative discourse that suggested a teleological approach to
the wars o f unification. Local liberals often praised the previous war as the first
necessary step towards unity. They admitted that at the time, many had viewed it as a
case o f Prussian expansionism, but history has proven that it constituted a required
clarification o f the relationship between the two great German powers. In their
attempts to rewrite the history o f the previous war, they always stressed how antiPrussian the Catholics had been, failing to mention that they had been highly critical
o f Bismarck and Prussia as well. Freie Stimme often focused on outlining and
explaining some o f the events (in which Bismarck’s role was becoming increasingly
suspect) that caused the war o f 1866.51 Throughout the next few years, they spent
considerable efforts trying to uncover the true reasons for the war, and many o f these
arguments were subsequently used to attack Bismarck and the liberals’ official version
of nationalism. As scholars have noted, responses to war are formed both through
personal experience and through pre-existing narratives.52 The act o f remembering a
war is done through a pre-existing cultural narrative, which aids people to understand
the present conflict. One o f the problems that Catholics encountered when attempting
51 These efforts intensified with time. See for instance, Freie Stimme, August 12, 1871.
52 For a very useful addition to the vast literature on this topic, see T.G. Ashplant, Graham Dawson, and
Michael Roper, eds., The Politics o f War: Memory and Commemoration (London: Routledge, 2000);
see also Peter Burke, “History as Social Memory,” in Memory, History, Culture and the Mind, ed. T.
Butler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 97-113.
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to express their memories o f the last war was that the official state-sponsored
discourse did not provide any frameworks through which Catholics could express their
sense o f Germanness as well as their view o f unification. While liberals, aided by
their control o f political power, sought to rework the meaning o f earlier historical
episodes such as the war o f 1866 to fit the official narrative, Catholics struggled to
preserve an alternative discourse that was threatened to be subsumed by the
hegemonic Protestant-liberal discourse.

Constructing a Kriegerdenkmal in Konstanz
While busy planning the peace celebration, members o f the city council also
discussed the need for a monument to celebrate recent events.

53

Swept up in the

commemorative craze that characterized most o f Germany at this time, it seemed
obvious that the city o f Konstanz would construct a statue as well. As will become
evident in later chapters, cities around Baden all embarked on similar projects during
the first few years o f the Second Empire. The city council first addressed this matter
on February 23, 1871. At this meeting, members initially considered placing a plaque
with the names of all participating soldiers on city hall. All agreed that in light o f the
sacrifices that these soldiers had made, the city would pay for the plaque. After
expressing concerns that two commemorative projects (a plaque and a monument)
would be too costly, members decided to explore the option o f constructing a

53 St. AK, S II 3045. Militar und Kriegssachen. Errichtung eines Kriegerdenkmals. Protocol from city
council meeting, Febmary 23, 1871.
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monument and placing a plaque on the base o f the statue. At the same meeting, they
also discussed the matter o f the proposed Siegesdenkmal in Freiburg, which was an
issue that caused them many problems during the next few months. Although they
were aware that it was supposed to represent the gratefulness o f the entire Badenese
state, they hesitated to contribute any funds. In their response to Freiburg, they stated
that they were considering constructing a monument in Konstanz, which would make
it very difficult for Konstanzers to donate any money to the statue in Freiburg.54
The city council’s attitude to the Siegesdenkmal is noteworthy. There is no
evidence that at the time o f their reply to Freiburg, they had finalized their plans to
build their own monument. Furthermore, during the next few weeks, as they refused
to answer letters from Freiburg and failed to organize any collection drives, it became
increasingly evident that members realized that they should have acted differently. On
May 28, the Konstanzers finally replied, reiterating that they would not be able to
participate in this project, since the construction o f their own monument would empty
the funds designated for commemorative activities. They also claimed that since they
had made their decision to construct a monument prior to the decision in Freiburg,
there was not anything that could be done about the situation. According to the
minutes o f the city council meetings, this was a blatant lie since no official decision
had yet been made concerning the monument in Konstanz.55 The organizing
committee in Freiburg authored a very stem reply to this letter, pointing out that many
54 Ibid.
55 St. AK, S II 3045, letter to the organizing committee in Freiburg, May 26, 1871.
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other Badenese communities were constructing monuments while simultaneously
contributing donations to the Siegesdenkmal,56 Faced with the possibility o f being
singled out as the only major Badenese city that refused to participate in this
undertaking, city council members reluctantly agreed to start a collection among
locals.57
There were several different reasons for this reluctance to participate in a
project that most other cities willingly supported. First o f all, it had suddenly become
evident to the city council that the commemorative events during the last few months
had cost a great deal o f money. All together, they had spent almost 8,000 Gulden,
which considering the city’s struggling economy was a substantial amount.

58

Eager in

their attempts to present the city as a bastion o f Germanness, city council members
had overextended their budget. The frivolous spending would greatly affect the
construction o f their own monument, as the council decided that they could not spend
as much as initially planned.
On June 1, the Gemeindeversammlung met to consider the prospects for the
construction o f a monument.59 The well-known local artist Hans Bauer had produced
a model o f a Victoria statue, which would cost 4,000-6,000 Gulden to build,
56 St. AK, S II 3045, letter to the city council in Konstanz from organizing committee in Freiburg, May
30, 1871.
57 St. AK, S II 3045.
58 St. AK, S II 3045. Noted in a protocol from the Gemeindeversammlung on June 1, 1871. The
Gemeindeversammlung was a formal gathering in which voting citizens could attend, though they
seldom did, the deliberations o f city politicians in regards to municipal administrative issues.
59 Ibid.
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depending on material. Bauer’s model held a laurel wreath (Lorbeerkranz) in one
hand and a palm branch (Palmzweig des Friedens) in the other, celebrating both the
victory as well as the peace that would now dawn on Germany. Interestingly, city
politicians stressed that this would not be presented as a Victoria statue. Instead, this
was supposed to be a statue modeled upon Nike, the Greek goddess, who according to
them was more akin to a “Germanic Virgin.”60 However, these plans failed
completely as inhabitants, as well as most politicians, always referred to the statue as
Victoria. This should not have been particularly surprising, since Victoria had long
since replaced Nike as the goddess o f victory. In their attempts to dislodge completely
the commemorative discourse from Rome and anything Catholic, politicians did not
take into account how deeply ingrained the figure o f Victoria was among the
population. At this meeting, they also discussed the high costs o f the past months’
celebrations, and they concluded that though the city could not afford to pay for the
entire monument, it would contribute 2,000 Gulden towards the total cost. On June
10, they decided to use marble as the material, which put the final cost to
approximately 6,000 Gulden.61
Despite this decision, city council members did not seem fully committed to
the monument. They waited until November 1871 to start collecting donations, which
60 In his report to the Konigliche Preussische Staatsanzeiger on February 25, 1875 regarding the
construction process o f the monument, Ludwig Leiner was keen to stress that Nike had been the
original model, not Victoria. According to Leiner, the former was modeled on the “...mild-mannered
and arts loving Hellas... not the more animalistic and baneful ‘Victoria’ that stems from the blood
thirsty and aggressive Romans. Nike is not only victorious, but because o f the victories, she has
morphed into a mild, human representation o f a German virgin.. St. AK, S II 3045.
61 St. AK, S II 3045, protocol from meeting o f the Bezirksamt, June 10, 1871.
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greatly increased the difficulties o f raising money.62 Most cities attempted to take
advantage o f the heightened nationalist pride that accompanied unification, which
made citizens more inclined to donate money to commemorative projects. However,
almost a year later most o f the initial euphoria had disappeared and been replaced with
old and often increased hostilities among the population. If not adequately tended to,
immediate memories o f the fears and joys that accompany wars can evaporate rather
quickly, and this was one o f the reasons Konstanzers displayed minimal enthusiasm
about the monument. In the close aftermath o f a war, both soldiers and civilians often
experience a need to express and manifest their memories, but often as time passes,
that need decreases. While in other cities, newspapers would report how much money
had been collected to date and who had provided an especially large donation, the
local press in Konstanz almost completely ignored this project, which was quite
detrimental to the fund raising. Another important factor why the project never
created much enthusiasm was that as confessional hostilities resumed and
subsequently increased during the first few years o f the Kaiserreich, the local Catholic
population became quite unwilling to partake in any o f the projects that seemingly
promoted the official commemorative discourse. The fact that this monument did not
aid the Catholic part o f the population to express their memories o f the conflict, and
faced with what they considered a hegemonic commemorative discourse that did not
include their own experiences, they were hesitant to support these types o f endeavors.
Clearly displeased with the fund raising, members o f the city council soon
62 St. AK, S II 3045, protocol from city council meeting, November 2, 1871.
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realized that they would have to modify their original plans. They had initially
envisioned a six-meter-high statue, but as it became evident that they would not be
able to raise the required funds, they decided to settle for an approximately two meter
tall Victoria figure.63 In late January 1872, Bauer reported that he would soon present
a plaster version o f the statue to council members.64 Although it took until June
before the model was ready for inspection, members expressed their satisfaction with
the work o f the renowned artist. During the next eighteen months, the production
process proceeded without major problems. The only question that caused some
debate was the location o f the monument. Initially, most members had advocated the
harbor as the most suitable place, primarily because the many visitors who arrived in
the city via the lake would be greatly impressed with this patriotic display. However,
after downscaling the monument, many voiced concerns that such a diminutive statue
in this prominent place would reflect poorly on the national character o f the
Konstanzers. Ludwig Leiner was the most outspoken representative o f this view and
led the attempts to find a more suitable location. After considering almost every
square in the city, they finally decided on the Marktstatte, agreeing that though the
square was prominent enough, it was not so large that the monument would
disappear.65
Freie Stimme used these debates to voice their displeasure at the importance

63 St. AK, S II 3045, protocol from city council meeting, January 7, 1872.
64 St. AK, S II 3045, letter from Hans Bauer to city council, January 24, 1872.
65 See for instance the discussion in Konstanzer Zeitung, June 2, 15, 1872.
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attributed to this project. They mockingly noted that it was fortunate that few tourists
were present in the city to witness the spectacle o f the Konstanzer elite carrying
around a plaster model to different places in the city. They were especially critical o f
Mayor Stromeyer, pointing out that it was rather symbolic to watch the mayor
following Victoria wherever she went.66 These sentiments served as an indirect
condemnation o f the national-liberal version o f patriotism. Catholics were often
critical o f their opponents for seemingly changing their definition o f nationalism to fit
a variety o f different political, cultural, and economic causes. Catholics argued that
the attempted rewriting o f the war o f 1866 served as an illustrative example o f how
liberals and Protestants reconstructed history to fit official notions o f Germanness.
Furthermore, the fact that they were so willing to reconstruct their notions o f German
national identity indicated that they had a limited understanding o f what it meant to be
a German. Their definition o f the concept was obviously highly superficial and did
not contain any profound and deeper understandings o f their own identity.67
Konstanzer Zeitung promptly used this criticism as proof that ultramontanes did not
understand what was important to a German. There was nothing shameful about the
way in which the mayor and the rest o f the city elite participated in this debate. On the
contrary, the importance attached to this matter clearly indicates how dedicated
Stromeyer and the liberals were to honor the great events o f the recent past.68

66 Freie Stimme, June 20, 1872.
67 Ibid. An additional example o f these sentiments can be found in Freie Stimme, December 9, 1871.
68 Konstanzer Zeitung, June 24, 1872.
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After having received fifteen centner o f French canons from Wilhelm I, the
construction process began in early 1873.69 City council members urged Bauer and
the foundry Lenz to make sure that the statue was in place by May 10, which was the
two-year anniversary o f the signing o f the peace treaty. Contrary to the majority o f
these ceremonies, this one was carried out “without great fanfare.”

70

To be sure, the

dignitaries o f the city were present and speeches were held, but compared to
unveilings in other cities, Konstanz’s was very subdued. Liberals blamed the poor
weather, which forced the city council to cancel the participation o f school children,
but that did not fully explain the lack o f enthusiasm. Unveiling ceremonies were
always considered an integral part o f the monument and the message(s) that it was
supposed to convey. Contemporaries were well aware o f the importance o f making
the unveiling as impressive as possible, which would instill respect, admiration, and
support for the monument. Most often, speakers heavily stressed the ideological
message that accompanied the monument, leaving little or no room for
misinterpretation. These types o f events also constituted opportunities to unite the
population as people gathered in the streets to display their support for a particular
cause. The unveiling o f the Siegesdenkmal in Freiburg constitutes an excellent
example o f a successful ceremony where local and national officials interacted with
69 The production process was actually delayed due to the fact that Konstanzers only received the
promised fifteen centner from the Emperor after asking him for it. During his visit to the city in late
1871, Wilhelm had promised to donate the material. However, he had to be reminded in the beginning
o f 1873 before the metal was sent to foundry Lenz in Niimberg. See letter from the city council to the
Emperor, January 15, 1873. They received a positive response on February 20, 1873. St. AK, S II
3045.
70 Konstanzer Zeitung, May 11, 1873.
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the city’s inhabitants to produce a festive and educational event.
The absence o f a grand ceremony at the unveiling of the monument illustrates
several important points. Locals’ lukewarm attitude toward the monument was a
reflection o f the problems and divisions that Konstanzers had faced during the past
few years. As had become evident in the press and in the local community, the little
unity that the war produced was long gone. The relaunching and intensifying o f the
Kulturkam pf heightened tensions between Catholics and Protestants, and the former
had become increasingly determined to display their own version o f the nation and the
events that had led to the unification o f the Reich. Although Bauer’s statue did not
contain any extravagant symbolism, it was still perceived to be located within the
official discourse o f unification that emanated from Berlin. Most ultramontanes
rejected the view o f the unification that the monument presented, and it was therefore
not surprising that many refrained from participating in the unveiling ceremony. In
addition, as we shall see later, the first few months o f 1873 were filled with
confessional conflicts, which further alienated the conservative Catholics from the
official commemorative discourse. The lack o f support for the monument also
illustrates the disparity between the liberal leadership and the Catholic majority o f the
population. This disparity was something that Catholics often criticized, claiming that
a few men were reforming the city in ways that few people really wanted.
Lack of Catholic support for the statue comes as no surprise, but the absence o f
enthusiasm for the monument extended to parts o f the community that had initially
been supportive o f the project. The brief report in Konstanzer Zeitung regarding the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

110
unveiling provides some clues as to why people had become disillusioned with the
undertaking.

71

The paper pointed out that though the monument was quite acceptable,

no blame should be placed on the artist for the average result. Although they did not
state it explicitly, journalists were very critical o f how the city and its inhabitants had
approached this project. By failing to raise enough money, the city had forced Bauer
to significantly reduce the size o f his statue, which had yielded a mediocre outcome.
The report, as well as letters to newspapers and the city council, indicate that many
citizens were simply ashamed o f their small and insignificant statue.72 In times where
national pride was often measured by the size and beauty o f a monument and/or the
enthusiasm displayed at public ceremonies, Konstanz’s failure in both areas did not
present the city in a favorable light. Instead o f producing a magnificent statue that
would prove to the Emperor and the rest o f Germany the loyalty and dedication o f his
new subjects in the southwest, this half-hearted measure reinforced the insecurity and
apprehension that many experienced at the prospect o f becoming Germans. By
comparison, monuments in cities such as Freiburg served as a source o f pride for the
city’s inhabitants and provided them with opportunities to use the ideological message
o f the monument for local, regional, or national integration. In Konstanz, the fact that
Konstanzer Zeitung, whose editor, Otto Amman, was one o f the staunchest liberals
and anti-Catholics in the area, offered this indirect criticism o f the liberal elite is

71 Ibid.
72 A few letters can be found in St. AK, S II 3045. This file also contains a long report from city
council member Ludwig Leiner, dated May 25, 1873, on the completed project, in which the criticism
from the community is discussed.
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highly significant, as the paper usually could find no fault with liberal policies. O f
course, Amman’s criticism did not only pertain to the liberal elites but also to the
majority o f Konstanzers who had not contributed enough to the monument. In this
case, Amman attributed their lack o f commitment to the influence o f the antinational
Catholic Church.
Konstanzers’ reception o f the monument had damaged the pride o f Hans Bauer
as well. In a letter to the city council on M ay 30, 1873, he voiced his displeasure at
the reception his statue had received. He claimed that he had been subjected to much
criticism from locals, who had informed him that the general consensus in the city was
that the monument was simply “insufficient.” He emphasized that when he planned
the statue, he had constructed a model whose proportions were ideally suited to a
monument much larger than the one he finally built.

The diminutive size o f the

statue was not the only criticism that the city council faced in the following weeks. To
meet this barrage o f negative sentiments, they appointed a special committee under
Ludwig Leiner. In a lengthy report on May 25, he discussed the perceived
shortcomings o f the monument. Apparently, many locals had approached him and the
city council with complaints that the list o f soldiers on the monument contained
numerous errors. People who did not participate in the war were included, some who
did were not, and only one soldier was identified as “Officer,” though there were at
least three others who deserved similar recognition. In his discussion o f these
complaints, Leiner addressed several o f the key issues accompanying
73 St. AK, S II 3045, letter from Hans Bauer to the city council, May 30, 1873.
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commemorations.

He stated that he had from the beginning been critical o f the suggestion to
place the names o f participating soldiers on the monument. His opposition to this idea
did not only stem from the difficulties involved in confirming that all the correct
names were included but also had a more profound reason. He argued that the
presence o f soldiers’ names provided them with too strong o f an association to the
statue, which should not only honor their deeds but the entire unification process.
After all, he stated, who was to say that the efforts on the home front were not as
valuable as the ones on the battlefield? Should not all the sacrifices made by civilian
men and women be recognized as well? Leiner claimed that despite his protests, the
rest o f the members were determined to place the names on the monument.

75

•

It is

interesting to note that Leiner, a staunch national-liberal who had been the leading
force in this project, now suddenly maintained that the ideological message o f the
monument was too narrow. Most likely, especially considering that the minutes from
the meetings show no trace o f his objections, he presented these claims in an attempt
to avoid the harsh criticism. However, irrespective o f his intentions, his remarks
highlight one o f the key problems when designing a commemorative effort, especially
in a society in which different groups struggle over the control o f the memory o f the
war. This discussion became even more intense because this monument was placed in
such a significant public space. In a time period when old elites and the emerging
74 St. AK, S II 3045, report from Ludwig Leiner to the city council, May 25, 1873.
75 Ibid.
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bourgeoisie fought to control the public space o f German cities, the monument (and its
message) became a highly important part o f this struggle. Leiner recounted all the
steps that had been taken to ensure that all o f the names were correctly spelled and that
none was forgotten. The final list had been compared to the m ilitary’s records and
approved by General Strauss. Furthermore, he noted that the city council had placed
several notices about this process in Konstanzer Zeitung, so if someone had a
complaint, there had been sufficient time to correct a mistake prior to the unveiling.76
It is noteworthy that they did not place any ads in Freie Stimme, thereby excluding
ultramontanes from this discourse. This fact casts some additional doubts on the
sincerity o f Leiner’s complaints that the commemorative discourse was not inclusive
enough.
In his report, Leiner recommended that nothing be done about the plaque,
pointing out that though at least one name was misspelled, that did not justify the cost
o f replacing the whole plaque. He reiterated that people did not realize how expensive
these types o f projects were, and if they could only fully grasp the difficulties involved
in the production process, they would not be so critical. He sarcastically suggested
that perhaps new plaques should be placed on city hall, where all people who were
remotely connected to the monument could be listed: the ones who fought, the ones
who went to church on Sunday praying for victory, the people who organized the
construction o f the monument, etc. He ended his long report by stating that the
original idea o f this monument was to express gratitude toward the sacrifices made
76 Ibid.
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and to celebrate the victorious war. Both o f these tasks had been accomplished in an
appropriate manner.77
The criticism o f the monument and Leiner’s response provides insights to
contemporary attitudes toward these commemorations. Although most often people
supported these initiatives to honor important events and/or people, if they were
conducted in an unsatisfactory manner, even people who would be expected to
champion these endeavors remained aloof. In his report, Leiner frequently stated that
the people offering criticism only did so because they had their own agenda to pursue.
What Leiner did not realize (or acknowledge) was that it was precisely this personal
agenda that commemorations were supposed to address. Because the commemoration
failed to celebrate properly the war and the unification, even veterans were alienated
from the discourse that the city council and Hans Bauer constructed. An important
reason why this monument was built was to strengthen the “new” national identity and
prove that Konstanzers were loyal subjects, but the poor execution o f the project
meant that none o f these objectives were fully achieved. O f course, commemorations
often failed to popularize an ideological message among all parts o f the population.
However, the fact that so many people who under normal circumstances would have
been expected to be enthusiastic about this project did not support it suggests that the
execution o f these commemorative activities played a large role in its potential
success. Although the monument occupied a reasonably important position in society
77 Ibid. Despite the long and detailed report, the members o f the city council decided on May 29 to at
least look into what it would cost to alter the plaque. St. AK, S II 3045, protocol from city council
meeting, May 29, 1873.
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during the following decades, citizens never quite seemed to embrace it
wholeheartedly. To be sure, on national holidays, veterans’ organizations would
gather at the statue, and sometimes official ceremonies would be conducted, but
overall, the monument played a comparatively minor role in local society.

Additional Commemorative Activities in the Postwar Period
Although the construction o f monuments played one o f the most important
roles in the commemorations o f the unification, the immediate post-1871 period
witnessed other events as well, which we will now analyze. Turning back to late 1871,
Konstanzers received an opportunity to exhibit their newfound patriotism as Emperor
Wilhelm made an official visit in October. Despite the fact that the relationship
between Catholics and Protestants had grown increasingly sour during the summer,
most citizens were excited at the prospect o f entertaining the Emperor as their guest.
The fact that Grand Duke Friedrich was so closely connected to the city made locals
even more receptive for imperial pomp and circumstance. Although many cities
throughout Baden and Germany claimed that they enjoyed a special relationship with
their local rulers and the Emperor, Konstanz, even more so than either Freiburg or
Heidelberg, did have a special relationship with especially the Grand Duke, but the
Emperor as well. The good-hearted and jovial nature o f the Grand Duke, who could
often be seen chatting casually with citizens during his Sunday strolls through
Konstanz, contributed greatly to the popularity o f imperial and royal symbols in the
city and its immediate surroundings. Even ultramontane Catholics, who elsewhere in
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Germany sometimes hesitated to participate in the most extreme examples of
•

■

veneration for the Emperor, joined in the celebrations, albeit on their own conditions.

78

Scholars have stressed that the Emperor served as an integrative symbol closely
associated with the official version o f German nationalism.

70

Although that was often

the case, the sentiments in Konstanz indicate that despite his obvious ties to the new
Reich, the persona o f Wilhelm was still located outside the official canon of
nationalism, which many Germans opposed.
Despite W ilhelm’s popularity, there were still some differences in how
Catholics and Protestants approached the festivities. Konstanzer Zeitung went out o f
its way to proclaim its loyalty to the prominent guest. The paper’s coverage o f the
event dominated the news for several days with long and detailed articles analyzing
the nature o f the celebration.80 Freie Stimme, on the other hand, was much more
subdued in its reporting. Although it dutifully described the visit and the reaction o f
locals, it did so in a more sober manner, omitting most o f the references to the
greatness of the Emperor that dominated the articles published in Konstanzer
Zeitung.81 The difference in press coverage serves as a reminder o f how easily the
rhetoric and language o f the Catholic papers could be interpreted as antinational.

78For analysis o f Catholic attitudes towards Wilhelm I, see Blessing,
79 See for instance Koshar,
80 See for instance

F ro m

M o n u m e n ts

K o n s ta n z e r Z e itu n g ,

to

S ta a t u n d K ir c h e ,

esp. 179-181.

T ra ces.

September 9, 12,14, 1871.

81 F r e i e S t i m m e did not reprint any o f the speeches held at the festivities, and their reporting was in
general quite subdued and devoid o f declarations o f the supposed greatness o f the Emperor. See for
instance F r e i e S t i m m e , September 14, 1871.
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Indeed, the comparison is even more illuminating if one analyzes Catholic coverage of
the many anniversaries and celebrations o f Pope Pius IX ’s reign. In describing these
occasions, the Catholic press used similar adjectives that the liberal Protestant papers
used when characterizing the Emperor. Both were portrayed as heroic, courageous,
and honorable men who served as great examples and leaders for their subjects. In a
society caught up in nationalist frenzy for large parts o f the immediate post unification
period, the ultramontanes’ celebratory discourse surrounding the Pope and the Vatican
was certain to offend many opponents.
In the coverage o f the Emperor’s visit, Konstanzer Zeitung repeatedly stated
that it was evident that citizens were keen to display their love and devotion to
Emperor and fatherland. Locals also stressed that because o f the presence o f Grand
Duke Friedrich, the crowds viewed Wilhelm in a new light.82 People witnessed the
affection between him, his daughter, and son-in-law, and instead o f royalty, they
became just another set o f family members. The good relationship that Konstanzers
enjoyed with the Grand Duke now enabled them to get closer to their Emperor.
Arriving by boat from the Mainau, Wilhelm was greeted by Mayor Stromeyer
in the harbor, whose welcoming speech contained an abundance o f nationalist cliches
while also managing to offend ultramontanes. Stromeyer greeted Wilhelm by
remarking that the city had finally escaped the dark period that had lasted for so many
centuries. No doubt referring to the long period o f Habsburg rule, he tied W ilhelm’s
visit to similar ones by German Emperors during the First Empire. The mayor also
82 Konstanzer Zeitung, September 14, 1871.
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stressed how much the city appreciated the Prussian leadership in the German
question, noting that “the more the sun shines on Prussia, the better Konstanz will
fare.”83 Keeping in mind the calls for “removal o f the Prussian from city hall” that
accompanied Stromeyer’s election, these sentiments were clearly not representative o f
the city’s population. This speech served as another attempt to rewrite the history of
German unification. Stromeyer’s references to the dark period from which Prussia
and Wilhelm had saved the inhabitants naturally disregarded that only five years ago
Konstanzers had gone to war against Prussia. Ultramontanes complained bitterly
about these attempts to legitimize the teleological and Prusso-centeric version o f the
unification. This official version o f local history clearly did not represent the
experience o f local Catholics, who were forced to create their own memory to be able
to ground their identities as Germans in a historical narrative. As we shall see, much
o f this narrative was created within the confines o f the Church and voluntary
associations, and Catholics made sure to utilize other types o f public ceremonies to
manifest publicly their responses to the foundation o f the nation-state.

Catholic Responses to the Official Commemorative Discourse
Considering the dominant role that liberals played in the immediate postwar
period, how did Catholics experience these first few months as Germans? As indicated
above, soon after the unification, liberals and Protestants launched an onslaught on
ultramontanes, which forced the latter to define and defend their positions as Germans.
83 Ibid.
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In a similar fashion to their brethren in Freiburg, one o f the earliest incidents to assert
themselves publicly in the community was the twenty-fifth anniversary o f Pius IX ’s
reign as Pope in June 1871. The celebrations in Freiburg were the most elaborate ones
in the state, so we will leave a more extensive analysis o f this important event to the
next chapter. However, it should be noted that much o f the rhetoric in Konstanz was
similar to that in Freiburg, but given the increasingly precarious situation o f the
conservative Catholics in the former, they placed even more emphasis on the need to
use this commemoration as an opportunity to display their aversion to what they
labeled the moral demise o f German society.

84

Local Catholics staged a variety o f attempts to defend themselves against the
accusations o f unpatriotic behavior. On the first anniversary o f the war, Freie Stimme
or

published a lead article concerning the events o f the past year.

The paper pointed

out that July 18, 1870, had witnessed two historical milestones. First o f all, the French
launched their attack on Germany, which after courageous fighting led to peace and
unification. However, ever since the conclusion o f the war, many Germans had
engaged in internal warfare, using the pretext o f the other historical event o f July 18:
the declaration o f papal infallibility as justification for their actions. During the past
few months, these so-called Germans had subjected one-third o f the population to
various allegations o f unpatriotic behavior. To refute these accusations, Freie Stimme
discussed the heroics o f local Catholic clergy members during the war, including
84 Freie Stimme, May 25, June 15, 1871.
85 Freie Stimme, July 22, 1871.
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volunteering at the local hospital.86
The Catholics remained steadfast in their convictions, drawing support by
portraying themselves as martyrs, falsely criticized o f a variety o f un-German
behavior. Catholics often used these accusations as a means o f integration. By
highlighting the negative qualities o f the Protestant national-liberal version o f
patriotism, they were able to accent their own sense o f Germanness simply by being
the things that Protestants and liberals were not. Their use o f the Protestant-liberal
Other enabled them to further consolidate and strengthen their own identity. A lead
article in Freie Stimme in November 1871 constitutes a perfect example o f this type o f
integration.87 The article claimed that national-liberals considered it patriotic to aid
your government in the hunt for Catholics, to label falsely Catholics as enemies o f the
fatherland, and to persecute local Catholic priests, while preventing them from
carrying out their divine duties. Most importantly, liberal patriotism seemed to be
based on the notion that German Catholics were vaterlandslose, who did not deserve
to have a nation to call their own. Without explicitly stating so, the article inferred
that simply by not possessing any o f these qualities, Catholics were better Germans
than their opponents. They often emphasized this last aspect o f official nationalism as
they pointed out that they never called for the exclusion o f anybody from the German
nation, which made them better Germans. O f course, this was a slightly idealized
picture, as Catholics often engaged in anti-Semitic rhetoric and were sometimes
86 Ibid. See also August 15, 1871.
87 Freie Stimme, November 11, 1871.
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outright hostile to including Jews in the German nation.88 Although as Smith has
observed, the Catholics did not participate in the anti-Semitic tirades to the same
extent as the Protestants, the Catholic community was quite clear that the Jews did not
have a place in the German nation. Especially in Konstanz, there were quite a few
instances of Catholic anti-Semitism, which Catholics used as means o f integrating into
the new nation-state. In conjunction with this discussion, Catholics also criticized
liberals and Protestants for claiming that Rome was the true Heimat for German
Catholics. They claimed that their opponents had never understood that though their
spiritual home was in Rome, that did not make them Italians. These sentiments tied
into their notions that liberals and Protestants only used the concept o f national
identity as a means to other ends. The latter’s preoccupation with materialism and
their tendency to use the nationalist discourse to gain material, financial, and
economic advantages proved that their Germanness was not as well-founded in the
German historical and philosophical tradition.

The Development of the Old Catholic Church
During the first few years o f the Empire, ultramontane Catholics in Konstanz
did not only face opposition from liberal Protestants but from fellow Catholics as well.

88 It is noteworthy that the small Jewish community in Konstanz often faced discrimination. See for
instance the discussions regarding the establishment o f a synagogue. Zang, Konstanz in der
Grossherzoglichen Zeit. Vol. 4.2, 97-98. See also Smith, “Religion and Conflict: Protestants,
Catholics, and Anti-Semitism in the State o f Baden in the Era o f Wilhelm II,” Central European
History 27 (1994): 283-315. For a somewhat conflicting view o f relations between different
confessions in Baden, please see Ulrich Baumann’s excellent essay, “The Development and Destruction
o f a Social Institution.”
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Mainly due to its long tradition o f liberal Catholicism, Konstanz was one o f the areas
in Germany where Old Catholics were able to establish themselves as a societal force,
OQ

albeit only for a brief period o f time.

t

t

At first glance, it might appear as if the

conflict surrounding the Old Catholics had little to do with issues o f national
integration, but upon further analysis, it soon becomes evident that national identity
and national integration were among the key issues fueling this conflict. Other
scholars, most notably Thomas Mergel, have argued that Old Catholics were
reluctantly pushed into a close relationship with the state and that nationalist issues
were o f only minor importance to them.90 However, a close reading o f the conflict in
Konstanz reveals that Old Catholics were more than willing to use questions of
national identity as one o f the means o f acquiring support. They placed much
emphasis on portraying themselves as better Germans than other Catholics and
attempted to use this line o f argument to better their relationship with the Badenese
state.
Throughout the summer and fall o f 1871, city liberals became increasingly
aggressive in their confessional rhetoric as they praised Joseph Ignatz von Dollinger as
one o f the few Catholics who properly combined patriotism and religion. Eager to

89 For general accounts on the Old Catholic Movement(s) in Baden and elsewhere, please see Becker,
i n d e r A r a v o n R e i c h s g r i i n d u n g u n d K u l t u r k a m p f especially 137-141, 3063 0 9 , 3 3 1 -3 4 2 ; Grober, “Der Altkatholizismus in Konstanz,” 1 9 0 -2 4 8 ; Maas, G e s c h i c h t e d e r
K a t h o l i s c h e n K i r c h e i m G r o f i h e r z o g t u m B a d e n , 282-291; Mergel, Z w i s c h e n K l a s s e u n d K o n f e s s i o n ,
282-307; and Johannes Rieks, D e r A l t k a t h o l i z i s m u s i n B a d e n . E i n e F e s t s c h r i f t z u r z e h n j a h r i g e n
L ib e r a le r S ta a t u n d K ir c h e

B e s te h u n g s fe ie r d e r b a d is c h e n
s a m t e in e m

90 Mergel,

G e m e in d e n ,

M itg lie d e r -V e r z e ic h n is d ie s e r

Z w is c h e n

K la s s e

in s b e s . d e r in H e id e lb e r g , L a d e n b u r g

u n d S c w e tz in g e n ,

(Heidelberg, 1883).
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portray the ultramontanes as unpatriotic, they argued that a Catholic who accepted the
declaration o f papal infallibility could not be a good German.91 Faced with these
accusations, ultramontanes connected Dollinger’s decision to leave the Church to the
recent political and military events. They argued that had not the Catholic powers of
Austria and France been defeated in 1866 and 1871 and had not Pius IX been removed
from Rome, Dollinger would never have had the courage to oppose him.
Consequently, his actions should be interpreted as an opportunistic ploy, which had
little to do with the Catholic faith.92 In their criticism o f the Old Catholic Movement,
this was a recurring theme. Ultramontanes often stressed that Old Catholics, the vast
majority o f whom were liberals, were using the conflict over papal infallibility to strip
the Church o f resources. Although this constituted a grave simplification o f the
matter, these allegations were not unfounded as Old Catholics spent much energy
focusing on how to acquire as much o f the Church’s capital as possible. This
controversy clearly illustrates how confessional issues transcended many other
important issues in Konstanz and that confessional conflicts became the arenas for
many other types o f conflicts.
The growth o f the Old Catholic Movement meant that ultramontanes in
Konstanz faced additional challenges in their attempts to integrate into the Second
Empire. On April 12, 1872, a number o f Old Catholics met in a local inn to discuss
the future o f the movement. Most o f the meeting focused on what was wrong with the
91 See for instance Konstanzer Zeitung, April 25, 1871.
92 See for instance Freie Stimme, May 6, 9, August 15, 1871.
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Catholic Church.93 Dr. Alfred Marquier claimed that the main problem with the
Catholic faith was that it actively opposed progress. To prove his point, he cited the
debates concerning the educational system, which indicated how closely tied the Old
Catholic Movement was to local liberal politics. Marquier furthermore argued that
Catholics, and then especially the Jesuits, were trying to dismantle the new Empire.
The Catholic faith was “completely anti-national, which has as its final goal the
destruction o f the German Reich.”94 Although the disagreements had little to do with
national issues, the Old Catholics consistently accused their opponents o f being anti
national. In the midst o f the most intense period o f the Kulturkam pf these
accusations were timely as they were bound to attract more supporters to the Old
Catholic cause. Some Catholics who were concerned about being labeled un-German
in these times o f nationalist frenzy were receptive to the Old Catholic assurances that
their faith enabled Konstanzers to be both good Catholics and good Germans.
In his speech, Marquier furthermore focused on Konstanz’s historic role in
promoting religious progress, which should serve as an inspiration to the Old
Catholics. Citing the important role played by Wessenberg in the history o f German
Catholicism, he claimed that all supporters o f progress needed to “...get together and
just as the brave heroes from Belfort built an iron wall to stave off the foreign enemy,

93 Joseph Laible, Chronik der Altkatholischen Gemeinde zu Konstanz von 1873-1898 (Konstanz: Buch
und Steindruckerei von J. Kuttruff, 1898), 11-12. The meeting is also described in great detail in
Konstanzer Zeitung, April 14, 1872.
94 Konstanzer Zeitung, April 14, 1872.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

125
so we should also stand together until the inner enemies are all defeated.”95 His
speech left no doubts about the role that the liberal Catholics and Protestants had
played in the war, and the role that they needed to play in the Second Empire. The
nationalist rhetoric and the invoking o f images from the last war, and then especially
the battle o f Belfort, where the Badenese troops played a major role, proved to be a
great success with the audience. Immediately after Marquier finished his speech, the
crowd demanded that they should form an Old Catholic community in Konstanz.
Although Marquier and Leiner decided that the time was not yet ripe for this drastic
step, they elected a delegation that would attend the upcoming Old Catholic meeting
in Offenburg.96
In January 1873, the anniversary o f the foundation o f the Reich triggered
several months o f intense confessional conflicts. At the banquet held to commemorate
the events in Versailles, Protestant General Alfred Strober proclaimed that Germans
had displayed great courage on the battlefield, which was now needed again to defeat
the domestic enemies.97 He finished his speech by noting that “just like our Army
stood, man by man, chest by chest, against the ones who were threatening our borders,
so must we also stand there against the ones who wants to tie our minds to a foreign
power...and every one should participate, who has the knowledge: I am a German.”98

95 Ibid.
96 Laible, Chronik der Altkatholischen Gemeinde, 15.
97 Konstanzer Zeitung, January 19, 1873.
98 Ibid.
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The last few words are especially noteworthy as they implied that Catholics were not
Germans. Outraged at this speech, ultramontane priests used the following Sunday’s
sermon to answer the accusations against them and their fellow C atholics." Clergy
members focused on illustrating the link between the Old Catholic faith and the
economic situation in the city, stressing that this was not a religious conflict, but an
economic one. The elites o f the city were using the infallibility issue to further
increase the economic differences between citizens. The Old Catholic Movement was
nothing but a cover to access more o f the city’s wealth.
Following this argument, Freie Stimme and Konstanzer Zeitung engaged in a
fierce discussion o f what constituted a true Catholic. The latter proclaimed itself the
official organ o f the Old Catholics while arguing that the only real Catholics were the
ones who rejected the doctrine o f papal infallibility. Journalists claimed that
ultramontane Catholics comprised a sect that did not deserve to be called Catholic
anymore. In the ensuing months, Old Catholics and Protestants often invoked the
image o f Protestant martyr Jan Hus, who had been executed in the city in the fifteenth
century, and they stressed the strong heritage that Hus and Wessenberg had left in the
city. Konstanzer Zeitung often stressed that locals were fortunate to witness a historic
period in the city, in which “the flames which murdered Jan Hus, will serve as a
guiding light for the future.” 100 The fact that the Old Catholics appropriated H us’s

99 Reports o f this can be found in Freie Stimme, as well as appeals to the Catholics in the city, outlining
the dangers o f the Old Catholic Movement. See Freie Stimme, January 19, 23, 1873.
100 Konstanzer Zeitung, February 4, 1873.
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memory is illustrative o f the conflation o f Protestant and Old Catholic identities. To
ultramontanes, the fact that the Old Catholics celebrated Hus only further reinforced
their notion that the former had no real knowledge o f the Catholic faith. By
appropriating the memory o f the Bohemian reformer, they were not only able to tie
their cause to a well-known historical figure, but they were also able to create a
continuous historical narrative from the times o f H us’s struggles against Church until
the last war against the French Catholics.
In response, Freie Stimme published a separate one page appeal addressed to
the Catholics o f the city. In this proclamation, they outlined the differences between
Old and “normal” Catholics in great detail, taking pains to discredit the former as
much as possible. Judging from the type o f people who supported the Old Catholic
movement, it was clear how much they knew about religion and the Church.
Ultramontanes pointed out that prior to the Vatican Council, none o f these people had
been active in the Catholic Church, and many had even been Protestants.
Consequently, they were not qualified to interpret the true meaning o f Catholicism.
The appeal also outlined some o f the features that characterized a true Catholic. It
reinforced the notion o f papal infallibility while strongly refuting the claims that Old
Catholics had a right to any o f the Church’s property.101
Early February 1873 witnessed an intensification of the hostilities. Led by
Leiner and Joseph Laible, the Old Catholics organized a referendum in which
Catholics were encouraged to come and vote yes or no to the declaration o f papal
101Freie Stimme, January 19, 23, 1873.
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infallibility. The date was set for February 10, and in the days preceding the
referendum, Old Catholics reiterated that this constituted a sign that Konstanz was
prepared to initiate another religious reform movement. They also compared the
excitement in the city to the one that had existed on the day that the news o f the
outbreak o f war in 1870 spread. The day was marked by chaos. People from both
camps were out in the streets trying to stake claim to the public space o f the city. A
few skirmishes took place, and one o f the leading ultramontanes, Joseph Wirth, was
attacked as a mob threw stones through his windows.102
Although they claimed otherwise, the results o f the referendum must have been
a disappointment to the Old Catholics. Despite their propaganda, only 657 people cast
their votes against infallibility, and since they claimed that over 3,000 people had
attended the preparatory meetings, the low turnout must have been a setback.103 The
result most likely reflected the fact that though many people might have been
dissatisfied with certain aspects o f their faith, most were not prepared to make an
official stance against the Church. Despite the relatively poor showing, Leiner and
Laible still hailed the result as a great victory and proceeded to form an official
community in Konstanz. On February 22, they presented a petition to the Grand Duke
and his government, claiming that a religious congregation o f this considerable size
possessed a right to use the local churches. Konstanzer Zeitung triumphantly printed
the reply from Julius Jolly, in which he stated that though they rejected the notion o f
102 Konig, ed., Konstanzer Licht-und Schattenbilder seit 1848, 80-85.
103 Results were reported in Konstanzer Zeitung, February 13, 1873.
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papal infallibility, these Konstanzers were still considered Catholics and consequently
had a right to use the churches in their city. They were granted a right to share one o f
the three Catholic churches, but since ultramontanes would never remain in a church
that Old Catholics used, the latter possessed complete control o f it.104 This was a
significant victory with broad ramifications. Not only had the Old Catholics been able
to acquire control o f a significant public space in the city; this decision presented the
ultramontanes with a number o f different problems. The uprooting o f an entire parish
was quite disruptive to religious life in the city, and conservative Catholics faced a
number o f logistical difficulties during the next few years trying to accommodate
these unfortunate members o f their congregation.
The reaction o f local ultramontanes was swift and decisive. Anybody who had
voted against the dogma o f infallibility was excluded from the Church, which meant
that the Catholic Church in Konstanz had officially split. In a city where religion
constituted a significant part o f everyday life, this division further disrupted the fabric
o f local society. The conflict in Konstanz attracted nationwide attention. Liberals and
Protestants celebrated the efforts o f the Old Catholics, invoking the legacies o f Hus
and Wessenberg while praising the city for always being at the forefront o f religious
reform. Faced with these challenges, ultramontanes began to more actively contest the
official version o f the war and the unification process. It was certainly no coincidence
that as the oppression o f Catholics increased, the more determined they became to
display and manifest their own version o f Germanness.
104Konstanzer Zeitung, February 22, 1873.
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In the midst o f these debates, the third annual Old Catholic Congress convened
in Konstanz on September 10-15, which added fuel to the ongoing debates.105 The
attitude o f local authorities was something that caused controversy and further
confirmed ultramontane suspicions that they suffered heavy discrimination. In 1869,
Mayor Stromeyer had refused to make any public buildings available for the proposed
general assembly o f German Catholics (Generalversammlung der Katholiken
Deutschlands). In addition, he proclaimed that a Catholic meeting o f this kind would
never take place in Konstanz as long as he was mayor, which forced organizers to
move it to another city.106 Conservative Catholics had not forgotten this injustice and
were therefore all the more incensed as the city council granted every Old Catholic
request. The theater, Konzilium building, and city hall were all made available to the
delegates. Konstanzer Zeitung played a major role in these events, promoting it as the
most important meeting since the fourteenth-century Konzil. The paper encouraged
locals to support the congress and use this opportunity to further distance themselves
from the “Jesuit pack” that was spoiling Germany’s national character. They told their
readers that “your suffering under the heavy-handedness o f Rome’s often half-crazed
•

followers and incendiaries would soon end.”

107

During the congress, 356 delegates

from several European states participated in a variety o f meetings and events. A few
common themes dominated the speeches. Maintaining that ultramontanes were
105 The congress is described in detail in Laible, Chronik der Altkatholischen Gemeinde, 55-72.
106 Grober, “Der Altkatholizismus in Konstanz. Die Geschichte seiner Entwicklung und Bekampfung,”
230.
107As quoted in ibid.
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completely under the control o f the Jesuits and the Pope, Old Catholics viewed
themselves as saviors o f religious virtue and freedom. They consistently compared
themselves to Luther and claimed that German history was about to enter a similarly
dramatic phase as during the Reformation.108
During the Old Catholic Congress, many conservative Catholics labored to
rewrite the history o f the wars o f unification. Drawing upon new evidence from
Italian diplomats, ultramontanes questioned Bismarck’s role in orchestrating these
wars, attempting to prove that he and his fellow Prussians had been the aggressors in
these conflicts. They accused the Chancellor o f having negotiated behind the back o f
his King and quoted him as having stated repeatedly that he was “much more Prussian
than German.” According to the ultramontanes, in 1866, Bismarck had been prepared
to cede (non-Prussian) German territories to France to avoid a conflict. This was cited
as evidence o f how Bismarck and his liberal supporters defined patriotism.
Furthermore, by tracing and presenting Bismarck’s plotting in 1866 and 1870,
conservative Catholics claimed to have debunked the myth o f the unification wars.
On both occasions, but especially in 1870, Germans had been told that the fatherland
was being attacked and that great sacrifices were needed to save the nation. However,
as ultramontanes strove to clarify Bismarck’s role in these wars, they criticized the
national-liberal notion that there had been something almost holy about the unification
process.109 Instead, they noted that the German lives lost in these wars had primarily

108 Freie Stimme, September 20, 1873.
109 Ibid.
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served to satisfy Bismarck’s appetite for territorial gains. The liberals responded
angrily to these Catholic aspirations to correct the history behind the wars, which only
proved that the Catholics were really allied with the French. Invoking the great efforts
during the war, the paper called upon all true Germans to rally around Emperor and
the Grand Duke to make sure that Catholics would not be able to further spread their
message o f deceit and treason.
In the beginning o f 1874, Konstanzer Zeitung and Freie Stimme engaged in a
fierce polemic regarding the development o f the German Reich. Ultramontanes
argued that it had become evident during the last few years that the inner unity that
had existed during the war had all but vanished and that Germans were becoming
increasingly divided. This development was blamed on Bismarck and the nationalliberals, who had deliberately chosen to ostracize more than one-third o f the
population. Freie Stimme claimed that it was unprecedented in history to have a group
o f people who “fought for the fatherland with courage and blood, be labeled deviant
sons o f the fatherland, traitors, and disturbers o f the peace.” 110
In the same year, Catholics, Protestants, and Old Catholics used the centenary
anniversary o f the birth o f Wessenberg as a forum to debate national identity. Because
o f the symbolic importance that Wessenberg enjoyed, his memory became heavily
contested. In a similar fashion to how ultramontanes utilized various anniversaries
connected to the Pope as opportunities to display their strengths, Old Catholics sought
to use W essenberg’s birthday to manifest their position in the city. This was a
110 Freie Stimme, January 3, 1874.
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celebration that attracted attention throughout the German lands, and national
newspapers debated W essenberg’s merits and flaws. Many arguments were framed in
nationalist terms; whether Wessenberg had placed Rome ahead o f the German nation
constituted one of the most frequently discussed questions. Local Old Catholics
attempted to claim Wessenberg as their own, arguing that he had always been mostly
concerned about the fate o f his fellow Germans and never succumbed to the pressure
from Rome. They often stressed that by standing up against Rome, he had served to
strengthen the German nation. The discussion about W essenberg’s relationship with
the German nation and his supposedly conscious efforts to strengthen it is a perfect
example of inventing traditions. At the time o f W essenberg’s action, Ernst Moritz
Arndt was trying to sort out what constituted the German fatherland and nothing
indicated that W essenberg’s actions were motivated by patriotic sentiments. Most o f
the Old Catholic celebrations turned into tirades against the Catholic Church, as
speakers focused on the detrimental role that the papacy had played throughout history
while stressing that W essenberg’s most admirable trait had been his determined
resistance to Rome. Several speakers drew parallels to the events o f 1870 and agreed
that had Wessenberg been alive, he would never have accepted papal infallibility.111
Freie Stimme was quick to answer this challenge and with the assistance o f
Badischer Beobachter stressed that the Old Catholics must stop tarnishing
W essenberg’s memory.

112

By extensively citing W essenberg’s letters, ultramontanes

111 Konstanzer Zeitung, November 5, 15, 1874.
112 See for instance Freie Stimme, November 12, 21, 1874.
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tried to prove that though Wessenberg had been a liberal Catholic, there existed no
evidence that he would have supported the Old Catholics. No doubt aware o f the
tremendous symbolic impact that Wessenberg had on locals, ultramontanes went to
great lengths to disassociate W essenberg’s memory from the Old Catholics by
pointing out that though Wessenberg had been liberal, he had always been determined
to avoid a split in the church. The ultramontanes furthermore cited several passages
from his writing in which he specifically stated that one of the most important tasks o f
the Church was to foster a national consciousness.113 This was a negative form o f
integration as ultramontanes, who normally were quite critical o f W essenberg’s ideas,
appropriated his memory only to prevent Old Catholics to reap benefits from
associating with the famous religious reformer.

Local Catholic Responses to National Events
Although most Konstanzers were focused on local matters, occasionally
national issues came to play an important role on the local level. Most often, these
events were interpreted in ways that exacerbated local conflicts. In 1875, the
unveiling o f the Hermannsdenkmal polarized Konstanzers. During these days o f
supposed national unity and joy, a conflict that emerged over the attitudes towards this
monument shook the city. Already a few days after the unveiling, Freie Stimme noted
that Old Catholics and Protestants had attempted to use the unveiling ceremony and
the discourse surrounding it as means o f further attacking the Church. This
113 Ibid.
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constituted another example where Catholics were not just excluded from the
commemorative discourse and reduced to the role o f spectator, but where they were
attacked by the interpretations o f the ideological message that accompanied the statue.
They were especially critical o f the fact that these people were so harsh in their
judgment o f the Church, though the Catholic Church had been the main reason for the
greatness o f German culture o f past centuries. Unwilling or unable to base their
identities in the recent military and political victories, Catholics elected to stress a
different form o f Germanness that emphasized cultural accomplishments. In the same
article, they reported extensively on the unveiling o f a local monument in Meersburg.
They highlighted this monument, which honored the sacrifices made by men and
women during the Franco-Prussian War, by stating that it was so nice and refreshing
to witness a ceremony devoid o f Kulturkam pf rhetoric.114 Consequently, Catholics
were more than willing to celebrate the recent war as long as the commemoration was
conducted in a manner which allowed Catholic experiences to be manifested as well.
The annual end o f the school year celebration triggered the controversy. As
part o f the festivities at the Gymnasium, Headmaster Schiller read a poem written by
one o f the students. The poem, entitled “Hermann the Cherusker’s Protest Against the
Hermannsdenkmal,” described what Hermann’s reactions to the monument might
have been had he been alive in 1875.115 Contrary to expectations, Hermann was not at
all pleased, but outraged and wished that he “still had his old strength so that he with
114Freie Stimme, August 19, 1875.
115Freie Stimme published the poem in its entirety on August 26, 1875.
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one blow could destroy the statue.” 116 The reason for his wrath was that he could not
understand how the builders, who dared to call themselves patriotic Germans, had the
audacity to construct a monument to his honor when they were still completely
dominated by the Romans. The main reason for his fury stemmed from the fact that
by the look o f contemporary society, Germans had not properly protected his great
victory over the Romans. According to the poem, Hermann did not want to have a
monument built until the German nation was unified again, which would not happen
as long as Jesuits and other servants o f Rome roamed freely throughout the German
lands. Hermann was ashamed to witness these developments, especially since they
took place in a country where proud men such as Luther had carried out many great
deeds. The tone o f the poem was very inflammatory and sure to insult Catholics.
Among other things, Hermann stated, “We, who beat the Romans/who are now with a
bloody hand/chaining you Germans/ and ruining your mind/I do not want to have
anything to do with a monument.”117
Even from an objective standpoint, the student writing the poem was guilty o f
some questionable interpretations o f German history. Freie Stimme immediately
pointed out that until Luther initiated centuries o f internal division, Germans had been
unified and quite powerful.

1 18

The Catholic Church had been completely innocent in

this conflict, which was to be blamed on the Protestants who had plunged Germany
116 Ibid.
117 Ibid.
118 Freie Stimme, August 31, 1875.
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into centuries o f despair. The paper also took issue with the glorification o f Ulrich
von Hutten, who had been nothing but a revolutionary troublemaker. Was the author
o f this poem aware o f the fact that von Hutten had led the French farmers in an
uprising that eventually threatened the Germans as w ell?119 Freie Stimme was highly
critical o f the author’s reference to the abundance o f Jesuits in Germany. Had the
author not noticed that the German government had passed several ruthless laws
which banned all Jesuit activity and forced them into exile? Furthermore, had he not
witnessed how the Jesuits had come to the rescue o f the fatherland in the last war and
how many o f them had served so valiantly that they received the Iron Cross?120 The
recital o f the poem sparked several different debates which covered topics from the
effectiveness o f the Oberschulrat to the interpretation o f German history.
Ultramontanes pointed out that most o f the draconian measures that the Oberschulrat
had initiated, including firing Catholic teachers, had been justified with the need to
“preserve the confessional peace.” They also focused much o f their criticism on the
fact that it was unacceptable to expose young children to such harsh Kulturkam pf
propaganda.
The nine hundredth anniversary o f the death o f the Holy Konrad, after whom
the city was named, provided Konstanz’s conservative Catholics with an excellent

119 Ulrich von Hutten was one o f the m ost prominent German literary figures during the Reformation.

In addition to authoring songs and poems, many o f which stressed the need for the German nobility to
unite and free themselves o f the yoke o f Rome, he strongly supported and published Luther’s works.
For additional information on Hutten’s life and ideas, please see Hajo Holbom, Ulrich von Hutten and
the German Reformation (New York: Harper & Row, 1965).
120Freie Stimme, August 31, 1875.
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opportunity to reclaim control o f the city’s public space.121 A well-publicized event
that attracted famous guests from all over Germany, this celebration constituted a
major occurrence for the city’s Catholics. Local Catholics were well aware o f the
importance o f the festivities as they repeatedly stated that it was a blessing that this
celebration occurred, considering all o f the difficulties that local Catholics had faced
during the past couple o f decades. An estimated 10-12,000 people visited the city and
sermons by Kiibel and Ketteler attracted over 5,000 people.122 Freie Stimme and other
Badenese papers described the festivities in painstaking detail, attempting to instill
new faith and strength in the Catholic subjects. Most o f the sermons held were quoted
at length in the Catholic papers; most o f them stressed the need for the faithful to
remain strong in the face o f all the persecution and injustices that the Church had
faced lately.123 The planning for the meeting was extensive and members o f the
organizing committee attempted to ensure that all o f the high-ranking guests received
at least one opportunity to hold a sermon. It is also noteworthy that organizers
claimed that they would not engage in any form o f polemic with other confessional
groups during the celebration. They explicitly stated that despite all o f the injustices
that had been done unto them, they would not seek out the opportunity for revenge.
By stressing the fact that they would focus on being good Catholics and good

121A detailed account o f the planning and execution o f these events can be found in Gustav Brugier,
Das 900jahrige Jubilaum des heiligen Konrad, gefeiert zu Konstanz vom 25. November bis 3.
Dezember 1876. (Freiburg: Herder, 1877).
122Freie Stimme, December 5, 1876.
123 See for instance Freie Stimme, December 2, 1876.
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Germans, locals were able to present themselves as superior to the polemics and
accusations that their enemies constantly initiated.
Bishop Ketteler held an impressive opening sermon, which centered on how
religion had become increasingly lost in society. He especially stressed the many
difficulties that Catholics have had to face during the past few years and how now
more than ever, people needed to turn to the Bible as a source o f unity and strength.124
During the three days, sermons covered a wide variety o f topics, many o f which
discussed various types o f affection for the fatherland. Kiibel among others claimed
that St. Konrad was a great patriot, who at all times followed the commands and
desires o f his Emperor. He also made a point o f stating that because o f the love for the
fatherland and the need to defend it, God also blessed the kind o f wars that are needed
to secure these things. He also spent much time outlining what one should do to
manifest and strengthen one’s love for the fatherland. With a clear message to the
Protestant national-liberals, the Bishop claimed that it was not enough to be a member
o f certain associations or to participate in festivities laced with great speeches. No, the
love and devotion to the fatherland must be expressed in proper behavior, hard work,
1

Jc

and religious dedication-all o f which would help strengthen the fatherland.
The military priest Finneisen delivered a whole sermon on the topic o f love for
the fatherland. From the outset, he noted that nowhere in the Bible does it say that one

124 Brugier, Das 900jahrige Jubilaum des heiligen Konrad, xxviii.
125 This sermon is reprinted in its entirety in Bmgier, Das 900jahrige Jubilaum des heiligen Konrad, 18.
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should love one’s fatherland. However, this was o f little importance as this kind o f
love is o f the kind that is inscribed in every person’s heart, just as the love for ones
mother. He also made a connection to the geographic location o f the city, stating that
in few other areas does the love o f the fatherland become so important as in a place
like Konstanz, where just a few steps would be required to enter another country.
Following some initial comments regarding the soldier’s love for his fatherland as he
fights to defend it against the enemy, he proceeded to discuss the religious foundations
o f this specific kind o f love and devotion. He briefly discussed the amount o f love for
the fatherland that the old prophets so wisely displayed.126
As the celebrations drew to a close, controversy emerged. The local Old
Catholic priest, Hoffmann, wrote a letter to Konstanzer Zeitung essentially challenging
Ketteler to a rhetorical duel, but as Freie Stimme noted with great satisfaction, Ketteler
would not lower him self to this level.127 The Catholic paper also argued that though
the Old Catholics claimed that their movement was still growing, the numbers in the
respective churches on Sunday effectively demonstrated who was winning the battle
within the Church. The Old Catholic service was visited by sixty-five people while
the regular service had 500-600 visitors. Freie Stimme also noted that Konstanzer
Zeitung had attempted to offer all sorts o f different explanations why this celebration
took place: to rally the forces before the upcoming Reichtags elections or to defeat the
Old Catholics. Freie Stimme countered by stating that they were offended by the fact
126 Ibid., 152-167.
127Freie Stimme, December 7, 1876.
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that their opponents thought that such worldly motives constituted the reason for this
celebration. Instead, this was a celebration to express gratitude for all o f the great
things that the Holy Konrad had done during his life and to ensure that his legacy
remained intact. Furthermore, this type o f celebration offered local Catholics an
opportunity to strengthen their spirit and resolve in a most public manner, which
considering the events o f the last few years had become increasingly important. In a
similar fashion, at the concluding banquet, von Bodmann specifically stressed that
irrespective o f the treatment that the national and state government had imposed on
Catholics, the latter were utterly dedicated and loyal subjects o f Wilhelm I, once again
reinforcing that the Emperor was excluded from most o f the criticism that Catholics
offered o f the government.
After the conclusion o f the festivities, local Catholics expressed delight at the
success o f the celebration. They stressed that the last few days had provided a good
opportunity for not only the city’s but Germany’s Catholics to display publicly their
strength and resolve to persist in the face o f the persecution they had faced since the
inception o f the Kaiserreich. They furthermore praised locals for attending the
services and ceremonies in great numbers, which had enabled the city to present itself
as a bastion o f Catholic Germanness. Consequently, it is evident that contemporaries
viewed this celebration as an opportunity to brandish their interpretation o f what it
meant to be a German. Finneisen’s sermon on the Bible as the final authority on the
characteristics o f love for the fatherland demonstrates that these Catholics were
actively participating in the construction o f a German national identity.
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In the immediate postunification period, because o f their dissatisfaction with
the ideological message accompanying the official commemorative and celebratory
discourse emanating from Berlin, local Catholics used opportunities and means such
as the ones discussed in this chapter to popularize and legitimize their own version of
the German nation. This version, though in many instances not drastically different
from the Protestant-liberal one, still contained enough differences to merit frequent
public display. Between 1871 and 1876, the Catholics in Konstanz utilized
commemorative activities to both express their opposition to parts o f the ideological
messages accompanying the official discourse as well as to offer their own
interpretation of the unification process and the Second Empire, which enabled them
to integrate into the new nation-state on their own terms. Because the city had
experienced fierce struggles between Protestants and Catholics throughout the
nineteenth century, tensions between the two confessions and between liberal and
conservative Catholics were high at the time o f unification. Rather than eliminating
these tensions, however, the popularized nationalist discourse enabled Protestants and
Catholics new means to preserve old conflicts in a new setting. As will also become
evident in the next chapter’s analysis o f the Catholic experience in Freiburg, in cities
such as Konstanz and Freiburg where confessional conflict had long been a staple o f
local society, Badenese Catholics and Protestants frequently used each other’s version
o f Germanness as an Other when negotiating their own identities. Because both cities
were strongholds o f clerical power, which often triggered a hostile relationship with
local Protestant urban elites, Catholics in both locations were forced to interact with
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Protestants when negotiating their identities. However, as was evidenced in Konstanz,
this interaction did not mean that Catholics were subsumed into a Protestant version o f
Germanness, but instead that the two confessions negotiated their own spaces within
the new national identity.
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CHAPTER 4
NATIONALIZING THE ARCHDIOCESE? FREIBURGER CATHOLICS IN THE
IMMEDIATE POSTUNIFICATION PERIOD

When the Siegesdenkmal in Freiburg was unveiled on October 3, 1876, citizens
o f the city assembled in the lavishly decorated streets, taking the opportunity to
display publicly their affection, love, and devotion to Emperor and fatherland.1 After
more than five years o f planning and construction, the time for the unveiling o f the
monument had arrived. The monument, which Freiburger Zeitung labeled one o f the
most magnificent in Germany, was to commemorate both the heroic efforts o f the
German military in the Franco-Prussian War and the subsequent unification. The
presence o f both the Grand Duke o f Baden, Friedrich I, and Emperor Wilhelm I at the
unveiling would underscore the significance o f the statue.
The unveiling o f the Siegesdenkmal appears at first instance to vindicate the
claims o f the national-liberal press that the German nation was finally completely
unified. A close examination o f these events, however, reveals that the seemingly
homogeneous commemorative context surrounding the monument was in fact
contested and infused with different meanings that could be interpreted in various
ways. Caught in a complex web o f old and new loyalties, the Catholics o f Freiburg

1Freiburger Zeitung, October 10, 1876.
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opposed much o f the official commemorative discourse that emerged from Berlin,
much in a similar fashion to their brethren in Konstanz. The discourse surrounding the
construction and reception o f the Siegesdenkmal indicates that though residents were
inclined to embrace certain aspects o f their new national identity, they were reluctant
to accept portrayal o f Prussia, the Hohenzollem dynasty, and Chancellor Otto von
Bismarck as the driving forces in the unification process. Despite brief, obligatory
references to the glory of Wilhelm I, the commemorative discourse around the
Siegesdenkmal focused almost solely on the role o f Baden’s soldiers in the FrancoPrussian War. The planning and construction o f the Siegesdenkmal illustrates how
Freiburgers, irrespective o f confession, made their integration into the Second Empire
dependent upon the maintenance o f local and regional identities. As was evident in
the last chapter, this type o f integration had taken place in Konstanz as well, but it was
even more evident in Freiburg. For many o f Freiburg’s ultramontane Catholics,
however, the ideological message o f the monument, though it challenged many
notions inherent in the official nationalist discourse, still did not represent their own
sense o f Germanness. Most o f the bourgeois city fathers who spearheaded this project
were either Protestants or Old Catholics, while ultramontanes remained largely
excluded from this exercise in region and nation building.
To be sure, since the monument served as a means o f constructing an
alternative memory o f the Franco-Prussian War and the unification o f the Reich,
conservative Catholics could identify with parts o f its ideological message. This
alternative memory o f unification enabled Freiburgers to maintain their local-regional
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loyalties while developing national-dynastic loyalties and integrating into the new
nation-state. The monument’s references to nation and Emperor were sentiments
mediated through the regional perspective, which permitted residents o f the state to
express devotion to their Emperor while also allowing them to legitimize their own
past as well as their special regional status in the new Reich. Although Catholics
rejected much o f the symbolism o f the Siegesdenkmal as well, the fact that the statue
represented the construction o f a national identity through a south German perspective
increased their acceptance o f its ideological message. The fact that the monument
offered them an opportunity to manifest part o f their regional identities as a vital
ingredient o f the national identity made it easier for these Catholics to accept the
official symbolism o f the monument. Thus, the Siegesdenkmal illustrates how both
regional and religious loyalties constituted important aspects o f the Catholic national
identity.
This chapter analyzes how Catholics in Freiburg attempted to construct and
assert their own sense o f Germanness in light o f their reactions to the Franco-Prussian
War and the commemorative discourse that emerged in the post-1871 period.
Although much o f the commemorative effort in Freiburg centered on the planning and
construction o f the Siegesdenkmal, Freiburg’s Catholics also employed other means to
affirm their own identities. As in other cities around the state, even during the war, it
became evident that local Catholics and Protestants would disagree on how to
construct a memory o f the war. Faced with liberal and Protestant accusations o f
harboring anti-German sentiments, and having only a very limited influence on the
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construction o f the Siegesdenkmal, Freiburg’s conservative Catholics resorted to other
means o f publicly displaying their identities. Since many o f the Catholic responses to
the official nationalist discourse were influenced by Freiburg’s location as a city on
the margins o f not only the Second Empire but Baden as well, a brief survey o f the
history o f the city since the inception o f the Grand Duchy is necessary to better
understand the Catholic responses to war and unification.

Turning Freiburgers into Badeners, 1806-1871
Freiburg was one o f the south German cities most affected by the territorial
changes that accompanied the Napoleonic wars. Until 1803, it was the capital o f the
Austrian Vorlande, thus occupying an important position as the westernmost city o f
the Habsburg Monarchy.2 After the Treaty o f Pressburg in 1805, the city was
transferred to Elector and soon-to-be Grand Duke Karl Friedrich o f Baden-Baden.
Having belonged to the Habsburgs since 1368, citizens o f Freiburg were now forced to
shift their allegiances. Because o f its relatively large size (in 1809, the city had 9,573
inhabitants), Freiburg immediately became the third most important city in Baden
after Mannheim and Karlsruhe, the capital.3
Faced with a new ruler and state administration, residents o f Freiburg
expressed many concerns about their future. In addition to fears that they would be
forced to give up their university and military garrison, they were apprehensive about
2 Heiko Haumann and Hans Schdek, eds., Geschichte der Stadt Freiburg im Breisgau. Band 3. Von der
badischen Herrschaft bis zur Gegenwart (Stuttgart: Theiss, 1992), 19.
3 Ibid., 20.
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the integration o f their almost exclusively Catholic city into a Grand Duchy governed
by a Protestant Grand Duke.4 These worries were soon overshadowed by more
immediate problems, as Breisgauers struggled to make it through the Wars o f
Liberation. These wars were taxing for the population, which complicated further
their acceptance o f the Badenese state, and triggered many complaints about their new
rulers. They not only resented that Badeners had to participate in the French attack on
Russia but also that their city was forced to quarter thousands o f Prussian and other
German soldiers after Baden deserted its French ally in 1813. Before the Congress o f
Vienna, neither Karl Friedrich nor his successor Karl was a popular figure in the city,
and citizens were still loyal to the Habsburgs. These sentiments were expressed when
the Habsburg Emperor Francis I arrived in Freiburg on December 15, 1813. People
lined the streets to greet “their” Emperor, and it was obvious that Freiburgers still
considered themselves a part o f the Habsburg Monarchy.5 After the battle o f Leipzig
in 1813, though the city had belonged to Baden for several years, people started
dreaming o f a return to the Habsburg Monarchy. This became all too evident in May
1814, when a pro-Habsburg mass demonstration turned into a riot, in which people
attacked city hall, tore down the Badenese coat o f arms, and replaced it with a double
headed eagle.6

4 See for instance Alfred von Kageneck, Das Ende der vorderosterreichischen Herrschaft im Breisgau
(Freiburg: Rombach, 2000), 288-290.
5 Anonymous pamphlet, Lebhafte Schilderung der Freuden- und Ehren-Bezeugungen, welcher Seiner
M ajestdt dem Kaiser von Oesterreich als Sieger bey Seiner Ankunft in Freyburg den 15then Dezember
1813 (Freiburg: no publisher, 1815).
6 Ursmar Engmann, ed. Das Tagebuch von Ignaz Speckle, Abt von St. Peter im Schwarzwald (Stuttgart:
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Although citizens slowly began to come to terms with the new state after 1815,
the process o f integration was uneven. The nobility and the Catholic Church were
least inclined to forsake their old Habsburg identities. Besides the confessional issue,
these groups were unwilling to accept the abolition o f the privilege state that
accompanied the foundation o f the Grand Duchy. Contemporaries noted that the 1828
statewide commemoration o f the centenary o f Karl Friedrich’s birth constituted one o f
the first occasions when Freiburgers enthusiastically demonstrated loyalty to Baden
and its ruling family.7
During the nineteenth century, Freiburg underwent many changes. From the
founding o f Baden until the unification o f the Second Empire, the city’s population
more than doubled. The increase was not so much the result o f changes in birth and
death rates, but rather from the increased immigration to the city that accompanied the
developing industry.8 Although Freiburg’s early entrepreneurs began the process of
industrialization in the pre-March period, the local bourgeoisie soon became
concerned with that city’s geographic location on the fringes o f the state. After Baden
joined the Customs Union in 1835, most o f the trade was directed away from France
towards other German states, and Freiburg’s southern location hampered industrial
development. Baden’s infrastructure was still evolving and the city became removed
from the major trade routes, which shifted most o f the industrial development to

Thiess, 1966), 467.
7 Freiburger Zeitung, November 26, 27, 1828.
8 Theodor Zwolfer, Die EinwohnerzahI der Stadt Freiburg in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart (Freiburg:
Herder, 1936), 3-4.
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Karlsruhe and Mannheim in the northern part o f the state. Not until 1845, when the
railroad between Offenburg and Basel was completed, was Freiburg reintegrated into
the economic life o f the state.9
During the nineteenth century Freiburg became one o f the main arenas for the
conflicts within the Catholic Church. Having been made the site o f the Archbishop o f
the Badenese diocese in 1821, the city became closely identified with the Catholic
Church and confessional politics for much o f the nineteenth century. Although
containing a strong ultramontane element, Freiburg was also home to a number o f
liberal Catholics. The latter, who subscribed to the ideas o f Vicar-General Ignaz
Heinrich von Wessenberg in Konstanz, were strongly represented in the city during
the 1820s and 30s, which provided for frequent clashes with more conservative
Catholics. However, after the Cologne events in 1837, and the subsequent Catholic
revival, few liberal Catholics remained in the city.10
Parallel to developments on the state and national levels, the political climate
grew increasingly hostile in Freiburg during the 1840s. Friedrich Hecker and Gustav
Struve’s radical liberal movement enjoyed a large following in Freiburg, and the two
often visited the city to rally further support. The election to city government in 1847
had witnessed a public split in the liberal camp as radicals and moderates argued about

9 Albert Kunzenmiiller, “Wie Freiburg zu seiner ersten Eisenbahn kam,” Freiburg Almanach 5 (1954):
121-136.
10 August Franzen, “Die Zolibatsfrage im 19. Jahrhundert. Der badische ‘Zolibatssturm’ und das
Problem der Priesterehe im Urteil Johann Adam Mohlers und Johann Baptist von Hirschers,”
Historisches Jahrbuch, 91 (1971): 345-383, here especially 366-367.
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to what extent society should be reformed.11 Following the news o f the revolution in
Paris in February 1848, the city’s leading liberals gathered in the tavern Harmonie and
selected a deputation dominated by radical liberals. This delegation included the
city’s most prominent men, who traveled to Karlsruhe to demand that the government
comply with Hecker and Struve’s demands. On March 26, 25,000 people gathered on
the Miinsterplatz, where the black-red-gold flag hung from the famous Catholic dome,
to hear Mayor Karl von Rotteck (the nephew o f the famous liberal) and Struve speak.
Both called for the creation o f a republic with a new constitution.12 Even before
Hecker declared the republic in Konstanz on April 12, radicals in the city had called
upon Badeners to rise up against the Grand Duke and the government.
When the Hecker-march began, though Rotteck had previously stated that an
armed uprising was premature and unjustified, he now declared that the city would
remain neutral. M any people interpreted this change o f tone as an affirmation o f the
city’s support for Hecker.

1T

During April, the rifts in the liberal movement became so

serious that street clashes became an everyday occurrence. At the end o f April, radical
liberals occupied city hall. However, they were quickly besieged by Badenese and
Hessian government troops. After a few skirmishes on Easter Monday, the
revolutionaries surrendered. Thirty-three people lost their lives in the struggles on

11 Bernhard Zilling, Helfen kann nur die grofle That...Die Radikalisierung in Baden 1848 (Freiburg:
Herder, 1984), 20-26.
12 Heinrich Schreiber, “Die biirgerlichen Bewegungen in den Jahren 1848 und 1849,” Schau-ins-Land.
Zeitschrift des Breisgaugeschichtsverein 41 (1967): 145-155.
13 Ibid., 156.
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April 23-24.14
Even after this defeat, a strong radical element remained in Freiburg, especially
among workers and students. The presence o f courts in which accused revolutionaries
were tried helped maintain the radical fervor. These trials were well-publicized
events, which often unveiled the brutality employed by state troops. Large audiences
attended the trials, and they often publicly celebrated the acquittal o f an accused.15
When Lorenzo Brentano led the third Badenese military uprising, many
Freiburger radicals once again took up arms. However, fear and skepticism were the
prevailing sentiments in the city. As the fortunes o f Brentano’s followers started to
turn, Freiburg was flooded with fleeing revolutionaries. At one point, the city housed
over 10,000 radicals, an overwhelming number for a city with 15,000 inhabitants.
Despite complying with Badenese and Prussian troops, Freiburg was occupied on July
7, 1849. The arrival of these soldiers initiated a trying time for the city as the state
demanded that inhabitants denounce the hiding revolutionaries. Many radicals were
caught, tried, and given harsh sentences. To add to the already difficult circumstances,
the city had to quarter the occupying Prussian soldiers for the next two years, which
created much aversion against the powerful state in the north.16
Because o f the important roles that many members o f city government had

14 Konrad Fisch, Hans Rittner, and Julian Wiirtenberger, Die Revolution 1848/49 in Freiburg (Freiburg:
Unpublished manuscript, 1974), 41-44.
15 Ibid., 74-75.
16 Rudolf Muhs, “Aus den letzten Tagen einer deutschen Revolution. Was in Freiburg vor 135 Jahren
geschah,” Badische Zeitung, July 7, 8, 1984.
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played in inciting revolutions in previous years, the state suspended their activities
until 1850. New elections were held that year, albeit without political debate and with
the understanding that anyone who had been active in the revolutionary cause would
not be allowed to stand for election. Political activity was further stifled due to the
fear o f the masses that members o f the upper classes had developed after witnessing
the events o f 1848-1849. Instead o f addressing how to improve the conditions for the
underprivileged, the nobility and local Honoratioren sought to further exclude them
from the political process, primarily by imposing stricter limitations on the
Biirgerrecht. These measures proved to be quite successful as the number o f
enfranchised citizens decreased from about 11 % in 1840 to 6,7 % in 1871. The new
three-class voting system also helped limit the local political influence o f the middle
and lower classes.17
Although the first few years after the revolution were characterized by a
struggling economy, the middle o f the 1850s and the 1860s witnessed a significant
economic boom. In 1859, the entrepreneur Eduard Fauler was elected mayor.
Although not popular with all Freiburgers, he possessed a keen sense for how to utilize
the innovations that accompanied the new liberal era to improve the city. The
presence o f liberals in city government brought improvements to infrastructure and
generally enhanced the conditions for industrialization. Especially the textile and
clothing industry developed rapidly during this time, and in 1870, almost seventy
percent o f the factory workers were employed within this sector. From 1847 to 1865,

17 Dieter Hein, “Badisches Biirgertum,” 78-79.
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the number o f people working in companies with more than twenty employees
increased by 536 % .18 One of the consequences o f the rapid industrialization and the
sudden rise in population was that it fostered tremendous social problems. In some
areas o f the city, poverty was rampant, the housing situation grossly inadequate, and
hygiene and sanitary conditions were often dismal. Some improvements were made in
the late 1860s, when a number o f factory owners followed the example o f Fauler and
Karl Mez and started constructing separate housing for their workers. The need for
adequate poor relief helped strengthen the position o f the Catholic Church, which
increasingly focused its attention on the social question. When Freiburg entered the
Kaiserreich, it was as a city that had to face both the negative and positive effects o f
the rapid industrialization during the preceding decade.
Because o f the presence o f the Archbishop and the Erzbischofliche Ordinariat
(EO), the tensions within the Catholic Church, and between church and state,
constituted a defining characteristic o f Freiburg. With the advent o f modernization,
confessional tensions often ran high. During the 1860s and 1870s, the religious
situation in Freiburg represented a microcosm o f the one on the state level. The city’s
Catholics were divided into two camps: ultramontane and liberals. As was the case in
many other areas o f Baden, the former constituted the vast majority while the latter
occupied many o f the most important positions in the city and were therefore able to
exercise a disproportionate influence on especially secular policies. Freiburg’s
strongly emerging bourgeoisie contained almost exclusively Protestants and liberal
18 Haumann and Schdek, eds., Geschichte der Stadt Freiburg im Breisgau, 151 -153.
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Catholics, who in their attempts to modernize society often clashed with the
ultramontane faction led by the Archbishop. In 1870, about ninety percent o f the city
was Catholic. However, because o f the economic and political rise o f the bourgeoisie,
Freiburg’s Protestants had a very disproportionate level o f influence.
The reforms that Franz von Roggenbach and his liberal government initiated
during the 1860s had immediate consequences on the local level. When the
parliament instituted Oberschulrate in 1864, ultramontane Catholics in Freiburg
greeted the news with dismay. Archbishop Vicari immediately published a pastoral
letter in which he called upon all Catholics to oppose these new provisions.19 To
nullify the effects o f this action, Mayor Fauler, him self a liberal Catholic, published an
announcement to declare his support o f the reforms. In 1864-1865, there were many
well-publicized cases in which teachers were either criticized or applauded for
refusing to follow the directions o f the state.

20

From the early 1850s, Vicari, BuB, and Andlaw had worked to strengthen the
position of the ultramontane Catholics. Until the mid-1860s, however, they were
largely a nonpresence in the public sphere. In the beginning o f 1865, Jakob Lindau’s
traveling Casino arrived in Freiburg. On February 14, Lindau, Andlaw, and the wellknown retired city councilor Karl Bader addressed a mass meeting o f Catholics and
encouraged them to resist the latest state-sponsored educational reforms. The
gathering was preceded by a public argument between Fauler, who had refused to let
19 Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt, March 23, 25, 1864.
20 For a good discussion o f some o f these cases, see Domeich, Franz Josef Bufi, 375-376.
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the meeting take place in the Festhalle, and the organizers o f the Casino. Participants
ended the Casino by publishing demands for increased freedom for the Catholic
Church.21 Ten days later, Fauler convened a meeting o f liberal Catholics, where they
distanced themselves from these demands while claiming to represent the true nature
o f Roman Catholicism. These two meetings were representative o f many similar
conflicts during the 1860s. When the ultramontanes founded Freiburger Katholisches
Kirchenblatt in 1864 and Freiburger Bote in 1867, they started engaging in an often
very hostile polemic with the liberal Freiburger Zeitung over political and religious
issues. Although the city’s Catholics briefly united during the war o f 1866, the
aftermath o f the war witnessed a renewal and intensification o f the conflicts.
The new liberal government that came into power after the war o f 1866
specifically targeted Freiburg with some o f their reforms. A decree dated November
14, 1867, stripped the city’s Dominican monastery o f control over its finances, and the
right to supervise the Adelhauser public school as well as its own educational institute.
Although this issue triggered indignant protests from both the EO and the local
population, the liberal government would not retract the decision.

22

As a consequence

o f the increased Catholic mobilization and the sharp tone o f their protests, the liberal
government grew less tolerant o f Catholic opposition. The state’s refusal to accept
Kiibel as the new Archbishop did not do much to damage the Catholic cause; on the
contrary, Catholics only grew more determined to resist the state’s persecutions. The
21 Domreich, “Die Entstehung der badischen ‘Katholischen Volkspartei,’” 315-316.
22 See for instance Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt, November 16, 23, December 7, 12, 1867.
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last few years leading up to unification were typified by an increasingly tense situation
in the city. The relationships between state and the EO and between ultramontane and
liberal Catholics were deteriorating rapidly, and Freiburg became a central arena for
confessional conflict. The pro-Prussian policies o f the Mathy/Jolly government were
very unpopular in the city, and inhabitants were quite apprehensive o f the prospect o f
joining the North German Confederation. A growing hostility between the
government and the city’s Catholics characterized the time immediately before
unification.

The Outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War and the Construction of an
Immediate Postwar Commemorative Discourse
When the conflict between Prussia and France escalated in the summer o f
1870, Freiburgers became swept up in the nationalist frenzy that characterized the
German public response to the outbreak o f the Franco-Prussian W ar in July.23 In
contrast to other areas in Germany, however, people in Baden did not become
completely engulfed in the aggressive nationalist rhetoric prevalent elsewhere.24 The
first few weeks o f the war witnessed a common unity that superseded all previous
divisions. For a brief period, inhabitants o f the city, which at the time numbered
almost 31,000, o f which 23,000 were Catholics, were no longer Badeners, Protestants,

23 Freiburger Zeitung, July 21, 1870.
24 It is noteworthy that it took until the end o f September before the newspapers in Freiburg began to
call for annexation o f French territories. In other areas o f Germany, these demands were made at a
considerably earlier stage.
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Catholics, or Jews, but Germans. Following the initial euphoria and heightened
nationalist pride, tension in the city grew quickly. Because o f their proximity to
France, citizens were aware o f their precarious geographical position. To add further
to the sense o f uncertainty, soldiers normally stationed in the city were incorporated
into the Fourteenth Army Corps and left for France. During the first few weeks o f the
war, Freiburgers could hear the fighting, which increased their apprehensions o f a
French invasion.25 This fear soon passed, however, as the German Army strung
together a series o f impressive victories, crowned by the stunning defeat o f the French
forces at Sedan on September 2.

'Jfi

As the sense o f security increased, many

Freiburgers became more aggressively nationalist; in the middle o f September, the
first demands for annexation o f Alsace-Lorraine surfaced in local newspapers.
Because o f its location, Freiburg was assigned a military hospital during the
war, and in late July, newspapers began calling for civilian volunteers.27 Throughout
the war, wounded soldiers were treated in the Festhalle or in private homes. Judging
by the number o f people who opened their homes to soldiers and/or refugees,
•

•

•

•

•

Freiburgers were willing to make the sacrifices necessary for victory.

98

Although by

volunteering local men and women proved their support for the war, many still

25 See for instance Freiburger Zeitung, August 30, 1870.
26 For a general description o f the battle o f Sedan, see Michael Howard, The Franco-Prussian War
(New York: Macmillan, 1962), 203-223.
21 Freiburger Zeitung, July 23, 1870.
28 Walter Vetter, “Anno 1870/71. Die Freiburger und der deutsch-ffanzosische Krieg,” EinwhonerAdrefibuch der Stadt Freiburg im Breisgau (Freiburg: Herder, 1971), 64-65.
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expressed ambivalent feelings about fighting the French. In the past, they had enjoyed
a close and friendly relationship with their Alsatian neighbors, and especially during
the last months o f the war, despite the official nationalist rhetoric, it became evident
that many Freiburgers had mixed feelings about this conflict.29
The Catholic makeup o f the city played an important role in the emerging
hesitancy towards the war. Much o f the German nationalist rhetoric, especially after
the victory at Sedan, explained the collapse o f the French forces by claiming that
•

•

Roman Catholicism had obstructed France’s transition to a modem nation-state.

30

The

majority o f Freiburgers strongly disagreed with this idea and pointed out that
Protestants and liberals had misinterpreted the religious aspect o f the war. Noting that
the declaration o f papal infallibility at the Vatican Council in July 1870 had gone
almost unnoticed because o f the outbreak o f war, Catholics maintained that the
conflict represented G od’s way o f showing both French and Germans how alienated
they had become from the Christian spirit. The suffering brought by the war, not only
to Germans and French but to the Pope as well, should remind Christians o f all
nationalities o f how important religion was. This war did not posit one confession
against another; instead, it served as a confirmation that in their quest for
*

*

modernization, Germans must not denigrate the importance o f religion.

31

These

sentiments illustrated the Catholic resistance towards the modernization reforms that

29 Ibid., 60-61. See also Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt, November 16, 1870.
30 See for example Freiburger Zeitung, October 3, 5, 1870.
31 Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt, July 20, 1870.
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Badenese liberals had initiated during the past decade. Catholics argued that these
reforms were signs that the German national character was increasingly corrupted by
the uninhibited striving for modernity.
In their responses to Protestant-liberal claims that Roman Catholicism cost the
French the victory, Freiburg Catholics stressed that the French failure did not stem
from their Catholic faith, but from their inability to remain good Catholics. They were
especially critical o f Napoleon Ill’s un-Catholic behavior, citing his decision to assist
the Italians against Austria in 1859 as a strong indication of how far he had strayed
from his convictions. Local papers stressed that though French Catholics were
suffering greatly, this ordeal would assist them in reconnecting with their Catholic
faith, which they had gradually abandoned during the past decades.32
When Bismarck initiated negotiations with the south German states in
November 1870, making it evident that Germans were heading towards unification,
Freiburg’s Catholics, though delighted at the prospect o f a unified Empire, remained
hesitant about their immediate future. Gravely concerned about the situation in Rome,
they realized that in the aftermath o f a German victory the fate o f the Pope would
become even more uncertain. After French troops left Rome in August 1870, Italian
forces chased the Pontiff out o f the capital on September 20. Relegated to the small
territorial enclave that constituted the Vatican, surrounded by liberal Italian
nationalists, the future o f Pius IX seemed very unsure. This matter was o f great
concern to German Catholics, and it occupied their attention for decades to come.
32 Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt, August 10, 1870.
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Inhabitants o f Freiburg repeatedly stressed the need to protect the Pope, arguing that if
the French were unable to do it, the Prussian government should assume this task. In
times o f war, statements o f the nature, “The interests o f Catholicism and Bonapartism
are no less than identical,” attracted criticism from other Germans who accused
Catholics o f enmity towards the fatherland.33 By repeatedly including the struggles o f
the Pope in their analyses o f the Franco-Prussian war, Catholics employed a non
nationalist discourse, which triggered charges o f treason from Protestants and liberals.
Catholics refuted these denunciations, claiming that their concern for the Pope did not
lessen their loyalty to the German cause. Indeed, these sentiments reflected a Catholic
sense o f Germanness that differed considerably from the national identity that
emerged from Berlin. German Catholics especially, with their strong ties to Rome,
had for centuries constructed their identities around the persona o f the Pope. When
entering the age o f the nation-state, with its exclusive focus on national groups, these
sentiments further complicated Catholic integration into the Second Empire.
After the initial unity that accompanied the outbreak o f war, relations between
Catholics and Protestants in Freiburg deteriorated during the last months o f 1870, just
as they had in Konstanz. Emboldened by the success o f the German Army, liberals
and Protestants started voicing complaints o f Catholic behavior during the war. In this
campaign, Catholic priests were especially targeted, and there were several wellpublicized cases in which local clergy were accused o f praying for French victory.
The behavior o f Catholic priests during times o f war was not a new topic o f conflict.
33 Ibid.; Freiburger Zeitung, August 19, 1870.
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After the war against Prussia in 1866, liberals and Protestants denounced Catholic
priests for boasting that in case o f Austrian victory, all German Protestants would be
forced to convert to Catholicism.34 In 1870-1871, one o f the cases that attracted most
attention was that o f Catholic priest Manfred Burgweiler in Pfullendorf, a rural
community on the eastern shore o f Lake Constance. During the fall o f 1870,
Burgweiler reportedly led his congregation in prayer for French victory on several
occasions, claiming that a Prussian triumph would greatly endanger German
Catholicism.35 These accusations not only reflected Protestant-liberal concerns about
the loyalties o f Catholic clergy but also fears about the increased influence o f Catholic
priests, especially in rural areas. Since the election o f Herman von Vicari as
Archbishop in 1842, a gradual ultramontanization o f the Catholic clergy had occurred.
Coupled with the popular religious revival that took place throughout the German
lands during the 1840s and ‘50s, it brought an increasingly powerful local clergy. The
influence that local priests enjoyed in their communities intimidated non-Catholics.
During the war, many allegations surfaced o f Catholic priests convincing entire
villages to support the French, which enhanced tensions between the two
confessions.36 The power o f local clergy remained a contentions issue throughout the
nineteenth century. On several occasions, Catholic priests were arrested in
conjunction with elections, accused o f persuading their parishes to vote for a particular
34 See for instance Freiburger Zeitung, February 10, 12, 1867.
35 Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt, August 31, September 7, 1870. See also Erzbischofliche
Archiv Freiburg (EAF hereafter), B2-29, Staat und Kirche.
36 Freiburger Zeitung, October 7, 13, 1870.
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candidate.
The Catholic press around Baden used these allegations o f anti-German
sentiments to illustrate how the prospect o f victory was corrupting many Germans.
Catholics in Freiburg referred to the initial Protestant-liberal reaction to the outbreak
o f war, which had stressed that this was a time when Germans would put aside their
political and confessional differences. Catholics claimed that liberals and Protestants
only heeded their own advice while the outcome o f the war was still uncertain.
However, as soon as victory was imminent, the apparent unity disappeared. Freiburg
Catholics cited several liberal newspapers that after the battle o f Sedan claimed that
the primary task in this war was to defeat Catholicism and found an Empire based
upon the only true religion—Protestantism.37 Liberals referred to the imminent defeat
o f the French and the removal o f the Pope from Rome as two major victories for
civilization. To accentuate these arguments, many liberal papers cited a letter from the
Prussian General Friedrich von Holstein to the French General Gorardin, in which he
explained the German victory with the following words: “The future belongs to the
Nordic or Protestant race...Catholicism stupidities...God will remain with the ones
TO

who seek progress, which is why he is abandoning the Roman people....”
Consequently, during the war, local Protestants began constructing a memory o f the
war that stressed the confessional aspect. As the conflict drew to a close, the hostility

37 Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt, October 5, 1870. For an excellent discussion o f the
relationship between Protestantism and the unification, see Ernst Bammel, Die Reichsgrundung und der
deutsche Protestantismus (Erlangen: Universitatsbund, 1973).
38 Freiburger Zeitung, October 3, 1870.
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towards Catholics only increased. When liberals outlined Germany’s promising
future, which was sure to follow this military victory, many openly questioned
whether there was any room for Catholics in the new Empire: “Should Germany
really contain a large part whose Heimat is not in Germany, but on the other side of
the Alps? After a struggle in which the best blood o f the fatherland was spent, that
would constitute treason and must under no circumstances be allowed by the nation.”

39

Although Catholics had contributed greatly to the war effort, the constructed memory
o f the war implied that not only had they been useless during these trying times but
also that their Catholic faith excluded them from the German nation. Even before any
peace treaties were signed, the official nationalist discourse interpreted the impending
victory as a signal for Germany to assume its rightful place as the most powerful state
in Europe. Freiburger Catholics, on the other hand, placed less emphasis on the
“positive” aspects o f the war and instead expressed concern about their own future
status in the Empire, and the increasing secularization o f society and lamented the fate
of the Pope. Even in the midst o f battle, German nationalist rhetoric tended to divide
more than it unified.
Faced with Protestant accusations o f anti-German sentiments and assertions
that they had no place in the German nation, Catholics in Freiburg recognized the need
to refute publicly the ideological messages that accompanied the official nationalist
rhetoric. During the fall o f 1870, locals held several mass meetings where they
discussed these denunciations and the appropriate reply. On October 23, Freiherr von

39 Ibid; see also Heidelberger Tagblatt, September 24, 1870.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

165
Andlaw addressed a large number o f Catholics and encouraged them to stand up for
the Pope, regardless o f the criticisms that their actions triggered. Claiming that it was
the duty of a Catholic to remain always loyal to the Pontiff, Andlaw stressed that these
sentiments did not prevent Catholics from being good Germans.40 To accentuate the
importance o f this cause, FKK published an announcement on November 16 calling
upon Catholics of all nationalities to donate money to a fund that would aid the
struggling Pope. Also at the October 23 meeting, Catholics expressed outrage at
suggestions from a few o f the city’s Protestants that one o f the premier Catholic
symbols in southern Germany—the Freiburg Cathedral—be handed over to the
Protestants after the war. The Protestants’ argument was rather unsubstantial. They
noted that the cathedral had at one point been Protestant and, in light o f the recent
Catholic defeats, should be returned to them. This claim was not taken very seriously
by the leaders o f the city and only served to alienate Catholics further from the
nationalist discourse and increase tensions between the two confessions.
Although Catholics in Freiburg participated in the celebration o f the
proclamation o f the Reich on January 18, 1871, as in other areas o f the state, doubts
about their future soon replaced the feelings o f elation. To be sure, they were
enthused about the new Empire, but the recent successes o f liberalism and
Protestantism were causes for concern. Even as they celebrated unification, Catholics
often stressed that they would not rest peacefully until the Pope had returned to Rome.
Catholics entered the new nation-state not only with different expectations about the
40 This meeting is discussed in great detail in Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt, October 26, 1870.
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future but also with a different memory o f the Franco-Prussian War. While most
Germans constructed their memory around notions o f military victories, success,
prosperity, and unity, for most Catholics this conflict had additional connotations.
Although they were proud o f the achievements o f the German troops and excited
about unification, the accusations o f anti-Germanness and the aggressive Protestant
nationalist rhetoric, in addition to the situation in Rome, caused Catholics to construct
a different memory o f the war.
In a similar fashion to other cities around the state, Freiburg celebrated the
return o f the troops. However, this festive occasion caused some conflict between
local Protestants and Catholics. In February 1871, Mayor Carl Schuster and city
councilor Karl Mez approached the EO and requested that a local Protestant minister
be allowed to hold the celebratory sermon, even though the main religious ceremonies
would take place in the Catholic cathedral. Citing canonical law, Capitular Otto
Marmon refused this petition, which triggered an argument about the rights of
ownership to the cathedral.41 Although a Catholic church and used by Catholics only,
the city o f Freiburg owned the building, which meant that depending on the
composition o f the city council, conflicts were bound to happen. Because o f the
prominence o f the cathedral, both Catholics and Protestants realized the importance o f
controlling it on days o f public commemorations. On several occasions throughout
the century, members o f the city council decided to flag the cathedral on non-Catholic

41 Letter from Schuster and Mez to the EO, March 28, 1871. The answer is dated March 20, 1871. This
correspondence can be found in Stadtarchiv Freiburg (St. AF hereafter), K 1/28, Nachlass Schuster.
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holidays, which offended Catholics. Although in this case the Protestant minister was
not allowed to hold the celebratory sermon, this well-publicized conflict made the
city’s Protestants aware that they possessed at least theoretical rights to use the church,
an insight that caused major conflicts in the 1890s.42
During the war, Freiburgers had been almost exclusively interested in the
activities o f the Fourteenth Army Corps, in which a majority o f Badenese soldiers
fought under General August von Werder.43 These first gained prominence in the
battle that led to the capture o f Strasbourg on September 28, but their most memorable
moments came as they besieged Belfort between November 1870 and January 1871.44
Following an approximately two-month stand-off between the Badenese and French
troops, a fierce and bloody battle erupted on January 14. It lasted for three days, until
on January 18 the Badenese troops took Belfort. This victory coincided with the
proclamation o f the Second German Empire in Versailles. After occupying the French
city for two months, the soldiers returned home. On March 23, the city organized a
large parade, decorated official buildings, and encouraged residents to decorate their
own homes festively. Most houses were adorned with yellow and red, the traditional
colors o f Baden. Few homes sported the Prussian black and white, fewer still elected

42 These conflicts are described in great detail in Heinrich Muller, Oberbiirgermeister Otto Winterer.
Ein Vierteljahrhundert Entwicklungsgeschichte der Stadt Freiburg (Freiburg: Herder, 1916), 140-171.
43 A quick glance at the newspaper coverage o f the war makes this evident. See for instance
Oberrheinischer Courier, August 5, August 16, 1870.
44 The activities o f the Fourteenth Army Corps are described in Vetter, “Anno 1870/71,” 60-66. For a
thorough description o f the war, see Theodor Fontane, Der Krieg gegen Frankreich, 1870-1871 (2
Vols.) (Berlin: Verlag der koniglichen Geheimen Ober-Hofbuchdruckerei, 1873); Howard, The
Franco-Prussian War.
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to use the grossdeutsch black, red, and gold.45
Although Freiburgers celebrated the return o f local soldiers in a cheerful
manner, local newspapers reported about hostilities between Protestants and Catholics
in surrounding areas. In Zweibriicken, just outside Freiburg, local Protestant priest
Heinz Roth used the peace celebration to proclaim that now when the external enemy
had been defeated, it was time to root out the internal ones. Attacking social
democrats and Catholics, he claimed that their behavior during the recent war proved
that there were many Vaterlandslose among the true (Protestant) Germans. If
Germany was to acquire its place in the sun, these elements had to be removed from
the German nation.46 Roth’s sermon represented an early example o f the liberalProtestant attempts to control the commemorative discourse. Many o f the
commemorative efforts in the first months after the war stressed the religious aspect o f
the recent war, as Protestants accentuated that Germans should be grateful towards
(the Protestant) God for the victory over France. Catholics, on the other hand, argued
that it was not altogether clear what their country had achieved in the last war. To be
sure, Germany was now unified, which was worth celebrating. They repeatedly
warned, however, against the overconfident attitude o f their fellow countrymen that
accompanied the military victory. The commemorative discourse surrounding
unification was littered with references to Germany’s greatness and how the rest o f
Europe now faced the reality o f a dominant German nation-state. Although they took

45 Freiburger Zeitung, March 24, 1871.
46 Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt, March 29, 1871.
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care to emphasize the value o f sound national pride, Catholics claimed that other
Germans were not behaving in a manner befitting to their supposedly religious
character. They never failed to point out that these attitudes were becoming part o f
what it meant to be German and that these sentiments were signs o f how the
Protestant-liberal stress on individuality and egocentrism had poisoned the German
national character.
May 1871 witnessed the emergence o f several conflicts in Freiburg concerning
both the commemorations o f recent events and over strictly religious matters.
Although at first glance it might appear as if confrontations over issues not directly
related to the construction o f national identity were irrelevant to that process, many o f
these apparently non related issues had a great impact on the project o f nation
building. Catholics often employed nationalist vocabulary when engaged in conflicts
over seemingly non national issues. Especially with regards to the increasing
competition to control public space in Freiburg, Catholics frequently used these
opportunities to assert their own sense o f Germanness. In the aftermath o f the war, the
relative peace that had characterized the relationship between the Catholic Church and
the state during the war ended, and the hostilities from the prewar period resumed.
The recommencing o f the Kulturkam pf which served in part as an attempt to construct
a national identity along confessional lines, immediately repolarized Catholics and
Protestants and greatly complicated their efforts to consolidate a new national
identity.47

47 For the interpretation o f the Kulturkampf as an attempt to construct a national identity along
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In late May, certain members o f the theology faculty at the university caused a
great controversy when they publicly supported Ignaz von Dollinger’s opposition to
papal infallibility.48 Although the influence o f liberal Catholics had steadily decreased
at the university during the past decades, there were still a few among the faculty.
Their actions caused an outrage among most Catholics in Freiburg. Not only were
they disappointed that some members o f the faculty supported Dollinger, but the fact
that the university made such negative headlines was a source o f embarrassment to the
Catholic city. Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt noted how strange it was that
these “so called Catholics” suddenly had become experts on religious matters.
Previously, none o f them had been among the well-known Catholic personalities o f
the city; they seldom attended church and never participated in any o f the numerous
Catholic organizations 49 Attempting to highlight the ignorance o f these liberal
Catholics, Freiburg’s ultramontanes tried to downplay the significance o f the event.
One o f the main things they stressed in their detailed criticism o f the theology faculty
was that no Catholic possessed the right to question the decisions o f the Pope. This
reference to the hierarchical nature o f the Catholic Church opened Freiburg’s
ultramontanes to criticism, as liberal Catholics and Protestants argued that it was
inconceivable that decisions made in Rome could carry such importance on German
soil. Critics reasoned that since conservative Catholics obeyed these decisions, it

confessional lines, see Smith, German Nationalism and Religious Conflict, 19-20.
48 On Dollinger, see Franz Xaver Bischof, Ignaz von Dollinger (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1997).
49 Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt, May 24, 1871.
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located the base o f their identities and loyalties in Rome instead o f Berlin.50
Faced with a commemorative discourse that largely celebrated a different
national identity, Catholics attempted to create an alternative discourse that expressed
their own sense o f Germanness. To succeed in this venture, they recognized the need
for an expanded Catholic presence in the public sphere, which would counteract the
Protestant-dominated official commemorative discourse. To control public space
became one o f the keys to Catholic construction and assertion o f national identity.
Various kinds o f papal anniversaries constituted one o f the most important means that
Catholics employed to gain control over the public sphere. More so than Protestants,
Catholics placed heavy emphasis on celebrating various religious anniversaries. Most
were small local festivities. However, the celebration o f several major papal
anniversaries constituted important occasions that demanded the attention o f the entire
city and its immediate surroundings. Taking into consideration the context in which
these celebrations were staged, it becomes evident that Catholics employed them, at
least in part, to display and manifest their own sense o f identity.
June 16, 1871, was the twenty-fifth anniversary o f Pius IX ’s election as Pope,
which provided Freiburg’s Catholics with an early opportunity to display publicly
their presence in the city and to offset some o f the hostile rhetoric that they had
endured during the last six months. Although these celebrations took place throughout
the state, since Freiburg was the site o f the Archdiocese, the city staged the largest and
most important celebration. On June 14, Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt (FKK)
50 See for instance Freiburger Zeitung, June 16, 1871.
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published a long article outlining the importance o f this commemoration. After
surveying some o f the festivities that were planned throughout Germany, the paper
turned to the upcoming events in Freiburg and the importance o f publicly celebrating
this occasion. The article claimed that though it was self-explanatory that every pious
Catholic would honor Pius IX on this day, people should be aware that at the present
time, Catholics needed to display their affections for the Church and Pope in a
distinctly public manner. Not only had the Pope experienced hardships during the last
year, but he had also been distraught at news from Freiburg about the behavior of
Protestants and liberal Catholics. To assure him that the city still remained strongly
Catholic, Freiburgers needed to display their loyalty in the streets as well as inside the
churches.51
Catholics deemed the three-day observance a great success. Thousands
participated in various celebrations, and their public presence made it evident that
though the German government refused to correct the injustices done to the Pope,
south German Catholics were unwavering in their support. By partaking in religious
services, various types o f processions, concerts, and theatrical performances, Catholics
in Freiburg displayed that their definition o f German national identity had room for
loyalty to the Pope. Not surprisingly, Protestants and liberals heavily criticized this
celebration, claiming that it only served as further proof what all good Germans
already knew -that there is no such thing as a loyal German Catholic.52

51 Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt, June 14, 1871.
52 Freiburger Zeitung, June 21, 23, 1871.
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During summer 1871, new debates emerged in Freiburg concerning the role o f
the Catholics in the Franco-Prussian War. The more distant the conflict, the more
Protestants and liberals tended to “forget” Catholic efforts in the war and instead
focused on their allegedly traitorous behavior. Part o f their attempts to control the
memory o f the war, Protestants and liberals ignored the official recognition that
various Catholic institutions received for their efforts. In August 1871, Luise, the wife
o f Grand Duke Friedrich I, traveled to Freiburg to honor the volunteer work o f the
Sisters o f Mercy. In a well-publicized ceremony, she placed a cross on their building
and spoke with respect o f the important contributions o f the nuns.53 A few days later,
the liberal newspaper Karlsruhe Zeitung published a lead article arguing that, during
the last few years, Baden’s Catholics had proven useless in the defense o f the
fatherland. Disloyal to their Emperor and without true love for the German Heimat,
Badenese Catholics had been more o f a burden than an asset in the recent war.54
Catholic newspapers were outraged at these accusations, and Stephan Braun, one o f
Freiburg’s leading Catholics, published an article in which he encouraged Protestants
and liberals to question Luise concerning this matter—she would set the record
straight. In addition, he recounted the activities o f the Maltheser order in painstaking
detail. Braun listed every conceivable statistic regarding the m onks’ activities during
the war, from how many volunteered as doctors and nurses to the number o f bandages

53 Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt, August, 2, 1871.
54 Karlsruhe Zeitung, August 5, 1871.
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they applied.55 Determined not to let Protestants and liberals exclude them from the
memory o f the war, Catholics took care to refute the false claims that the former used
in their attempts to control the commemorative discourse.

The Construction of the Siegesdenkmal
Although Protestants and Catholics clashed over several different issues in
conjunction with the commemoration o f unification, the construction o f monuments
constituted perhaps the most important means o f publicly negotiating their identities.
Indeed, with the possible exception o f the controversies surrounding Sedan Day, the
planning and construction o f the Siegesdenkmal in Freiburg was the most important
commemorative effort in Freiburg. Although it is evident that though the planning and
construction o f this monument first and foremost reflect how residents o f Freiburg,
irrespective o f confession, used this monument to combat the Prusso-centered national
identity emerging from Berlin, the discourse surrounding the statue also provides
indications o f how the city’s Catholics manifested their identities. Indeed, that the
monument allowed Freiburgers to integrate into the Second Empire by maintaining
their local and regional identities indicates how resistant the majority o f Badeners
were to accept the means o f nation building emanating from Berlin. In the end, this
resistance made it easier for Catholics to accept at least parts o f this particular
commemorative discourse.

55 Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt, August 28, 1871.

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

175
After the proclamation o f the Reich, the citizens o f Freiburg began to address
the issue o f commemorating the recent historic events.56 It became evident in early
discussions that the memory o f the Franco-Prussian W ar would be commemorated to
help maintain local-regional loyalties as the southwest Germans were integrated into
the new Reich. On January 23, members o f the BiXrgerausschuss met to consider
whether to honor General Werder by making him an honorary citizen o f the city.57
These discussions were similar to others throughout the German lands, where
committees took analogous initiatives in the wake o f the nationalist exhilaration that
accompanied the military victory and unification. Following initial deliberations,
however, the members o f the Biirgerausschuss agreed that rather than limit
celebrations to Freiburg, it would be more appropriate to include all the major cities in
southern Baden in the commemorative effort. Their logic was simple: since the brave
actions o f Werder and his men had saved the Badenese state from invasion and
subsequent destruction by the French, the entire region needed to display gratefulness
towards the troops.58 The more people who participated, the greater the significance
o f the project.59
The Biirgerausschuss sent a memorandum to several cities in south Baden,
asking for donations to provide Werder with a ceremonial sword and a small gratuity

56 St. AF, Cl/Denkmaler/3, protocol from Biirgerausschuss meeting, January 23, 1871.
57 Ibid.
58 The term “Badische Oberland” refers to the southwestern part o f the state.
59 St. AF, Cl/Denkmaler/3, protocol fro m Burgera ussch uss meeting, January 23, 1871.
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for each participating soldier. Most communities responded positively; some even
included a donation with their answer.60 Many offered suggestions about what might
be another appropriate form o f honoring Werder and his troops. From the outset o f
this initiative, however, it was evident that not everyone agreed on the meaning and
value o f the commemorative effort. For instance, the town council o f St. Blasien,
whose members were all conservative Catholics, immediately condemned the
proposed monument as a waste o f money. Council members declared themselves
willing to donate only if the local soldiers were to receive some compensation from
the new German nation-state, for which they had so valiantly risked their lives. The
ultramontane Catholic city councils in Triberg and Breisach also opposed spending
money on anything other than aiding the veterans. Instead o f constructing a
monument, they argued that funds should provide assistance to wounded war veterans
to help them cope with life after the war. In their replies, all three cities made
references to the recent Austro-Prussian War. The St. Blasien council expressed
dissatisfaction that the veterans o f 1866 had not been honored in the same manner as
those o f the more recent war, although they also had risked their lives to protect their
fatherland. Triberg echoed these sentiments, pointing out that many veterans o f 1866
had experienced economic difficulties when they returned to civilian life.61 Not only
did the differing opinions demonstrate that even the seemingly most homogeneous

60 St. AF, Cl/Denkmaler/5. See for instance the answer from Kandem, February 7, 1871.
61 St. AF, Cl/Denkmaler/5, letters to the Biirgerausschuss from Breisach, February 9; Lorrach,
February 11; and Triberg, February 16, 1871.
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local-regional commemorative discourse could be contested but also how differently
many Catholics viewed the process o f unification compared to the official nationalist
discourse.
In the popular Protestant-Prussian memory o f unification, the three wars
against Denmark, Austria, and France constituted an almost ideal way to achieve
unity. According to the official discourse, Germans had been divided for centuries,
until the threat o f external enemies brought them together in joint defense o f their
common fatherland. Baden’s Catholics found this ideological message impossible to
accept for several reasons. First and foremost, they had fought with the Austrians in
1866. Although the liberal government and Grand Duke Friedrich I had hoped to join
a Prussian-led unification up until the outbreak o f war, the overwhelming majority o f
the Badenese population supported Austria. It should be pointed out that not until the
outbreak o f the Franco-Prussian War did most Badeners abandon their hopes for an
inclusion o f Austria in a unified Germany. Consequently, Badenese Catholics were
unable to accept the notion that the war o f 1866 constituted a logical step on the road
to unification. Their criticisms o f the failure o f the official commemorative discourse
to recognize the efforts o f courageous Badeners who had supported their fellow
Austro-German Catholics illustrated the different collective memory that they had o f
unification. Badenese Protestants, on the other hand, most o f whom had supported the
philo-prussian policies o f the Grand Duke, Roggenbach, and Lamey, simply
suppressed the Austro-Prussian War in their construction o f the memory of
unification. Baden’s Catholics were also critical o f the fact that the official
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commemorative discourse declared that Germans, in a similar fashion to 1870, had
defended their fatherland in 1866. The term “fatherland” meant something entirely
different to the Catholics in Freiburg and the Breisgau, which had belonged to the
Habsburg Monarchy for several centuries before 1806, than it did to other Germans.
As part o f their opposition to the construction o f the Siegesdenkmal, some Freiburg
Catholics reminded members o f the Biirgerausschuss that if the veterans o f 1870-1871
were commemorated with a monument, attempts should be made to include the
veterans o f 1866 in this discourse as well.62
The members o f the Bonndorf town council first voiced the idea o f
constructing a monument in one o f the larger cities in the area to commemorate recent
events. Freiburg, a city that had housed a garrison, would be the logical choice.

AT

On

February 19, representatives from the major Badenese cities met in Freiburg and
decided to go ahead with the construction.64 The Freiburg city council formed a
committee with the task o f overseeing the planning and construction o f the monument.
Most o f the members o f this body came from the city council itself. However, other
important local personalities, such as Mayor Carl Schuster, council members Carl Mez
and Adolph Wagner, retired Lieutenant von Boeck, and privy councilor Alexander

62 St. AF, Denkmaler/3. This was discussed in a meeting on March 10, 1871.
63 St. AF, Cl/Denkmaler/5, letter to the Biirgerausschuss from Bonndorf, February 7, 1871.
64 This decision was made after a request from several communities in the northern part o f the state. The
latter thought that if they were to donate money to the project, they should be allowed to participate in
the organizational work. St. AF, Cl/Denkmaler/2/2.
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Ecker were also included.65 The composition o f the committee ensured that almost all
important sectors o f bourgeois society were represented, including industrialists,
politicians, and military officials. Members o f the city council made a conscious
effort to form a committee that would command respect from the population o f both
city and state. There was no dearth o f potential candidates; many members o f the
rising bourgeoisie were eager to perform their civic duty publicly, thus establishing
themselves as important actors in the local community during the last h alf o f the
nineteenth century. Voluntary associations such as this committee became tools o f
bourgeois emancipation and self-affirmation.66 Since the majority o f the city’s
bourgeoisie was either Protestant, liberal Catholic, or about to become Old Catholic,
the committee did not truly represent the population o f the city, the vast majority o f
which consisted o f conservative Catholics.
From the outset o f this project, it was evident that the Siegesdenkmal would be
employed to facilitate integration into the nation-state by maintaining the strength of
local loyalties, which enabled Catholic acceptance o f parts o f its ideological message.
In March, the organizing committee sent a Dankadress to General Werder, signed by
the mayors o f the largest cities in Baden. The text o f this document indicates how the
construction o f the memory o f this still recent war was adopted to fit the local context.
It recounted the major victories o f the German Army while stressing the grave danger
65 St. AF, Cl/Denkmaler/5. The selection o f the committee was finalized on March 6, 1871.
66 See for instance Geoff Eley, “Nations, Publics, and Political Cultures: Placing Habermas in the
Nineteenth Century,” in Culture/Power/History: A Reader in Contemporary Social Theory, eds.
Nicholas B. Dirks, G eoff Eley, and Sherry B. Ortner (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994),
302-304.
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that Baden had faced during the conflict. “In the days between January 15 and 17, our
people waited anxiously as the enemy, three times as strong and hungry for revenge,
attacked our army. It was our brothers and sons who formed the last line o f
defense.. ..”67 The text conveyed the notion that had it not been for the heroic efforts
o f Werder and his men, the French would have invaded the state. The national
perspective was virtually excluded from the address, and the only time that it was
mentioned was to illustrate how grateful the rest o f Germany was towards the
Badenese troops for winning the war. “Admiringly, the grateful eyes o f all o f
Germany...went to General Werder, the re-conqueror o f our Strassbourg, the savior o f
south Germany....”68
The campaign to collect donations from throughout the state began on June 22,
1871, when the committee published an official announcement. Like the Dankadress,
this document stressed the important role played by the local troops, which under
W erder’s heroic leadership had not only prevented the French from occupying Baden
but had also delivered the final blow that caused the French to surrender.69 Freiburg
itself had already set the pace for the campaign by donating 5,000 Gulden.70 The
initial response to the announcement proved extraordinarily positive as donations
came from every comer o f the state. While many o f the donations came from the
67 A copy o f the letter can be found in St. AF, K l/28, Nachlass Schuster.
68 Ibid.
69 The Aufruf can be found in St. AF, Cl/Denkmaler/2/2.
70 St. AF, Cl/Denkmaler/2/2, protocol from Biirgerausschuss, February 28, 1871.
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upper classes, the response from the middle classes was quite positive. Like their
willingness to serve on organizing committees, the well-publicized generosity o f the
local bourgeoisie indicates their eagerness to use this project to establish themselves as
important personalities in the community. Since Honoratioren still largely dominated
politics, the Badenese bourgeoisie used various organizations, associations, and public
projects to gain control o f the public sphere in the Empire. The construction o f
monuments offered the bourgeoisie a context in which they could express their
aspirations to social, cultural, political, and economic leadership in the Empire. In
Freiburg, representatives o f both Bildungs- and Wirtschaftsbiirgertum dominated the
process o f planning and constructing the Siegesdenkmal.

71

The presence o f local members o f the bourgeoisie in these projects was not
uncommon throughout Germany, and certainly not in Baden either. As scholars have
pointed out, Baden possessed an active bourgeoisie that participated to a great extent
in the development and administration o f their cities. Indeed, even in smaller towns,
both Catholic and Protestant bourgeoisie used city and commune administration as one
o f the most important means to heighten their importance in their communities. It is
worth nothing that though most o f the members o f the bourgeoisie were Protestant,
Baden had a sizeable contingent o f Catholics in this class as well. Because o f many
71 For a discussion o f the Burgertum and its relation to the Denkmalskultur, see Wolfgang Hardtwig,
Nationalismus und Burgerkultur (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck &Ruprecht, 1994); idem, Geschichtskultur
und Wissenschaft (Miinchen: Deutscher Taschenbuchverlag, 1990). For a more general discussion on
the Burgertum and its role in Imperial Germany, see David Blackboum and Geoff Eley, The
Peculiarities o f German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth Century Germany
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984); Lothar Gall, Burgertum in Deutschland (Berlin: Siedler,
1990); Jurgen Kocka, Burger und Burgerlichkeit im 19. Jahrhundert (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck &
Ruprecht, 1987).
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reasons, one o f the most important ones being that Baden did not employ
primogeniture, the state had a relatively large pool o f citizens who aspired to become
part o f the Burgertum. Despite the sometimes harsh conflicts with the Catholic
Church, certain Catholics were part o f this group. To be sure, many o f them left the
Church; however, many still remained active Catholics.72
One o f the favored means o f collecting donations was to organize events such
as concerts and plays whose proceeds would be donated to the monument fund.73 The
committee also publicized the names o f the people who had contributed, often
including the exact amount o f the donation.74 Members o f the Freiburg city council
devised a particularly ingenious way to collect money for the Siegesdenkmal. In
November 1872, they decided to compensate those who had housed soldiers and/or
refugees during the war. Those offered this money, however, were encouraged to
refrain from collecting it, instead having it directly transferred to the monument’s
n e

fund.

The publicity associated with a large donation could o f course turn negative if

an individual or community did not contribute as much as contemporaries expected of
them. When members o f the Konstanz city council initially declined to participate in
the campaign, claiming that they had their hands full trying to collect enough money

72 Heilbronner, “In search o f the (Rural) Catholic Bourgeoisie,” 175-200; Hein, “Badisches Burgertum,”
65-96.
73 St. AF, Cl/Denkmaler/3.
74 Local newspapers often published detailed lists complete with names and amount donated. See for
instance Freiburger Zeitung, October 11, 1871.
75 The announcement to encourage people to donate the money that they were about to receive was
published on November 21, 1871. St. AF, Cl/Denkmaler/3.
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to build their own monument, Freiburg city council members criticized them, pointing
out that there were other cities in the same situation that had still graciously donated
large sums o f money for the Freiburg monument.76 Although the Konstanzer city
council certainly could afford to contribute a small amount to the monument in
Freiburg, the fact that they were unwilling to do so is noteworthy. This dispute points
to the multifaceted web o f loyalties that the citizens o f the Second German Empire had
to sort through when integrating into the new nation-state and how difficult it
sometimes could be to forge even regional identities.77
When the committee met again in late September 1871, members drafted the
•

4

invitation to the competition to decide who would construct the monument.

75?

Committee members initially disagreed whether they should limit the competition to
Badenese artists and sculptors only. They eventually decided to allow artists from the
entire Reich to participate, primarily because a national competition would increase
the status o f the monument. The competition announcement detailed what the
monument should illustrate, though artists were left with some room for their own
interpretation o f the recent events: “...a main part containing an allegorical figure or a

76 St. AF, Cl/Denkmaler/3., letter from the city council o f Konstanz to the organization committee in
Freiburg, May 26, 1871. Also, answer from the organization committee to the city council in Konstanz,
May 29, 1871. Apparently, the city o f Konstanz decided that the publicity would be too negative and
eventually donated 84 Gulden. See also pages 103-104 in Chapter 2.
77 It should also be noted that Konstanz was not the only city to complain about having to donate money
to this project. The mayors o f Mannheim and Karlsruhe were both initially quite unwilling to organize
donation drives in their cities. The mayor o f Karlsruhe repeatedly stressed that it was going to be
difficult to contribute money to the monument in Freiburg. St. AF, Cl/Denkmaler/3, letter from the
mayor o f Karlsruhe to the organizing committee, February 10, 1872.
78 This invitation is dated “October o f 1871” and can be found in St. AF, Cl/Denkmaler/5.
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group o f figures representing the successful defense o f south Germany and especially
the Badenese lands... .”79 As in the Dankaddress to Werder, the committee stressed
the local-regional rather than the national-dynastic perspective o f the war and
subsequent unification. Since the monument was to be a permanent site o f memory,
the committee wanted to ensure that the memory constructed would facilitate
maintenance o f local-regional loyalties while also permitting the integrating of
Badeners into the Empire on their own terms. The committee set a M ay 1, 1872,
deadline for submissions. In order to confirm and stress the notion that this was to be
a popular monument, the invitation declared that all artists had to submit a model of
the proposal, which was to be publicly exhibited. The jury would consist o f five wellknown German artists.
The committee decided to exhibit the twenty best proposals in Freiburg’s art
museum from May 12 to June 9 , 1872.81 To honor the occasion, the museum was
richly decorated with flowers, wreaths, paintings, and busts o f Bismarck, Moltke,
Friedrich I, and Wilhelm I and others.82 Judging by the efforts that the organizers
made to create an environment filled with patriotic symbols, they were aware o f the
importance that people attached to these symbols and their roles in the process of
identity formation.
79 Ibid.
80 According to Ute Scherb, the jury consisted o f art professors Semper, Magnus, Hahnel, Liibke and
Knecht. Ute Scherb, Das Freiburger Siegesdenkmal—ein badischer Alleingang? (Freiburg:
Unpublished master’s thesis, University o f Freiburg, 1990), 72.
81 Freiburger Zeitung, May, 25, 1872.
82 Ibid.
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The public took great interest in the exhibit. Over 5,000 people attended,
which, considering that Freiburg only had 30,000 inhabitants, was a remarkable
number. The committee made a nice profit, which it applied towards the cost o f the
monument. Most o f the models were variations on the same theme: a triumphant
Germania, illustrating the strength and greatness o f the German nation. A few artists
attempted to portray the complex relationship between Baden and the new nation-state
by including both Germania and Badenia in their monuments. For the duration o f the
exhibit, the local public opinion was preoccupied with the evaluation o f the merits and
flaws o f the models, and the citizens o f Freiburg enthusiastically offered a variety o f
criticisms. According to newspapers, none o f the models was able to excite the public
with a proper visual representation o f the Franco-Prussian War and the unification o f
the Reich. The most common complaint was that the models placed too much
emphasis on the national perspective.83 All o f the monuments that centered on
Germania, regardless o f their overall artistic quality, were criticized for failing to
consider the important aspects o f the Badenese history and the major role that Baden
and its Grand Duke had played in the unification process.

04

Local citizens and the press accused even those artists who had included
Badenia in their models o f having misunderstood the real relationship between
Badenia and Germania.85 In these models, the former was too passive and seemed to

83 See for instance Freiburger Zeitung, May 28, 1872.
84 Ibid.
85 Breisgauer Zeitung, June 8, 1872.
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be in a subordinate role to the latter. There was particular criticism o f the few models
where it appeared as if Germania was offering protection to Badenia. The public
maintained that due to the prominent role that Baden and its soldiers had played in
unification, the reverse would better represent the true nature o f the relationship
between the local and national. Any other type o f symbolism would constitute a
distortion o f the facts and provide a false account o f both the Franco-Prussian War and
the unification process.86 This alleged misrepresentation o f events proved a sore point
for liberals, conservatives, Catholics, and Protestants alike, and the discourse
surrounding these models provided an outlet for some o f the frustrations that people,
despite their nationalist rhetoric, experienced during the unification process.
Commentators often pointed out that the people o f the city and the state had no interest
in commemorating how the mighty Germania saved the weaker and dependent
Badenia from the grasp o f the French. Not only was this an incorrect account of
events, but it also implied that the state o f Baden was in a submissive position to the
•

rest o f Germany in the new Reich.

87

Such sentiments can be partly traced to the fact that Baden was the only one of
the three southern states that conceded almost all o f its demands in negotiations with
Bismarck during the last months o f 1870. Both Wiirttemberg and Bavaria proved
more resistant to the demands o f the future Chancellor, which in the end provided

86 Freiburger Zeitung, May 29, 1872.
87 Ibid.
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•

them a larger degree o f autonomy in the new Empire than Baden received.

88

This

issue was sensitive to many Badeners, and they often complained that their state was
neglected in both the economic and political realms compared to other German
states.89 Therefore, it became even more important for citizens o f the state to make
sure that they maintained control over their public space. Many argued that an
unconditional acceptance o f the ideological message o f the official commemorative
discourse that emerged from the center would be unacceptable. These people on the
margins o f the Empire were not prepared to concede control o f their public space in
favor o f the Prussian-dominated national symbolism that stressed the importance o f
the Hohenzollem family and Emperor Wilhelm I. Control o f their local public space
became a way o f asserting their own identities and counteracting the political,
economic, and cultural hegemony that accompanied the official commemorative
discourse. As John Bodnar has pointed out, the creation o f public memory “help[s] a
public or society understand both its past and its present, and by implication, its
future.”90 The construction o f a public memory ideally takes place in a public space,
where it offers insights into structures o f power in a society and questions o f loyalty to
various institutions. By insisting on constructing a monument that offered a regional
interpretation o f the process o f unification, and by placing it in a prominent city such
88 Karl Bosl, “Die Verhandlungen iiber den Eintritt der siiddeutschen Staaten in den Norddeutschen
Bund und die Entstehung der Reichsverfassung,” in Reichsgrundung 1870/71, eds., Duerlein and
Schieder, 148-163. See also Gall, Bismarck, 447.
89 Some o f these ideas are discussed, albeit on a more local scale, in Zang, ed., Provizialisierung einer
Region. See also Haumann and Schadek, eds., Geschichte der Stadt Freiburg im Breisgau, 199-200.
90 John Bodnar, “Public Memory in an American City: Commemoration in Cleveland,” in
Commemorations, ed. Gillis, 72.
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as Freiburg, Badeners wanted to ensure that the importance o f their role in the
unification process as well as in the new Empire was made evident. Once again, these
types o f sentiments made it easier for conservative Catholics to partake in this project.
Although few o f Freiburg’s conservative Catholics played an important role in the
planning and construction o f this monument, the knowledge that the statue’s
ideological message, though not in confessional terms, opposed the official nationalist
rhetoric enabled ultramontanes to remain relatively neutral.
In their criticism o f these models, most journalists were understanding o f the
faults o f the artists. They noted that most o f the participating artists lived outside
Baden and had not experienced the horrors o f the war and the threat o f French
invasion first-hand. Thus, they should not be judged too harshly for their failure to
commemorate the war and the unification o f the Reich properly.91 Most used this
argument as a further indication that it was all the more important for the people o f
Baden to describe and commemorate the events that had taken place in this area
during the war in a proper manner. Otherwise, they ran the risk o f being neglected in
the overall narrative o f the Franco-Prussian War. This fear proved unfounded as
contemporary histories o f the war included sufficient descriptions and analysis o f the
activities o f Werder and his troops.92 These discussions point to the value people
placed on maintaining the originality and uniqueness o f their region. During the
planning and construction o f the Siegesdenkmal, local citizens often expressed
91 Freiburger Zeitung, May 29, 1872.
92 See for instance Fontane, D er Krieg gegen Frankreich, Vol. II, 714-726, 922-964.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

189
contempt for Prussian descriptions o f the dangers the German fatherland faced during
the war, arguing that it was only the people o f Baden who had the right to discuss the
dangers o f a potential French invasion.93 This served to strengthen not only their
regional identities, but also, because their region was the one exposed to the gravest
danger during the war, which had called for a heroic defense o f the fatherland, it
enhanced Badeners’ sense o f importance.
Freiburg’s proximity to the French border further complicated the acceptance
o f the commemorative discourse surrounding unification. This became evident in the
public’s criticism o f these models as too degrading in their representation o f the
French. As previously discussed, the city’s Catholics had already during the war
opposed the defamation o f the Catholic French. Although many Protestants and
liberals had been quite harsh in their descriptions o f the inabilities o f the French troops
during the war, they did not want this denigration to be displayed in such a permanent
medium as a monument. Newspapers from across the political spectrum agreed that
the city o f Freiburg could not identify with an anti-French monument. Journalists
pointed out that this monument was to be an integral part o f the city for centuries to
come, and though locals wanted to celebrate the victory o f the war and the unification
o f the Reich, they had no desire to completely degrade their neighbors in the process.94
People kept in mind the many years o f fruitful cooperation that they had experienced
in the past and hoped for in the future. Newspapers cited these opinions as evidence
93 See for instance Breisgauer Zeitung, June 6, 1872.
94 Freiburger Zeitung, May 25, 1872.
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o f the cultured and sophisticated nature o f the Badeners. To quote Freiburger
Zeitung: “Our respect for humanity forbids us to humiliate publicly a neighboring
state for hundreds o f years to come.”95 These sentiments reinforced Badeners sense o f
identity in a positive manner and set them aside from the “official” national identity
that made frequent use o f the French Other.96
After intense deliberations, the jury decided to award first prize to the
relatively unknown artist Friedrich Moest from Karlsruhe.97 The choice o f an unsung,
but local, artist caused much speculation in the newspapers over the fairness o f the
competition. Journalists agreed that there were other models that were far superior to
M oest’s. And although the jury was supposed to have made its decision without
knowledge o f the identity o f the participating artists, people surmised that Moest had
no

been awarded first price because he was from Karlsruhe.

The jury also submitted a

long list o f details that needed to be altered before the final construction o f the
monument.99 To be sure, it was not uncommon for a jury to offer suggestions for the
improvement o f a winning model. In this case, however, the list o f recommended
changes was more extensive than usual. The fact that a Badenese artist won the

95 Ibid.
96 Freiburger Zeitung, May 25, 1872.
97 St. AF, Cl/Denkmaler/5, announcement from the jury, May 29, 1872. For a brief sketch on M oest’s
career, see Brigitte Mayer, “Friedrich Moest,” in Denkmaler, Brunnen und Freiplastiken in Karlsruhe,
ed. Gerlinde Brandenburger, (Karlsruhe: Badenia, 1987), 686.
98 Freiburger Zeitung, June 2, 1872.
99 St. AF, Cl/Denkmaler/5, announcement from the jury, May 29, 1872.
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competition indicates that the committee wanted to ensure that the Siegesdenkmal
would present local-regional loyalties in an appropriate manner. In general, the people
of Freiburg were not too critical o f the winning entry, but they did not display great
enthusiasm for it either. Most seemed to have accepted M oest’s model as perhaps not
the greatest piece o f art, but one which contained no incorrect or offending symbolism.
Moest envisioned a fifteen-meter monument, consisting o f a five-meter bronze
statue o f Victoria atop a ten-meter pedestal (fifty percent granite and fifty percent iron;
100 see Figure 1). The selection o f Victoria as the major figure for this monument
indicates the difficulties that accompanied the symbolic issue. As noted above, many
artists’ choice o f Germania drew criticism for placing too much emphasis on the
national perspective. Artists also faced the problem that Badenia was relatively
unknown as a symbol, which meant that many viewers would have difficulties
understanding the allegorical message o f the monument. The relative dearth o f localregional symbols suggests another difficulty that people encountered when trying to
imagine the region. By choosing Victoria, Moest simply avoided most o f these thorny
issues while still using a symbol that resonated with the vast majority o f the
population as representing German might and power.
M oest’s statute focuses on the figure o f Victoria, who, holding a laurel wreath,
stands atop a globe, symbolizing the rise o f the German nation to the top o f the world.
Victoria’s solemn gaze is directed downward to the soldiers below her, leaving the
impression that even in this triumphant moment, she is mourning the lives lost. Both
100 For a detailed description o f the monument, see Scherb, Das Freiburger Siegesdenkmal, 77-80.
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Figure 1. The Siegesdenkmal in Freiburg. (Reprinted from Otto Funke. Das
Siegesdenkmal zu Freiburg im Breisgau. Freiburg: Lauber & Mehlhase,
1877).
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her hair and clothes seem to be flowing in the wind, providing the notion o f her body
in forward motion. These details leave little doubt that Moest wanted to express the
forward motion o f the Empire as it assumed its place as one o f the dominant powers in
the newly industrializing world. Below the globe upon which Victoria is standing,
four soldiers, a gunner, an infantry man, a man with a rifle, and a militia man, are
positioned. By clothing two o f them (the militia man and the soldier with the rifle) in
Prussian uniforms and the other two in Badenese uniforms, it might appear as if Moest
struck a “proper” balance between the regional and national perspective. However,
upon closer examination, the picture becomes more complicated. The militia man and
the solider with the rifle are clearly the more passive and defensive o f the soldiers.
Despite looking courageous, they both seem to be hesitant and waiting for assistance.
Both the gunner and the infantry man, however, appear to be active, strong, and
determined. This symbolism illustrates how the artist wanted the public to view and
remember the events o f the war. The majority o f symbols on the monument illustrate
an extraordinary role played by Baden in the unification process, reflecting the alleged
impossibility o f achieving such a glorious victory over the French had it not been for
the valiant efforts o f the Badenese troops.
Aware that his monument also needed to reflect some form o f nationaldynastic loyalties, Moest also included references to Emperor and Reich. On the
middle o f the foundation, he placed a plaque containing the text o f the telegram that
Wilhelm I sent to the Empress after the battle o f Belfort.101 In Baden, because o f its

101 Ibid.
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emphasis on the local soldiers, this telegram was often employed in the
commemorative discourse that surrounded the Franco-Prussian W ar and unification.
On almost any anniversary o f either the battle at Belfort or the proclamation o f the
Reich, liberal newspapers reprinted it to remind citizens o f the elation that had
accompanied this event.102 Despite its national-dynastic connotations, however, this
telegram also reinforced the notion that the victory o f the Fourteenth Army Corps had
been o f utmost importance for the overall campaign. Consequently, even when
addressing the national perspective, the symbolism o f the monument enabled locals to
construct their national identity and express loyalty to Wilhelm I by stressing the
importance o f their local identities.
Below the telegram was an imperial crown, one o f the symbols that drew
public criticism. Many complained that two symbols o f Reich and Emperor were too
many and that it was a shame that the “great” General Werder was not represented on
the front o f the monument.103 The committee had intense discussions about what to
place on the sides o f the pedestal. A variety o f ideas were examined before the
committee members finally elected to place the imperial crown on the prestigious
front side.104 These discussions continued after the statue was unveiled as locals
voiced their displeasure that Werder did not occupy the most prominent spot on the
pedestal. Largely as a result o f popular pressure, members o f the city council decided

102 See for instance Freiburger Zeitung, January 21, 1872.
103 Freiburger Zeitung, June 2, 1872.
104 St. AF, Cl/Denkmaler/2/2, protocol from committee meeting, April 21, 1875.
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to replace the imperial crown with a bust o f the General following W erder’s retirement
in 1879.105 Residents o f the city as well as o f the rest o f the state expressed
satisfaction upon learning o f this change. Once again, this leaves little doubt as to
what aspects o f the monument the public deemed worthy o f emphasizing, and it also
indicates that even after the Second Empire had been in existence for almost a decade,
the people o f Baden were still not willing to concede completely their regional
loyalties in favor o f national-dynastic ones.
The fact that the battles around Belfort were the last major ones in the war
played a role in creating the notion that they had been the decisive ones for the
outcome o f the war. When constructing this memory, locals often ignored basic facts.
It was certainly true that Werder and his troops had survived a hefty challenge during
those critical days in January 1871. Considering, however, the overall context o f the
war, the local population exaggerated the importance o f the efforts o f the Badenese
troops. In reality, Werder and his soldiers had experienced serious difficulties towards
the end o f the battle. Had they not received assistance from General Edwin von
Mantteuffel and his Prussian troops, the Fourteenth Corps would probably not have
captured Belfort.106 Local contemporary accounts almost completely ignored the role
o f the Prussians. As the planning o f the Siegesdenkmal progressed, locals overlooked

105 St. AF, Cl/Denkmaler/5. This decision was made in a city council meeting on April 29, 1879.
106 Howard, Franco-Prussian War, 424-427. He points out that though Mantteuffel did not offer much
direct assistance to Werder, the fact that the former was approaching the battlefield with thousands of
Pmssian soldiers broke the spirit and resolve o f the French army.
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Mantteuffel’s involvement to an even greater extent.107 An even more remarkable
example o f inventing traditions was the attempt to make General Werder, in reality a
Prussian, into a Badener who had answered the call o f his fatherland and valiantly
fought off the French attacks.108
One o f the persistent voices opposing the view o f the war that the monument
presented was that o f Freiburg military historian Friedrich von der Wengen.
Beginning in January 1872, he wrote several letters to the organizing committee,
arguing that the commemorative discourse offered a distorted account o f the recent
events. Citing both French and German sources indicating that the heroics o f
W erder’s troops had been considerably exaggerated, he argued that if Mantteuffel had
not arrived with his Prussian troops to support the Fourteenth Army Corps, it would
have been defeated in the battles around Belfort. Thus, von der Wengen argued that
Mantteuffel deserved to be honored rather than Werder.
The correspondence grew increasingly hostile after several o f the military
historian’s letters were published in the Oberrheinischer Courier, providing von der
Wengen with a public forum for his views. The national-liberal Freiburger Zeitung
refused to discuss this controversy, realizing how the constructed memory o f the war
could be tarnished if the public arena for W engen’s views was expanded. The
organizing committee continued to dispute his arguments, even though they were

107 The actions o f Mantteuffel and his troops were never discussed in any o f the otherwise very detailed
descriptions o f the battles that the newspapers offered. See for instance Freiburger Zeitung, January,
17, 1872.
108 Oberrheinischer Courier, May 25, 1872.
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never able to refute his claims properly. The committee was unable to make the kinds
o f changes to the monument that von der Wengen was demanding since they would
have shifted the focus o f the monument from the regional towards the national
perspective. This conflict continued until October 1872, when the committee simply
stopped responding to von der W engen’s letters.109

Other Catholic Manifestations of Their National Identity
While the construction o f the monument would take another three years,
Freiburg’s Catholics were involved in other instances o f intense contestation o f their
national identity. As the Badenese Kulturkam pf resumed in 1872 and 1873, this time
intensified by a full-scale national one as well, the city’s Catholics came under
increased pressure. In 1873, in a similar fashion to the celebration o f Pius IX in 1871,
Freiburg’s Catholics took advantage o f the centenary celebration o f former
Archbishop Hermann von Vicari’s birth on M ay 13 to stake public claim to the city.
As one o f the main leaders o f the Catholic revival after 1850, Vicari was a revered
symbol o f the strength o f the Catholic Church. Because o f his close ties to the city,
inhabitants o f Freiburg and surrounding areas were especially keen to treasure his
memory and were determined to use this celebration to showcase their appreciation of
his efforts for the Church. The Catholic press once again reminded people that given

109 The correspondence can be found in St. AF, Cl/Denkmaler/2/2. See also Oberrheinischer Courier,
July 16, October 3, 4, 1872.
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the current situation it was crucial that they take these celebrations to the streets.110
Since this commemoration took place only a few days after the passing o f the May
laws, Catholics were under heavy pressure throughout the Reich. In addition to
stressing the need for Catholics to display their strength, the Catholic press also
published excerpts from the Archbishop’s diary describing his house arrest in 1854. It
was no coincidence that these passages were chosen. Since the initiation o f the
Kulturexamen in 1867, an ever-increasing number o f Catholic priests had been
arrested. The so called Sperrlinge, who were forced to carry out their activities in
secrecy and under constant threat o f discovery, needed encouragement to maintain
their resolve.111 The centenary commemoration o f Vicari’s birth was a success as it
attracted thousands o f Catholics from the city and surrounding areas. Immediately
after the passing o f the harshest Kulturkam pf laws, the celebration constituted an
impressive display o f Catholic unity and strength.
In 1875, Catholics in Freiburg and around the state took advantage o f two
opportunities to celebrate publicly their faith and sense o f Germanness. On July 25,
Wilhelm von Ketteler, one o f the best-known German bishops, had his twenty-fifth
anniversary as Bishop. Once again, the eagerness Catholics displayed as they
embarked on the planning and celebrating o f this commemoration indicates their
resistance to the Protestant-based national identity. Most o f these public celebrations
were accompanied by harsh polemic in the press, both prior to and after the event. In
110 Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt, May 14, 1873.
111 Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt, June 4, 1873.
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the last weeks leading up to Ketteler’s anniversary, the liberal Badische Landeszeitung
and FKK engaged in a fierce debate regarding the importance o f the Bishop to
contemporary society.112 The former attempted to downplay the significance of
Ketteler to the Catholic cause while FKK answered by discussing in great detail all he
had done for the Church. FKK placed much emphasis on Ketteler’s great qualities as
a human, which they claimed earned him respect among his enemies as well. This
was a common trend throughout these debates, as Catholics often stressed the personal
qualities o f their own, claiming that the Catholic in question constituted a perfect
example o f a German. Their enemies, on the other hand, were mostly denigrated as
shallow, egotistical, and unkind persons, representing a poor example o f Germanness.
Many times, these characterizations were conducted in national terms, indicating that
the opponents o f the Catholic cause were not really true Germans, wheras Catholics
constituted the perfect embodiment o f Germanness.

113

As far as Ketteler’s character was concerned, FKK pointed out that as a true
man o f God, members o f the local and national community respected him. In
conjunction with this celebration, the ever-present issue of papal infallibility was once
again brought to the forefront o f the debate. In an attempt to disgrace Ketteler,
Protestants and Old Catholics claimed that prior to the Vatican Council he had been
opposed to the notion o f infallibility. Ketteler refuted these allegations by admitting

112 Badische Landeszeitung, June 26, 28, 1875; Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt, July 21, 1875.
113 An excellent example o f this can be found in Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt, August 11,
1873, where Vicari is seen as an exemplary German while Bismarck is heavily criticized for embodying
all the flaws o f the German national character.
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that he had initially expressed some concerns about certain aspects o f the notion of
infallibility. As soon as the Council made its decision however, he unconditionally
accepted it. This was the main difference between him self (and in the end, every good
Catholic) and the Old Catholics and Protestants, who incorrectly believed that they
could challenge the decisions o f the highest clergy.114
Also in 1875, as the host o f the General Assembly of Germany’s Catholics
(Generalversammlung der Katholiken Deutschlands), Freiburg and the Catholics of
Baden had another opportunity to manifest their strength. This annual event
constituted a highlight for Catholics throughout Germany and neighboring countries.
Almost every Catholic newspaper carried extensive coverage o f the congress,
commenting on the debates and the decisions made. The local Catholic press covered
the meetings in great detail, often including complete transcripts o f the discussions.
The Catholics o f Freiburg were determined to take advantage o f this opportunity to
prove themselves worthy hosts o f this event, just as Catholics in Konstanz had
embraced the anniversary o f the birth o f the Holy Konrad in 1876 to manifest publicly
their presence in their city. Prior to the congress, people were encouraged to
participate in as many proceedings as possible, to ensure that the rest o f Germany
would witness the strength and vitality o f the Catholic community. An event o f this
magnitude was tremendously important to the Catholics in Freiburg as it provided
them with an opportunity to control the city’s public space. During the several days
that the congress lasted, the city was overwhelmed by Catholics who completely
114 Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt, August 11, 1875.
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dominated the urban landscape. Indirectly addressing this issue, on September 1,
1875, Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt published a long letter from Pius IX to
the organizing committee, expressing his delight that Freiburg hosted that year’s
congress. He encouraged people to gather strength from the presence o f other
Catholics, which was even more important in these times when liberal regimes in
Germany and Europe constantly attacked Catholics.115
As opening day drew nearer, masses o f Catholics arrived in the city.
Contemporaries estimated the number o f participants at over 2,000, most o f them
Germans, but with a fair number o f French, Austrian, and Swiss delegates as well.
The main events took place in the Festhalle, which was the only building large enough
to hold all the delegates. Auxiliary Bishop Lothar von Ktibel gave the opening
speech, in which he outlined the importance o f these meetings as means o f increasing
the strength and unity o f Catholics. Besides stressing the value o f having so many
Catholics gathered in one place, he focused most o f his speech on the latest
educational reforms at the hands o f the liberal government.116
In the following speech, Bishop Ketteler provided a good example o f how
German Catholics viewed themselves and their role in contemporary Germany. Not
surprisingly, he was extremely critical o f the liberal regime in power, claiming that
there was nothing liberal about it—members o f the liberal movement were absolutists,
just as Louis XIV had been an absolutist ruler in France. Ketteler expressed dismay
115 See Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt, September 1,9, 1875.
116 Freiburger Katholisches Kirchenblatt, September 9, 1875.
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that liberals based their idea of the modem state on the notion that they could form
human beings through application o f secular laws. He attacked the liberal argument
that schools needed to be reformed to provide for a more nationally integrated and
better educated population, claiming that the removal o f religious influences in the
schools would bring disastrous consequences. In his criticisms, Ketteler revealed how
differently Catholics viewed the construction o f a nationally conscious population.
While most liberals viewed these reforms as prerequisites for a successful transition to
a modernized nation-state, Catholics were more inclined to embrace an older version
o f national identity that stressed ties to the past. Furthermore, Ketteler sharply
criticized the notion that the state could shape its citizens. In Ketteler’s view, this
constituted blasphemy as it seemed to imply that the modem state was assuming the
role o f God. This argument was a recurring one in Catholic criticisms o f the modem
state; they often accused liberals o f placing entirely too much faith in the powers of
the modem state and failing to recognize the important role that religion had to play in
the modem society.
Ketteler also took issue with liberal claims that the deregulation o f trade and
commerce had increased the freedom o f Germans. He maintained that one just had to
look at the dismal conditions o f the factory workers to realize that this was not tme.
He also addressed the recent economic crash by using a nationalist vocabulary.
Claiming that Catholics have always been tm e to the German fatherland, he argued
that the liberal entrepreneurs who caused the recent economic downturn were the true
enemies o f the fatherland. These liberals had no concern for their fellow Germans, but
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instead were only interested in increasing their own fortunes, which in the end caused
tremendous suffering to the German nation.

117

The president o f the congress, Freiherr von Bamboldt, gave one o f the most
important speeches o f the event. Briefly outlining some o f the major events o f the last
century, he noted that the last few decades had not been kind to the Catholics, or to
any confession for that matter. There had been more wars, more revolutions, more
shifts of power than ever before. In his speech, Bamboldt made a comment that was
immediately seized upon by his enemies as proof that Catholics were not interested in
bringing Germany to the forefront o f European politics. Bamboldt stated that though
life was simple in the Middle Ages, at least back then people were pious, and they all
believed in one God, whom they obeyed. The ruling kings and popes maintained a
good grip on their respective power and rarely fought over who would control which
aspects of society. During the last century, however, the constant struggles between
the church and secular leaders had contributed to an increasingly chaotic and
degenerate society, in which individualism and egocentrism constitute the ruling
virtues.118 Both local and national Protestant-liberal press attacked these statements,
which they claimed served as irrefutable proof that the influence o f the Catholic
Church needed to be even further reduced if Germany were to claim its place in the

117 Ibid.
118 Ibid.
119 Freiburger Zeitung, September 15, 1875.
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Despite the criticism that some o f the speeches attracted in Protestant-liberal
circles, the Catholics in Freiburg were very pleased with the outcome o f the congress.
For several days, Catholics, who grew ever more determined to refute the claims that
they did not constitute true Germans, dominated the city’s public space. To be sure,
sentiments such as the ones expressed by Bamboldt illustrated that Catholics, aided by
their own interpretation o f the German past, subscribed to different notions o f
Germanness. That did not, however, make them less national than their Protestant
countrymen and women.

Completion and Unveiling of the Siegesdenkmal
During all o f these debates, the men responsible for the construction o f the
Siegesdenkmal continued their work. During late 1875, discussions over the location
o f the monument delayed the construction for a few months. In spring 1876, the
committee began to push hard for an unveiling during the late summer or early fall.
The main reason for their hurry was that Wilhelm I and other members o f the
Hohenzollem family often visited the spa in Baden-Baden during the summer, a stay
that this year included the celebration o f the Empress’s birthday on September 29.
Keeping in mind that Baden-Baden was only a few hours away, the committee
members considered their chances o f securing the presence o f the Emperor and any
other family members at the unveiling to be much greater during the early fall, before
the return to Berlin. Already in a letter to Moest in April 1876, the committee stressed
120 St. AF, Cl/Denkmaler/2/2. The letter to Moest was sent on April 29, 1876.
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the importance o f completing the monument before a proposed date in early October
since that would greatly enhance the possibility o f an imperial presence at the
unveiling.121
The organizing committee was well aware that Wilhelm I often attended these
types o f ceremonies, making him the premier consumer of the monument culture that
emerged in Germany. Wilhelm I was convinced that he needed to undertake many
trips within his Empire to manifest both his own legitimacy and that o f the nation
state. His role as a consumer o f this culture not only lent legitimacy to it, but it also
helped popularize the persona o f the Emperor.122 The committee was elated when he
accepted their invitation, though he was sorry to inform them that due to poor health,
his wife would not accompany him to Freiburg.

123

On August 18, 1876, a committee was formed to plan the unveiling ceremony.
Invitations were sent out to selected dignitaries, including Wilhelm I, Grand Duke
Friedrich I, General Werder, Bismarck, Moltke, and Mantteuffel. Werder agreed to
attend the ceremony on the condition that he would not be its focus, which indicates
that the location o f the ideological emphasis o f the monument was no secret.124 In
addition to figures o f national prominence, the committee invited all o f Baden’s
121 On August 1, the committee finalized October 3, 1876, as the date for the unveiling after consulting
with both Lenz and Moest. St. AF, Cl/Denkmaler/2/2.
122 Koshar, From Monuments to Traces, 24-25.
123 St. AF, Cl/Denkmaler/2/2, letter from the Office o f the Emperor to the organization committee,
August 27, 1876.
124 St. AF, Cl/Denkmaler/2/1. Werder’s request was discussed in a meeting o f the organizing
committee on September 11, 1876.
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ministers as well as representatives o f hundreds o f different organizations. Among the
latter, the city offered some rare praise for the women o f the city as they invited
members o f the Freiburger Hiilfsverein to attend the ceremony. Leading women in
the community had founded this organization immediately after the outbreak o f the
war, and they proved to be o f much value on the home front during the w ar.125 This
was the first major public occasion on which the city had recognized the efforts o f the
women. Other than this rather minor note, women were largely excluded from this
project as well as from most o f the commemorative discourse that surrounded the
unification.
The members o f the organizing committee went to great lengths to include the
entire city in the planned ceremonies. They planned a parade from the train station to
the place o f the unveiling that was to include the most prominent guests, and they also
arranged for several different ceremonies to be held throughout the city. In addition,
they were careful to include the Catholic Church in these ceremonies. This was
obviously a thorny issue, especially since the Badenese Kulturkam pf had just reached
new heights during the summer and fall o f 1876 as the provincial parliament had
passed new legislation that abolished confessional schools, which upset Catholics.126
In addition to the aforementioned Catholic reservations concerning this monument,
local Catholics had become increasingly critical o f the fact that while monuments
were being built all over Germany to celebrate the efforts o f the soldiers, Jesuits were
125 Otto Funke, Das Siegesdenkmal zu Freiburg im Breisgau (Freiburg: Lauber & Mehlhase, 1877), 29.
126 Becker, Liberaler Staat undKirche, 358-364.
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being driven out o f the new nation-state. According to most Catholics, the Jesuits had
played an important role in caring for the wounded, especially in southern Baden, and
some o f them had been awarded the Iron Cross for their services.127 In the first
decades after the war, Jesuits and their role in the Franco-Prussian War caused
considerable controversy as liberals accused them o f having prayed for French victory.
Catholics pointed to the courage and love for the fatherland Jesuits had displayed
when volunteering for the war effort.128 Especially in 1874-1875, when reports about
mistreatment o f Jesuits reached Freiburg and the EO on an almost daily basis, local
Catholics were very critical of the actions o f both the national and state government.
Consequently, members o f the EO found themselves in a difficult position. On
the one hand, they were hesitant to associate with celebrations that commemorated an
event that in many ways constituted the beginning o f the national Kulturkampf. On
the other, they regularly faced accusations o f being enemies o f the fatherland who
maintained closer and stronger ties to Rome than Berlin. Therefore, if they elected not
to participate, it would be interpreted as yet another confirmation o f their hostile
attitudes towards the Second Empire. Finally, after some negotiating between the
organizing committee and Kiibel, the latter agreed to deliver a speech that day, not at
the monument, but at the Catholic dome. His decision to participate in the ceremony
was made easier by the fact that the monument did not contain any anti-Catholic

127 These types o f debates resurfaced in conjunction with different types o f commemorative activities.
See for instance Freie Stimme, September 9, 1874.
128 See Michael B. Gross, “Kulturkampf and Unification: German Liberalism and the War Against the
Jesuits,” Central European History 30 (1997): 545-566.
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symbolism, nor did it resonate with the official national identity emanating from
Berlin. In addition, Kiibel was able to convince the committee not to let the Old
Catholics participate in the ceremony, which would enable Freiburg’s conservative
Catholics to stake claim to a small part o f the commemorative discourse.129
•

Most local newspapers participated in heightening the anticipation o f the day
o f unveiling. In the days before and after to the ceremony, they were filled with
articles, editorials, poems, and songs. “Zum Dritten Oktober 1876,” an article
published in the Freiburger Zeitung, hailed the deeds o f Werder and his troops.
According to this article, although Werder and his men were faced by an enemy that
vastly outnumbered them (the French were said to have had a ten to one numerical
advantage), they only had to recall the danger that the women and children at home
were facing in order to summon courage to do battle. The article repeatedly stressed
that during these three days o f national danger, it was Werder and his men who held
“die Wacht am Rhein.” 130 This glorified version o f events ignored the fact that the
French, while not yet defeated, did not constitute a significant threat to the Germans
by January 1871. After the defeat at Sedan, the French army had primarily engaged in
a defensive war.
Another page in the Freiburger Zeitung contained a song honoring Werder and
his troops. This song followed a similar pattern to the article, placing particular
emphasis on the unity, courage, and nobility o f W erder’s troops. It made clear that the
129 St. AF, Cl/Denkmaler/5, letter from Kiibel to the organizing committee, September 30, 1876.
130 Freiburger Zeitung, October 3, 1876.
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unveiling commemorated the role that Werder and his men played in the defense o f
the Badenese (and German) fatherland. There was no mention o f unification, though
it is inferred that by exhausting the last reserves o f the French enemy, the Badenese
troops were the ones who delivered the decisive blow that made possible the
proclamation o f the Reich and forced the French to surrender.

1T 1

Furthermore, it

alluded to the ambivalent meaning o f the term “fatherland.” Often, it seems as if the
newspapers themselves were unsure what exactly constituted their fatherland. There
are numerous examples defining it in local {Badische Oberland), regional (Baden),
and national terms. This ambivalence indicates that locals were not prepared to accept
simply the connotations that the official discourse attached to the term and that they
used the term to express their own definition o f Germanness. Indeed, the various
meanings o f fatherland indicate the unstable nature o f the nationalizing project.
The newspapers furthermore claimed that the time had finally come for
Freiburg and Baden to display the appreciation o f its citizens for its brave fathers,
sons, and brothers, who risked their lives in order to protect the German border. When
the monument was unveiled, it would stand as a symbol to remind this and future
generations o f the heroic deeds o f these soldiers. The Freiburger Zeitung praised the
Emperor for accepting the invitation to attend the ceremony, and reminded its readers
o f the last visit that Wilhelm I had made to the city. It took place in September 1870,
as the King o f Prussia arrived to inspect the dutiful work o f the people in the middle o f
the war. Who does not remember the great speech that he held on the Karlsplatz that
131 Ibid.
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day, encouraging people to maintain their morale in these difficult times? The paper
even claimed that already on this chilly September evening, one could tell that the
people o f the city had long embraced the idea o f the unification o f the Reich and that
the mere presence o f the future Emperor prompted many spontaneous expressions o f
devotion to the Hohenzollem family.132 This is another example o f an attempt to
invent traditions. The public did not respond to the future Emperor’s visit in the
fashion that the newspaper now tried to portray. To be sure, newspaper reports
portrayed the city as elated by the presence o f the King o f Prussia. There was,
however, little or no traces o f any sentiments expressing a desire to crown him
German Emperor.133
Newspapers further stressed that although the last few years had been filled
with hard work, the love for Emperor and fatherland had only increased since 1871.
This love would be manifested in the grandest o f manners as the Emperor visited the
city.134 Oberrheinischer Courier went to great lengths to emphasize that after
witnessing the display of affection and love for the Emperor, no one would doubt that
the people o f Freiburg and Baden were loyal subjects o f Wilhelm I. The paper
repeatedly emphasized that the only thing that mattered was for the Emperor to leave
the city with a good impression o f its inhabitants. He reportedly did not care about the
pomp and glamour that surrounded the monument, or even the monument itself.

132 Freiburger Zeitung, October 2, 1876.
133 Freiburger Zeitung, September 21, 1870.
134 Breisgauer Zeitung, October 2, 1876.
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Instead, all that concerned him was how the people o f Freiburg greeted him .135 These
sentiments indicate that the people o f the city were well aware that their monument
favored local-regional over national-dynastic loyalties, which made it all the more
important for the people o f the city to display their love and devotion to the Emperor.
The citizens o f Freiburg made every effort to beautify their city on October 3.
According to newspapers, the city had seldom looked so attractive as houses and
buildings were decorated to mark this event.136 The Grand Duke and prominent
representatives o f the city greeted Wilhelm I and his entourage at the train station;
cannons were fired and church bells were rung to signal the long-awaited return o f the
Emperor. Along the parade route, cheering people lined the streets, anxious to get a
glimpse o f their Emperor. Judging from the number o f people that turned out, the
inhabitants o f the city cherished their Emperor. At the ceremony itself, many
renowned members o f the local community delivered speeches, the vast majority o f
which focused most o f their attention on the heroic efforts o f the Badenese troops
during the w ar.137 Both the unification and the ties to the Hohenzollem dynasty were
celebrated as well, especially since Wilhelm I had been gracious enough to attend this
ceremony. Still, most speeches treated the unification o f the Reich and the role o f the
Emperor, Bismarck, and military leaders such as Moltke, as secondary. After the
event, a few o f the local newspapers even remarked that if one had not known

135 Oberrheinischer Courier, October 2, 1876.
136 See for instance Oberrheinischer Courier, October 5, 1876.
137 All speeches are reprinted in Funke, Das Siegesdenkmal, 28-51.
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anything about the war, one would have believed that had not Werder and his men
fought so valiantly, Germany would never have been unified.

138

Privy councilor Ecker, the chairman o f the organizing committee, gave the
main speech at the unveiling ceremony. In his address, he asserted that because all of
Baden had contributed to the construction o f this monument, the Siegesdenkmal
should be labeled a Badenese monument, which had enjoyed unequivocal support and
approval in the entire state. He noted that it was a privilege for the city to be able to
present to the Emperor this

...Siegesdenkmal that has been constructed by the entire

Badenese people.” 139 This was at best a half-truth, for communities such as St.
Blasien, Triberg, and Breisach had opposed its construction for a variety o f reasons.
Ecker recounted the process by which the monument came into existence so that all
present would “correctly” understand the “true” meaning and symbolism o f this statue.
The majority o f his speech centered on the fear that the people in the Badenese
Oberland had experienced during the course o f the war, how the heroics o f the
Fourteenth Army Corps had saved the fatherland, and how the “ .. .rest o f Germany
admired the Fourteenth Army Corps and its leader.” 140 Paralleling the ambiguous
language that the newspapers employed, Ecker also refrained from offering a more
precise definition of the term “fatherland.” In addressing the imperial presence, he
stated that the city o f Freiburg was honored to have the Emperor as its guest. He
138 See for instance Oberrheinischer Courier, October 7, 1876.
139 Funke, Das Siegesdenkmal, 31.
140 Ibid., 33.
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quoted the telegram that Wilhelm sent to his wife after the battle o f Belfort, reporting
that the French had been defeated in the southwest. By reading this telegram, he
ensured that the national perspective was recognized. It should be noted, however,
that the telegram places the Emperor in an inactive role in the unification process. As
its author, he is reduced to the role o f medium that reports the military victories that
led to unification. Consequently, though he acknowledged W ilhelm’s importance in
the unification process, as well as his graciousness in attending the ceremony, Ecker
was able to ensure that the state o f Baden and the city o f Freiburg were portrayed as
extremely important agents o f German unification. Finally, Ecker pointed to the two
Badenese and two Prussian soldiers pictured on the monument, which he claimed
provided the entire statue with a greater and deeper meaning:
And just as North and South stand here in united defense, this monument
should proclaim that the German tribes that fought and bled together
should also in the future remain inseparable, and it should serve as a
permanent symbol o f the re-conquered, united German Fatherland,
which we have hoped and fought for ever since our youth, and which has
now been given to us by our exalted Emperor and his glorious army.141
In his claim that people had dreamed o f the unification since their youth, Ecker
conveniently failed to mention that Baden and Prussia fought on opposite sides in the
war o f 1866. Moreover, Ecker’s reference to this supposed unity o f North and South
came at the end o f his speech, after he had already established the symbolic context o f
the monument, which pointed to the important role that Baden had played in the
process o f unification and its vital role in the new Empire. Hence, the unity o f North

141 Ibid., 35.
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and South was established on the terms o f the southern states (i.e., Baden) and was
perceived as dependent on an acceptance o f the south’s own sense o f Germanness.
Following Ecker’s speech, the Emperor unveiled the statue, whose grandeur
reportedly stunned those present.142 The ceremony ended with the singing o f “Heil
D ir im Siegerkranz." After the unveiling, the Emperor and his entourage participated
in another procession through the city that ended at the famous Freiburg Cathedral,
where Lothar von Kiibel and other members o f the high clergy welcomed them. After
a tour o f the church, Kiibel conducted a separate ceremony, providing the Catholic
Church with the opportunity to participate in this commemorative effort on its own
terms. Kiibel must have been pleased at this privilege as well as the fact that the Old
Catholics were denied participation in the official ceremonies. True to their habit o f
portraying themselves as more patriotic than the Catholics, the Old Catholics hung a
banner outside their church:

“When the state, as in this case/unites with the

church/the Empire stands forever/solid on its foundation.”143 Because Old Catholics
were not allowed to participate in the official ceremonies, however, Kiibel and his
conservative Catholics held the upper hand on this day.
Most local newspapers agreed that the unveiling and imperial visit had been a
great success. They praised the city’s residents for providing the Emperor with a
warm welcome, which surely convinced Wilhelm o f the support and popularity that he
enjoyed even in this liminal area o f the Empire. The newspapers’ emphasis that it was
142 See for instance Freiburger Zeitung, October 6, 1876.
143 A selective list o f some o f the banners that were hung around the city can be found in Funke, Das
Siegesdenkmal, 64-70.
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so important that the Emperor had gained a favorable impression o f Freiburg and its
inhabitants serves as a further reminder that when expressing national-dynastic
loyalties, people were more concerned about the immediate impression they had made
on the Emperor.
Although Wilhelm I’s presence at the unveiling o f the monument affirmed the
national-dynastic connotations o f the statue, the memory o f the Emperor’s visit faded
with the passing o f time, while the permanent symbolism of the monument remained,
which prioritized the local-regional over the national-dynastic. By securing the
attendance o f the Emperor, people received the opportunity to demonstrate to him and
the rest of the German nation their devotion to the Emperor. However, the monument,
as a permanent site o f memory, ensured that after this occasion had passed, people
were able to continue constructing their national identities through the regional lens.
For the duration o f the Second Empire, the monument occupied an important space in
the city. On most official holidays associated with the unification, some type o f
ceremony would take place at the monument, which enabled citizens to continue
constructing their national identities on their own terms. This is not to say that the
people o f the city did not cherish their Emperor. There is no doubt that they had great
admiration for his persona. Their dedication to Wilhelm I, however, did not mean that
they were willing to accept a hegemonic status o f Prussia and the Hohenzollem family
in the newly founded nation-state.
As we have seen throughout these discussions, the fact that the monument’s
symbolism stressed the local rather than the national perspective made it somewhat
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easier for Freiburg’s Catholics to accept its ideological message. Strengthened by the
many public manifestations o f their own sense o f Germanness between 1870-1876, the
city’s Catholics were able to participate actively in the commemorations o f the wars o f
unification on their own terms. During these first years o f the Kaiserreich, they seized
every opportunity to contest the official German national identity emanating from
Berlin and Prussia. As evidenced at instances such as the General Assembly o f
Catholics in 1875, Freiburger Catholics sought the support o f their confessional
brethren elsewhere in Germany in their joint efforts to withstand the pressure to
assimilate into the new nation-state on Protestant/Prussian conditions. The city’s
Catholics demonstrated on several occasions that they accepted the kleindeutsche
solution to the German question. However, because their version o f Germanness
differed from their Protestant counterparts, they were forced to offer alternatives to the
official discourse. By creating an alternative discourse, they ensured that the
Protestant anti-Catholic sentiments did not became part o f the new national identity.
Instead, during the first few years o f the Second Empire, Catholics and Protestants in
Freiburg used nationalist sentiments to debate what it meant to be German in post
unification times. In a similar fashion to Catholics in Konstanz, Freiburger Catholics
employed the nationalist discourse to manifest their own version o f Germanness. The
analysis o f the relationship between Catholics and Protestants in these two cities and
how they used nationalist sentiments suggests that Badenese Catholics were active
participants in the creation o f the new national identity, despite facing economic and
political disadvantages. The following chapter will trace the lives o f Catholics in
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Heidelberg during the first few years o f the Empire, which will illuminate a slightly
different Catholic experience. Because Heidelberg was a city that enjoyed more
amicable relations between Catholics and Protestants, its Catholic citizens faced
slightly different circumstances as they negotiated their identities in the postunification period.
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CHAPTER 5
A DIFFERENT CATHOLIC EXPERIENCE? HEIDELBERGER CATHOLICS
COMMEMORATE UNIFICATION

After the analysis o f early Catholic responses to war and unification in Konstanz
and Freiburg, it is now time to investigate the reactions o f Heidelberger Catholics to the
events leading up to and immediately following the unification o f the German Empire.1
As was seen in the previous discussions, Catholics in Konstanz and Freiburg shared
similar experiences during the years prior to and after the unification. Although
Catholics in Heidelberg certainly were forced to deal with some o f the similar antiCatholic sentiments, they experienced a slightly smoother transition into the Kaiserreich
than their brethren in the southern part o f the state. O f course, this did not mean that their
transformation from Badenese Catholics into Germans was conflict-free, but the
commemorative discourse was somewhat different in Heidelberg compared to Freiburg
and Konstanz. Thus, Heidelberg’s Catholics reacted differently to some o f the events and
commemorations that surrounded unification. Because the Catholic experience around

1Unfortunately, the Third Reich and the Second World War witnessed the destruction o f many valuable
sources in Heidelberg, especially in regards to the city’s Catholics. From the early 1860s to the late 1880s,
there are large gaps in newspaper, city council, and associational records, which makes it slightly more
difficult to analyze reactions o f Heidelberger Catholics to the foundation o f the Empire. In addition, due to
the scarcity o f sources, scholars have been unable to compose a comprehensive history o f Heidelberg. To
be sure, there are several sources that provide glimpses into certain aspects o f city life, but no general
history o f the city. For some examples see Oliver Fink, Kleine Heidelberger Stadtgeschichte (Regensburg:
Verlag Friedrich Pustet, 2005); Elmar Mittler, Heidelberg: Geschichte und Gestalt (Heidelberg: C.
Winter, 1996); and, Heidelberg—Stadt und Universitat {Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1997). These sources,
along with many others, do not discuss the political and/or religious history o f the city but instead focus
most o f their attention on cultural and intellectual developments and personalities.
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Baden certainly was not uniform, an analysis o f the reactions o f Heidelberger Catholics
to the unification will provide useful clues to how different groups o f Catholics
responded to these monumental changes. As will become evident, Catholics in
Heidelberg enjoyed a more amicable relationship with the city’s Protestants, which
provided them with a less hostile environment in which to negotiate their changing
identities. There were several reasons for the different nature o f the relationship between
Catholics and Protestants. For one, the population o f about 22,000 was more evenly
distributed between Catholics and Protestants, with the latter constituting the majority
with 13,000. Also, in general, the Catholic population in Heidelberg was less politically
mobilized. The city lacked a strong class o f Catholic clergy and intellectuals, which
existed in both Konstanz and Freiburg. While the latter two had long been strongholds o f
Catholic power, manifested in the role o f the Church (and the university in Freiburg), that
was not the case in Heidelberg. The city did not possess a strong Catholic clergy, and the
university’s theology faculty was Protestant. Moreover, the economic and to some extent
the political power was more evenly distributed between Catholics and Protestants in
Heidelberg compared to the other two cities under investigation, and it will be useful to
evaluate how this more equal relationship affected the construction o f the new national
identity.
Because o f the scarcity o f sources, this chapter will not include much information
on this city’s history until 1866 but instead will focus more on the events between 1866
and 1871. Although this method will provide a slightly different view from the analysis
o f Catholic reactions in Konstanz and Freiburg, it will still be useful since it will
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illuminate Catholic attitudes to the prospect o f Germany unification prior to 1871. In
addition, despite the paucity o f post-1871 sources, the existing ones still enable us to gain
brief insights into how Catholics approached the unification o f the Kaiserreich. To be
sure, the scarcity o f sources will not allow a similar in-depth investigation as in the cases
o f Konstanz and Freiburg, but the available material will still provide an adequate picture
o f the different Catholic experience in Heidelberg. In addition, the situation o f Catholics
in Heidelberg during the late 1860s and early 1870s was more akin to the situation in
Baden and the German Empire during the 1890s, which will provide useful clues into
how Catholics successfully integrated in the Kaiserreich.

Heidelberger Catholics and the Austro-Prussian War
Similar to the situations in Konstanz and Freiburg, Heidelberger Catholics firmly
supported Austria as tensions began to escalate between Bismarck and Habsburg
Emperor Francis Joseph I in 1866. Because Heidelberg is located in the northern part o f
Baden, the city’s inhabitants, both Catholic and Protestant, were not as intimately tied to
the Austrian sphere o f influence, though they were clearly more loyal to their southern
neighbor than to Prussia. As an early example o f these sentiments, the Catholic Pfalzer
Bote noted in April 1866 that though Bismarck had enhanced the status o f Prussia, he had
done so at the expense o f other German states, and then especially Austria. The paper
further claimed that Bismarck’s demands on Austria were completely unrealistic and
proved that Prussia was an uncivilized and barbaric state. The paper also maintained that
if Bismarck had attacked any country but Austria, he might have been able to gain the
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support o f the Badenese people; however, his recent actions left true Germans no choice
but to support the Austrians.2 Thus, already before tensions had escalated into war,
Catholics in Heidelberg attempted to portray Bismarck and the Prussians as anti-German,
who were only concerned about improving Prussia’s lot, even at the expense o f other
German states.
When war broke out, both Catholics and Protestants in the city united behind the
Austrians. The Protestant Heidelberger Zeitung sharply criticized the Badenese
government for delaying support to the Austrians, which not only hurt them but also
jeopardized Badenese soldiers.3 Pfalzer Bote reacted to the news o f war by publishing an
appeal to the city’s inhabitants, in which they claimed that Bismarck was violating
international and natural law and needed to be stopped immediately. Every true German
should do his duty and defend Baden and Austria. The call to action was signed by the
city’s three most influential Catholics: Jakob Lindau, Ferdinand Bissing, and Leopold
Fischer. They argued that it was evident that Prussians, and specifically Bismarck, had
no understanding o f the true requirements o f patriotism and that his actions proved that
he only sought to expand Prussia’s role in Europe at the expense o f other German states.4
The city’s Catholics were fiercely loyal to Baden and Austria in the face o f these attacks
from the un-German Prussians. Catholics also argued that through their actions Prussia
and Bismarck had violated natural laws that every German possessed. Alluding to a

2 Pfalzer Bote, April 7, 14, 17, 1866.
3 Heidelberger Zeitung, July 13, 1866.
4 Pfalzer Bote, June 19, 1866.
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sense that all Germans possessed a shared set o f qualities, characteristics, and inviolable
rights, Catholics claimed that Bismarck’s violation o f these rights proved that he was not
a true German. O f course, to label negative characteristics un-German was a very
common method that both Protestants and Catholics employed in their struggle for
control o f the construction o f German national identity.
During the first few days o f the war, Heidelberg’s Catholics were hopeful that
Prussia would be quickly defeated. Pfalzer Bote reprinted Emperor Francis Joseph’s
appeal for all Germans to stand up to the Prussian offensive, and the paper maintained
that after Bismarck had been defeated, the relationship between the German states would
be greatly improved. Badenese Catholics argued that ever since the conclusion o f the
war against Denmark in 1864, Bismarck’s actions had only been designed to benefit
Prussia. Indeed, the recent events proved that he was not a German patriot and that he
was detrimental to the cause o f German unity. Because the Badenese government under
August Lamey and Foreign Minister Franz von Roggenbach had been relatively friendly
to Bismarck, Badenese Catholics also criticized government officials in this context. It
was not uncommon for Catholic newspapers to accuse Bismarck o f being anti-German
while at the same time implicating the Badenese government in this charge as well.
However, Heidelberg’s proximity to the Badenese government in Karlsruhe placed
Pfalzer Bote in a more critical position than other Catholic papers throughout the state.
The criticism o f Roggenbach, Ludwig Edelsheim (his successor since 1865), and the
Badenese government’s perceived inability to defend the Badenese and Austrian honor
was met with great hostility from the government. While Catholic newspapers in
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Konstanz and Freiburg enjoyed a much greater freedom in their ability to criticize the
government, the Pfalzer Bote soon found itself under attack. Already on July 3, 1866, the
paper reported that government officials had seized their issues on five different
occasions and that they were under constant pressure to cease their criticism o f the
government’s policies.5 A few days later, the paper discussed these measures in greater
detail as they claimed that they were only defending the rights o f all Germans and that the
government had misinterpreted their intentions. They furthermore noted that the
government’s actions towards the paper did nothing to aid the war effort; instead, it only
ensured that confessional discord grew across the state and Germany. They maintained
that not only had Catholic papers been targeted with sanctions but also that the
government was spreading lies about Catholic intentions in case o f an Austrian victory.
Here, the usual accusations surfaced against Catholics, most notably the claim that in
case o f an Austrian victory, Catholics would forcibly convert the state’s Protestants.
Pfalzer Bote also reported that the government was spreading lies about Catholic plans to
use the war as a pretext to murder Protestants and Jews.6 The paper responded that these
accusations were completely unfounded and that these actions proved that the
government was not interested in strengthening and protecting the Badenese fatherland.
They noted that the government’s intentions to disturb the confessional peace only
n

proved that they were not fully committed to the Austrian and Badenese cause.

5 Pjalzer Bote, July 3, 1866.
6 Pfalzer Bote, July 5, 1866.
7 Ibid.
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addition to offering support to the Austrians, these arguments also aided Heidelberger
Catholics in presenting themselves as better Germans. By labeling the ideas and actions
o f their opponents as un-German, they sought to strengthen their own connections to the
construction o f national identity. As has been evident throughout this work, this method
o f identity formation was quite common among Catholics in the postunification period.

Construction of a Memory of the Austro-Prussian War
Although Heidelberg’s Catholics and Protestants had been united in their support
o f Austria during the war, differences began to emerge as soon as the peace treaty was
signed. Protestant papers noted that though it was unfortunate that the Austrians had lost
the war, Badeners must now attempt to negotiate a favorable treaty with Bismarck and
Prussia. Protestants claimed that Badeners faced a difficult choice: to ally themselves
closer with Bismarck or to remain independent and isolated. Heidelberger Zeitung
advocated the first option, arguing that an isolationist policy would leave Baden
vulnerable to the French. To be sure, Protestants in the city were quite unhappy with the
outcome o f the war, and they were still very critical o f Bismarck and his aggressive
behavior, but they also realized that the current political conditions forced them to make
some difficult choices.8
This rhetoric did not sway Heidelberg’s Catholics. They were incensed that the
Austrian and Badenese governments had accepted defeat so quickly and even noted that
“ .. .are we not men enough to continue this struggle? We have a nation (!) o f forty

8 Heidelberger Zeitung, July 22, 23, 1866.
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million people who would support u s... .”9 To illustrate further this point, on July 21,
Pfalzer Bote published a letter from Roggenbach to Bismarck, in which the Badenese
minister admitted that Prussia needed to play the leading role in German affairs.10 They
were highly critical o f the former foreign minister and even accused him o f treason.
Besides being directly critical o f certain specific actions that the government undertook,
these sentiments also illustrated the fact that Heidelberger Catholics did not feel that their
own government represented their interests. O f course, the recent Badenese Kulturkam pf
made it difficult for Catholics to trust any government policy.
Considering the Catholic statements in the immediate aftermath o f the war, it was
evident that they were still loyal to Austria. However, Catholics were also aware o f the
political shift that had taken place and the need to perhaps reevaluate some o f their
policies. Towards the end o f July, Pfalzer Bote published a series o f articles in which the
paper outlined its responses to the new political developments. Although they were still
very critical o f the Prussian actions, as time passed, they grew more conciliatory. To be
sure, the paper made a point to note that Badeners were not as friendly towards Bismarck
as several other German states, but they also admitted that the behavior o f the Prussians
was improving. Especially after the arrival o f Prussian troops in the city, they noted that
the soldiers were friendly and treated locals with dignity and respect.11 However, these
sentiments did not mean that Heidelberger Catholics were prepared to accept entry into

9 Pfalzer Bote, July 14, 1866.
10 Pfalzer Bote, July 21, 1866.
11 Pfalzer Bote, July 28, August 14, 1866.
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the North German Confederation, something that local liberals and Protestants were
strongly considering. Although the latter were mindful o f the harsh fate that awaited
Austria, they also noted that the war might prove a blessing as Germans would finally be
able to unify.12 Not surprisingly, Catholics in the city took issue with these sentiments.
In a long article in the August 9 issue, Pfalzer Bote claimed that no matter what had
happened in the past, they must make sure that “ .. .the south German way o f living and
their [south Germans’] love o f freedom must be protected... .The North German Bund
would perhaps make for a strong entity on the outside, but it would be rotting on the
inside... .” 13 They also noted that proponents o f the North German Confederation
supported “ .. .German unity, Protestantism, the Customs union, and France.. .”14 Thus, it
was evident that already in 1866, Badenese Catholics associated a Prussian-led
unification with Protestantism, which made them even more opposed to the policies o f
Bismarck and his allies. It was also clear that they did not believe that the North German
Confederation had any long-lasting value. As has been evident throughout our
discussions, Catholics tried to present themselves as advocates o f a nation-state that was
based on strong internal values and not corrupted by Prussian and Protestant materialistic
concerns.
Heidelberger Catholics also maintained that the Austro-Prussian War had
weakened the German states. They claimed that though Prussia had become stronger, the

12 Heidelberger Zeitung, July 17, 1866
13 Pfalzer Bote, August 9, 1866.
14 Pfalzer Bote August 11, 1866.
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war and subsequent territorial changes would make the German states more vulnerable to
outside threats. Moreover, Catholics disputed the assertion that the recent war had
clarified the German question. On the contrary, the last war had only further confused
the relationship between the German states, especially since an increasing number was
falling under the Prussian spell.15
Although there was some hostility between the Catholic and Protestant camps in
the city, and it was clear that they subscribed to different notions about what Baden
should do following the war o f 1866, it was also evident that these differences were not
as pronounced as in Konstanz and Freiburg. While Pfalzer Bote had been, and continued
to be, critical o f Prussia and Bismarck, the paper was not nearly as virulent in its criticism
as some o f the Catholic papers in Freiburg and Konstanz. This did not mean that
Catholics were applauding Bismarck’s policies, but it did represent a softer approach to
Prussia and its chancellor. These sentiments were probably also a result o f the fact that
the area around Heidelberg was a stronghold o f the kleindeutsche view. Most o f the
Badenese supporters o f the kleindeutsche alternative to German unification were located
around Karlsruhe, Heidelberg, and Mannheim. Also, it is noteworthy that during the
Austro-Prussian War, there was much less hostile rhetoric between the two confessional
camps in Heidelberg. To be sure, some o f the usual accusations that if Austria won
Catholics would forcibly convert all Germans to Catholicism did surface, but overall the
two confessions enjoyed a better relationship than in Konstanz and Freiburg. This was a
trend that resurfaced during the Franco-Prussian War, and it continued for most o f the

15 Pfalzer Bote, July 30, 1866.
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Second Empire. An indication o f this friendlier relationship is that the rate o f interfaith
marriages in Heidelberg was among the highest in the state.16 Here, the lack o f a militant
Catholic clergy probably played a very important role in allowing for more interfaith
marriages. Another reason for the seemingly more amicable relationship was that the city
had a more equal distribution o f Catholics and Protestants, with a slight majority for the
latter.17 Thus, there was less overt Catholic hostility towards the fact that the city’s
Protestants occupied most o f the political, economic, and cultural capital in the city.
Conversely, Heidelberg Protestants also tended to be less aggressive towards the city’s
Catholics since they were not threatened by their numerical advantage. In cities such as
Freiburg and Konstanz, Protestants were in a clear minority and thus faced constant
pressure from the Catholic majority to relinquish some o f their political and economic
power. As has been evident throughout this work, this unequal distribution was one o f
the main reasons why Catholics and Protestants used nationalist rhetoric and the
construction o f a national identity as means o f gaining political, economic, cultural, or
social power.

Catholic Reactions to the Outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War
Turning to the outbreak o f war in 1870 between Prussia and France, Catholics in
Heidelberg initially viewed the increased tension between the two states almost with
indifference. They focused most o f their attention on the activities at the Vatican

16 Smith, “Religion and Conflict: Protestants, Catholics, and Anti-Semitism in the State o f Baden in the Era
o f Wilhelm II,” 290.
17 D ie Katholische Gemeinde Heidelberg (Heidelberg: Libertas Verlag, 1989), 10.
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Council, and the conflict between Prussia and France was almost entirely absent from the
news. As the conflict escalated in the middle o f July, Pfalzer Bote even deemed it
necessary to summarize the major events associated with the question o f the Spanish
succession, since

. .many of our readers might not be entirely familiar with all o f these

complex events... .”18 At first, their reporting displayed a certain amount o f neutrality.
They assigned partial blame to both camps for the increased tensions, though they were
careful to point out that Bismarck and the Prussians were more in the right than their
French counterparts.19 However, as the prospect o f war loomed larger, their tone became
increasingly anti-French. They maintained that France was acting in an irresponsible
manner that threatened to bring chaos to the European continent. Catholics were
especially critical o f the un-Catholic behavior o f Napoleon III and accused him of
provoking a war only to improve his domestic situation, which had grown increasingly
dire during the last few years. However, it should be noted that though supportive of
Bismarck and Wilhelm I, Heidelberger Catholics also claimed that they were somewhat
hesitant about the prospect o f war. They maintained that this seemed to be largely a
Prussian cause and that it was not entirely clear what the other German states stood to
gain from a war with France. They also expressed concern for Baden’s exposed
geographical position. Just a few days before the outbreak o f war, they openly
questioned if Baden would be able to defend itself and if other German states would

18 Pfalzer Bote, July 14, 1870.
19 Ibid.
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come to its aid if needed.20 These types o f sentiments illustrate that Germany was far
from ready for complete external and internal unification in 1870. Although
Heidelberger Catholics were slowly warming to the Prussian cause, they were still not
convinced that this was a war they should fight. O f course, these types o f statements
made Catholics vulnerable to Protestant and liberal accusations o f anti-German feelings,
which helps explain why the construction o f the memory o f the Franco-Prussian War and
the subsequent unification became so contested.
However, as soon as war broke out, any Catholic doubts about the military
conflict disappeared quickly. On July 19, Pfalzer Bote reported that citizens across the
German lands were ecstatic about the war and that the French enemy had to be defeated
at all costs. Catholics also noted that though the Catholic People’s Party had not been
supportive o f the Badenese government in the past, true Germans would now set aside
their differences and unite in support o f the fatherland. Catholics claimed that their party
was one o f the most patriotic ones and that they would now receive a chance to prove
their worth to Germany.21 In a similar fashion to Catholics and Protestants around the
state, Catholics in Heidelberg suddenly did not display any doubts about what constituted
their fatherland. These sentiments also illustrate how fluid the notions o f national and
regional identity were at this time. Only a few days prior to the war, Heidelberger
Catholics had openly wondered whether Prussia’s cause was theirs, but as soon as war
broke out, these Catholics were united with Prussians, Wiirttembergers, Bavarians, and
other Germans.
20 Pfalzer Bote, July 16, 1870.
21 Pfalzer Bote, July 19, 1870.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

231
Similarly to the situations in Konstanz and Freiburg, Heidelberger Protestants and
Catholics were united in their war efforts for the first few days. However, Pfalzer Bote
soon noted that there were some Protestant and liberal papers that labeled the Catholics
lesser Germans. Already on July 30, the paper had to defend the wartime behavior o f
Catholics, who were accused o f being as indifferent to this war as they had been to
defending German interests in 1866. The paper pointed out that it was wrong to compare
the two wars. The Austro-Prussian W ar had been an unfortunate affair between two
brothers, which explained Catholic ambivalence towards it. Indeed, the paper maintained
that Catholic reluctance to fight the Prussians could and should serve as an indication of
their patriotism. O f course, they also pointed out that Protestants had been eager to fight
the Prussians in 1866, a fact that was now conveniently forgotten. Heidelberger
Catholics furthermore argued that this war was completely different. This time, an
outside enemy had attacked the German fatherland, and Catholics were keen to defend
German territories against the external threat.22
Despite this occurrence o f some hostile rhetoric, it is interesting to note that most
o f the accusations that Catholics faced came from outside the city. Indeed, the Protestant
Heidelberger Zeitung was much more conciliatory towards the Catholic part o f the
population compared to other Protestant publications around the state. Throughout the
fall o f 1870, the paper was very respectful towards the Catholics, and towards the end o f
the war, they even claimed that it was remarkable to see how loyal the city’s Catholics
had been during the war effort. They maintained that throughout the war, Catholics and

22 Pfalzer Bote, July 30, 31, 1870.
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Protestants had successfully fought side by side.23 Although there were occasional
accusations o f Catholic anti-Germanness, these instances were far and few between, and
when they did occur, they were mild in comparison to similar ones around the state. As
we saw with cases such as the accusations against Manfred Burgweiler in Pfullendorf,
liberal and Protestant newspapers often focused on the alleged misdeeds o f local
Catholics to illustrate Catholic anti-German sentiments. For some o f the reasons already
alluded to, this was not the case in Heidelberg, where Catholics and Protestants, though
not living in perfect harmony, managed to coexist relatively well, even during such a
critical time as the Franco-Prussian War.
Although Catholics and Protestants in Heidelberg reacted in similar manners to
the war, there were still slight differences in how they viewed the conflict and what it
meant for the future o f the German states. While the city’s Protestants were consumed
with thoughts about the glory that the German fatherland would now enjoy, Catholics
were more careful in their assessment o f the current events. Despite growing
increasingly enthusiastic about the efforts o f the German troops with each military
victory, there were also some concerns for the future mixed in with these positive
sentiments, particularly in regards to the minority status o f Catholics in the new Empire.
Although there were differences between Heidelberger Catholics and Protestants in their
responses to the war, there were also marked differences between how the city’s
Catholics reacted to the war compared to other Catholics around the state. On August 21,
even before the victory at Sedan, Pfalzer Bote argued that Germans must already begin to

23 Heidelberger Zeitung, December 29, 1870.
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consider what would happen after the war. They maintained that one o f the big mistakes
that Germans had made after the victory o f 1813 was that they had not adequately
planned their move towards unification. Thus, they should now begin a discussion about
how Germany would unify once the French enemy had been defeated. Quite remarkably,
the paper argued that after the war, Germany had to unite under Prussian leadership and
elect Wilhelm I German Emperor. Catholics claimed that though the Catholics in
Heidelberg and Baden had always been loyal to the Austrians in their struggle with the
Prussians, it had now become evident that the former were not strong enough and would
not be able to provide adequate leadership in the German quest for unification. Instead,
Germans needed to follow the lead o f the Prussian king towards a unified nation-state.24
Although these were o f course very pro-Prussian sentiments, the paper also noted
that “black-red-gold” should be the theme for the Empire and that this war constituted the
end o f Prussian dominance in German affairs. They claimed that Prussia had enjoyed a
long history with many glorious moments; however, Germany (though they never defined
what they meant by “Germany”) possessed an even longer history, and it was now time
for a German nation-state to assume its rightful position in Europe. Catholics also argued
that this was the time when Germany would be able to finalize their relationships with
France and Austria.25 O f course, these attitudes were different compared to the ones in
both Freiburg and Konstanz, where Catholics had been reluctant to even discuss the
prospect o f unification until just a few weeks before it was completed. The different

24 Pfalzer Bote, August 21, 1870.
25 Ibid.
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Catholic attitudes in Heidelberg illustrates that not only did they have a better
relationship with Protestants in the city, but their Catholic identities were composed in a
slightly different manner. During the latter part o f the Kaiserreich, it became evident that
Catholic attitudes around the state were more uniform; however, at this time that was not
yet the case. These notions also serve as an illustration hat the state o f Baden was not as
unified and cohesive as some o f its citizens portrayed it to be and that not only did
Germans disagree on what constituted the German fatherland, they also disagreed on how
to define Baden. Judging by these accounts, Catholics in Heidelberg were more
integrated into the North German Confederation than their brethren in the southern part
o f the state. To be sure, this did not mean that Catholics in Heidelberg would ally
themselves with Bismarck rather than with the south Badenese Catholics, but it does
illustrate the fluid nature o f their identities. As will become evident, on most issues
Heidelberger Catholics agreed with Catholics in Konstanz and Freiburg, but there were
also instances where they differed. These differences illustrate just how difficult it was
for any group to maintain, preserve, and strengthen a cohesive identity during the middle
part of the nineteenth century when German society underwent so many drastic changes.
During the fall o f 1870, citizens in Heidelberg were relatively unaffected by the
war. Compared to both Freiburg and Konstanz, Heidelbergers did not complain about the
threat o f a French invasion. Indeed, based on newspaper accounts, the war passed
without any major distractions to civic life. On December 22, Pfalzer Bote reported that
the Catholic People’s Party had voted to support the creation o f a unified Empire. The
paper maintained that though this was not an easy decision, it was the right one,
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especially considering that it was impossible for Baden to remain independent. In
addition, with the recent Badenese Kulturkam pf in mind, they argued, somewhat naively,
that by supporting the creation o f an Empire, the party had ensured that Badenese
Catholics would be more protected than under the rule o f the Badenese government.
Hence, to support unification did not represent a capitulation to Prussian interests, but
rather a careful plan to protect both the interest o f the Church and the Badenese
fatherland. In a similar fashion to other Catholic sentiments around the state, it was clear
that Catholics in Heidelberg were not completely satisfied with how unification had taken
place. However, given the current circumstances, the creation o f the Kaiserreich
constituted the most attractive political alternative.26
Although Catholics in Heidelberg displayed slightly different sentiments towards
German unification than did some o f their brethren in Freiburg and Konstanz, it was still
evident that they did not consider the Second Empire the ideal solution to the German
question. As Pfalzer Bote reported in a subdued manner on the celebrations following
the proclamation of the Empire in Versailles, they claimed that though this was a great
day for Germany, Catholics would liked to have see an Austrian Emperor at the head o f
the German Empire. However, they also argued that it really did not matter what they
wanted; instead, they had to accept that the German fatherland needed Wilhelm to be its
Emperor, and thus every true German needed to support him. The paper maintained that
people in Heidelberg, both Catholics and Protestants, had greeted the news o f the
proclamation o f the Empire in a very positive manner and that citizens had gathered as

26 Pfalzer Bote, December 22, 1870.
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Germans in the streets to celebrate this news. However, in the same article, they also
noted that Catholics around Baden and Germany needed to be watchful as there were
already rumors circulating about the recommencement o f a Kulturkam pf but this time on
a national scale. They quoted the Center Party leader Ludwig Windthorst, who warned
that now when the French had been defeated, liberals and Protestants had turned their
attention to the Catholics, who could expect many attacks in the coming years.27 Thus,
already from the very outset of the Second Empire, Catholics were uneasy about their
existence in the new nation-state.28
In a similar fashion to the inhabitants o f Freiburg and Konstanz, Catholics and
Protestants in Heidelberg approached the Second Empire with different attitudes. While
the latter viewed January 1871 as the beginning o f a glorious time that would transform
Germany into one o f the most powerful states in Europe, Catholics were a bit more
subdued. O f course, Catholics worried about the threat o f a national Kulturkampf, but
also about issues such as the status o f the Pope in Rome.29 The Catholic ambivalence
towards this new political arrangement became clear very quickly. Even in the first few
days after the foundation of the Empire, Catholics in Heidelberg focused on their fears
rather than their hopes for the future.30 O f course, the fact that Catholics in Heidelberg
displayed trepidation before these new times, despite the fact that they had enjoyed a
much greater degree o f peace and harmony than other Catholics around the state, clearly
27 Pfalzer Bote, January 21, 1871.
28 For an example o f some o f these concerns, see for instance Anderson, Windthorst, 146-149.
29 Ibid.
30 For example, Pfalzer Bote, January 23, 26, 1871.
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illustrates the difficult situation Catholics faced in the Empire. Furthermore, it also
proves that though Germany had just unified, the new nation-state was not cohesive and
that the new national identity was far from stable.
In the beginning o f February 1871, both Heidelberg Catholics and Protestants
gathered in the streets o f the city to commemorate the official capitulation o f France.
People hung flags on their houses, paraded in the streets, and celebrated this piece of
news in a dignified and worthy manner. However, in the aftermath o f this celebration,
the city witnessed one o f the few recorded incidents o f public manifestations o f antiCatholic sentiments. In the morning hours o f February 2, three drunken men tried to set
fire to a local Catholic’s house, claiming that he belonged to the “blacks.” They failed in
their attempts to bum down the house and were subsequently arrested by the police.
Pfalzer Bote noted that it was unfortunate that some did not understand how to celebrate
patriotic occasions and that they were saddened that an act by a few people would ruin
the celebration for others.31 However, other than these relatively mild statements, the
Catholic daily did not spend any more time on this incident, which again illustrates the
relatively amicable relationship between the two confessions. In other cities, this type o f
event attracted great attention from Catholics and Protestants alike, and the two
confessions would use the occasion to debate the national character o f the opposing
confession. Also, it should be noted that this was the only incident o f anti-Catholic
behavior that the local press reported, which is quite different from the frequent attacks
that Catholics around the state had to endure. Given the anti-Catholic sentiments that

31 Pfalzer Bote, February 4, 1871.
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were evident in both Freiburg and Konstanz, it appears as if Catholics in Heidelberg were
in a different situation compared to their brethren in other parts o f the state.
O f course, this did not mean that Heidelberg Catholics were completely immune
to the abuse that was taking place around Baden and Germany. Following the first
elections to the German Parliament in February 1871, Pfalzer Bote claimed that it had
long been clear that the Catholics would lose since the election districts were divided up
in an unfair manner that benefited the national liberals.32 Protestants and national-liberals
argued that the decline in Catholic political power since the elections to the Customs
Union in 1868 proved that Catholics were opposed to the new nation-state and that voters
had punished the Catholic parties for their anti-German policies.

33

However, according

to Pfalzer Bote, this decline in political power was not due to voters’ disapproval o f the
Catholic political message; instead, the decrease in political power could be attributed
solely to the new election districts.34 The national-liberals and Protestants countered this
argument by maintaining that it was evident that Catholics were anti-German and that
they longed for the preunification days.35 These were not uncommon sentiments as
Protestants and national-liberals used any type o f Catholic criticism o f the new political
conditions as evidence that they were opposed to the foundation o f the Empire. Pfalzer
Bote also argued that the national-liberals had been very successful in using the
32 See also Hans-Jurgen Kremer, ed., M itt Gott fu r Wahrheit, Freiheit und Recht: Quellen zur
O rg a n isa tio n u n d P o litik d e r Z e n tr u m s p a rte i u n d d es p o litis c h e n K a th o lizism u s in B a d e n 1 8 8 8 -1 9 14

(Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1983), 41-42.
33 Pfalzer Bote, March 6, 1871.
34 Pfalzer Bote, March 11, 16, 1871.
35 Heidelberger Zeitung, March 8, 1871.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

239
unification as a means to achieve success in the first parliamentary election.36 As was the
case in other areas o f Baden, national-liberals did very well in these first elections, and
many viewed it as a confirmation that Germans subscribed to their notion o f unification
as the apex o f a teleological view o f history. O f course, this view o f history as a straight
line leading up to unification was a complete construct as even the Protestant nationalliberals had been opposed to Bismarck and his annexationist policies until after the war o f
1866. Still, the tone between Catholics and Protestants in Heidelberg was much more
conciliatory than in Freiburg and Konstanz. To be sure, there were many instances where
both camps engaged in hostile rhetoric, but the changing o f the political discourse to
include nationalist rhetoric adopted from the war did not happen as quickly here as it did
in other parts o f Baden. As will become evident later, these antagonistic notions actually
become more popular later in the Kaiserreich, though they never reached the same
heights as they did in other parts o f the state.

Additional Catholic Displays of an Alternative National Identity
Catholics in Heidelberg also used the twenty-fifth anniversary in June 1871 of
Pius IX’s election as Pope as a way o f publicly manifesting their presence in the public
sphere. However, celebrations were not as extensive as they were in other parts o f the
state, and they were met with a lot less resistance from Protestants in the city.

Although

it is of course difficult to pinpoint exactly why Protestants were less inclined to oppose

36 Pfalzer Bote, March 11, 1871.
37 It is interesting to note that during the days surrounding the twenty-fifth anniversary, Heidelberger
Zeitung completely ignored these events. In both Konstanz and Freiburg, the Protestant press used this
occasion to label Catholics anti-German, whose Heimat was located in Rome and not in Germany.
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these public manifestations o f Catholic identity, it should be noted that Protestants in
Heidelberg seemed to be generally more inclined to accept a Catholic version o f
Germanness. The Protestant approach towards these events was more similar to the ones
during the last two decades o f the Empire when the economic, political, and cultural
power relationship between the two confessions was more equal. Thus, it would seem as
if Protestants were better prepared to accept the Catholic version o f national identity
when the relationship between the two confessions was more equal. O f course, it should
also be noted that throughout the nineteenth century, Heidelberg had not served as a
bastion o f Church power, which had been the case in both Freiburg and Konstanz. In
those cities, Protestants were still determined to strip the Catholic Church o f as much
power as possible, which reflected earlier events during the nineteenth century. Since
this was not the case in Heidelberg, Protestants were more inclined to ignore Catholic
displays o f identity.
In the days leading up to the June 16 anniversary, Pfalzer Bote argued that
Catholics around Germany and in Heidelberg should use this opportunity to display their
gratitude towards the Pope for his great leadership during these difficult times. Catholics
argued that this celebration constituted a good opportunity for them to display how strong
and united they were, despite some o f the problems that they were encountering on the
national level.38 Once again, Catholics in Heidelberg were not too critical o f the situation
in their own city, but they noted that Catholics were quickly labeled second-class citizens
in the new nation-state.

38 Pfalzer Bote, June 15, 1871.
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On June 16, 1871, local Catholics gathered in the city and organized a march to a
cross dedicated to Archbishop Hermann von Vicari on the Leitenberg outside the city.
Pfalzer Bote reported that the city’s local Casino association had organized the
celebration and that people had followed the lead o f the city’s leading Catholic
dignitaries in displaying their strong support for the embattled Pope. Most o f the
coverage focused on the fact that German Catholics now more than ever needed to
support the Pope since other European Catholics, most notably the French, were
abandoning him. Also, though the paper discussed the celebrations in Heidelberg, it
spilled far more ink describing the celebrations in Freiburg and Rome. As with many
other events during this time, by publishing detailed accounts o f events in other cities, the
paper helped to create an imagined community o f Catholics. Throughout the
Kaiserreich, the Catholic press made good use o f this new means o f creating and
consolidating identities. By publishing accounts o f different events and trends that
pertained to the Catholic experience in the Second Empire, Catholic newspapers served
as extremely valuable tools to create a sense o f strength and cohesion among the state’s
population. This phenomenon was not only evident in conjunction with various
commemorations but also during the Kulturkam pf Newspapers around the state would
keep a close eye on what was transpiring in other communities, and reports from around
the state became pivotal in strengthening the Catholic community, particularly in times of
crisis and turmoil. In addition, considering that the Catholics in Heidelberg did not have
the same kind o f exuberant celebrations that took place in other areas o f the state, it was
useful for them to be able to partake in these events, even if it was just via a newspaper
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account. In their reporting, Pfdlzer Bote was careful to point out that the Pope had
reacted very favorably to the Catholic display o f support and that this event had
strengthened the Catholic community.39 As a matter o f fact, the celebrations in
Heidelberg became almost secondary to the ones in Rome and Freiburg. By focusing
much o f their attention o f other events around the state, Pfdlzer Bote confirmed that
though Heidelberg Catholics were in a relatively favorable position compared to many
other Catholics around the state, they still needed to be aware o f how Catholics in other
areas were treated.
Another example o f creating and strengthening the imagined community o f
Catholics appeared in Pfdlzer Bote a few days later. In their June 20, 1871, issue, the
paper discussed the recently published book, Der Staat und die Kirche im
Grossherzogtum Baden seit dem Jahre 1860, by Prof. Albert Friedberg. This book was
heavily critical o f the Catholic Church and adopted a very pro-Protestant and nationalliberal stance. It was not uncommon for Catholic papers to discuss works that were either
strongly pro- or anti-Catholic, and these discussions served an important function in
strengthening the Catholic community. In addition to alerting citizens to newly published
works, these discussions also informed Catholics about what constituted the official
Catholic view o f a certain issue. Also, these types o f discussion also strengthened the
Catholic imagined community. As noted above, these types o f discussions would enable
leading Catholics to educate their constituents and it ultimately served as an extremely
important tool to create a more cohesive community.

39 Pfalzer Bote, June 17, 1871.
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For two days, Pfdlzer Bote analyzed Prof. Friedberg’s arguments. He claimed
that by having to constantly fight the Catholic Church, the Badenese state had been
hindered in its economic, cultural, and political development. Furthermore, he
maintained that the Church was too powerful and that if Baden wanted to modernize, the
government needed to reduce clerical influence. The paper reported that most o f the
book focused on a comparison o f Prussia and Baden, and given the fact that the author
was Prussian, it was no surprise that he was very critical o f Baden’s perceived lack o f
development.40
Pfdlzer Bote used Friedberg’s arguments to manifest the ill-treatment o f Badenese
Catholics since 1860. They claimed that though the church laws o f 1860 should have
guaranteed the safety of the church and the freedom o f religion for all citizens, the
government had failed to implement these laws correctly. The paper outlined the various
abuses that the clergy had been exposed to ever since the national-liberals had come to
power. They were especially critical o f the Staatsexamen, which had done more damage
to the Catholic cause than any other law. The paper also chronicled some o f the most
famous cases o f government mistreatment o f Catholics. This was another useful way o f
ensuring that Catholics were aware o f the injustices that were being done to them around
the state and nation. Especially for Catholics in Heidelberg, who were not exposed to the
same mistreatment as many of their brethren, these accounts were valuable tools to
strengthen the Catholic community. Last, the paper tied this discussion into the context
o f the creation o f a national identity by criticizing Friedberg’s defense o f the state’s right

40 Pfdlzer Bote, June 20, 1871.
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to ban certain female orders. Pfdlzer Bote maintained that these Catholics represented the
German spirit better than anybody else and that the state was depriving itself o f some o f
its best assets. This was an argument that constantly resurfaced in these discussions.
Catholics maintained that they were the best representatives and defenders o f the German
national spirit, and by attacking and banning these orders, Protestants were undermining
the German national character. Hence, though this issue was not directly related to war
and unification, it became tied into the newly popularized nationalist discourse.

Construction of a Kriegerdenkmal in Heidelberg
A comprehensive analysis o f the commemorative activities that immediately
followed the unification of the Second Empire is difficult because o f the limited sources.
Available sources do, however, provide some insight into how Heidelberg Catholics
viewed the foundation o f the Kaiserreich and the immediate postunification period. In a
similar fashion to the other cities analyzed in this work, the city o f Heidelberg also
decided to construct a monument to honor the efforts o f German and local soldiers in the
Franco-Prussian War. On June 19, 1871, the Heidelberg city council decided to construct
a plaque to honor the local soldiers who had died in the war against France. On the same
date, city council officials also decided that they would set aside a special place for these
soldiers in the city’s most prestigious graveyard.41 However, after additional discussion,
they revised their plans on July 5. Instead o f just producing a plaque, they would

41 Stadtarchiv Heidelberg (St. AH hereafter), Heidelberger Uraltaktien (HUA) 158-3, Die Errichtung eines
Denkmals fur die Gefallene im Deutsch-Franzosischen Krieg 1870-1871, protocol from city council
meeting, July 5, 1871.
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construct a monument. Although city council records show no indication o f the reason
for this change, it is pretty safe to assume that since many other Badenese and German
states were constructing monuments, the Heidelberger city council did not want to appear
unpatriotic by just donating a plaque. Recognizing the expensive nature o f this project,
the city council agreed to pay for the entire monument by guaranteeing 3,000 Gulden.
(This was less than half what Konstanz spent for their monument, and obviously much
less than the cost for the Siegesdenkmal.) It is also noteworthy that the city did not ask
the general population for donations. Instead, the city’s elite donated an additional
several hundred Guldens, which the city used as part o f the payment for the monument.
In a speech to the city council, Mayor Schnetzler remarked that because the victorious
war had brought national unification, locals must never forget the military and civilian
sacrifices. He noted that even as he spoke, there were soldiers in the hospital who had
not yet recovered from wounds suffered in the war and that the city and its inhabitants
needed to honor these men in an appropriate manner.42
A committee was appointed to spearhead the project, led by city councilors
Bauemfeind, Desaga, Mays, and Trtibner. During the first few months o f 1872, they
invited artists to produce models o f the proposed monument. After much debate, they
decided that the local artist Hermann Behagel would receive the honor o f designing the
monument. Continuing with the local theme, they entrusted local Bildhauer Franz
Sommer with the construction o f the monument. 43 Behagel’s winning entry consisted o f

42 St. AH, HUA 158-3, protocol from city council meeting meeting, December 12, 1871.
43 Geschichte und Beschreibung des Krieger-Denkmals in Heidelberg (Heidelberg: Georg Mohr, 1873), 9.
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a three-tiered monument composed o f red sandstone. On two sides o f the monument, the
names o f the 157 German soldiers who were buried in Heidelberg were listed. Only four
of these soldiers hailed from Heidelberg, but by listing all the soldiers who were buried
on the Heidelberg cemetery, the city council ensured that the monument assumed a
national as well as regional character. This was important as it served to integrate further
the city into the national landscape o f monuments. On the other two sides, the monument
displayed the Reichsadler as well as several wreaths and cannon balls. The top consisted
o f an obelisk with an elaborate design that contained cannon balls and wreaths. Under
one o f the wreaths, an inscription listed: “In memory o f the German soldiers buried here
who fought for the honor and unity o f the fatherland in the years 1870-1871. Dedicated
by the city o f Heidelberg.” 44
Although Sommer completed the monument in November 1872, the city council
decided to postpone its unveiling to the spring to ensure better weather for the ceremony.
Contrary to most other unveiling ceremonies around Baden and Germany, the general
population was not invited to attend. The ceremony took place on the graveyard where
the monument was located. Because space was limited on the site o f the monument, only
a select number o f individuals were invited. Coupled with the fact that there had been no
donations from the general population, this underscored the fact that the monument was
not a mass-based one. Compared to most other monuments analyzed in this work,
common citizens in Heidelberg, whether Catholic or Protestant, had no influence on what
the monument would look like, where it would be located, or who would pay for it. To

44 ibid., 10.
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be sure, there were representatives from all major groups o f the city, such as the clergy,
students, politicians, important businessmen, as well as military officials from Bavaria,
Wurttemberg, and Baden. In addition, about twenty relatives o f the fallen soldiers had
made the trip to Heidelberg and were made honorary guests at the ceremony. However,
despite the fact that these people marched in a parade from the center o f the city out to
the cemetery, which was located outside the immediate city center, popular participation
in this project remained limited. Contemporary sources made no reference to any
significant popular reception o f the monument, which is important. Usually, in order to
emphasize that these types o f monuments represented popular sentiments, contemporaries
were careful to stress that the general population had responded very well to a certain
monument. On this occasion, however, it seems as if the monument in Heidelberg was
comparatively disassociated from the everyday citizen.
Mayor Krausmann held the plenary speech at the unveiling. After a brief recap o f
the war, he recounted how the city council in June 1871 had decided to honor the great
sacrifice that these Germans had offered the fatherland. He claimed that this monument
constituted the least that civilians could do, especially since they were now reaping the
benefits o f the soldiers’ heroics. Furthermore, there were many German soldiers who
perished in the war and were not able to witness the glorious achievement that they had
accomplished. He also noted that the monument struck a nice balance between the local
and national since it honored the efforts o f German soldiers from many different areas o f
the nation-state. Thus, the monument could be seen as a sign o f the new national spirit
that was spreading across Germany and that had contributed to the successful foundation
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o f the Empire. The mayor also claimed that the monument would always serve as a
reminder o f how grateful Germans should be for the unified Empire and how the heroics
o f these soldiers had answered the prayers o f German patriots. The monument should
also remind people that the city o f Heidelberg was very grateful for what Germans from
every part o f the country did for their fatherland. Hence, the city should serve as a
guiding light for some o f the other German cities that had not yet honored the German
soldiers in a fitting way.45 After the mayor had concluded his speech, a Protestant and
Catholic priest held two separate prayers. The Catholic priest, Wilfried Herbst, remarked
that city inhabitants must never forget the sacrifices made by these people and that the
efforts o f these men fulfilled the dreams that Germans had held for several centuries. The
ceremony ended with the Protestant clergyman Hermann Schellenberg noting that
although it was unfortunate that these people had perished in the service o f the fatherland,
people could rest assured that they were in a better place.46
Although this monument was constructed around the same time as some o f the
other ones that have been analyzed in this work, the one in Heidelberg represented a
different type o f monument. First o f all, because the general population was not invited
to participate to any great extent in the planning and/or construction process, the
population struggled to identify with the monument.47 Throughout history, it has always
been easier for people to identify with monuments that are perceived to be truly popular.

45 Ibid., 12-13.
46 Ibid., 14.
47 Neither archival sources nor newspapers mention any parades out to the monument on national holidays,
events that were commonplace in both Konstanz and Freiburg.
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In addition, because the monument was placed on the outskirts o f the city, it was not
readily accessible for Heidelbergers. While the Siegesdenkmal in Freiburg was located in
the immediate city center, that was not the case in Heidelberg, which made it even more
difficult to popularize the monument. This monument was also slightly different because
it was designed to honor both local soldiers as well as soldiers from other parts o f
Germany. To be sure, the people behind the Siegesdenkmal attempted to portray it as a
national monument as well, but as was evident in the analysis o f its symbolism, that was
not the case. Both the Siegsesdenkmal and the monument in Konstanz were more located
in the local context. Once again, this serves as an illustration o f the fact that the city o f
Heidelberg, due to its geographic location, was not as provincial as Konstanz and
Freiburg. One thing that is clear is that the monument did not attract the same kind o f
controversy and/or attention as some o f the other ones did. This was something that was
constructed by the city elite and it does not appear as if it ever became part o f the popular
consciousness. Thus, as has been evident throughout these discussions, the memory o f
the Franco-Prussian War and the unification was not as contested in Heidelberg as it was
in other areas o f the state. While citizens in Konstanz and Freiburg employed the newly
popularized nationalist discourse to intensify existing conflicts, locals in Heidelberg
initially remained relatively unaffected o f the divisive effects o f the nationalist discourse.
Despite the limited sources that obstruct the view o f how Catholics and
Protestants viewed the unification and initial years o f the Second Empire in Heidelberg, it
is still evident that the relationship between the two confessions was more amicable in the
1860s and 1870s than it was in both Konstanz and Freiburg. Because the city had a more
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even distribution between the two major confessions, they seem to have enjoyed a better
relationship. Also, as was seen above, the fact that Heidelberg had never been a bastion
o f Catholic clerical power certainly helped their citizens to a better relationship with their
Protestant counterparts. While Protestants and liberals in Konstanz and Freiburg were
intent on stripping away as much power as possible from the once-so-powerful Catholic
church, no such trends were evident in Heidelberg. Naturally, the Protestant and liberal
actions in Konstanz and Freiburg ensured that the relationship between state and church,
as well as between Protestants and Catholics, was quite uneasy. However, the absence of
these types o f conflicts in Heidelberg meant that the two major confessions were able to
coexist in a much more peaceful manner. Largely because o f these reasons, Catholics in
Heidelberg enjoyed a smoother and less conflict-ridden integration into the Second
Empire, though conflicts between Catholics and Protestants certainly existed there as
well. O f course, this does not mean that Heidelberg Catholics simply changed their
identities to German in January 1871, but the lack o f strong conflicts between Catholics
and Protestants meant that the city’s Catholics had one less element to contend with as
they negotiated their new national identity in the postunification period.
Although Catholics and Protestants in the city enjoyed a more amicable
relationship, there certainly existed conflicts between Catholics and Protestants, and
people did try to construct different memories o f the Franco-Prussian War and
unification, particularly towards the end o f the nineteenth century. For instance, the
controversies surrounding the celebrations o f Bismarck’s eightieth birthday in 1895
caused some Heidelberg Catholics to lament how poorly treated they had been and how
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their brethren had suffered during the war. However, these alternative memories were
created in retrospect and did not adequately reflect reality. Although some o f these
sentiments certainly reflected how some Catholics experienced the war and unification,
contemporary sources really do not support these notions. One o f the reasons why
Catholics in Heidelberg were more likely in the 1890s to complain about the conditions
during the 1860s and 1870s was the fact that by the 1890s Catholics had been able to
form a much stronger consciousness, largely due to the K ulturkam pf and the advent o f a
more developed Catholic press and associational life. Scholars have documented how the
Kulturkam pf served to strengthen Catholic identity rather than weaken it, and the
Catholic press and associational life also served to create a more homogeneous Catholic
identity. Hence, during the 1880s and into the 1890s, Catholics all around the state of
Baden became acutely aware o f how they had been mistreated by local Protestants and/or
the state. Thus, even if they lived in a community that enjoyed amicable confessional
relations, by the 1890s, the stronger Catholic consciousness would enable them to be
more aligned with some o f the other sentiments in the state. Consequently, when they
constructed the memory o f the unification twenty years later, they tended to emphasize
the more adverse aspects o f the Franco-Prussian W ar and the immediate postunification
period, though this might not reflect adequately the situation in their city. Indeed, one o f
the things that should be taken away from this chapter is the fact that though the Catholic
experience in Baden had many common elements to it, there were certain differences
between areas as well, especially in the first few years o f the Second Empire. Catholics
in Freiburg and Konstanz faced different circumstances than the ones in Heidelberg,
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which caused slightly different experiences. After the conclusion o f the Kulturkampf,
Catholics around the state exhibited a more cohesive identity, but as was seen in this
chapter, at the time o f the unification, Catholics around Baden displayed slight
differences in how they approached the commemorative discourse surrounding
unification. It should also be noted that the fact that Protestants in Heidelberg refrained
from launching into too many o f the customary anti-Catholic tirades also meant that the
nationalist discourse was more stable and less contested. It was not until later in the
Kaiserreich, when Catholics in Heidelberg had become fully aware o f the injustices done
to their brethren around the state, that they engaged fully the Protestant ideological
message that surrounded much o f the commemorative discourse.
Despite these differences, however, there were certain elements that united
Catholics around the state. The next chapter will primarily chronicle Catholic resistance
against the Sedan Day, which was a holiday that Catholics around the Empire vehemently
opposed. Thus, though Catholics around Baden reacted slightly differently to unification,
there were still certain Protestant ideological messages that they all opposed and that in
the end aided them in manifesting their own version o f German national identity.
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CHAPTER 6
CREATING ANOTHER KIND OF GERMAN: CATHOLIC OPPOSITION TO
SEDAN DAY

During the 1870s and ‘80s, Badenese Catholics responded in a variety o f ways
to the official attempts to exclude them from the commemorative discourse
surrounding war and unification. This chapter will investigate the most contested o f
the commemorations: Sedan Day. This celebration merits a closer analysis for a
number o f reasons. First of all, it created more controversy than any other public
ceremony in the immediate postunification period. Second, the debates that ensued in
the wake o f these conflicts serve as excellent representations o f many o f the issues that
Protestants and Catholics contested as they embarked on the nation-building project.
In conjunction with these discussions, we will also examine other public celebrations
such as specific battle commemorations and imperial birthdays, which at first glance
might not seem to be related to war commemorations. However, closer investigation
o f these events reveals that city elites utilized a variety o f different public celebrations,
not all o f them directly related to wars, to construct an official memory o f wars and
unification. War and unification tended to dominate the discourse at most public
events, and especially since control o f the public space became increasingly important
to Catholics and Protestants, they debated these issues in a variety o f settings. For
instance, the ideological message surrounding imperial birthdays placed
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great emphasis on the rulers’ roles as Germans, and their specific contributions to the
unification process. Thus, Catholics faced a difficult choice in how to approach these
celebrations. On the one hand, they wanted to express their devotion to the Emperor,
but on the other, most o f the rhetoric at these events was tinged with strong antiCatholic sentiments. This discussion will also trace how Catholic attitudes towards
the official commemorative discourse changed as the nineteenth century drew to a
close. Some o f these changes stemmed from the changing political conditions as the
National Liberal Party struggled to retain their grip on political power. As Catholics
were able to play more important political and economic roles in the Second Empire,
they were better able to manifest their own sense o f Germanness. To be able to
understand fully some o f the changes in Catholic attitudes towards the official
commemorative discourse, a brief overview o f some o f the most important political
developments is necessary.

Badenese Political and Religious Developments, 1871-1914
During the first few years o f the Second Empire, the national-liberals under
their controversial leader Julius Jolly dominated Badenese politics. Popular among
the state’s Protestants and liberals, Jolly’s embrace o f the Kulturkam pf alienated
Catholics throughout the state. Strengthened by the passing o f the May laws in 1873,
he categorically refused to negotiate with the EO and passed many decrees regulating
the activity o f the Church. He shut down most seminaries, imprisoned a majority o f
Catholic priests, and granted extensive rights to Old Catholics. All o f these measures
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divided the state and distanced the Catholic majority from the government’s political
program.1
Despite the political hegemony o f the national-liberals, Jolly’s hard-line
policies eventually alienated many Protestants as well. Although most Protestants
supported the liberal attacks on the Catholic Church, and though the Protestant
community in Baden was much more cohesive than in most other areas o f Germany,
Jolly’s actions finally became too much for some Protestants. As the minister
president pushed hard for the complete abolishing o f confessional schools, Grand
Duke Friedrich, considerably concerned about the increasingly hostile relationship
between Catholics and Protestants, only agreed to sign the law into effect if Jolly
consented to resign. Understanding that to continue as minister president would be
impossible without the support o f the Grand Duke, Jolly resigned on September 21,
1876.

This event signified a turning point in the relationship between Baden’s

Catholics and the state.
Friedrich appointed Ludwig Turban to replace Jolly. Contemporaries
considered Turban a moderate politician who had remained in the background during
most o f the struggles between the church and state. Turban and Friedrich cooperated
to staff the new administration with ministers such as Franz Ludwig Stosser, who were
willing to abolish some o f the more draconian measures o f the Kulturkampf. To the
state’s Catholics, these decisions cemented and increased the popularity o f the Grand
1 Schwarzmeier, Handbuch derBaden-Wurttembergischen Geschichte, 173-175.
2 Becker, Liberaler Staat und Kirche, 364-365.
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Duke. People around the state praised him for removing Jolly and recognizing the
need to normalize relations between Catholics and Protestants.3 This reinforced the
already popular notion that Friedrich never really had been aware o f the poor
treatment that Catholics suffered at the hands o f Jolly and his accomplices.4
While the dismissal o f Jolly indicated a slight change in religious policies, the
Badenese Kulturkam pf remained in effect, and it was not until 1879 that conditions
began to change. Once again, it was the Grand D uke’s distress over the religious
situation that prompted an improvement for the state’s Catholics. At the end o f the
1870s, due to the effects o f the Examensgesetz, 416 Catholic parishes did not have a
priest.5 Concerned about the obvious plight o f many o f his Catholic subjects,
Friedrich was determined to bring the state and the Catholic Church to the negotiating
table. Although Lothar von Kiibel was initially reluctant to agree to some o f the
conditions o f the proposed compromise, the improved relationship between Berlin and
the Vatican following the death o f Pius IX and the succession o f Leo XIII enabled
more fruitful negotiations. In 1880, after lengthy talks, the Examsgesetz was changed
in a manner acceptable to both parties. This compromise helped normalize relations
between Catholics and Protestants. Within a relatively short time, the majority o f
vacant parishes had been filled, which appeased Badenese Catholics and removed

3 Ibid., 366-367.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., 367.
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some o f the aversion towards the state.6
Kiibel’s unexpected death in August 1881 provided the two sides with an
opportunity to further improve their relationship. In the light o f the recent successful
cooperation, both church and state were keen to fill the Archbishop seat in Freiburg,
which had been vacant since the death o f Herman von Vicari in 1868. Further
facilitating a compromise was the altered political landscape. Although the nationalliberals were still in control o f the government, their support was steadily decreasing.
Whereas they had received over fifty percent o f the votes in the elections between
1871-1877, in the beginning o f the 1880s, their numbers had declined to around forty
percent. Indeed, in the 1881 elections, they failed for the first time since 1859 to
*

obtain an absolute majority in the second chamber o f the parliament.

7

Contemporaries

debated the reasons for this loss. Many liberals argued that the easing o f the
Kulturkam pf had produced a number o f new, strongly antiliberal priests who had
reasserted control over their parish members. Although many subscribed to this
convenient explanation for the party’s recent struggles, the reasons were more
complicated. First o f all, the enormous success that the party had enjoyed for the
better part o f two decades had made its leaders complacent. They no longer
participated with equal vigor in the election campaigns and often ignored the issues
voters considered important. Furthermore, the economic depression that hit the state
and the rest o f Germany after 1873 had caused a general loss o f faith in liberal
6 Ibid., 367-368.
7 Hug, Geschichte Badens, 287.
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economic policies. Both the Catholic Party and the conservatives had focused much
of their election campaigns on the economic issues, and the former even avoided
religious questions to concentrate on the poor standard o f living.
After drawn-out negotiations, Johann Baptist Orbin was elected new
Archbishop in 1882. Orbin placed emphasis on improving the relationship with the
Badenese liberals and Protestants. Especially during his first few years as Archbishop,
he remained rather passive in religious matters, an approach that significantly
improved the relationship with the state. He employed a careful approach in his
negotiations with the state. Instead o f presenting a long list o f demands, which had
been the frequent habit o f his predecessors, he elected to concentrate on one issue at
the time. The government responded favorably to his overtures and permitted re
opening o f new seminaries in Freiburg, Konstanz, and Tauerbischofsheim, in addition
to scaling back the rights o f the Old Catholics.8 Although the increased cooperation
with the government aided the Catholics in their quest to revoke all o f the Kulturkam pf
legislation, it also presented them with a political dilemma. No longer able to base
their party ideology solely on resistance to the government’s policies, they needed to
redefine their political identity. The ensuing debates regarding the character o f the
party greatly diminished popular support for the party. Thus, though the religious
situation improved considerably, Catholics were not able to take political advantage o f
these developments
Orbin became Archbishop at age seventy-five, and his death five years later
8 Lauer, Geschichte der katholischen Kirche, 329-335.
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therefore came as no surprise. He was quickly replaced with the Bishop o f Limburg,
Johann Christian Roos. The latter enjoyed a reputation as a peaceful man, intent on
improving the relationship between church and state, much like his predecessor.
Initially, he lived up to the expectations that the government had placed on him;
however, after Prussia repealed the vast majority o f its Kulturkampf Jaws in 1887, he
became much more politically active. Roos used the increasing growth o f the socialdemocrats as a powerful argument why it was so important for church and state to
cooperate as much as possible. The new minister responsible for cultural and religious
affairs, Wilhelm Nokk, presented a series o f suggestions for a compromise between
the two sides. Although the government did not reject all the legislation passed during
the Kulturkam pf they eliminated key decrees and debated passing some new
legislation favorable to Catholics. Among the more important ones was a
recommendation to permit members o f religious orders, who were still banned in
Baden, to conduct charity work. While the Parliament rejected this particular law, it
passed many others, which helped to improve the situation for Catholic clergy and
laity in the state.9 Although the Church was satisfied with the concessions, the laws
voted into effect in July 1888 did not mean that the tension between Catholics,
Protestants, and the state had come to an end. Many Kulturkam pf laws were still in
effect, though they were not enforced with the same rigor.
Similarly to the national Kulturkam pf the Badenese version ultimately failed.
Despite the fact that the state created great problems for the Catholic Church, the

9 Ibid., 337-339.
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resistance offered by both the EO as well as Catholic laity made it impossible for the
state to complete their agenda. Indeed, most o f these measures strengthened Catholic
communities as they united to meet the state’s challenge.
Although national-liberals were vulnerable to political attacks during the late
1870s and the 1880s, struggles within the Catholic Party over how to approach the
ending o f the Kulturkam pf prevented the latter from taking full advantage o f the
situation. In the Catholic Party, Theodor Wacker led the faction advocating a hard
line approach to the issue, whereas Frans Xaver Lender supported a more conciliatory
approach to the liberal government.10 The debates grew increasingly hostile until a
public argument during the 1885 election campaign completely severed the
relationship between the two sides. After realizing that Lender enjoyed more support
within the party, Wacker officially resigned his seat while refusing to recognize the
legitimacy o f Lender’s faction. Although the Catholic Party had enjoyed an increasing
amount o f support, these disputes undermined their credibility among the population.
Thus, in the 1887 election, they only managed to acquire nine seats. This poor result
forced Lender to retire from politics and created a power vacuum within the party. In
1888, Wacker, together with the prominent Freiburger lawyer Ludwig Marbe, staged a
number o f rallies throughout Baden to try to revive support for their version o f
political Catholicism. W acker’s speech at the General Assembly o f Catholics in
Freiburg in 1888 marked his ascendancy to power and the beginning o f a
reorganization o f the party. He stressed the need to maintain the strong opposition
10 Kremer, Mitt G ottfur Wahrheit, Freihet und Recht, 25, 32-33, 116-117.
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towards the National Liberal Party, especially since so many o f the K ulturkam pf laws
were still in effect. Seeking to integrate the Badenese party more fully into the
national party structure, he also managed to supervise a name change to the Badische
Zentrumspartei (Badenese Center Party). Wacker immediately embarked on a
reorganization o f the party structure, creating three party centers in Konstanz,
Freiburg, and Heidelberg. Under his leadership, the party transformed itself from a
Weltanschaungspartei into more o f a Intressenpartei, which was more apt to gain
political support. Already in 1891, his efforts brought significant results as the party
improved its share o f seats in the Parliament from nine to twenty-one.11
Consequently, when Nokk replaced Turban as minister president in March
1893, the national-liberals were on the defensive. In the elections a few months later,
they lost additional seats to the Catholics, which meant that they no longer possessed a
majority in the state parliament. Instead, the opposition occupied thirty-three o f the
sixty-three seats. More importantly, the liberals were unable to reverse this negative
trend. Catholics, social-democrats, and conservatives continued to gain seats, and in
the m id-1890s, the liberals “only” possessed about forty percent o f the seats, a very
low number by their standards.12
Although religious issues still played a major role in Badenese politics, much
o f the political life around the turn o f the century focused on the need for electoral
reform. Catholics and social democrats were the most fervent supporters o f some type
11 Ibid, 35-36.
12 Landeszentrale, ed., Badische Geschichte, 82-83.
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o f reform. In a similar fashion to the rest o f Germany, the Badenese liberal
Honoratioren experienced difficulties adapting to the new mass politics that began to
develop in the 1890s.13 They often complained that if the election system was to be
changed according to the wishes o f the Catholics and the social-democrats, the lower
house would soon be overflowing with members from the lower classes. During the
last few years o f the century, all major parties offered different suggestions as to how
the election system should be altered. Eventually, it was the resignation o f Nokk in
1900, who had been one o f the staunchest opponents o f direct elections, which paved
the way for a compromise. During the next three years, representatives from all
parties debated the best way to redraw the Badenese constitution. The result was a
substantial change o f the political system. The introduction o f direct, universal (male)
suffrage once again placed Baden at the forefront o f liberal reform. Both the first and
second chambers were expanded and the election districts were redrawn to better
represent the new urban society. The special privileges held by nobility and clergy in
the first chambers were removed. These provisions ensured that the political life
would take on a new shape after 1905.14
The fact that elections o f representatives to the chambers were to be
determined in main and run-off elections opened the possibility for new electoral
alliances. In the past, the common opposition to the national-liberals had preserved
the harmony among the opposition parties. With the uncertainty about how voters
13 Ibid.; Hug, Geschichte Badens, 287.
14 Hug, Geschichte Badens, 289.
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would behave in this new system, the national-liberals became increasingly interested
in ensuring support from especially the Freisinnn and the Democratic Party. The
negotiations between the three parties resulted in a pact in which they all agreed not to
participate in certain election districts. Both the social-democrats and the Catholic
Center remained aloof from these negotiations and conducted independent campaigns.
After the first round o f elections, it appeared that the Center Party was headed
for an absolute m ajority-they only needed to win nine o f the twenty-three seats that
had to be determined in run-off elections. Catholics across the state were jubilant, as it
appeared as if they had finally placed themselves in a position to enjoy significant
political power. However, to the great surprise o f political analysts everywhere, the
national-liberals and social-democrats now entered an alliance that all but doomed the
Center’s chances o f reaching a majority. As the result o f the run-off elections came in,
the Center had failed to win a single seat. Although they were still the largest party,
they were far away from a majority, and given the newfound cooperation among the
social-democrats and the national-liberals, the prospect for political reform remained
poor.
The formation of this so-called “GrossblocK’ caused strong reactions, and not
only among the Catholics, who were incensed at this unholy alliance. Large parts o f
the bourgeoisie, as well as Grand Duke Friedrich, demanded an explanation how the
national-liberal leadership had allowed such a dramatic increase in revolutionary
influence to take place. Alexander Freiherr von Dusch, the national-liberal leader,
tried to assure both the Grand Duke and the voters that this was an entirely pragmatic
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alliance and that the social-democrats would not be able to exercise any major
influence on the course o f Badenese politics. For the Catholics, this alliance
constituted a heavy blow. The exhilaration that they had experienced after the first
round o f elections had been quickly replaced by despair. Despite the remarkable
growth in strength, the party would not be able to exercise any major influence on the
course o f state politics. The last decade prior to the outbreak o f World W ar I was
characterized by a political stalemate as passing o f new decrees often was dependent
upon the cooperation between social-democrats and national-liberals. Although this
coalition experienced many problems, it performed better than might have been
expected. Especially after the 1909 elections, the two parties proved that they were
able to cooperate rather well, and they made sure to set aside any major conflicts and
focus instead on issues that they agreed upon. Despite a remarkable amount o f
success, the last elections prior to the war in 1913 displayed an increase in the support
for the Center, while the other major parties drew less support.15
As noted above, Catholics around the state were outraged at the alliance
between social-democrats and national-liberals. Because Catholics had been able to
cultivate their loyalties to the Badenese state in a much different manner since the
dismantling o f the Kulturkampf, this failure was even more hurtful. As will become
evident in the discussions regarding Catholic attitudes towards various
commemorations, it became increasingly clear that they felt more integrated into
Baden and Germany as the nineteenth century drew to a close. The only major issue
15 Ibid.; Kremer, M itt G ottfur Wahrheit, Freihet und Recht, 43-44.
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o f contention between the government and the Church was the ban on the religious
orders that was still in effect. The increased political strength o f the Center Party
enabled the religious leadership to place increasing pressure on both the Grand Duke
and the national-liberals. Aided by the number o f Center representatives in the first
and second chambers, the Church was able to revoke the ban on the missions in 1894;
however, the orders were still not allowed to return. Despite presenting a number o f
different suggestions that would facilitate the return o f the orders, the EO was not able
to convince the government to change its stance.
Because o f the struggles over the religious orders, the appointment o f a new
archbishop following the death o f Roos in 1896 became hotly contested. After almost
two years o f negotiations and one failed appointment (Bishop Komp died on his way
to Freiburg), the two sides agreed on Thomas Norber from Baden-Baden.16 The
government and the Grand Duke expected him to exercise a calming influence on the
agitation from the Center, but that proved false. After a few initial confrontations,
Friedrich informed Norber that he would have to help calm W acker down before any
meaningful negotiations could take place. Because Norber’s appointment was
accompanied by a much milder rhetoric from Wacker, it seems likely that the new
archbishop was able to convince the political leader to tone down some o f his more
aggressive argumentation. As a result o f the improved relationships, in 1902, the
liberal government even declared itself prepared to discuss the reopening o f some o f
the monasteries and even the potential return o f some o f the religious orders.
16 Lauer, Geschichte der katholischen Kirche, 353-354.
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However, though the liberal politicians might have been ready to accommodate the
Catholics, large parts o f society was not. The news that the government and the EO
were entering negotiations regarding this issue ignited a storm o f popular protests
around the state. Indicating that the relationship between Protestant and Catholics still
remained tense, the so-called Klostersturm attempted to influence the government.
Refusing to give in to both popular pressure and the opposition o f the Grand Duke, the
minister president Arthur von Brauer began talks with the EO in 1903. Despite their
determination to negotiate, it soon became clear that the government was only
prepared to do it on its own terms. Thus, the EO quickly left the negotiating table,
citing the inflexible stance o f the government as their reason for abandoning the
attempt to bring the orders back into the state.

17

The formation o f the Grossblock presented Badenese Catholics with an
interesting situation. To be sure, they did not possess the political power that they
thought they deserved; however, the fact that the social-democrats and the nationalliberals differed significantly on the religious issue provided some potential leverage.
However, they were unable to achieve any major victories, and the relationship
between state and church was pretty uneventful during the last decade before the war.
Although the Center Party was unable to facilitate the re-entry o f the religious orders
into Baden, their political situation had undergone a drastic change since the inception
o f the Second Empire. Badenese political Catholicism had developed from a
disorganized and splintered movement into a major political force that exercised

17 Kramer, Mitt Gott filr Wahrheit, Freihet und Recht, 152-154.
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considerable influence on the political process. As we shall see, this change also
manifested itself in transformed Catholic attitudes towards the official rhetoric
surrounding wars and unification. However, this change was a slow and often painful
process as will become clearly evident in the analysis o f Sedan Day.

Catholic Responses to Sedan Day
The annual commemoration o f the victory at Sedan proved to be one o f the
most contested celebrations in early Imperial Germany.18 Although social-democrats
and others abstained from participating, confessional and not class issues were at the
forefront o f the controversies. Protestants viewed the annual celebration o f the
military victory as an opportunity to shape the nascent nation-state according to the
tenants o f liberalism and Kulturprotestantismus. Especially during the first two
decades o f the Kaiserreich, the commemorations became manifestations o f the
supposedly close connection between nationalism and Protestantism. As part o f their
attempts to control the construction o f Germanness, Protestants used this and other
commemorations to establish a link between the wars o f unification and their
confession. This holiday became a vehicle for Protestants to assume the role o f sole
interpreters o f the national history and national identity. They presented these ideas in
a manner which supposedly made them incontestable; however, Catholics and others
actively protested this view o f German history and identity. Thus, few other

18 Excellent accounts o f Sedan Day include: Confino, The Nation as a Local Metaphor, 27-51; Lepp,
“Protestanten feiem ihre Nation”; Schneider, Politische Festkultur.
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commemorations caused more debates regarding the manner in which unification had
been achieved and how to shape the new nation-state.
In Baden and other confessionally mixed areas, Sedan Day became an annual
forum for contesting the nature o f the German nation, and Catholics, Old Catholics,
and Protestants clashed (sometimes violently) over what constituted a good German.
An analysis o f the debates surrounding this celebration will not only highlight the
contested nature o f Germanness but also reveal some o f the methods that Catholics
employed to display publicly their own view o f the nation. Some scholars have
argued that since Catholics seldom organized counter-demonstrations on September 2,
they did not utilize Sedan Day to rally support to the same extent as social-democrats,
who often staged alternative meetings on the very day o f the celebration.19 However,
this interpretation fails to take into consideration the important role that the debates
surrounding this annual celebration played in the Catholic community. By using the
debates in the media, Catholics and others were able to propagate their own view o f
the German nation. This constitutes a good illustration o f the fact that
commemorations and corresponding debates served as more than a means o f spreading
an officially approved ideological message. Groups such as Catholics and socialdemocrats used these newly opened avenues o f communication to criticize specific
features o f contemporary German society. These commemorations often enabled
various groups to make their voices heard in a more efficient and public way than
would otherwise have been the case.

19 To a certain extent, this view permeates Schneider’s work.
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Although receiving an increasing amount o f scholarly attention during the past
decade, the historiography of Sedan Day still contains significant gaps. Alon Confino
and Ute Schneider have attempted to locate this commemoration in the wider context
o f the creation o f a public culture, collective memory, and national narrative.
However, neither has considered in depth the importance o f the debates surrounding
Sedan Day to the Catholic community, though Confino stresses the intimate
connections between the Protestant-liberal view o f the nation and the celebration. The
history o f Sedan Day represents yet another means that Protestants and liberals used in
their attempts to shape the German nation-state according to their own values. Thus,
in many Badenese communities, especially during the 1870s, the festivities became
instruments in the fierce K ulturkam pf that dominated most local societies. It was no
coincidence that the popularity o f Sedan celebrations concurred with the political
dominance o f the National Liberal Party. Local Protestant liberals employed these
celebrations to affirm their dominant position in society and to appropriate the role as
interpreters o f Germany’s national history. Although Confino is correct when arguing
that liberals “...voiced their own ideas o f Germany and o f German history in a way
that made these ideas incontestable...,”20 he overstates the hegemony o f the
Protestant-liberal view of the national narrative. To be sure, most o f the people who
organized Sedan Day were members o f their community elite, which lent a certain
amount o f authority to their message. However, because Confino’s study centers on
Wurttemberg, which did not experience a strong Kulturkampf, he overlooks the
20 Confino, The Nation as a Local Methapor, 58
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centrality o f confessional conflict to Sedan Day. In Baden, Catholics were quite
successful in using the debates surrounding the ideological message that liberals and
Protestants presented to manifest their own view o f Germany’s past and future. Here,
the fact that Catholics had already experienced a harsh Kulturkam pf aided them in
their struggles with the Protestant-liberal elite. Already accustomed to discrimination
and unjust treatment, Catholics did not let the political and economic power o f their
opponents prevent them from expressing an alternative sense o f Germanness.
Moreover, Catholics employed these debates to validate and legitimize their
membership in the German imagined community. Although not actively participating
in the festivities, Catholics used their opposition to Sedan Day to construct and exhibit
notions o f Germanness.
Almost immediately after the capture o f Napoleon III, a number o f Germans
demanded that the nationalist exhilaration that had accompanied the military victory
should be manifested in a ceremony. Members o f the Protestant Association in
Bremen first requested an annual celebration in which Germans could showcase their
patriotism and love for the fatherland. During the first few months o f 1871, the wellknown lawyer Franz von Holtzendorff and Johann Caspar Bluntschli, the president o f
the Protestant Association, discussed initiating an “allgemeine Volks und
Kirchenfest.,,2i During the 1860s, Bluntschli, located in Heidelberg, had become
known as one o f the fiercest advocates o f the Badenese Kulturkampf. Although he
and Holtzendorff initially claimed that the celebration would have an intra21 Quoted in Becker, Liberaler Staat und Kirche, 310.
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confessional character, their private correspondence reveals their intentions to use it to
exclude parts o f the population from the German nation-building project. In a letter to
Bluntschli in February 1871, Holtzendorff stated: “No law or parliamentary debate
can damage the radicals, the socialists, the Jesuits, and the ultramontanes, as seriously
as a Volksfest, in which people are annually reminded just who the founder o f the
Empire were, and who the enemies o f the German Reich in 1870 were.”22
Fully aware o f the importance o f public celebrations to the nation-building
project, Bluntschli suggested turning Sedan Day into a Burgerweihe in which young
Germans would pass through an acceptance ritual into the national community.
However, Holtzendorff and others deemed these ideas to be too ambitious. Instead,
under the auspices o f Holtzendorff, eighty-eight liberal Honoratioren signed a petition
to the Emperor, asking him to initiate an annual “Volks-und Kirchenfest.” Most o f the
signers came from Baden and included Grand Duke Friedrich I. In addition, the
Grand Duke personally handed over petitions from forty-nine Badenese communities
that supported Holtzendorff and Bluntschli’s initiative. Given the intense nature o f the
Badenese Kulturkam pf during the 1860s and the Protestant domination o f municipal
politics, this level o f support was not surprising. Despite these efforts, Wilhelm turned
down their request. Although he had several different motives for his actions (one
being his dislike o f the Protestant Association), his official explanation was that a
celebration such as this one should not be organized from above, but instead emerge
spontaneously from the people.
22 Ibid.
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Following this official rebuke, the Protestant minister Friedrich von
Bodelschwingh took up the matter. During summer 1871, he circulated a similar, only
more detailed, petition to communities in the Rhineland. His initiative attracted
national attention, and local communities throughout Germany began planning a
celebration o f Sedan along similar lines o f the commemoration o f the victory at
Leipzig in 1813. Only a few cities staged official festivities in 1871, but by 1872,
most communities organized some form o f celebration.
In Baden, Protestants and Catholics already from the outset contested the
nature of this commemoration. For instance, in Konstanz, though the city council did
not organize an official celebration in 1871, a number o f locals attempted to take
advantage o f this opportunity to manifest their dissatisfaction with the actions and
policies of the Catholic Church.23 In a similar fashion, a more official celebration in
1872 contained harsh anti-Catholic rhetoric. Having witnessed the surge in nationalist
sentiments during the Franco-Prussian war, these locals had learned to use the
nationalist rhetoric to criticize certain features o f society, and they realized that it
could be employed as an effective weapon in the Kulturkampf. Most o f the speeches
held during the 1871 festivities focused on the need for an intensifying o f the
Kulturkam pf rather than celebrating the victory at Sedan. Speakers placed the
majority o f their emphasis on the religious aspect o f the war and noted that at Sedan
“ .. .the Roman spirit was defeated by the courageous and dutiful Germanic spirit,
which was able to deliver a deadly blow to the Jesuits, who had been protected by the
23 Konstanzer Zeitung, September 5, 1871.
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French for so long.”24 Notwithstanding that the celebration did not attract any major
attention, it was still important as it established the tone for future ones that would
draw more participants and spectators.
Although substantial anti-Catholic sentiments were present from the outset o f
the commemoration, the intensification o f the regional and national Kulturkam pf
significantly increased the hostility towards Catholics during the festivities. The brief
unity that had existed in the wake o f war and unification had quickly disappeared and
was replaced with struggles over how to remember these momentous events. Already
from the outset o f these celebrations, they turned into a forum in which liberals and
Protestants tried to propagate their view o f German history. They had been
increasingly successful in connecting the recent war with their faith. In 1873, the
liberal association (Liberale Verein) in Konstanz organized a celebration complete
with a banquet in the Konzilsaal. Liberal politician and Old Catholic Hermann
Schulze-Delitzsch gave the plenary speech, in which he focused on the connection
between the last war and the Konzilsaal, where the decision to execute the Czech
religious reformer Jan Hus had been taken in 1415.25 He urged his audience to note
that the events surrounding the injustices done to Hus marked the pinnacle o f clerical
power in Konstanz, and though the last war as well as some o f the domestic efforts
since 1871 had been successful in the battle against the internal enemy, the war was
not yet won. He reminded people that the clerical spirit was resilient and it would
24 Konstanzer Zeitung, September 3, 1872.
25 Konstanzer Zeitung, September 4, 1873.
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require much determination and dedication on behalf o f “true” Germans if they were
to break the stronghold which the Church had held on local society for so long. He
ended his speech by conjuring the spirit o f Hus, stating that it was unfortunate that
they just could not bum the spirit o f the clericals, just as they had burned the religious
reformer.26
Throughout the Kaiserreich, especially during the Kulturkampf, Badenese
liberals and Protestants frequently compared the current situation to the martyrdom o f
Hus. They often constructed monuments and organized other commemorative
ceremonies to maintain and honor the memory o f Hus. For instance, in Konstanz, one
o f the most controversial topics o f the 1860s had been the construction o f a monument
to celebrate the city’s intimate connection to the Bohemian reformer.27 Thus, they tied
their cause to one o f the best-known historical figures in the area, and they were also
able to create a continuous historical narrative from the times o f H us’s struggle against
Rome until the last war against the papal powers. This view o f history fit perfectly
with the kleindeutsche version that culminated in the unification in 1871. In addition,
it excluded Catholics from the commemorative discourse. Even if they had wanted to
celebrate the victory at Sedan, they were unable to do so because o f the heavy antiCatholic sentiments that dominated the official discourse. This proved to be very

26 Ibid.
27 Konstanzer Zeitung, 21 January, 27, 28 March, 10 April 1862. See also Jiri Koralka, “Konstaz als
Reiseziel tschchischer Husverehrer um die Mitte des 19. Jahrhundrets,” Schrr VG Bodensee (1987):
93-130; St. AK, S II 15226, Die Errichtung eines Hussenstein, 1834-1939. Another illuminating
example o f Konstanz’s ambivalent relationship to the Czech reformer is the controversy regarding a
1877 decision to change “PaulstraBc” to “HuscnstraBe.” See for instance Freie Stimme, August 4, 1877.
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important since Germans placed so much emphasis on using these events as basis for
their new national identity.
Another typical example o f the controversies that took place was the conflicts
connected to the school celebrations that had taken place just outside the city.
Ceremonies involving children were often the source o f some o f the most heated
debates, especially since, as Confino has noted, “celebrants therefore directed their
efforts to the children and the youth whose identity was still in a sense a tabula rasa.”28
In the small town o f Tiengen, the local teacher, accompanied by a priest, usually took
the children for a walk to explain the significance o f the day. Germans attached great
importance to Sedan Day as a pedagogical holiday. This was supposed to be an
occasion when children o f all ages were educated about the great sacrifices made by
their fathers and the need to honor those deeds, which was one o f the major reasons
why this and other holidays became so controversial. Citizens recognized how
influential these ceremonies could be to a child, which explains why parents went to
such great lengths to ensure that their offspring would not be taught what they
considered corrupting ideas. However, this year the city council had assigned the Old
Catholic priest Hampp to guide the children, which upset many parents, who
subsequently approached the school and asked them to revert the decision. The
parents appeared reasonable in their request, suggesting that to make everybody
happy, it was probably better to eliminate the role o f the priest altogether. Despite
widespread support for this appeal, the decision stood. As a result, many parents
28 Confino, The Nation as a Local Metaphor, 46.
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boycotted the celebration and instead organized their own walk from Tiengen to
nearby Waldshut, in which over 160 children participated. Although the local clergy
and various Catholic organizations praised the parents for taking this worthy initiative,
local liberal politicians criticized them heavily. The latter claimed that by separating
the Catholic children from the Protestant, Jewish, and Old Catholic ones, they were
only serving to further divide the German Reich. Despite the criticism, Catholics
stood by their decision, stressing how important it was to provide today’s youth with a
proper understanding o f the recent events.

9Q

Consequently, they used the national-

liberals’ own argument as to why some o f these commemorations were so important,
but instead o f exposing their children to the official canon o f nationalism, they elected
to present their own version o f these important events.
This was one o f the most common conflicts during the first few years o f the
Kaiserreich. In Konstanz and other cities, Catholic parents often kept their children
home on the days when Sedan was celebrated. Naturally, this caused much
controversy as liberals and Protestants used this behavior as evidence o f how
backward Catholics were since they were willing to risk their children’s education for
their own political and religious purposes. Another reoccurring conflict pertained to
the unwillingness o f local Catholic clergy members to support publicly the ideological
messages that accompanied the festivities, which they manifested by frequently
refusing to ring the church bells. This pointed and very public action led to heavy
criticism and renewed accusations o f hostility towards the fatherland. The refusal to
29 Freie Stimme, September 5, 1873.
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ring the bells constituted a powerful manifestation o f Catholic disapproval o f the
ideological messages surrounding the celebrations. As Protestant churches around the
state were ringing on the morning o f September 2, the silence o f Catholic ones
constituted a sharp contrast and disrupted the intended effect o f the commemoration.
By not participating and indeed often going about their lives as if it was any normal
day, Catholics and others were able to destroy the supposedly special character o f this
holiday. The Catholic disruption o f this effort to create an imagined community was
quite successful.

TO

Catholics often complained that though their brethren were frequently targets
for both verbal and physical abuse, they were not even allowed to offer light-hearted
criticism o f public figures. Towards the end o f the nineteenth century, the public
sphere assumed ever greater importance in a modernizing German society. Catholics,
despite being labeled backward and antimodem by their opponents, were keenly aware
o f the importance o f controlling, or at least participating in, the public arena. They
used papal anniversaries and other Catholic holidays to establish their presence in the
public sphere, and their criticism o f the exclusiveness o f Sedan Day reflected similar
concerns. Catholics around the state criticized how both local and state government
ignored the verbal and sometimes physical abuse Catholics had to suffer at the hands
o f Protestants. Physical confrontations were not everyday events, but assumed great
importance when they happened. Many contemporaries viewed them as a literal
manifestation o f the struggle for control o f the public space that took place between
30 Schneider, Politische Festkultur, 241.
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Catholics and Protestants. Following the 1873 celebrations, Badischer Beobachter
questioned the Grand Duke and his government: “ [Are] we Catholics are without any
rights?...since the government does nothing to stop these actions.”

31

In the wake o f unification, liberals and Protestants argued that it was evident
by how people celebrated Sedan Day that it had become the new national holiday.
Catholics, however, rejected this claim, maintaining that only the veterans association
staged celebrations and that people were already growing tired o f this
commemoration.32 They also claimed that an increasing number o f liberals boycotted
the event, joining the ranks o f Catholics and socialists, which rendered Sedan Day an
increasingly artificial celebration. Indeed, they claimed that the ceremony had
developed into “a farce arranged by the [liberal] party leadership.. ..”33 This
interpretation was far removed from the liberal and Protestant attempts o f portraying
the festivities as something that had emerged from the people. Freie Stimme noted:
that
It would be more than enough to do it every ten years. The French are
just happy that Napoleon is gone, and for us Germans, who are more
divided and hostile towards each other than ever before-all because of

31 Badischer Beaobachter, September 5, 1873.
32 Although Catholics were active in veterans organizations in Baden, Protestants dominated these
associations. These associations were supposed to be confessionally neutral, but in reality, their
rhetoric and actions often carried traits o f anti-Catholic sentiments. See Thomas Rohkramer, Der
Militarismus der “kleinen Leute
die Kriegervereine im Deutschen Kaiserreich (Munich: Oldenbourg,
1990).
33 Freie Stimme, September 2, 1873.
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the K ulturkam pf that began in those September days o f 1870—it would
be enough to celebrate the great national-liberal St. Sedan every ten
34
years.

Such statements illustrate how differently Catholics and Protestants viewed the
war. It was impossible for Catholics to relate to the commemorative discourse
surrounding September 2. While Protestants celebrated it as one o f the greatest days
in German history, Catholics located the origins o f the national Kulturkam pf in the
victory over Napoleon III.35 Liberal behavior proved that they, who claimed to be the
true representatives o f Germanness, tried to use Sedan Day to complete their victory
over the Catholic Church. In their attempts to prove how limited support for this
commemoration was, Catholic newspapers offered detailed accounts from any city in
Germany where celebrations had not met liberal and Protestant expectations. They
reported extensively on nonexisting decorations, canceled banquets, and poor
attendance. They argued that one o f the main reasons why the commemoration had
failed to gather popular support was its militaristic and chauvinistic nature, which did
not fit the pious German national character. This constituted a frequent Catholic
complaint and serves as a proper illustration o f their attempts to stress the religious
aspect o f their national identity. Furthermore, the constant references to the defeat o f
the Catholic French, which would be followed with an onslaught on German
C atholics, natu rally alienated the C atholic p art o f the population.

34 Freie Stimme, September 12, 1876.
35 Ibid.
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In their criticism, Badenese Catholics also complained that not only did
liberals and Protestants condemn them for their alleged disloyalty during the last war,
but they were also beginning to blame them for the suffering that Germans had to
endure ever since the Reformation. Especially during the first three decades o f the
Kaiserreich, the debates concerning Luther, the Reformation, and the origins and
causes o f the Thirty Years War intensified, and arguments regarding the role o f the
Protestant Swedish King Gustavus Adolphus often emerged in the wake o f Sedan
Day.36 In their speeches, Protestants and liberals often pointed out that the military
victory at Sedan had finally brought the victory that Protestants for so long had sought.
Thus, instead o f creating unity, the memory o f this victory served to further alienate
the two confessions from each other as it confirmed the different fates they had
suffered as Germans. Catholics also pointed out that the more divided Germans
became, the more certain sectors o f society insisted on staging public celebrations and
commemorations. They sarcastically noted that “...if a foreigner would arrive in
Germany, he would think that we Germans did not have a problem in the world, since
all we do is celebrate the greatness o f our nation.”37 Catholics offered some stinging
criticism o f this trend and demanded that it stop, otherwise it would completely
demoralize the German nation. During the last years o f the Kaiserreich, these
sentiments became commonplace, but Catholics were among the first to criticize this
trend o f overexposing Germans to commemorative activities.

36 Cramer, “The Cult o f Gustavus Adolphus,” 97-121.
37 Freie Stimme, September 16, 1876.
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After the passing o f the May Laws in 1873, Catholics had been locked in a
fierce battle with the state. In late August 1874, Bishop Ketteler outlined why
Catholics should not participate in this commemoration. His criticism focused on the
divisive character o f this supposedly national holiday. He stressed that if this indeed
was a celebration that promoted unity, Catholics would gladly participate in
commemorating the military victory that was so important for the foundation o f the
Reich, to which they had made such an important contribution. He also advised
Catholics to pay proper tribute to the sacrifices made by soldiers in the past war.
However, as long as liberals and Protestants were in charge o f organizing the events,
no Catholic could identify with the ideological messages that accompanied the
festivities. Protestants and liberals designed the events so that they did not represent
the true beliefs o f the German people, but instead only illustrated the sentiments o f an
elite intent on alienating Catholics and others from the nation-state. Hence, the
holiday did not adequately represent the collective identity o f Germans. Members o f
the Protestant city elite were misrepresenting the true nature o f this celebration: “On
Sedan Day, they do not celebrate the victory o f the German people against France as
much as the victory o f their own party over the Church. They want to force the
Catholic Church to participate in this celebration, to celebrate its own battle
wounds.”38
Ketteler also argued that as good Christians, Catholics could not participate in
a celebration alongside the same Protestants who were attempting to eliminate all
38 Ketteler’s text was reprinted in several newspapers; see for instance Freie Stimme, August 29, 1874.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

282
traces o f Christianity from the new nation-state. Furthermore, in times when the Pope
was under attack, when German priests and bishops were being imprisoned, and when
Catholics were subjected to all sorts o f discrimination, it would be inappropriate to
take part in the celebration of a state that was responsible for so many o f these
problems. Ketteler argued that the few Catholics who had participated in the
commemoration o f Sedan had compromised not only their own characters but the
characters o f Catholics everywhere. At the end o f the tract, the Bishop emphasized
that as true Germans, Catholics had a duty to pray for the fatherland, but they should
do this either on the Sunday before or after the official Sedan Day celebration.39
Not surprisingly, Ketteler’s argument initiated an intense debate regarding the
nature o f this celebration and the overall character o f the German nation. This is a
good example o f how the discourse surrounding these events was formulated and
reshaped by the interaction between the Catholic and Protestant press and also how the
latter contributed to the formation o f the German imagined community. Protestant and
liberal newspapers criticized the Bishop heavily for not respecting the sacrifices made
at Sedan and other battles and argued that this tract once and for all settled the
question of the loyalty o f German Catholics. If they could not appreciate the
commemoration o f the possibly greatest victory in German history, they did not
deserve to be included in the German nation-state. Some papers even went as far as
claiming that Ketteler had secretly been hoping for a French victory at Sedan. As
debates intensified, Badenese papers employed increasingly aggressive rhetoric.
39 Ibid.
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Freiburger Zeitung claimed that Catholics around the state were hoping for a French
revenge and that drastic measures had to be taken to deal with this very serious threat.
The paper maintained that “the blacks have chosen 2 September as a test day for the
pure intentions o f the German Catholics-they are requesting their own Sedan, to
which they should be assisted.”40 By using the powerful images o f war, they were
able to evoke a strong response among the population.
Having initially focused primarily on the supposedly anti-German behavior
Catholics had displayed in the war, Protestants now used Catholic attitudes toward
Sedan Day to prove their unwillingness to become Germans. Attacks often focused on
Catholic inability to appreciate the sacrifices made by the soldiers in the last war.
These accusations were especially damaging since much o f the commemorative
discourse surrounding the war and unification justified the loss o f lives by claiming
that an event of such importance as unification required great personal sacrifice. Since
Catholics were not willing to honor the fallen soldiers, they did not deserve a place in
the new nation-state.
This was another instance where Catholics displayed a slightly different
perception of the unification period and the character o f the Empire. As the debates
surrounding the commemoration turned into a forum for the current state o f the
Empire, Catholics were quick to point out the many problems that had surfaced during
the last few years. They often pointed out that an increasing number o f cities refused
to provide financial assistance for the celebrations, citing the strained economy that
40 Freiburger Zeitung, September 1, 1874.
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affected virtually every sector o f society during the Grunderkrise. In addition,
Catholics maintained that there really was not that much to celebrate in Germany at
the moment. Contrary to the Protestant and liberal claims that the foundation o f the
Empire meant that Germany was about to assume a very powerful position in
European and world politics, Catholics cited the deteriorating economy as an
indication that the official rhetoric was no more than propaganda. They frequently
centered their criticism on the discrimination that they faced from both national and
state governments. In addition, they argued that contrary to what Protestants and
liberals maintained, the German nation was not more unified now than it had been
before 1871. Indeed, many Catholics complained that by using Sedan Day as a
vehicle for Protestant, national-liberal policies, bourgeois elites had ruined the
memory o f a great military victory where Catholics and Protestants from all over
Germany had stood together in defense o f their common fatherland.
Towards the end o f the 1870s, Catholics no longer paid much attention to the
specific celebrations that were taking place on September 2 but instead used the
occasion to launch attacks on current conditions in society. As the German economy
worsened, Catholics were able to utilize their position as outsiders to criticize nationalliberal policies. Because they had supposedly not been part o f the driving forces in the
unification process, Catholics did not have to explain the failure to fulfill the promises
made in the post-1871 exhilaration. Indeed, Catholics often pointed out that none o f
the national-liberal grand visions for the future had been realized, which proved that
the sacrifices made by German soldiers and civilians had only served to satisfy the
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territorial aspirations o f Bismarck and his Prussian cohorts. Although Catholics were
careful to point out that their criticism should not be mistaken for anti-Germanness,
they repeatedly insisted that the Kaiserreich had failed to live up to expectations.
In a lead article published on September 5, 1878, Freie Stimme noted that after
the first initial economic success, largely triggered by the reparations from France,
economic, social, political, and religious conditions had deteriorated compared to the
pre-1871 period. Much o f the Catholic analysis centered on the effects o f the
Kulturkampf. They pointed out that though they had suffered discrimination prior to
unification as well, it had increased drastically after 1871. When analyzing Catholic
impressions o f the first few years o f the Kaiserreich, the importance o f the
Kulturkam pf can hardly be overestimated. For instance, the article in Freie Stimme
focused largely on how unjustly Catholics were treated in the Empire. Ever since the
conclusion o f the war against France, civil rights had steadily eroded, and people were
often imprisoned for no reason other than their religious belief. Adding that the
economic policies o f the national-liberals had accomplished nothing but enrichment o f
the upper classes, Catholics declared the liberal economic scheme worthless. Finally,
the last few years had witnessed a steady moral decline so that murders and robberies
were now part o f everyday life. These observations were tied into the reoccurring
Catholic complaints concerning the liberal and Protestant determination to modernize
at all cost. Germans had become too caught up in the financial hysteria that
accompanied unification and the economic boom triggered by the reparations from
France. As a result, Christian values had been all but forgotten, and Germans were
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now paying the price for neglecting the spiritual aspects of their lives.41
In conjunction with the debates regarding Sedan Day, Catholics also noted that
despite all national-liberal promises o f unity and prosperity, none had been fulfilled.
On the other hand, all the rhetoric about freedom and unity had simply fizzled out as
so many other promises made by Bismarck and the national-liberals. Catholics also
used these debates to attack one o f the common assumptions about the reason for the
German victory in the last war: the fact that the Catholic faith had hindered France’s
transition to a modem nation-state. Now, a few years after unification, Catholics
looked to France and the relative stability that had set in after the Paris Commune and
contrasted that with their own experiences in the Second Empire. Once again, the
ghost o f the K ulturkam pf loomed large as Catholics noted that the French were well on
their way to surpass the Germans, despite all o f the destruction that the war had
brought. Freie Stimme argued in 1876 that given the economic circumstances, it did
not seem appropriate to devote so much time, effort, and money to celebrating every
significant and insignificant event in the manner that Germans were currently doing.
In a time when hard work, piety and religious faith constituted the proper means to get
Germany back on track, this constant celebrating was an evil that needed to be
eliminated. As already noted, Catholics constituted one o f the first groups to criticize
the commemorative craze that spread throughout Germany during the last quarter o f
the nineteenth century.42

41 Freie Stimme, September 5, 10, 1878.
42 Freie Stimme, September 16, 1876.
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Interestingly, Protestants and liberals answered Catholic criticism o f the failing
economy by attempting to reconstruct the memory o f the Austro-Prussian War. Once
again in conjunction with the debates regarding Sedan Day, the Protestant press
claimed that Catholics had caused this economic crisis. Because o f the reparations
that Baden had to pay to Prussia-approximately six million-the Catholics had placed
enormous restraint on the economy that no liberal policies could correct. Protestants
maintained that in 1866, only Catholics had been willing to fight on the side o f the
Austrians, and consequently, Catholics were to blame for the hefty reparations.43 O f
course, Catholics, who during the past few years had spent considerable time and
efforts trying to uncover the true reasons behind the war o f 1866, refuted these
“ridiculous accusations.” They pointed out that though a few Protestants and liberals
had supported the reactionary and annexationist policies o f Bismarck, the vast
majority had championed the Austrian cause.44
The controversy over Sedan Day reached its climax during the 1870s. This
should come as no surprise as the immediate postunification period witnessed the most
intense commemorative activities. Although Protestant and liberal papers insisted that
entire communities participated in the celebrations, a careful reading o f these accounts
reveals that even among people who had previously supported Sedan Day, the
commemoration quickly lost its relevance. For instance, despite Konstanzer Zeitung's

43 These claims were discussed throughout the state in 1880. See for instance Freie Stimme, September
11, 1880.
44 Ibid.
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claims that by 1876 the commemoration had assumed national importance, the paper
also noted that the city would not stage any official events to honor the day. Towards
the end o f the 1870s, the paper only published very brief reports on the annual
festivities organized by the local veterans’ association, which usually attracted a
respectable number o f participants but without involving the entire community. The
resistance offered by Catholics and other groups eventually proved too disruptive for
liberals and Protestants, and as the immediate nationalist exhilaration disappeared in
the first few postunification years, locals soon lost much o f their interest in
commemorating Sedan. The liberal and Protestant failure to find any meaningful
political symbols that were accessible and acceptable to the majority o f Badeners
essentially doomed the holiday from the outset. After the initial enthusiasm, both
supporters and opponents o f the holiday stopped paying attention to it.45
Although local veterans’ organizations continued to celebrate Sedan Day
during the 1880s and ‘90s, the commemoration received ever less attention from the
rest o f the population. Especially after the gradual dismantling o f the Kulturkampf,
organizers o f Sedan Day failed to attract any great number o f participants. To be sure,
controversies over a particular speech still occurred, but on the whole, both Protestants
and Catholics lost interest in this holiday. During the last decades o f the nineteenth
century, the only times when Sedan Day attracted attention was when dignitaries
happened to make some comments that both Protestants and Catholics attempted to
interpret in such a manner that their own view o f the nation would be validated. One
45 Confino, The Nation as a Local Metaphor, 86.
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such example was Grand Duke Friedrich’s visit to the city o f Uberlingen in 1889.
Attending the Sedan Day celebration organized by the local veterans organization,
Friedrich held a speech that citizens in Baden and the rest o f Germany discussed at
length. Apart from the customary remarks about the importance o f remembering the
sacrifices made by the soldiers and civilians, he also noted that in times such as these,
it was important for all Germans to defend the interests o f Germany, both abroad and
at home. Never really defining what or whom he was referring to, Friedrich claimed
that enemies existed at home who threatened German cities, Heimats, and families.
Although it is difficult to know exactly what or whom the Grand Duke was alluding
to, his subsequent remarks regarding the importance o f maintaining an orderly civil
society indicates that he was concerned about some o f the negative effects that was
accompanying German modernization. His caution to parents to ensure that today’s
youth do not fall prey to some o f the temptations o f society could perhaps be
interpreted as a warning against the ever growing social-democratic threat.46
Immediately following his speech, liberal and Protestant papers offered their
interpretations o f it. Although some maintained that he had referred to the unions and
the social-democrats, many immediately seized this opportunity to renew the
accusations o f anti-German sentiments against the Catholics. These accusations
should be viewed in the context o f the controversies that emerged regarding the
monument dedicated to Giordano Bruno in Rome 47 Although taking place in Italy,

46 The speech was cited in a number o f newspapers. See for instance Freie Stimme, September 5, 1889.
47 Debates regarding this monument occupied most o f the space in primarily Catholic, but also
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this was a topic that attracted enormous attention in Germany, especially from
Catholics, but also from liberals and Protestants. During the late spring and summer
1889, German Catholics had expressed great indignation at the behavior o f Italian
liberals and the disrespectful manner in which they had treated the Pope. On June 9,
Italians had unveiled an imposing monument, located in the heart o f Rome, to
Giordano Bruno, whom they celebrated as a national hero. Bruno had been a
sixteenth-century Dominican monk whose interest in newer strands o f thought,
particularly within astronomy, had drawn the ire o f the Catholic Church. After
spending most o f his life on the run from the Inquisition, he was finally executed in
1600.

The debates regarding the monument had renewed the animosity between

Catholics and Protestants, especially regarding their view o f history. Thus, the Grand
Duke’s speech was debated in a public sphere that was already heavily polarized as a
result o f the Italian monument. The controversies regarding Bruno might seem
unrelated to the nature o f the German national identity, but we must recognize that
these debates dominated newspapers for several weeks and spilled over into a number
o f other issues.
In their responses to the accusations, Catholics displayed that their view o f the
German nation-state and their place in it had changed since the inception o f the
Empire. Aside from the usual rhetoric condemning the attempts o f Protestants and
Protestant-liberal, newspapers during June 1889.
48 For an overview o f Bruno’s life, see Dorotea Waley Singer, Giordano Bruno: His Life and Thought
(New York: Schuman: 1950). It should also be noted that though Protestant and liberals defended his
person and reputation in these debates, he had been excommunicated from both the Lutheran and
Calvinist churches as well.
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liberals to divide the nation, Catholics centered most o f their arguments on the positive
role that they were playing in the modernizing project that Germany was currently
undergoing. They pointed to the prominence o f the Catholic Church in local
communities and how the values o f Catholicism helped stabilize families throughout
Germany. Although these arguments were not novel, Catholics were also able to point
to some additional evidence o f their loyalty to state and Emperor. Having grown
increasingly strong during the 1880s, the Center Party now occupied an increasingly
important position in local and national politics. Now, Catholics could cite a variety
o f statements from Bismarck in which he praised the Center for becoming a party that
participated in a constructive manner in the governing o f the Reich. This was quite
different from the Kulturkam pf years when Bismarck singled out German Catholics as
enemies o f the nation. Many o f these statements were a result o f the shifting focus o f
Bismarck’s domestic politics. After the passing o f the anti-socialist law in 1878 and
the slow reconciliation with Catholics, Bismarck was forced to the let the Center party
play an increasingly active role in national politics. Thus, Catholics throughout the
Empire could refer to their active and willing participation in the nation-building
project. During the Kulturkampf, Catholics would have been hard pressed to cite
evidence o f their involvement in daily political life. Badenese Catholics were
especially keen to refer to their involvement in easing some o f the social ills that
accompanied modernization. Referring to the “problems” that the Grand Duke had
mentioned in his speech in Uberlingen, they pointed to their charitable work as proof
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o f their loyalty and dedication to the German fatherland.49
M any Badenese cities ceased to stage official celebrations during the 1890s
and early 1900s, and only local veterans organizations continued to mark the
anniversary o f the military victory. As the nineteenth century drew to a close, many
veterans organizations abandoned the celebrations as well. There were many different
reasons for this decline in the popularity o f the holiday. First and foremost, the failure
o f the liberals to “produce any meaningful discourse about localness and nationhood.”
created a national holiday that excluded much o f the national community.50 Also, the
political and social changes during the last two decades o f the nineteenth century
negatively affected the image o f Sedan Day. During the 1890s, political Catholicism
and social-democrats began to seriously challenge the stronghold o f political power
that the national-liberals had been enjoying since the early 1860s. To be sure, the
latter were able to retain more o f their political power than in most other German
states; however, they were often forced to enter into a variety o f coalitions to remain
the dominant party. Thus, the principal role that local notables had played in the
shaping and forming o f the holiday was no longer in existence. The introduction o f
mass politics and the growing strength o f the Social-Democratic Party produced a
society in which the liberal H onoratioren’s view o f German history and national
identity did not correspond to reality. Beginning in the late 1880s, Protestant nationalliberals could no longer attempt to monopolize the vision o f German identity that they
49 Freie Stimme, September 14, 1889.
50 Confino, The Nation as a Local Metaphor, 86.
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had tried to present during the Sedan Day celebrations.
Consequently, in 1897, the city council in Freiburg sent out a letter to councils
o f other major Badenese cities asking whether Sedan Day was celebrated, and if so, in
which manner. Most councils replied that though they did not stage any official
ceremonies, local veterans organizations organized small commemorations. However,
several cities, most notably Mannheim and Karlsruhe, maintained that the day was not
celebrated at all. As Germany became increasingly infused with nationalist sentiments
during the first decade o f the twentieth century, Sedan Day drifted into obscurity.
Despite the growing influence o f imperialism and colonialism, expansion o f the
German Navy, and the growth o f nationalist organizations such as Alldeutscher
Verein, Sedan Day failed to attract support. An illustrative example o f how
insignificant this day had become is the conflict that broke out in Freiburg in 1913.
During the previous years, the city council had organized a free concert in the
Stadtgarten to commemorate the events o f September 2. However, the organizers
often had trouble attracting a respectable number o f spectators; in 1906, they
contemplated abolishing the concert since the number o f musicians often outnumbered
the audience.51 In 1913, no celebration took place since the Stadtgarten was to be
occupied by the local theater, which was staging a dress rehearsal o f their latest
production-Don Giovanni. Despite being asked by the city to move their dress
rehearsal to a different place, the theater director refused, claiming that nobody cared

51 St. AF, C3/472/8, letter to city council, July 30, 1906.
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about Sedan Day anyway.
The exception to this trend o f decreasing interest in Sedan Day was the twentyfifth anniversary in 1895. As we shall see later, this and the following year were
characterized by more widespread support for war and unification celebrations, even
from Catholics. In Heidelberg, for instance, both Protestants and Catholics
participated in joint celebrations, which according to the local press signified how
unified the German Empire had become. They made a special point to commend the
city’s Catholics for electing to participate in the festivities. Local Catholic papers
noted that though they still did not find it necessary to celebrate Sedan Day every year,
they welcomed the opportunity to commemorate the more significant twenty-fifth
anniversary o f the military victory. Liberals and Protestants praised Catholics for
finally displaying proper respect for this momentous event. They also claimed that the
fact that Catholics now elected to participate displayed that there were bonds to the
fatherland that were simply impossible to neglect.53 Protestants and liberals compared
this behavior with that o f the social-democrats, who still refused to partake. These
sentiments only reinforce how arbitrarily groups were singled out as either supporters
or enemies o f the Reich. The group in charge o f organizing these events always
sought to determine the ideological message that accompanied the celebrations, and
depending upon other social, political, economic, or cultural factors, one or more

52 This correspondence can be found in St. AF, C3/472/8, letters to and from city council, August 18,
20, 22, 1913.
53 Heidelberger Zeitung, September 2, 1895.
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groups were often targeted as outsiders.
In the end, Sedan Day failed to serve as the integrating factor that the liberal
and Protestant forces behind it had hoped. Instead o f uniting Germans around a single
ideological message, the celebration offered Catholics and other marginalized groups
opportunities to manifest their own view o f the unification process and the
characteristics of the German nation. After a couple o f decades in which citizens
fought over the true meaning o f the commemoration, interest declined and even
veterans organizations placed less emphasis on celebrating the victory over Napoleon
III. However, it should be noted that though Sedan Day divided the population as
much as it united, it contributed to an integration o f Catholics and social-democrats
into the Empire. Although these groups did not subscribe to the notions inherent in
the official commemorative discourse, their willingness to present publicly their own
interpretation o f Germanness offered opportunities for integration into the complex
German nation-state. Many previous scholars have neglected to consider the
importance o f these manifestations for the construction o f German national identity.
An analysis o f Sedan Day indicates the need to slightly reevaluate how different
groups in society accessed and employed nationalist rhetoric. Although Catholics
were largely excluded from the official commemorative discourse, they were still able
to utilize the debates surrounding these festivities to present their own view o f German
history, the war, and unification. In addition, by challenging many o f the Protestant
and liberal claims, Catholics were in the end able to alter the official discourse so that
it would better represent their own view o f Germanness.
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The Commemoration of Other Important Battles and Various Imperial Holidays
Naturally, Badeners did not only celebrate the military victory at Sedan, but
other significant victories as well. In the middle o f January every year, Badeners
organized and participated in the commemorations o f two historic events: the
military victory at Belfort and the subsequent unification. As noted in the discussion
regarding the construction o f the Siegesdenkmal in Freiburg, Badeners attached great
importance to the victory at Belfort. They constructed a memory o f the last stages o f
the war that implied that had it not been for the heroic efforts o f the Badenese troops,
Germans would not have achieved unification in such a glorious manner. Especially
considering that Belfort was not a nationally celebrated holiday, Badeners organized a
ceremony designed to strengthen their own position in the Second Empire by
reinforcing the important role played by General Werder and his troops. The
festivities remained similar throughout the years: parades, banquets, religious
services, and school celebrations.54
Although the commemoration o f Belfort was primarily employed to strengthen
Badeners local identity, liberals and Protestants also used it to question the
Germanness o f Catholics. For instance, at a banquet in Konstanz in 1873, Colonel
Kraus claimed that Badeners and Germans now had to unite in a similar fashion to the
troops at Belfort to defeat the attacks from the anti-German elements that sought to
make the new nation-state dependent upon Rome.55 In the midst o f the debates that

54 Konstanzer Zeitung, January 18, 1872.
55 Konstanzer Zeitung, January 19, 1873.
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were to lead up to the passing o f the M ay Laws, these comments should come as no
surprise.56 The battle lent itself well to criticism o f certain features o f German society.
Many o f the images conjured up in these commemorations referred to bravery,
heroics, courage, and the need to fight for what is valuable, images that were all
applied in the Kulturkampf. Contemporaries frequently used battle images in the
commemorative discourse, a trend that was even more common in regards to the
construction o f the victory at Belfort. These images were quite useful in launching
attacks on Catholics and other supposedly antinational groups.
Faced with hostile rhetoric, Catholics largely ignored the commemorations of
the victory. Although some Catholic associations participated in the festivities, most
simply abstained from partaking in a celebration marked by often strong anti-Catholic
sentiments. Although the anti-Catholic propaganda diminished as the Kulturkam pf
subsided, by that time, the commemoration o f Belfort had lost most o f its importance
and no longer constituted a major event in local society. The diminishing importance
attached to the celebration o f Belfort could also be interpreted as a sign that Badeners
were becoming increasingly integrated into the German state. After the first decade,
most Badeners no longer experienced an immediate need to manifest publicly the
strength o f their own “narrow fatherland,” and while the victory at Belfort was always
celebrated in a dignified manner, public participation steadily dwindled as the
nineteenth century progressed.57 The ten-year anniversary o f the battle constitutes a

56 See for instance Badischer Beobachter, January 22, 1873.
57 See for instance the account in Freiburger Zeitung, January 18, 1881.
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useful illustration o f this trend. Although Freiburger Zeitung noted that the day had
been commemorated in a worthy fashion, they did not offer any detailed description o f
the festivities. In their brief report o f the day’s events, they also noted that only a few
locals had heeded the suggestion from the city council to hoist their flags. After a few
years o f limited popular participation, it soon became a day for veterans’ organizations
and their families to remember the great battle. The relatively small importance o f the
commemoration o f Belfort becomes even more obvious when compared to the debates
surrounding the Sedan Day celebration. While the former was largely ignored by
Catholics, Protestants, and Old Catholics alike, the latter triggered intense debates
regarding the commemoration as well as the nature and character o f the German
Empire.58
In addition to commemorations o f military victories and the foundation o f the
Empire, imperial birthdays played a significant role in the commemorative discourse
surrounding German unification. Although at first glance a celebration o f the
Emperor’s birthday does not seem to have anything to do with commemoration o f the
war and unification, a closer analysis o f the discourse surrounding these events reveals
that these occasions were indeed used to construct a memory o f the unification
process. Citizens not only used these birthdays to celebrate that the Emperor had
become one year older but also to present their own view o f the course o f German
history and the Emperor’s role in it, and the new national identity, as well as
contemporary political, cultural, and economic issues. Especially in the relative
58 Ibid. For a comparison, see for instance Freiburger Zeitung, September 1, 2, 3, 1881.
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turmoil that characterized the immediate postunification period, citizens attached great
importance to these events. In addition to illustrating the popularity o f the Emperors,
this also indicates how important public events and the developing public sphere were
to the consolidation o f the new national identity. Quite often, Badeners utilized public
events seemingly unrelated to the founding o f the German Empire to construct a
memory o f the war that corresponded to their ideological beliefs.
Amid the plethora o f public ceremonies in the Second Empire, the Emperor’s
birthday occupied a prominent place. Largely due to W ilhelm’s popularity among all
Germans, his birthday was celebrated with fanfare each year. In Baden, the Emperor’s
close connection to the well-liked Grand Duke Friedrich I only added to his
popularity. Although Wilhelm did not visit Baden any more often than other parts of
Germany, Badeners claimed that they had a closer relationship with him than other
Germans did. As previously noted, Badenese Catholics held their Emperor in high
esteem and did not blame him for the injustices that they suffered at the hands o f the
German and Badenese governments. Catholics respected his religious devotion, and
they often praised his engagement in religious questions. When addressing his role in
the Kulturkampf, Catholics (at least publicly) assumed that he had not been supportive
o f the many unjust laws passed and that Bismarck and Kultusminister Adalbert Falk
kept him unaware o f the poor treatment o f Catholics.
Wilhelm never declared his birthday a national holiday and he refrained from
promoting any official celebrations. This attitude did not necessarily stem from an
unwillingness to mark his own birthday, but reflected W ilhelm’s fear that too many
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imperial celebrations would undermine his role as Prussian king. Despite no official
endorsement, local communities staged extravagant ceremonies. The festivities
followed a familiar pattern: cities were decorated, church bells rang, banquets held,
and parades organized. A procession through the local community often constituted
the central element o f the holiday. In these parades, most local organizations and
associations participated, irrespective o f their political or confessional views. Since
the majority o f the members o f these organizations belonged to the emerging
bourgeoisie, they were able to place a bourgeois stamp on many o f the activities.
Similar to how members o f the bourgeoisie used the construction o f monuments to
establish themselves in the local community, these parades aided the bourgeoisie in
their struggle to control the public sphere and further advance their positions in
society. Because o f the bourgeois dominance, it should come as no surprise that the
Catholics played a relatively modest role in organizing these events. Aside from the
obligatory church service, Catholics were not able to shape the official discourse to
any great extent.
Despite the Emperor’s popularity, the Badenese celebrations o f his birthday
often failed to attract the desired number o f people. Naturally, the fact that the
celebrations often took place on a weekday prevented many from participating. In
addition, during the Kulturkampf, many Catholics and social-democrats boycotted the
festivities. Although Catholics were keen to express their loyalty to Emperor, they
often refrained from taking part in the celebrations, claiming that the Protestant and
liberal insistence on using an official discourse that was dominated by anti-Catholic
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sentiments prevented them from participating. Catholics frequently complained that
because o f the anti-Catholic rhetoric, they were unable to display properly their
devotion and loyalty to the Emperor. Protestants often controlled city councils and
were thus able to shape the festivities according to their own ideas, which frequently
meant excluding Catholics. Thus, this constitutes another example o f Catholic
alienation in the Kaiserreich that they had to overcome to integrate properly into the
new nation-state.
Liberals and Protestants attempted to link W ilhelm’s Protestant faith to the
recent string o f military and political successes, often praising him for restoring unity
to a Germany divided since the Reformation. Speeches, newspaper articles, and
pamphlets used the birthday celebration to revisit the events o f the war and once again
commend Wilhelm for the determined manner in which he had dealt with the French
archenemy. Many o f the speeches held at banquets and parades placed great emphasis
on connecting the Protestant character o f Wilhelm to the recent military successes and
the unification o f the German people. Hence, the celebration o f the Emperor’s
birthday served as an additional means to commemorate the wars o f unification.
Much o f the rhetoric centered on the Emperor’s leadership in solving the German
question. Protestants and liberals often cited his courage in dealing with the French as
one o f the primary reasons why Germany was now unified and looking forward to a
bright future. Newspapers often focused on the historical connection between
Wilhelm and previous German Emperors, most notably Barbarossa. The linking o f
the current Emperor to his predecessor constituted an important part o f the Protestant-
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liberal attempts to rewrite the course o f German history to fit their teleological view o f
the process o f unification.59
As noted above, Catholics were ambivalent in their attitudes towards this
celebration. Although the majority stressed the importance o f displaying their love for
and devotion to the Emperor, many were hesitant about how to express these
sentiments in a public sphere that was decidedly anti-Catholic. Although most
Germans were caught up in a nationalist frenzy following the military victory and
unification in 1871, relatively few Badeners elected to celebrate W ilhelm’s birthday
only a few months later. The question o f which flag to hoist sometimes created a
minor controversy. As already mentioned, anti-Prussian sentiments were strong
among large parts o f the population, and then especially among Catholics, and many
Badenese Catholics refused to display the Prussian flag. To counteract the prevalence
o f Prussian symbols, numerous Badeners hoisted the yellow papal flag as well, which
drew the ire o f Protestants and liberals. The latter pointed out that to raise the papal
flag on the Emperor’s birthday constituted a good indication o f where the loyalties of
Badenese Catholics were located. This was yet another instance where Protestants and
liberals failed to understand fully the complexities o f the Catholic version o f
Germanness, which encouraged the nourishing o f loyalties to both Berlin and Rome.
To the vast majority o f Catholics, the two were compatible, and the hoisting o f a
yellow flag on the Emperor’s birthday did not necessarily mean that one harbored antiGerman sentiments. Much to the chagrin o f both the Grand Duke and Jolly, the
59 See for instance Konstanzer Zeitung, March 23, 26, 1871.
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celebrations on March 22 failed to attract what they considered an appropriate number
o f people. They attached much significance to this celebration because it served as an
indication o f how “German” Badeners were. Contemporaries often compared the
celebrations in various states as indications o f their loyalty to the Emperor and his
nation-state. To ensure proper participation, Grand Duke Friedrich in 1872 made an
official decision that this father-in-law’s birthday would be officially celebrated in all
major Badenese cities. In a letter from Jolly to Auxiliary Bishop Kiibel on March 11,
1872, the minister requested that this year’s birthday be celebrated in a festive manner
befitting a great personality such as Wilhelm.60
Kiibel was conciliatory in his response and decided that on the day preceding
the celebration, church bells would be rung, followed by a special service the next day.
This special service presented a dilemma for the clergy. Because W ilhelm’s birthday
fell in late March, it often interfered with either Lent or Easter. Especially on the few
occasions when Easter coincided with W ilhelm’s birthday, such as in 1875, heated
discussions were held regarding whether to move the service honoring the Emperor.61
This became an issue o f great importance as it forced Catholics to negotiate—in a most
public manner—between their loyalty to the Emperor and their faith. In his directions
to local clergy members, Kiibel ordered that a Te Deum be spoken at the conclusion o f
the service. Normally, Te Deum was not spoken during Lent, but due to the

60 EAF, B2-14/13. Kaiserliches und Grossherzogliches Haus: Geburtstagsfeier, letter from Jolly to
Kiibel, March 11, 1872.
61 EAF, B2-14/13, letters between Jolly, Kiibel, and various congregations. It was finally decided to
move the birthday service to March 20.
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“extraordinary character o f the day,” the auxiliary bishop made an exception. This
was a much different attitude compared to the EO ’s unwillingness to compromise
when it came to events surrounding Sedan Day. However, during the next few years,
it became evident that many clergy members did not share his view on this issue. In
1876, Jolly complained to Kiibel about the fact that in both 1874 and 1875 several
clergy members had excluded Te Deum from their service in honor o f the Emperor.
Although they never stated that they had left out the Te Deum as a formal protest,
Jolly interpreted these actions as disloyal towards the Emperor. Considering the fact
that most clergy members included the song “Heil unserer Grossherzog” as a
replacement, it seems fairly certain that their actions were intended as a form o f
political protest. Their choice o f hymn also reveals something about how unwilling
many Catholics were to accept the course o f unification, at least initially. Declaring
their loyalty to the Grand Duke on a day designed to honor the Emperor constituted a
strong indication o f their determination to maintain as much o f their regional identity
as possible. In addition, by declaring their loyalty to the Grand Duke, they had found
a “safe” way o f protesting. Liberals and Protestants would be hard pressed to fault
Catholics for lauding the virtues o f their local ruler. Even Kiibel was critical o f them
and not only demanded an explanation for their behavior but also required that it never
happen again, lest they were to suffer disciplinary action.62
Kiibel’s behavior in this matter is indicative o f the more appeasing manner in
62 EAF, B2-14/13, letter from Kiibel to Heilig, March 6, 1876.
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which he treated the events surrounding the Emperor’s birthday. The conciliatory
attitude o f the Catholic leadership suggests that they were attempting to create a better
relationship with the Badenese state, despite the fact that many o f the Kulturkam pf
laws were still in effect. They were also more inclined to cooperate with the state
when it came to matters such as honoring the German Emperor, which did not seem to
contain any threats towards the Catholic community. It is also interesting to note that
despite the fact that the Catholic leadership attempted to improve the relationship with
Protestants and the state, many Catholics in the local communities still complained
about being mistreated and opposed the EO ’s friendly attitude towards Jolly and the
Badenese government. These disagreements are noteworthy because they provide
glimpses into a Catholic milieu that does not match what many contemporaries and
later historians considered to be a homogenized environment. Indeed, these
complaints reveal that there were sometimes major discrepancies between what they
EO deemed to be the right solution to a problem and what locals considered
acceptable. This casts doubts on the common assumption that the Catholic masses
were tools in the hands o f the high Catholic clergy and suggests that there were many
more layers to the Catholic milieu than previously thought.
In 1883, clergy member Birk from the small town o f Muhlheim outside
Freiburg, lodged a grievance, accusing Kiibel o f failing to protect the interest o f the
Church in his dealings with the state. Although this complaint reached the EO after
Kiibel had passed away and been replaced with Johann Baptist Orbin, these
discussions provide interesting insights to the relationship between Catholics and
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Protestants a decade after unification. Birk was unhappy that in 1878 Kiibel had
agreed to a suggestion from the Badenese government to hold a common service for
both confessions on all political Feiertage. Although this was not a new concept
(many Germans offered similar suggestions in conjunction with the debates
surrounding Sedan Day), this constituted the first time that the Catholic Church had
agreed to do it. The suggestion did not pertain to all citizens, only to state employees,
who were supposed to set a good example for the rest o f the population. Joint services
would alternate between Catholic and Protestant churches, and city councils were to
determine in which church a particular service would be held. Birk admitted that in
theory this was a good idea to improve the relationship between the two confessions;
however, in reality, it only caused further discrimination against Catholics. The priest
claimed that because Protestants dominated city councils, services were not altering
between the churches. Since 1878, eight services had taken place in Protestant
churches, while only two had been held in Catholic ones. In addition, Birk forwarded
a number o f complaints regarding Protestant behavior during the Catholic services.
Birk cited a number o f instances where Protestants had to be removed from the
ceremony because o f their laughing, talking, and commenting upon various aspects o f
the service. Thus, he demanded that this idea should be abolished since it only served
to increase tensions between Catholics and Protestants and reinforced the secondary
status o f Catholics as they were forced to comply with discriminatory measures from
above.63

63 EAF, B2-14/13, letter from Birk to Orbin, August 1, 1883.
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Birk was not alone in finding it difficult to comply with policies aimed at
furthering the confessional peace. In 1884, the EO received a similar letter from the
local priest in Gemsbach. These complaints initiated the beginning o f a lengthy
conflict that attracted much attention across the state during the 1880s. Initially, Orbin
answered these grievances by referring to the importance o f protecting the improved
relationship between church and state that had accompanied the gradual dismantling o f
the Kulturkampf. However, Orbin’s attitude did not reflect adequately the feelings o f
most Catholic civil service employees, who demanded that the law be repealed.
Eventually, Orbin and his advisors realized how strongly many o f their fellow
Catholics felt about this issue, especially since the last few political celebrations had
taken place on a Sunday, forcing civil service employees to miss their regular service.
Finally in 1886, the EO approached the government with a request to repeal the law.64
After some debate, the latter decided that this law indeed had not had the desired
effect and instead o f creating a more unified society had done the exact opposite.
Consequently, on March 17, 1886, the Badenese government decided that all civil
servants could attend the service o f their own choice. This was an important decision
as it reflected the newfound power o f the Catholics to alter decisions. Having drawn
strength and determination from how they had managed to withstand the Kulturkampf,
Catholics were increasingly able to influence and shape political and cultural matters.
However, this controversy was not yet over. Apparently, some city councils did not
follow these new directions and continued to designate a church in which a joint
64 EAF, B2-14/13, letter dated February 4, 1886.
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service would be held. Both in 1887 and 1889, the city council in Baden-Baden
staged official celebrations and parades that ended at a designated church. Despite
numerous protests from Catholics, they were forced to participate under the alleged
threat o f losing their position if they did not comply. When approached by the
government, the city council in Baden-Baden claimed that they had never forced
anybody to attend a particular service and that the allegations from Catholics were
false. The EO continued to press the government to make sure that these new rules
were being enforced, and it was not until the beginning o f the 1890s that things
returned to normal.65

Wilhelm II and the Change in Official Commemorative Discourse
After the death o f Wilhelm I in 1888 and the accession o f his grandson
Wilhelm II, the character o f the Emperor’s birthday celebrations changed quite
drastically. These modifications were intimately connected to the different perception
that Wilhelm II had o f him self and his imperial status compared to his grandfather.
While the latter had considered him self a part o f the German state and constitutional
system, the former regarded his position to be God-given.66 Over time, this view came
to permeate most aspects o f German society, and Wilhelm II placed strong emphasis
on using his own birthday as a means o f spreading this message to unify his

65 EAF, B2-14/13.
66 For a good discussion o f this difference, see Elisabeth Fehrenbach, Wandlungen des deutschen
Kaisergedankens, 1871-1918 (Miinchen: Oldenbourg, 1969), 99-107.
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population. As we shall see, Catholics proved more receptive to the ideological
message presented at these celebrations. One o f the major reasons for this was the fact
that the commemorative discourse surrounding Wilhelm II did not have the
opportunity to link his birthday to the wars o f unification and the foundation o f the
Second Empire to any great extent. Furthermore, as far as Catholics were concerned,
the situation in the Reich had drastically improved since the abolishing o f the
Kulturkampf, and since Wilhelm II had not had any experience with that or any
discriminatory measures against the Catholics, they were much more prepared to
participate in the annual celebrations.
One instance in which the new attitudes towards royal birthdays became
clearly evident was the 1897 celebration o f the centenary birthday o f Wilhelm I.
Wilhelm II considered the 100th birthday as an excellent opportunity to further
consolidate the myth o f Wilhelm I as the founding father o f the German Empire.
Given the importance that the Emperor and others attached to this celebration, it
should come as no surprise that it created a few controversies. On January 1, 1897,
Wilhelm II announced that a three-day celebration would take place, starting on March
21. The festivities would include religious services, banquets, parades, and a variety
o f artistic performances. To underscore the importance o f the events and to ensure
proper participation, the Emperor declared these days public holidays. Reinforcing the
pedagogical value o f this celebration, he also ordered schools to distribute some form
o f pamphlet to their students, highlighting the historical significance o f Wilhelm I.67

67 Schneider, Politische Festkultur, 207-209.
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Although the type o f pamphlet and/or gift varied, they all emphasized how Wilhelm I
had made the well-being o f the German nation his first priority, which was an attitude
that should be emulated by the children o f the new generation. This was a lesson that
elites constantly tried to reinforce when staging these events. According to the official
discourse, citizens needed to be aware o f the supposedly self-less manner in which
figures such as Wilhelm and Bismarck had lived their lives so that they could emulate
these attitudes in their own lives. Germans should always prioritize the well-being o f
the national community ahead o f their own individual well-being.
No other royal birthday celebration during the Second Empire attracted more
participants. Contemporaries remarked that even the social-democrats, who normally
were so hostile to any type o f patriotic celebration, elected to take part this time.
Although many Badenese Catholics had previously boycotted the annual birthday
celebrations, this time Catholic clergy and laity partook in the festivities. In many
parts o f Germany, including Baden, this constituted the first occasion where the
Catholic clergy actively joined in the civil celebrations outside their own services.
Contemporaries labeled this to be very significant, and many argued that it proved that
Germany was now truly a unified state.68 Although this claim might have been a little
exaggerated, it still reflected the changes that had taken place during the last two
decades. Despite the fact that Catholics were still not completely integrated into the
Empire, they were able to play a much more active role in both the local and national
community. Thus, contemporaries (and later historians) labeled the centenary
68 Ibid., 214-215.
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celebration one o f the most prominent public events o f the Kaiserreich. Heavily
regulated from above, and with a strong emphasis on militaristic and nationalistic
motives, the ideological message o f the celebrations fit well with the current domestic
and international policies o f Wilhelm II.
In Freiburg, the city council began planning in February 1897.69 Already from
the outset, it was evident that the Catholic leadership would play an active role in both
the preparation and execution o f the events. When asked by the council in which
fashion they wanted to participate, the EO replied that “...on this glorious day, we as
true sons o f the fatherland want to thank publicly God for the great victories that he
bestowed on our Emperor, and for granting us a unified German Empire, which God
enabled our victorious Emperor to create.”70 This reply indicates that not only were
Catholics now able to participate in the organization o f these events but also just how
central the founding o f the Empire was to all sorts o f commemorative discourses and
how determined Catholics were to include religious connotations into this celebration.
The EO also decided that in addition to ringing the bells on the evening o f March 20,
there would be a special service the following day.
In their descriptions o f the festivities, locals were proud o f the efforts o f the
Freiburger citizens. All accounts stressed how unified the city had appeared and how
great it had been to witness people from different classes, parties, and confessions join

69 Information pertaining to this celebration can be found in St. AF, C3/466/2, Feier des 100 jahrigen
Geburtstages Wilhelm I.
70 St. AF, C3/466/2, letter from EO to city council, February 25, 1897.
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to honor the founding father o f the Empire. Many o f the houses in the city were
decorated, and newspapers described in detail some o f the more beautiful ones. A
grand military parade, headed by the 113th Regiment, which had fought so valiantly in
the Franco-Prussian War, worked its way through the city and ended in front o f the
military barracks on K arl’s square. Here the main speech was delivered by Professor
Fabricius, who painted an eloquent picture o f the Emperor as the first German national
hero. He repeatedly referred to Wilhelm as a character that should serve as an
example for all Germans, young as well as old. Much o f his speech focused on how
united and powerful Germany had grown since 1871. Reflecting the developments in
foreign policy and Germany’s entrance into the colonial race, his rhetoric manifested
the shift towards the more militaristic and jingoistic nationalism that came to
characterize the last decades o f the Empire.71 He also pointed out that in Berlin at that
very moment, Wilhelm II was unveiling a grand monument to the honor o f Wilhelm I.
His attempt to direct people’s attention to the monument in the capital illustrates how
leading elites in the peripheral areas o f the state often tried to construct an imagined
community by using the example o f monuments and statues. Speakers often made
references to similar celebrations in other cities in their attempts to create a
homogeneous national community. By directing the attention o f the Freiburger
citizens to the grand design in Berlin, Fabricius sought to connect the southwestern
comer o f the Empire with the capital.72

71 Ibid.
72 His speech was reprinted in its entirety in Freiburger Tagblatt, March 24, 1897.
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Although Freiburg Catholics participated fully in these events, they still
offered some criticism o f them, which reinforced the notion that though slowly
integrating into the Reich, they maintained their own understanding o f German
identity. In the days immediately after the festivities, many Catholics complained that
while most o f the celebrations had been very appropriate, they found the militaristic
nature o f many o f the ceremonies to be unfitting. They pointed out that originally, the
military parade was scheduled to take place on the evening o f March 22, after the civil
events. However, the city council altered these plans so that the military parade was
held at the same time as the civil ceremony in the Festhalle. Catholics maintained that
this was unfortunate for a variety o f reasons. First o f all, the military parade attracted
a great number o f people who would normally have attended the Festhalle.
Freiburger Bote remarked that too many Germans became too excited at the prospect
o f “straight lines o f military men and their shining weapons.”73 This was especially
unfortunate since it deprived many people o f the opportunity to listen to the excellent
and highly patriotic speeches that were held in the Festhallle. Furthermore, in passing
by the Festhalle, the military parade had blocked the entrance for a long time, which
had also prevented people from attending the civil parts of the celebrations.74 A few
days later, the city council replied in an open letter to the Catholic daily that though
they were aware o f the conflict between the military and civilian events, the matter
had been out o f their hands. The council claimed that they had received orders from
73 Freiburger Bote, March 24, 1897.
74 Ibid.
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Berlin that the military parade was to be held at the same time all throughout
Germany, which left them with no choice but to have the two ceremonies overlap.
If celebrations in Konstanz and Freiburg proceeded without major problems,
the events in Heidelberg caused greater controversy. In anticipation o f the upcoming
festivities, the Catholic Pfalzer Bote published a lead article prior to the centenary in
which they offered some stem criticism o f the excess with which Germans celebrated
•

various events.

7S

■

•

The daily claimed that the true meaning o f these celebrations had

long been forgotten, and people were only interested in enjoying themselves and/or
making a profit on the various events. In addition, the rhetoric used at the festivities
had become so exaggerated that nobody really knew the true meaning o f these
bombastic words. As a consequence, it had became increasingly difficult to honor
respectable men such as the late Emperor, simply because there was no suitable
discourse at hand. Furthermore, the abundance o f celebrations indicates that Germans
had forgotten what made both Prussia and the rest o f the country so great: the simple
life, hard work, and piety. Catholics often voiced these and similar sentiments in their
attempts to reappropriate the commemorative discourse from liberals and others who
had mined it with their inflated rhetoric, which depleted the discourse o f true meaning.
The paper also complained that though the accusations o f treason and
disloyalty towards the fatherland had decreased during the last few years, it was still
quite difficult to offer any sort o f criticism o f these festivities.76 Dissatisfied that

75 Pfalzer Bote, March 18, 1897.
76 Ibid.
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Catholics did not feel part of the discourse, the paper also noted that the celebration
brought back bad memories from times when Badenese Catholics were not accepted
as worthy members o f the German nation. To reinforce their arguments, they
recounted the story o f Pater Clemens Faller, one o f the most prolific and active Jesuits
at the outset o f the German Empire. Pfalzer Bote listed all o f his great achievements,
including founding a number o f schools and seminaries, and his heroic efforts in the
Franco-Prussian W ar as a doctor. However, instead o f being honored, the May Laws
forced him to flee his fatherland. He eventually ended up in South America, where he
played important roles in a number o f countries. By retelling the tragic story o f Faller,
the paper illustrated that brave, courageous, and able men such as he deserved better
treatment from the fatherland that they had served so valiantly. Catholics often used
this line o f reasoning to illustrate how severely Protestants and liberals had damaged
the national community by depriving it o f such capable and talented men. These ideas
assumed increasing importance as the nationalist rhetoric grew increasingly hostile
towards the foreign Other, which most often was portrayed as a Slavic threat to the
national community.
During the celebrations, Catholics were both directly and indirectly targeted.
Prof. Schafer delivered the main speech, in which he made a number o f false
statements regarding the role o f the Catholics in the unification process.77 Catholics
criticized the professor for not being able to abstain from party politics on this day of
supposed national unity. They claimed that his speech reflected how determined
77 Pfalzer Bote, March 24, 1897.
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liberals and Protestants still were to exclude Catholics from the public discourse.
Many Catholic papers also tied these attacks to the current domestic political crisis.
The centenary celebration came in the midst o f the debates over the Tirpitz Navy bills,
and many Catholics suspected that the celebration was being used to rally nationalist
sentiments, which in turn would increase the support for the naval bills.78 Catholics
openly questioned the liberal and Protestant claims that Germany was facing a serious
foreign policy crisis. The latter also attempted to divide the German nation by
labeling the opponents o f the naval bills “unpatriotic.” Catholics, though the Center
Party had been one o f the supporters o f this bill, still resented the practice o f excluding
parts o f the population from the national community. The memory o f the Kulturkam pf
was still strong in the Catholic community, and most resented the use o f public
festivities such as the centenary celebration to strengthen a political agenda.
Despite the fact that controversies emerged on occasion in conjunction with the
Emperor’s birthday, most often Catholics and Protestants were able to, if not jointly, at
least side by side, celebrate their Emperor. These ceremonies proved to be o f great
importance to Catholics as they were able to use these occasions to participate actively
in the construction o f a commemorative discourse. Although this discourse did not
specifically address war and unification, these themes were ever present, and Catholic
participation in the shaping o f these events provided them a means to integrate into the
new national state on their own conditions.

78 See for instance Pfalzer Bote, March 24, 28, 1897.
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Celebrations of the Grand Duke’s Birthdays
To an even greater extent than the celebrations o f Emperor W ilhelm’s
birthday, Badenese Catholics willingly participated in the festivities surrounding
Grand Duke Friedrich’s birthday. Although both a Protestant and a staunch liberal,
Friedrich enjoyed great acceptance among Badenese Catholics. Most o f the time, the
birthday celebrations followed a similar pattern to the ones staged for the Emperor,
including parades, religious services, and banquets.79 The only time in which they
caused some controversy was during the most intense stages o f the Kulturkam pf As
was the case with the discourse surrounding the construction o f the Siegesdenkmal in
Freiburg, Badenese Catholics tended to be more accepting o f the official discourse
when it stressed the value o f the regional and local over the national, which was the
case with most o f the celebrations honoring Friedrich I. Although he had been a
strong supporter o f the kleindeutsche solution to the German question and actively
strove to promote and support the policies o f the same national-liberal government
that staged one o f the fiercest Kulturkampfe in Germany, Catholics seldom engaged in
any criticism o f his rule. In a similar fashion to the reluctance to criticize the
Emperor, Catholics were keen to display their love and devotion to their Grand Duke.
This was not only because o f their sincere love for him but also because they could
use him as a means o f integration into the Empire. By associating themselves with
Friedrich and his actions during the process o f unification, though the overwhelming
79 For descriptions o f the planning o f these events, see for instance St. AK, S II 7201, Grossherzogliches
Haus. Veranstaltung von Festlichkeiten zu Ehren seiner Koniglichen Hoheit des Grossherzogs. 184978. For aspects involving the Catholic Church, see EAF, B2-14/13.
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majority o f Catholics had opposed his policies, Catholics attempted to highlight their
own importance in the unification process. As has already been evident, this view did
not accurately represent reality and was more representative o f Catholic attempts to
rewrite history.
Despite the fact that most birthday celebrations proceeded without major
problems and/or controversies, exceptions existed. For instance, in Freiburg in 1873,
liberals and Protestants used the Grand Duke’s birthday to add to the current
controversies surrounding Sedan Day and the emergence o f the Old Catholic
Movement. Although liberals and Protestants both agreed that the birthday was
usually celebrated in a dignified manner, this year recent events had produced some
complications for the upcoming festivities. The Protestant-liberal Freiburger Zeitung
claimed that in the past, though Catholic clergy had participated in the special services
designed to honor the Grand Duke, they had always done so reluctantly and with
“hatred burning in their eyes.”

80

According to liberals and Protestants, it was clearly

evident that Catholic clergy members harbored little love for the Grand Duke and that
they were only interested in undermining Friedrich’s position. They offered some
scathing criticism o f Kiibel and his associates, who were allegedly attempting to ruin
the German national character and the Badenese state. The paper did not mince
words, claiming that the Catholics who supported the doctrine o f papal infallibility
were allied with the devil and trying to bring about the ruin o f humankind.81

80 Freiburger Zeitung, September 9, 1873.
81 Ibid.
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Consequently, the paper argued, most Freiburgers had been dissatisfied with these
services and had long been searching for more dignified alternatives. Until this year,
no such alternative had existed; however, with the foundation o f the Old Catholic
Church, Freiburgers could once again honor their Grand Duke in an appropriate
manner. The paper welcomed Bishop Josef Reinkens, the most prominent Badenese
Old Catholic clergy member, to the city. Freiburger Zeitung stressed that Bishop
Reinkens had only decided to come to Freiburg to provide the city’s Catholics with an
opportunity to partake in a religious service that would not be directed against the
Grand Duke and his state. Since this celebration took place in close proximity to the
Old Catholic congress in Konstanz, the daily hoped that Reinken’s visit would
jumpstart the Old Catholic community in the city.
Despite a few o f these instances in which Protestants and liberals utilized the
birthday o f the Grand Duke to exclude Catholics from the local, regional, and national
community, the latter were most often able to participate fully in these celebrations.
Furthermore, since this was one o f the few public celebrations that remained relatively
free from hostile rhetoric, many Catholics used it as a means o f integrating into the
German Empire. The figure o f the Grand Duke was especially suitable for this
purpose. In addition to being the son-in-law o f Emperor Wilhelm, he had also played
an important role in the unification process. Despite the fact that the vast majority o f
Catholics had opposed the philo-prussian policies o f Friedrich in the pre-1871 period,
they praised his activities in the post-unification Empire. They often referred to him
as “Friedrich the German,” and it was clear that they attempted to use their love and
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devotion to him as a means o f proving their Germanness. Although most regular
birthday celebrations contained relatively few references to the events during the
1860s, the celebration o f major birthdays such as his sixtieth and seventieth were
littered with references to his important role not only as a ruler o f Baden but also as a
man who cared deeply about all Germans.
The image o f the Grand Duke was an important tool for all Badeners in their
attempts to negotiate regional and national identities in the postunification period. As
has been evident, citizens attempted to protect and preserve as much as possible o f
their local and regional identities while still portraying themselves as Germans. In the
instances where regional and national identities competed for the loyalties o f
Badeners, less internal strife existed between Catholics and Protestants. Although
both camps used Friedrich on occasion as a tool in their struggle with each other, the
constructed image o f the Grand Duke remained fairly homogeneous. Catholics often
remarked that though a Protestant and a liberal, he had been able to make room for the
Catholics in his state, which was not something that all state rulers had accomplished.

Additional Catholic Displays of Their National Identity
As we have already seen in conjunction with various celebrations o f papal
anniversaries, Catholic congresses, and the activities o f Catholic associations and
organizations, Badenese Catholics strove actively to counter the official discourse
surrounding the wars o f unification. We have already discussed how they used papal
anniversaries and similar events to display publicly their own understanding o f

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

321
Germanness. In a similar fashion to how the birthdays o f emperors and grand dukes
were utilized not only to honor them but also to celebrate the founding o f the Second
Empire, Catholics often used purely religious celebrations as means o f demonstrating
their status as Germans. One o f the more controversial religious celebrations during
the Second Empire was the Fronleichnahmsfest (Corpus Christi Celebration). The
Protestant and liberal attempts to curtail the celebration triggered intense Catholic
protests, and many o f these debates offer insights into how Catholics viewed
themselves and their place in the German nation-state.
The Corpus Christi Celebration had been part o f the Catholic festive calendar
since a 1264 decree by Pope Urban IV declared that a procession would be held in
which the consecrated bread would be paraded through city streets and admired by
people as the body o f Christ. Thus, the Corpus Christi ceremony is a public
celebration o f the Holy Communion. Given its public nature and the increasing
importance o f controlling public space, Catholics attached great importance to this
event. In Freiburg, for instance, following the resumption o f the festivities after the
Napoleonic Wars, the celebration developed into one o f the major events o f the year.
Taking place sometime between late May and mid-June, it often brought thousands o f
people into the streets to witness the extravagant processions. When the Catholic
Church underwent a revival during the mid-nineteenth century, the Corpus Christi
Celebration became one o f the most important ways o f showcasing the increasing
strength o f the Church.82 At the same time, as the confessional tensions in Baden

82 Eva Kimmich, Prozessionsteufel, Herrgottmaschinen und Hakenkreuzflaggen. Zur Geschichte des
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increased, the opposition from Protestants and liberals to this celebration grew
steadily. The latter frequently attempted to disturb the festivities, and physical
0 -5

confrontations were not uncommon.
As the nineteenth century progressed, Catholics began to change their view o f
the CCC. Although they still placed most o f their emphasis on the religious aspect o f
the celebration, it became increasingly evident that many Catholics viewed this event
as an opportunity to display publicly that despite all o f the injustices done unto them,
the Catholic community was growing in strength. Although these festivities and
rituals did not directly address issues o f war commemoration and/or national politics,
they still served as an important means o f establishing a Catholic presence in the
public sphere. For one day, Catholics completely dominated the urban landscape.
They often approached city councils with requests to ensure their safety during the
parades, and they also tried to convince cities to pay for the decorations o f houses
throughout the cities.84 The conflicts with Protestants illustrate how seriously
contemporaries treated these events. In a similar fashion to the General Assembly o f
Catholics and the many papal anniversaries, Catholic showcasing o f their identity
further assisted their integration into Baden and the Kaiserreich. To them, these
processions offered an opportunity to ritually confirm their roles in the community.
Protestants, on the other hand, viewed them as an attempt to reintroduce religious
Fronleichnamsfestes in Freiburg und Baden (Freiburg: Schillinger Verlag, 1983), 26.
83 Ibid., 37-38.
84 For some o f these complaints and requests, see EAF, B2-16/6, Disziplin. Dekanatsberichet iiber die
Feier des Fronleichnamsfestes.
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fanaticism.85
The four hundredth anniversary o f Martin Luther’s birthday was another
religious commemoration that created great debate among both Catholics and
Protestants and further radicalized their arguments about the nature o f German history
and national identity. As has been evident throughout our discussions, Luther and the
Protestant Reformation played an important role in German commemorations o f the
wars o f unification and the construction o f a national identity. Especially with regards
to unification, Protestants frequently noted that the German nation was reunited for the
first time since the Reformation. To most Protestants, Luther was not only celebrated
as a religious reformer but also as a national hero who rid the German nation o f the
evils spread by the Roman papacy. According to the official discourse, the true
German national spirit had only survived the Reformation in the Protestant parts o f the
country, while Catholics had nurtured a spirit alien to the German character. Thus, the
Protestants turned their cause into one o f national significance, and to them, Luther
was the most German o f Germans (der Deutschesten der Deutschen). To celebrate
and honor Luther became equivalent o f celebrating and honoring what was truly
German. Most o f the celebrations in 1883 ended with singing o f the Deutschlandslied,
which reinforced the connection between Luther and the German national identity.86

83 Smith, German Nationalism and Religious Conflict, 100-101.
86 For an introduction to the relationship between Luther and the German nation see Johannes
Burkhardt, “Reformations- und Lutherfeiem. Die Verbiirgerlichung der reformatorischen
Jubilaumskultur,” in Offentliche Festkultur, eds. Dtiding, Friedemann, and Munch, 212-236, and
Hartmut Lehmann, “Martin Luther als deutscher Nationalheld im 19. Jahrhundert,” Luther. Zeitschrift
der Luthergesellschaft 55 (1984): 53-65.
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Naturally, Catholics disagreed with these ideas, claiming that it was only because o f
Luther’s heresies that the German nation had suffered for so long. If not for Luther’s
division o f the Church, Germany would have remained unified and strong and would
had dominated European politics. In the wake o f unification, as Germans used their
history as one o f the building blocks for their national identity, the controversies over
Luther assumed great significance. This celebration served as an important
opportunity for Protestants to try to rewrite history to lit their own notion o f German
history. Protestants were especially keen to connect Luther and the Reformation to the
idea o f progress. As we have seen on a number o f occasions, Protestants always
portrayed themselves as the bearer o f progress while stressing the need to limit
Catholic influence in the Second Empire lest Germany be left behind in the
development o f a modernized society. Thus, many speakers claimed that not only
would Luther have been very happy about the rebirth o f the Protestant Empire, but he
would also have welcomed the Protestant liberal advances in the realm o f
industrialization.
Throughout Germany and Baden in 1883, citizens placed great efforts into the
planning o f the 400th anniversary o f Luther’s birthday. Protestants organized a variety
o f parades, banquets, and religious services. Many viewed this as an excellent
opportunity to upend the Catholic celebrations o f various papal anniversaries.
Because o f the magnitude o f this event, the Catholic and Protestant communities
engaged in fierce debates regarding Luther and the character o f the German national
identity. Although at first glance, these debates might seem to pertain to Luther only,
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a closer examination reveal that they grappled with more fundamental issues about
who constituted the driving forces in the nation-building project. In Konstanz, Freie
Stimme dedicated several lead articles to the celebrations, rebutting many o f the
accusations against the Catholic Church that surfaced in conjunction with these
debates. In a similar fashion to events such as Sedan Day, Catholics, though naturally
excluded from the celebratory discourse, were able to use the controversies
surrounding these events to present their own view o f German history and their own
understanding o f Germanness. Although the end o f the 1870s and the beginning o f the
1880s had witnessed an easing o f the Kulturkam pf in Baden, relations between the two
confessions remained strained. Confessional conflicts still dominated local society,
and an event such as the Luther celebration triggered an intensification o f current
conflicts. In many cities, the Protestant request to stage public celebrations caused
great controversy. Catholics strongly opposed this idea, arguing while it was
acceptable for Protestants to hold religious services, Luther was not deserving o f
public celebrations. Simply put, he had caused too many Germans too much pain.
While Catholics maintained that only Protestants wanted to honor Luther, the latter
claimed that because o f his status as a national hero, Germans o f all confessions would
come out into the streets.
Catholics offered several arguments why Luther should not be celebrated as a
German national hero, highlighting the difference between the Catholic and Protestant
views of history. Catholics pointed out that despite the Protestant claim that Luther
had accomplished so much for the German nation, history did not support their
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arguments. On the contrary, the centuries following Luther’s death had been
characterized by a very poor German cultural and artistic life. Indeed, during this
time, French literature and culture dominated German society, a fact that did not speak
well o f the influence o f the religious reformer. Consequently, from a national
•

standpoint, the period after the Reformation must be considered a negative one.

87

Catholics also reminded Protestants that Luther had revolted against his Emperor,
which should not be celebrated as a memorable deed. If someone were to take similar
action today, Protestants and liberals would be the first ones to demand the
imprisonment and/or execution o f this traitor. Catholics further questioned how
Protestants could honor Luther’s rebellion against the Emperor while at the same time
condemning Catholic passive resistance against the May Laws.
Catholics also criticized Protestants for returning to rhetoric and action o f the
Kulturkam pf when planning these events. They remarked that this was an unfortunate
development, especially since conditions for Catholics in Baden had slightly improved
during the last few years. Now this celebration threatened to reverse these positive
developments and relaunch the Kulturkampf. Catholics used this argument to prove
that Protestants were not at all interested in consolidating national unity but were
instead still trying to exclude Catholics from the national community.88 Indeed, many
Catholics labeled the two-day celebration “days o f sorrow and pain.”89 They

87 See for instance Freie Stimme, November 6, 1883.
88 See for instance Freie Stimme, November 8, 10, 1883.
89 Freie Stimme, November 10, 1883.
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questioned the Protestant understanding o f patriotism since it was clearly evident that
the Reformation had caused such great problems for Germans. Catholics portrayed
themselves as better Christians, who would pray for their lost brothers, who failed to
understand properly the true meaning o f patriotism. This conciliatory approach to the
conflict provided Catholics with the opportunity to present themselves as benevolent
and good Germans who would be patient with the mistakes o f their fellow
countrymen.

90

An analysis o f the articles published by both Protestant and liberal papers
reveals that most o f their efforts were spent on discussing Luther’s role as a national
figure and not his religious teachings. To be sure, Catholics outlined what they
considered the most severe flaws in Luther’s theories, but that really constituted a
minor part o f all the material published. Instead, they tirelessly debated Luther’s role
as a German national hero. Despite the Catholic resistance to the celebrations,
throughout Baden most events were staged without any major problems. Although a
few minor altercations were reported, the majority o f events proceeded as planned. In
the end, Catholics simply decided to stay home and ignore the festivities, much in the
same manner as most Protestants behaved during the papal celebrations.
As has been evident throughout this chapter, Badenese Catholics were able to
shape much o f the commemorative discourse during the Kaiserreich. Their fierce
opposition to Sedan Day illustrates not only their determination to be included in the
new national identity, but it also depicts their readiness to use the emerging Catholic
90 See for instance Freie Stimme, November 13, 1883.
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press to combat the propaganda against them. Indeed, the Catholics that emerge in the
wake o f the struggles surrounding Sedan Day represent members o f a community that
were determined to integrate into the new Empire on their own terms. The debates
surrounding Sedan Day also illustrate how contested the creation o f the German
national identity was. While many Protestants were able to celebrate annually the
capture o f Napoleon III as evidence o f the strength o f the German nation, many
Catholics traced the origins o f the Kulturkam pf back to those days in the early part o f
September 1870. Although there were certainly other reasons besides Catholic
resistance involved in the demise o f this public holiday, no other factor played such an
important role. Both Catholics and Protestants in Baden viewed Sedan Day as a
vehicle to propagate the Kulturkam pf measures, which was one o f the many reasons
why the celebration became so contested. The fact that the celebration ultimately
failed indicates not only that Catholics were successful in maintaining their own view
o f national identity but also that Catholics and Protestants used nationalist vocabulary
to debate their differences in society. Thus, nationalist sentiments did not only unify
but at times served to divide the nation, which was certainly the case during Sedan
Day. The Catholic success in repelling the accusations o f anti-Germanness and
treason, in addition to the increasing political success o f the Catholics, enabled
members o f the Catholic community to shape the formation o f the public sphere,
something that became highly evident in their celebrations o f the Corpus Christi
Celebration. Catholics utilized these parades to manifest both their religious and civic
identity as Germans. Furthermore, the fact that Catholics in all three cities under
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investigation opposed Sedan Day also indicates that their opposition aided them in
creating a more cohesive society. Although our analysis indicated some differences in
how Catholics in Freiburg, Konstanz, and Heidelberg viewed unification, the fact that
all of them opposed Sedan Day suggests that events such as these served to smooth out
some o f the differences and made for a stronger sense o f Catholic identity, though
there o f course still existed certain differences within this community.
Catholic participation in the celebrations o f imperial birthdays also testify to
their ability to participate in the local commemorative discourse without
compromising their own understanding o f Germanness. Indeed, the celebrations o f
the Emperor’s birthday offered Badenese Catholics in all three cities an excellent
opportunity to presents themselves as loyal subjects and true Germans. Despite
having to endure some hostile rhetoric at these events, Catholics were able to manifest
their dedication to the newly formed nation-states. However, our discussions also
revealed that not all members o f the Catholic community agreed with the conciliatory
policy that the EO adopted towards these celebrations. These instances o f dissonance
suggest that the Catholic milieu was much more complicated and heterogeneous than
both contemporaries and many later historians have assumed. As will become evident
in the next chapter’s discussion regarding some o f the nation-building projects that
Catholics initiated and supported during the last decade o f the Kaiserreich, the
Catholic community was often quite divided on how to approach these issues once the
immediate threat o f the K ulturkam pf laws had been removed. During the 1870s, and
to a certain extent the 1880s, the great majority o f the Catholic community had been

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

highly unified due to their common opposition to the Kulturkampf. However, once
that immediate threat was removed, some Catholics disagreed on how to protect and
further their own interest. In the next chapter we will trace how the more established
role o f Badenese Catholics affected their integration into the new national identity.
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CHAPTER 7
REACHING AN UNEASY CONSENSUS: CATHOLIC VIEWS OF THE
UNIFICATION DURING THE LAST TWO DECADES PRIOR TO THE GREAT
WAR

As we saw in the last chapter, the status o f Badenese Catholics was changing
towards the end o f the nineteenth century. Although they remained socially,
culturally, politically, and economically disadvantaged, there were increasing signs
that the state’s Catholics were beginning to integrate successfully into both their
regional milieu and the German nation-state. Especially after the reconstitution o f the
Catholic People’s Party as the Badenese Center Party in 1888, Catholics played a
prominent role in Badenese politics and society. Throughout the Kaiserreich, the
Badenese Center Party was one o f the strongest political groupings, thus enhancing the
status o f its constituency. Their increased political strength, coupled with a strong
Catholic presence in the colonial movement and a growing associational life, enabled
Baden’s Catholics to escape the status o f second-class citizens.
This chapter traces how Catholics viewed and helped shape the changing
commemorative discourse surrounding the unification o f the Kaiserreich during the
final two decades o f the Second Empire. Although contemporaries agreed that
Catholics were becoming more “German,” in many cases their view o f Germaneness
still conflicted with the state-sponsored version. This tension was most evident in the
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commemorations o f former Chancellor Otto von Bismarck. The debates concerning
the old statesman underscored that though Germany was now many years removed
from the Kulturkampf, many o f Baden’s Catholics were still uneasy about Bismarck’s
role in these events. Analysis o f how Catholics viewed the widespread construction o f
Bismarck and Emperor Wilhelm monuments that took place in Baden and the rest o f
Germany at the fin de siecle will illuminate their attitudes towards the founding fathers
o f the Empire. Although not directly connected to the unification, these projects are
still relevant as most o f the ideological messages connected to these celebrations
centered on the process surrounding unification. Badenese Catholics approached these
celebratory efforts with greater enthusiasm than previously. However, despite the
increased acceptance o f and inclusion in the official commemorative discourse,
Catholics still struggled to reconcile with parts o f it. Although they were now better
able to shape this discourse to suit their own view o f the last twenty-five years, they
were still reluctant to accept parts o f the official discourse. Celebrations were held
throughout Baden in 1895 in conjunction with Sedan Day and in January 1896 to
commemorate the twenty-fifth anniversary o f the founding o f the Empire. As was
seen in the last chapter, though initially controversial, celebrations o f Sedan Day had
become inconsequential during the last decade. In anticipation o f the twenty-fifth
anniversary, however, Freiburg, Konstanz, and Heidelberg all organized large
celebrations. In contrast to earlier celebrations, in 1895, Catholics and Protestants
both actively participated in remembering the events o f 1870. Celebrations followed a
similar pattern around the state as organizers attempted to include the entire
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population in the festivities.

Celebrating the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of War and Unification
On September 2, cannons were fired in Freiburg at 6 o ’clock in the morning to
remind people o f the events o f a quarter century before. During the morning, the three
major confessions held celebratory church services, in which clergy asked citizens to
remember and honor the sacrifices made by their fellow Germans. From the outset o f
these celebrations, it was evident that most o f the commemorative discourse centered
on the efforts o f the Badenese soldiers and their efforts in the Franco-Prussian War.
Following the services, the city council staged a parade o f the city’s dignitaries and
surviving veterans from the city center to the Siegesdenkmal and then to the graveyard
where veterans placed wreaths on both German and French graves. Newspapers
reported that it was nice to see that the French victims were remembered as well, yet
another indication o f the noble German spirit.1 It is evident from the speeches at the
cemetery that this celebration was different from many others during the first few
decades o f the Kaiserreich. In other commemorations, speakers not only praised the
efforts o f the German soldiers, but they also stressed how much Germans had
accomplished since unification. Often, this part o f the commemorative discourse
became the most contested because citizens had different memories o f the first few
years o f the Second Empire. For the state’s Catholics, the recommencement o f the
Kulturkam pf meant that the immediate postunification years did not have the same
1 See for instance Freiburger Zeitung, September 3, 1895.
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positive connotation as it had for many Protestants and liberals. But, since most o f the
speeches ignored the postunification years, it was easier for the state’s Catholics to
participate in these festivities.
Following the ceremony at the cemetery, participants paraded to city hall
where the celebration continued with a banquet. The city orchestra initiated the
celebrations with a rendition o f “Hymn to the Honor o f the German Empire,” which
according to newspapers set the tone for the rest o f the celebration. Mayor Winterer
gave the plenary speech in which he praised the efforts o f the local veterans. He also
noted that today’s generation should follow the veterans’ example. Instead o f being
satisfied with Baden and Germany’s progress during the last twenty-five years, locals
must remain pious, hard-working, and disciplined to honor the veterans’ sacrifices.2
This was not an uncommon theme when cities honored the efforts o f war veterans.
Many members o f the war generation believed that younger Germans simply took
Germany’s strength and unity for granted. However, for Germany to continue to grow
stronger and more powerful, the spirit o f 1870-1871 had to be at the forefront o f the
German consciousness.
Despite the controversies surrounding Sedan Day, Catholics in Freiburg
participated in these events. Freiburger Bote labeled the celebration one o f the best
ever in the city, and there was no trace o f K ulturkam pf rhetoric during these events.
To be sure, the fact that the speeches held during these ceremonies centered on the
efforts o f the local soldiers made the celebration much easier to support for local
2 See for instance Freiburger Bote, September 3, 1895. For information in regards to the planning of
these events, see also St. AF, Cl/Festlichkeiten/lB/8.
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Catholics. The Catholics’ unconditional acceptance o f the commemorative discourse
surrounding such an important event as the foundation o f the Reich certainly indicates
that they were much more integrated in the Empire than had been the case just a few
years earlier. As will become evident later in this chapter, much o f this integration
was due to their increased political strength, as well as an increasingly strong
associational life, which enabled increasing Catholic participation in the shaping o f
local and national society.
Local veterans were honored in similar ceremonies in Konstanz and
Heidelberg. Veterans in Baden paraded through their communities and attended
speeches lauding them for their sacrifices to the German fatherland. The city council
in Konstanz also provided the veterans with a commemorative plaque, which thanked
them for their efforts during the unification process. The plaque noted that if not for
these select individuals, Germany would not be as unified and strong today.3 As
another means o f ensuring that these events were remembered properly, cities also
published accounts o f the events o f 1870-1871. In Freiburg, the local history
professor Franz Albert chronicled the great efforts o f the Badenese soldiers. In his
book, he once again stressed the proximity o f Freiburg to the French border and how
grateful all citizens should be towards the soldiers who had so valiantly protected the
Badenese fatherland.4 Before the anniversary, city councils had stressed how
important it would be to honor the veterans in a worthy manner. For the most part,
3 Ibid.
4 The booklet can be found in St. AF, Cl/Festlichkeiten/lB/8.
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veterans led an anonymous existence in their towns, and leading politicians now noted
how important it would be to ensure that locals were aware o f their existence and what
they had accomplished for their local and national communities.5 Judging from this
correspondence, it is evident that public officials experienced a need to remind their
constituencies that the veterans’ efforts must not be forgotten. In addition, by
stressing the veterans’ great character, they would be able to use these men as models
for today’s generation. Hence, they deemed it important to ensure that the veterans
were given a prominent place in these celebrations.
During the fall o f 1895, both the Catholic and Protestant press ran series o f
articles recalling the events o f 1870. Especially in conjunction with Sedan Day,
newspapers published descriptions o f the most important battles as well as lists o f the
Badeners who had died while serving their fatherland.6 Pfalzer Bote published a
series o f articles entitled “The German Soldier in War” in which they portrayed him as
more courageous, pious, and skilled than his French counterpart. In these articles,
they also reprinted a telegram that Wilhelm I had sent to Bismarck, in which he stated
that once Germany had become unified, it would be very important for citizens to
honor these events by constructing different kinds o f monuments. These monuments
would serve as means o f integration for Germans and would also ensure that Germans
never forget the sacrifices that these men had done in the service o f Germany.7

5 St. AK, S II 5375, letter from the city council o f Konstanz to the one in Pforzheim, July 22, 1895.
6 See for instance Pfalzer Bote, September 6, 1895.
1 Pfalzer Bote, September 10, 1895.
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Although Protestants and Catholics displayed remarkable unity in celebrating
the events surrounding Sedan Day, and though these celebrations reflected increased
Catholic integration into the Second German Empire, Catholics also had a different set
o f memories from those days in 1870. To be sure, Catholics and Protestants both
agreed in their assessment o f the events o f the Franco-Prussian War, but in 1895,
Catholics again lamented the fate o f Pope Pius IX in 1870. During the FrancoPrussian War, Catholics had been very concerned about the fate o f the Pope as French
forces left Rome to fight the Germans. These sentiments had caused much strife with
the Protestants both during the conflict with France as well as in the immediate postunification period. Often, Protestants cited these sentiments as proof that Catholics
were not true Germans and that their Heimat was Rome rather than Baden. As the
twenty-fifth anniversary o f the sequestering o f the Pope to the Vatican approached,
Catholics focused much o f their attention on this anniversary.
On September 19, the lead article in Pfalzer Bote condemned Italians for
celebrating the twenty-fifth anniversary o f what the latter labeled their true unification.
The title o f the article, “The Italian Robbery,” reflected the Catholic view o f these
events. The paper noted that it was evident that Italians failed to understand properly
what constituted patriotism. Italians now claimed that the removal o f the Pope had
constituted an act o f nationalism, which had strengthened Italy. Catholics accused
Italians o f distorting history and misunderstanding the proper meaning o f nationalism.
Catholics argued that diminishing the power o f the Pope should never be celebrated as
a nationalistic deed. Thus, it was evident that Italians were far behind the modem
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times in comprehending the requirements o f nationalism. They were also critical of
the fact that the Protestant press noted that the anniversaries o f the unifications o f Italy
and Germany constituted two major events that had ushered in a long period o f
prosperity and peace for both populations. Catholics argued that true Germans would
understand how fundamentally different the two events were. The Italians did not
deserve to be commemorated in a similar fashion to the Germans who valiantly fought
to protect their fatherland. On the contrary, the Italians had succumbed to greed as
they removed the Pope from Rome for materialistic reasons. More importantly, it was
un-German o f the Protestants to celebrate the German and Italian victories in the same
way, thus cheapening the German heroic deeds. Catholics attributed the celebrations
in Italy to the whims o f a few elite politicians and not representative o f the true wishes
o f the Italian people. They also noted that Protestants had previously ridiculed
countries such as Spain and Italy for the lack o f progress that they had displayed
during the past twenty-five years. Thus, their compliments on the Italian
accomplishments since they had limited papal influence rang hollow. Pfalzer Bote
ended the article by noting that Rome had been, and always would be, the domain o f
the Pope.8 This is o f course interesting as these sentiments were antithetical to the
principles o f national sovereignty and nationalism, which were so prevalent during the
later part o f the nineteenth century.
During the following days, the Catholics returned to these events several times,
noting that the church had constituted the oldest basis for a state and that a proper
8 Pfalzer Bote, September 19, 1895.
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understanding o f nationalism must recognize this fact. They also maintained that
these celebrations were not representative o f the spirit o f the Italian people. Instead,
the people who organized these celebrations were only interested in making money on
these commemorations, sentiments alien to the true Italian spirit, which was still
enumerating from the Pope. Catholics also protested the Protestant assertions that the
Pope was reduced to a powerless prisoner in the Vatican. They maintained that the
Pope was more powerful than ever before and that the colonial movement had
enhanced his power throughout the world. Last, they repeated the argument that
Protestants were not able to comment on the status o f the Pope since they were not
able to understand properly the relationship between the Vatican and the rest o f the
world. Indeed, they noted that people during these last twenty-five years had
constantly misrepresented this relationship. While German Protestants had argued that
Catholic loyalties to Rome constituted proof that the latter could never be true
members o f the nation-state, the relationship was not that simple. Instead, Catholics
around the world were able to be loyal to both their nation-state as well as their Pope,
and the fact that they were able to maintain both o f these relationships actually made
them better citizens o f their respective states.9
What is interesting to note here is that Protestants largely ignored these
Catholic sentiments. Although the role o f the Pope had been a hotly contested subject
between Catholics and Protestants during the initial years o f the Kaiserreich, these
viewpoints were not as controversial anymore. To be sure, this illustrates the fact that
9 Pfalzer Bote, September 23, 24, 1895.
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Catholics had become more integrated into the Second German Empire, but it is also a
reflection o f the improved relationship between the Empire and the Vatican. Ever
since the death o f Pius IX, the tone between the two parties had been much more
conciliatory, which contributed to a greater Protestant acceptance o f Catholic loyalties
to the Pope. Furthermore, due to the fact that Catholics had played an important role
in supporting the strengthening o f the military, most notably against the wishes o f Leo
XIII in 1888, they had proved to the rest o f Germany that they were interested in
protecting Germany rather than blindly obeying the wishes o f the Vatican. Comparing
these sentiments to the demands Catholics had made in the early 1870s that the
German government ensure the protection o f the Pope, it was clear that Catholics were
in a much different situation in the 1890s compared to the 1870s.
Following the celebrations o f Sedan Day in 1895, Badeners commemorated the
twenty-fifth anniversary o f the foundation o f the Empire in January 1896. However,
instead o f celebrating the anniversary o f the proclamation o f the Reich, Badenese
cities focused their efforts on the anniversary o f the victory o f the 113th Badenese
Regiment at Belfort. City councils did not participate to any great extent in these
celebrations, which were instead organized by the local veterans associations.
Nonetheless, these celebrations resonated very well with citizens, and locals observed
this anniversary with great reverence. Celebrations in Heidelberg and Freiburg were
relatively minor compared to the rest o f the state, but in Konstanz, the veterans
association organized a more extensive two-day celebration. On January 14, local
veterans, as well as some who had been stationed in Konstanz during the war, were
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paraded throughout the city. Konstanzers had decorated their houses in customary
fashion, with the willing participation o f both Protestants and Catholics. This should
come as no surprise since the commemoration o f the battle o f Belfort had always been
a relatively uncontroversial celebration. Following the parade, veterans and local
dignitaries assembled at the theatre. Here, Lieutenant Baumann gave a speech in
which he outlined the achievements o f the local soldiers during the past fifty years.
Throughout his remarks, Baumann stressed the important role that local soldiers had
played in local, regional, and national history. He emphasized that locals should not
forget that though soldiers had played decisive roles on the battlefields, they had also
been instrumental in turning Konstanz into a better city. He argued that the local
economy had benefited from the presence o f these soldiers and that they had always
played a constructive role in the development o f the city.10
Following Baumann’s speech, the local theatre association performed a play
entitled “We Deserve the Entire Germany,” in which the events o f the war were
replayed. In addition, the play also chronicled some o f the key political developments
during the past twenty-five years, and especially how the city o f Konstanz had
benefited from the efforts o f the three Emperors. Most o f the play centered on the war
and the valiant efforts o f local soldiers who had saved the Badenese fatherland from
French threat. Konstanzer Nachrichten reported that the audience had been very
appreciative o f the play and that it had constituted a nice way for people to remember

10 Konstanzer Nachrichten, January 16, 17, 1896. See also St. AK, S II 5375.
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the valiant efforts o f local soldiers.11 At the end o f the day, Grand Duke Friedrich
arrived in the city, and people greeted him at the train station, where it was noted that
he had been one o f the instrumental figures in bringing about German unity. The
celebrations ended the following day with celebratory masses in all o f the churches,
and it is noteworthy that the Grand Duke elected to attend both Protestant as well as
Catholic services, which indicated that the city enjoyed a much greater confessional
•

harmony than in previous years.

12

Judging from the unified response that Badenese Catholics and Protestants
displayed towards the twenty-fifth anniversary o f the German unification, it was clear
that the state’s Catholics were in a much better position than during most o f the last
twenty-five years. However, none o f these celebrations contained much potential for
controversy. To be sure, Sedan Day had been perhaps the greatest source o f
controversy during the first few years o f the Kaiserreich, but during the past decade,
both Catholics and Protestants had largely neglected this holiday. Thus, when it was
once again revisited, both confessions were able to embrace the commemoration of
this important military victory without engaging in confessional polemics.
Furthermore, since the vast majority o f these commemorations centered on the efforts
o f local soldiers, it was relatively easy for the state’s Catholics to participate fully in
these festivities. Although the efforts o f Catholic soldiers during the war had been a
source o f controversy for the first few years o f the Second Empire, Protestants had
11 Konstanzer Nachrichten, January 16, 1896.
12 Konstanzer Zeitung, January 17, 1896.
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ceased their accusations o f Catholic un-German behavior relatively soon after the
foundation o f the Kaiserreich, which enabled both confessions to honor properly the
efforts of all German soldiers. Although it is clear that the twenty-fifth anniversary o f
the Empire indicated a greater Catholic integration into the Second Empire, events
such as the commemorations tied to the persona o f Bismarck displayed that there were
still certain topics related to the unification that caused great conflict between the
state’s two predominant confessions.

Catholic Reactions towards the Development of a Bismarck Cult
In conjunction with Bismarck’s eightieth birthday in 1895, controversy ensued
that illustrates how Catholic and Protestant attitudes had changed towards the old
statesman. Following the death o f Wilhelm I and the brief reign o f his son, Friedrich
III, Wilhelm II became the new German Emperor on June 15, 1888. Whereas his
grandfather had almost reluctantly accepted his role as Landesvater, Wilhelm II
embraced and cherished his role as the premier figure in German society. This attitude
led to an almost immediate conflict with Chancellor Bismarck, who had been
accustomed to conducting his political affairs relatively independent o f the Emperor.
The new Emperor’s insistence on shaping especially foreign policy irked the
Chancellor and their relationship was strained from the outset. It came therefore as no
great surprise when it was announced on March 18, 1890, that Bismarck had resigned.
Germans around the Empire greeted this news with mixed emotions. Careful not to
seem opposed to the recently crowned Emperor, many remarked that though Bismarck
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had offered invaluable services to the fatherland, his age made retirement appropriate
at that moment. Naturally, especially in conservative and liberal circles, many were
aghast at the disrespectful manner in which Wilhelm II had dismissed the greatest
German statesman in history.13
Catholics in Baden greeted the news o f Bismarck’s resignation with a more
modest approach than conservatives and national-liberals. Their judgment of
Bismarck’s legacy was surprisingly neutral, and in some instances almost positive,
which serves as an indication that their status in the Reich had changed since the days
o f the Kulturkampf, when they considered Bismarck their greatest enemy. Badenese
Catholics did of course note that Bismarck had been one o f their fiercest political
opponents, especially in conjunction with the Kulturkampf. However, they also
admitted to a reluctant respect for the great statesman and his efforts to unify
Germany, an event that they now labeled the greatest achievement in German history.
Catholics also claimed that for most o f the last quarter o f the nineteenth century,
people around the world had considered Bismarck and German Catholics the two most
important societal forces in Germany, which they interpreted as proof o f their
important status in the Empire. They claimed that Bismarck had learned much from
the Catholics, and their unwillingness to bow to his pressure had left him in awe o f
their strength and caused him to alter his policies towards the Church. In addition,
they also credited Bismarck with strengthening the Catholic Church and facilitating
the integration o f Catholics into the nation-state. By launching the Kulturkampf,
13 See for instance Gall, Bismarck, 693, 711-713.
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Bismarck had forced the Catholics to rally together and unite in the face o f this fierce
opposition, and this newfound strength had served the Catholic community well as
they gained acceptance as members o f the nation-state.14
After his resignation, Bismarck lived in an uneasy retirement. Initially inclined
to remain involved in German politics, he relatively quickly drifted into status o f the
revered old statesman who nonetheless was kept outside the political life.
Occasionally, a controversy would emerge as conservatives and national-liberals
expressed dismay at the policies o f the new political leadership, and calls for
reinstatement o f Bismarck would ensue. However, the relative peaceful existence o f
the old Chancellor ceased in 1895 when Germans began to plan for celebrations o f his
eightieth birthday on April 1.
As far as the Badenese cities were concerned, on January 15, 1895, Mayor
Wilckens o f Heidelberg suggested to Mayor Schnetzler of Karlsruhe that the major
Badenese cities should plan a joint celebration o f the upcoming birthday.15 The
affirmative response came quickly from Karlsruhe, in which the mayor noted that such
a momentous event deserved the full attention o f Badeners. After this initial contact,
letters were distributed to the mayors o f the other large cities, asking them to
participate in this venture and to ensure that Bismarck was bestowed the title o f
Honorary Citizen o f the cities in question. At the Oberburgermeisterkonferenz on

14 See for instance Freie Stimme, March 22, 25, 27, 1890.
15 St. AH, Heidelberger Uraltaktien (HUA) 219-5, Ehrungen des Fiirsten Bismarcks, letter from
Wilckens to Schnetzler in Karlsruhe, January 15, 1895.
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January 25, the mayors also decided to let Direktor Goetz from Karlsruhe draw up the
official letter denoting the title o f Honorary Citizen on Bismarck. Indicating that the
mayors were well aware that this could prove to be a thorny issue with their
constituencies, they also noted that if any o f the cities in question would decide against
the idea, the remaining ones would still proceed with the initiative.16 Following this
meeting, the mayor o f Karlsruhe privately alerted Wilckens to the fact that this matter
would likely cause conflict among the local population. In a January 29 letter, he
wrote Wilckens that though the vast majority o f Badeners would agree that Bismarck
had served the fatherland well, his domestic policies, especially in regards to the
Catholic Church, would cause debate whether Baden should honor the old
Chancellor.17
During the following days, city councils around the state discussed this issue,
and already from the outset, it was evident that this was to be a hotly contested topic.
In the January 31 meeting in Konstanz, a fierce debate broke out as members o f the
council voiced their opinions on Bismarck’s legacy. Although many were in favor,
several Catholics expressed dismay at the notion o f honoring Bismarck. In a very
lively debate, Dr. Mon wanted it on the record that as a faithful Catholic, he could not
support this idea. He admitted that Bismarck had certainly served Germany well,
especially in regards to foreign policy, but his war on the Church was something that

16 St. AK, S II 5576, Staatsorganisation, Reichssachen. Ehrung des Fiirsten Bismarcks, report from OB
meeting, January 25, 1895.
17 St. AH, HUA 219-5, letter from Schnetzler to Wilckens, January 29, 1895.
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no Catholic could ever forget and which should disqualify him from any public
honors. After an intense debate during which the chairman several times had to call
members to order, the motion was passed. Out o f the sixty-two members present,
fifty-two voted in favor, four against, and six abstained. However, Catholics noted
that twenty-four members were missing, which they interpreted as a clear sign o f their
disapproval.18
Having initiated the idea, Mayor Wilckens eagerly awaited the results o f the
voting throughout the state. In his correspondence with the other mayors, he noted
with pride that his own city council had passed the motion unanimously. However, as
soon became evident, many cities around the state were much more hesitant towards
this idea. Although they finally passed the motion, both Mannheim and Pforzheim
had large numbers voting against the initiative.19 Catholics offered the fiercest
resistance, but democrats were also in opposition to the idea. Nonetheless, the mayors
declared that they would proceed with planning o f the individual festivities throughout
the state. In the beginning o f March, conflict ensued as some cities decided that they
did not have the financial means to contribute to the proposed honorary gift. Wilckens
and Schnetzler solved this problem by reassuring the other mayors that they would
only pay an amount commensurate to the size o f each city. In the end, all o f the other
mayors, despite some misgivings, agreed to pay the suggested amounts.20 These

18 St. AK, S II 5576, report from city council meeting, January 31, 1895.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
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events also illustrate how sometimes these commemorative efforts could be
misrepresentative o f public opinion. In the end, mayors presented all o f these cities as
equal participants in this project, which obviously was not true.
Until this point, most o f these debates had been carried out within the confines
o f the local political elite, without any direct involvement from local citizens or the
press. However, this changed on March 23 when the German Parliament voted not to
recognize Bismarck’s birthday. The most commonly cited reason why parliament
should not congratulate Bismarck was that it would constitute a political act. Because
o f the politics that Bismarck had advocated, the Center Party and others declared that
they would not be able to support the idea. These debates clearly illustrate how
closely commemorative efforts were associated with politics, and it furthermore
displays just how aware Catholics were o f the political importance associated with the
official commemorative discourse. What is interesting to note is the fact that this
constituted one o f the first occasions on which the Center Party was strong enough
politically to be able to shape the official commemorative discourse that was so
closely tied to unification.
This decision triggered an intense debate concerning the past and present
character o f Bismarck, in which everybody from the Emperor to the common man
voiced their opinion. Because these debates centered on the statesman’s political
career, they serve as a good illustration of memory construction and how Badenese
Catholics and others viewed the course o f German history during the preceding thirty
years. At the outset o f these debates, the national-liberals attacked what they labeled
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one o f the greatest injustices o f German parliamentary history. They interpreted the
poor decision o f Parliament as another indication o f the dangers o f a popular
democracy. In a leading article on March 26, Konstanzer Zeitung issued a stem
criticism o f the behavior o f the Parliament. They stressed that nowhere else in the
world would a parliament refuse a simple birthday wish to one o f its greatest men,
especially not on his eightieth birthday. The paper claimed that the reason for this
shameful decision was that Catholic and social-democratic parliamentary members
were unable to recognize Bismarck’s greatness as a German and instead focused
exclusively on his party politics.21
The injustice done to Bismarck continued to dominate the pages o f Konstanzer
Zeitung for the following days. They noted that Germans throughout the Empire were
incensed at the poor taste o f the Parliament in Berlin. In these discussions, several
recognizable themes soon became evident. The paper argued that all citizens who
possessed a proper understanding o f what it meant to be a true German and who
understood how to support the construction o f a strong nation-state were in favor o f
congratulating Bismarck. They labeled the old Chancellor the founder o f the German
Empire and the man responsible for bringing Germany to its place in the sun. Thus, to
oppose this motion was not only a sign o f how far removed from their constituencies
the members o f Parliament were, but it also showed that they were lesser Germans
than the rest o f their colleagues. The paper also questioned why Catholics and

21 Konstanzer Zeitung, March 26, 1895.
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democrats had not opposed the celebration o f Bismarck’s seventieth birthday.22
Although the Catholics never responded to this particular charge, their change o f mind
should be attributed to the altered political situation in the Empire. Not only was
Bismarck no longer in office, which made it less important to placate him, but the
Center Party had grown considerably in strength during the last decade and was now
in a better position to oppose these kinds o f initiatives.
On March 30, Professor Gottlob Egelhaaf published an essay entitled
“Bismarck and the South Germans” in Konstanzer Zeitung. The purpose o f this article
was clear. By taking a historical look at Bismarck’s life and political career, he
attempted to solidify the official view o f the retired Chancellor as somebody who had
always sought to improve the lives o f all Germans. In addition to the usual praise for
his foreign policy successes, Egelhaaf noted that Bismarck had a jovial character that
had always been very close to the sympathetic south German one. He alleged that the
Kulturkampf had not been aimed at German Catholics but rather to clear the Church of
undue papal influence and dogma as well as to eliminate the antinational efforts o f the
Jesuits. Still, the tone o f these accounts had changed slightly during the past few
years. National-liberals and Protestants such as Egelhaaf now admitted that Bismarck
had made some mistakes in conducting the struggle against the Church. However,
despite this more conciliatory tone, Egelhaaf claimed that any true Christian and
German would be able to forgive Bismarck for his political sins. Hence, it now
became un-German to still hold a grudge for the few mistakes that the Chancellor
22 Konstanzer Zeitung, March 27, 1895.
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might have made.23
Protestants and national-liberals also used the discussion regarding this event
to voice misgivings about the development o f German society. Not only in Baden, but
throughout the Empire, national-liberals experienced difficulties adapting to the new
mode of mass politics that developed in the 1890s. Although the Badenese National
Liberal Party was able to remain in power, they suffered heavy political setbacks as
they struggled to adjust from the mode o f Honoratiorenpolitik to the more inclusive
mass politics that challenged their political hegemony. As a result, they viewed this
latest controversy as proof that today’s Germans did not understand what was truly
important and that they had taken for granted Germany’s preeminence in Europe.
Resorting to the often-used argument that a people who could not honor its important
figures properly was a people in deep crisis, they stressed that ever since the death o f
Wilhelm I in 1888 there had been several signs that the German nation was
deteriorating quickly. They stressed that celebrations such as these had in the past
helped strengthen and unify Germans and constituted one o f the major reasons why
Germany had so quickly been able to establish itself as a world power. Engaging in a
rewriting o f history, national-liberals and Protestants argued that in the past, all
national holidays had been celebrated in a worthy and respectful manner by the entire
nation, which had served to further solidify Germany’s strength. Lamenting that the
recent liberal political setbacks illustrated that Germans no longer respected what
made them successful and German, they claimed that materialist ideas were ruining
23 Konstanzer Zeitung, March 30, 31, 1895.
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German society and the national character. They especially singled out the socialdemocrats and their notion o f class struggle as one o f the main reasons why liberalism
was in decline and threatened to be replaced by an individualistic struggle for
materialistic self-fulfillment. They claimed that this individualism, which most
Catholics and democrats would have attributed to liberals themselves, was threatening
to tear apart German society and weaken the nation-state.24
National-liberals also used this opportunity to question the politics o f the
Center Party. At a time when the party was assuming an increasingly important role
in German politics, this conflict provided the national-liberals with an opportunity to
revisit some o f the supposedly antinational policies o f the Center from the past
decades. They stressed the continuously fierce Catholic opposition towards Bismarck
and the Reich, which allegedly had inhibited the development o f the German Empire.
Furthermore, Catholics were seen as defenders o f the Polish minority in the Reich, and
calls for removal o f the “Polish supporters” became common during these debates.
This constitutes another example o f how commemorations such as these were closely
interconnected to current political issues. Many Germans had always been ambivalent
towards the sizeable Polish minority in the eastern parts o f the Reich. The formation
and increased popularity o f mass organizations such as the Society for the Eastern
Marches, which had as one o f its main goals to Germanize the eastern parts o f the
Empire, indicate that this was a topic that assumed ever more popular attention.
Notwithstanding the fact that many Catholics were uneasy about the Polish issue, and
2AFreiburger Zeitung, March 24, 1895.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

353
that many o f them even openly opposed an increase in minority rights for the Poles,
the Catholics were assumed to be strong supporters o f their Catholic brethren. Once
again, this was another instance in which the Catholics were accused o f placing their
religious loyalties above their ethnic ones; they were more interested in enhancing the
status o f their church in Germany than they were in protecting the national community
o f Germans.25
Faced with this criticism from fellow Germans, Catholics responded in kind to
the accusations o f anti national feelings. O f course, this was not a novel phenomenon,
as they had been forced to do so during the entire existence o f the Second Empire,
however, the Catholics were now in a better position to offer some constructive
arguments as to how the nationalist discourse should be constructed. One o f their
earliest responses to the criticism was to downplay the importance o f this event.
Complaining that national-liberals and Protestants treated this controversy as a sign of
the apocalypse, Catholics ridiculed the national-liberal and Protestant outrage. Due to
their more established political, economic, and social situation, Catholics could now
afford to question the inherent importance o f these types o f events, something that
would not have been possible before. Otherwise, Catholics were somewhat more
conciliatory in their approach to Bismarck, pointing out that he had indeed been a man
who had accomplished good things for Germany, especially in regards to the
unification. Accusations o f Bismarck’s bullish and reactionary behavior, especially
towards the south German states and Austria, were absent, and overall, unification was
25 Ibid.
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regarded in a positive light, despite the manner in which it had taken place.
After remarking that the importance o f Bism arck’s birthday had been vastly
exaggerated, Catholics noted that Bismarck had for several decades bullied the
Emperor, the Parliament, and the German people. However, with the arrival o f a new
Emperor, Bismarck was quickly reduced to a less important figure, and his power
diminished rapidly. This was something that did not fit his temperament, and he
quickly decided to resign. By offering this relatively mild criticism o f Bismarck, as
well as Wilhelm I, Catholics were able to voice their support for the current Emperor.
They openly praised him for restoring his position as the most powerful man in
Germany and indicated that for national-liberals and Protestants to be upset about this
latest turn o f events indicated their faltering support for Wilhelm II.26
Catholics further argued that one o f the main reasons why Bismarck had been
denied an official congratulation from Parliament was that he had never been able to
reconcile him self to the more democratic mode o f politics. This argument positioned
Catholics as advocates o f a more modem and inclusive society. They portrayed
Bismarck as a representative o f an outdated world, which was now giving way to a
more democratic political process. Thus, they were able to present themselves as the
bearers o f progress, a role that had been reserved for national-liberals and Protestants
ever since the foundation o f the Reich. They noted that the same people who in the
past had criticized Catholics for opposing democracy were now disputing the
democratically taken decision not to honor Bismarck. They argued that though not all
26 See for instance P faker Bote, March 23, 1895.
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Germans might agree with the decision, this was part o f a democratic society, which
they had supposedly supported for a long time. Catholics also claimed that this latest
turn o f events displayed the true colors o f their opponents. They had never been
honest proponents o f democracy, but only supported it when it suited their agenda.
Now, when Catholics and other elements o f German society were able to shape the
political process to a much greater extent, liberals were no longer interested in
promoting popular democracy.27
Catholics furthermore maintained that though they would certainly not have
been pleased with the decision o f the German Parliament had they been nationliberals, they would have had to accept the voice o f the German people, who clearly
did not want this type o f attention bestowed upon Bismarck. By using this argument,
Catholics portrayed themselves as better representatives o f the German people. To be
sure, Catholics had always presented themselves as better Germans and more in touch
with the true nature o f the German character, but they had previously always been
forced to present these arguments in a defensive manner. Now, for the first time, they
were able to point to the decision o f the Parliament as proof that the Catholic version
o f Germanness was closer to what the great mass o f Germans espoused.
In addition, the fact that this controversy was based on the persona o f
Bismarck also lent some further credibility to the Catholic accusations about the
brutish character of the old Chancellor. They did not fail to note that these sentiments,
though belated, certainly served as a strong indication o f what Germans all along had
27 Konstanzer Nachrichten, March 28, 1895.
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thought o f the Prussian Junker. The only difference now was that with a more
democratic society in place, these views were not only represented in the public sphere
but in the political realm as well.28 In the March 28 edition o f Konstanzer Zeitung, the
paper quoted an incendiary poem dedicated to the follies o f the Parliament, published
in several national-liberal papers.29 Using this poem as evidence o f how their political
opponents really viewed society, Catholics claimed that the Center Party, despite all
the abuse it had suffered throughout the first few decades o f the Reich, was the only
party that truly understood what would strengthen Germany. Citing their recent
support for the military bills, the paper claimed that Catholics were now the ones who
best understood the German national character. They also argued that whether a
member o f Parliament supported the initiative to honor Bismarck was no true
indication o f his Germanness; instead, people should observe what kind o f respect
these members displayed for the political institutions o f the Reich. Last, they gleefully
noted that Bismarck had never been able to defeat the Catholics: not during the
unification process, not during the Kulturkam pf or during any other time o f his reign
as Chancellor, and certainly not during his time as political retiree.30
Despite the great controversy regarding the German Parliament’s decision not
to honor Bismarck officially, Konstanz, Heidelberg, and Freiburg all organized
celebrations on his eightieth birthday. The festivities followed similar patterns

28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Freie Stimme, April 1, 1895.
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throughout the state, with the most emphasis being placed on a banquet in honor o f
Bismarck. City councils sent congratulatory telegrams to Friedrichsruh, a gesture that
was deemed appropriate even by most Catholics. This fact also serves as an indication
o f the increased confidence with which Catholics participated in Badenese and
German society. Despite the complicated history that characterized Bismarck’s
relationship with the state’s Catholics, only a handful o f people opposed sending the
telegram, a sign that they were no longer too concerned about the long shadows cast
by Bismarck’s figure. People in the three cities were asked to flag their houses;
however, according to most contemporary reports, many chose not to do so.31
On the eve o f April 1, city elites gathered to celebrate Bismarck and his
contributions to the German nation. Among elaborate decorations, dignitaries gave a
number o f speeches, outlining the great character o f the old Chancellor. Two o f the
most commonly addressed themes were the need to express how grateful Germans
were for Bismarck’s lengthy service to them and the importance o f these types o f
events to solidify the national consciousness. Most speakers referred to the
discussions o f the last few days as signs that Germans were becoming increasingly
disassociated from their nation-state and that much work needed to be done to ensure
that Germany would remain strong, even though Bismarck had left office. Speakers
remarked that Germany was more divided now than it had been for a long time and
that it was not inconceivable that they would return to the state o f disunity that had
existed for over 1,000 years prior to unification. These sentiments served as a
31 See for instance Konstanzer Nachrichten, April 4, 1895.
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criticism o f the latest actions and growing presence o f Catholics and social-democrats,
but they also underscored how important unification had been to the Germans. They
portrayed Bismarck as the one man who had been able to alleviate Germans from
centuries o f division, during which the thought o f a unified state had remained nothing
but an idea. They revisited Bismarck’s political career, stressing how he had always
placed Germany’s interests above both Prussia and himself. The speeches centered on
the 1860s and ‘70s, and speakers presented a historical interpretation that fit quite well
with the official commemorative discourse that had been prevalent in the first few
years o f the Empire. Bismarck’s spirit had shaped Germany into the grand state that it
had achieved, and Germans must not forget that spirit, lest they risk falling back into
political and diplomatic obscurity again.
Speakers described Bismarck as the guiding light o f German history who had
set a great example for Germans to follow. Most o f these speeches focused on his role
in the unification, which was a little bit different from previous commemorative
efforts. Although his domestic policies were mentioned, it was usually just in passing.
This emphasis on Bismarck’s role as the unifier o f Germany should not be surprising,
given the recent controversies. Since Bismarck’s supporters now found themselves in
a more defensive position than during the first few decades o f the Reich, they chose to
stress the accomplishments that almost all Germans appreciated. As we have seen in
our discussions, the way in which the nation-state had been unified had become
increasingly accepted even by social-democrats and Catholics during the past few
years, and it was unlikely that they would offer any strong opposition to these views.
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Thus, the commemorative discourse surrounding these events indicated not only how
the memory o f Bismarck’s career was being constructed, it also reflected the new
political situation in the Reich. One o f the last things that speakers did at these
banquets was to read a variety o f telegrams that had been sent to Friedrichsruh from
all over Germany, which served to enhance the national character o f the celebration as
all o f these telegrams tied Germans into a commemorative web that spanned across
national boundaries.32
While the first few reports from the festivities contained little political
commentary, the national-liberal papers sharpened their tone in the following days as
it became clear that Catholics were critical o f some o f the parts o f the discourse.
National-liberal and Protestant newspapers focused less on the content o f the
celebration and instead reflected more on the political career o f Bismarck, especially
how he had always had enemies who did not understand what was best for Germany.
Although they seldom singled out Catholics, it was still evident that the majority o f
the criticism was directed at them. On April 3, Freiburger Zeitung noted that
Bismarck had always been a man o f the highest integrity who served his country on
the basis o f his strong moral code and religious beliefs. Even during times when his
enemies resorted to lies and deceit to prevent Bismarck from protecting German
interests, he always remained true to his Christian policies. This serves as another
useful example o f the fluidity o f the commemorative discourse. Faced with Catholic
criticism o f the celebration, Bismarck’s supporters resorted to questioning the
32 See for instance Freiburger Zeitung, April 1, 1895.
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Germanness o f their opponents. They then began to claim that Catholics, by opposing
Bismarck on numerous occasions, had stymied the growth o f the Empire, and had it
not been for Bismarck’s steadfast resolve, the Reich would never have reached the
strong position that it currently occupied in the world.

33

The national-liberal and Protestant papers all published extensive accounts o f
the celebrations in Friedrichsruh. The arrival o f the Grand Duke on March 29 was
described in great detail, and naturally, the jovial relationship between the two men
was heavily emphasized. Papers noted that Bismarck certainly knew that the
Badenese Grand Duke had played one o f the most important roles in the unification
process. The papers dedicated even more space to the visit that Wilhelm II paid to the
home o f his first Chancellor. Noting that their relationship certainly had been rocky at
times, the papers placed most o f their emphasis on noting how well the two got along
now, and how critical the Emperor was o f the decision taken by the German
Parliament. The implication was o f course that these were the two men who really
understood how Germans felt about this whole affair and that they were the true
representatives o f popular national sentiment. Once again, this serves as an indication
o f just how apprehensive some o f the old elites were at the prospect o f a new massbased society.
So what were then the Catholic responses to this celebration as it was carried
out around Germany? As we have already noted, though willing to credit Bismarck
with some accomplishments, they were still hesitant about certain aspects o f this
33 See for instance Freiburger Zeitung, April 3; Konstanzer Zeitung, April 5, 1895.
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project. Compared to many o f the earlier commemorations, April 1 did not provide
any major controversies. Still, Catholics did not participate to any great extent in
these festivities. M any national-liberal papers offered the standard criticism o f
Catholics, pointing out that they had not flagged their houses. However, given that
many Protestant citizens failed to do the same thing, this should not be considered any
major divergence from the main ideological currents. What is interesting to note is
that for the most part, Catholics were not overly critical o f the speeches held at these
events. Konstanzer Nachrichen for instance opened their account o f the festivities by
praising M ayor Weber for his speech, noting that it was free from any kind o f political
content and instead focused solely on Bismarck the man, an effort for which the
Catholics were quite grateful, noting how different things had been in the past.34
Furthermore, the paper noted that the speakers had mostly omitted any references to
Bismarck’s domestic policies, since it would have caused controversy. They forgave
speakers for only praising Bismarck, noting that if Catholics were to celebrate one o f
their own, they would do the same thing.35 However, the paper could not refrain from
pointing out that the K ulturkam pf and Bismarck’s treatment o f the Jesuits should serve
as reminders that there had been both positive and negative sides to his reign.36
Other than these relatively mild statements, the only thing that the Catholics in
Konstanz were upset about in regards to the celebration was the hoisting o f a flag on

34 Konstanzer Zeitung, April 3, 1895.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
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the Catholic cathedral. They noted that many o f the city’s religious men and women
had been surprised and angry when they saw the flag. However, it turned out that this
was a prank done by two men who had somehow gained access to the church without
the knowledge o f the religious leadership in the town. Leading clergy members
pointed out that no official order had been given to hoist the flag and that the mistake
had been corrected as soon as people had made them aware o f it.37 Thus, the
celebrations in Baden and in the three cities under investigation here proceeded
smoothly, which, given the contentious status o f Bismarck, illustrate how integrated
Catholics had become into the Empire. Still, we should note that the Catholic papers
around the state remained critical o f some o f the events that had taken place elsewhere
in Germany. In the days and weeks following this event, they paid close attention to
how other areas o f the Empire had celebrated the Emperor, and these discussions are
indicative how Badenese Catholics had begun to view themselves, their state, and its
role in the German Empire. A few days after the celebrations, Pfalzer Bote cited
several of the poems that various speakers and newspapers had proclaimed to the
honor o f Bismarck. In contrast to most o f the speeches held around Baden, these
placed strong emphasis on Bismarck’s domestic policies. It is interesting to note that
the paper criticized these efforts from a Catholic viewpoint and also used them to
portray the Badenese people, both Catholics and Protestants, as better Germans than
most. They claimed that despite the complicated relationship that had existed between
the two confessions in Baden for many decades, they commended the state’s
37 Konstanzer Nachrichten, April 4, 1895.
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population for coming together and celebrating this event in a worthy manner. These
arguments were used to emphasize that Badeners understood how to be true Germans
while others, who were apparently still stuck in a Kulturkam pf mood, did nothing to
further the German cause. These sentiments are interesting as they clearly display that
as Germany had established its role in Europe, and as foreign policy centered on
supporting colonial ventures and a military build-up, both o f which Catholics had
promoted, the latter could use these arguments to portray themselves as true
Germans.38 It also provides evidence that the old north-south split that had
characterized the years prior to and immediately after unification was still present.
Badeners, whether Catholic or Protestant, argued that they were better Germans and
more prepared as their nation-state faced new challenges.
These sentiments were also evident as newspapers reported on the last aspect
o f this celebration, the visit by the Badenese delegation o f mayors to Friedrichsruh on
June 14. Many o f the state’s newspapers, irrespective o f political or confessional
leanings, reported at length about this event. The conversations between Bismarck
and the members o f the delegation were reprinted in detail, and they offer some
interesting insights into how the Badenese delegation viewed themselves and their role
in this commemorative effort.39 The delegates emphasized how grateful the state o f
Baden was towards the old statesman for his efforts throughout his career. They noted
that in times o f severe crisis, such as in the beginning o f the Franco-Prussian War, the

38 Pfalzer Bote, April 7, 1895.
39 See for instance Freie Stimme, May 17, 1895.
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Chancellor had ensured that the Badenese state was secure in the face o f the French
threat. Furthermore, the conversation also focused on how the Badenese people had
united as one in defense o f the fatherland, led by Grand Duke Friedrich. Bismarck
was o f course very complimentary in his remarks, noting that the state had played a
very important role in unifying the Empire, and then especially the Grand Duke.
Bismarck remarked that while many citizens had forgotten how to be true Germans,
the people o f Baden had become ever more German as the Empire grew and expanded
its influence. The old Chancellor even made a joke about the fact that the Badenese
Parliament must be a much nicer place to work these days, at least when compared to
the German Parliament. Furthermore, he noted that Baden had always played a strong
role in the creation and consolidation o f the Empire. During the unification process
the state ensured that the rest o f the southern states would support the unification
effort, and after the unification had been completed, Baden had always attempted to be
one o f the premier states in the Empire. The Badenese delegation used these remarks
to further bolster their case as one o f the important states in the Empire. Claiming that
they had played one o f the key roles in unifying the Reich, they also stressed their
continued support for the Reich and its policies, even when other areas o f Germany
had been more hesitant to follow suit. Bismarck had also inquired as to how the
celebrations o f his birthday had proceeded, and the press noted that the Badenese
bourgeoisie had celebrated the momentous occasion in a worthy fashion.
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The Death of Bismarck and Construction of Bismarck Towers
Throughout his political career, Bismarck had been one o f the most
controversial figures o f the German Empire. Although Bismarck’s relationship with
German Catholics improved after the easing o f the Kulturkampf \ the old Chancellor
had remained a symbol for the mistreatment that many Catholics felt that they had
been exposed to for the first few decades o f the Second Empire. Nonetheless,
Bismarck was obviously one o f the most revered men in Germany during the last half
o f the nineteenth century, and it should come as no surprise that his passing on July
31,1898, constituted a major event in Germany. For many Germans, the death o f
Bismarck, approximately a decade after the passing o f Wilhelm I, meant that the two
giants o f the generation that founded the Empire were now gone. For many, this
symbolized a generational shift in German politics and society that ushered in a new
era in Germany. To Protestants and national-liberals especially, this was vaguely
unsettling, especially considering that the policies and actions o f the new political and
economic leadership often left the old elites unsure about their status. O f course, the
advent of a more modem society with a mass-based political system and a more
diversified economy did little to alleviate the fears o f the old elites, which is one o f the
reasons why they reacted so strongly to the news o f Bismarck’s death.
Although the death o f Bismarck came suddenly, it was not necessarily
unexpected. He had been in declining health for some time, and during the last few
days leading up to his death, newspapers published accounts about what was sure to be
the end o f an era. When the news o f his passing was announced, city councils around
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Baden m et in emergency sessions to decide what would be the proper way o f marking
the tragic event. All council members, even the most staunchly ultramontane ones,
agreed that this constituted an event that needed to be recognized in a variety o f ways.
In Heidelberg, Konstanz, and Freiburg, the councils decided to ring the church bells
between 12-1 pm to let people know o f the passing o f the old Chancellor. Also, on the
same day, members decided to send a telegram to his son and to place a wreath on the
cities’ Bismarck monument. National-liberal papers carried a black band across the
top, and cities were decorated in Trauergeschmuck.40
Immediately after Bismarck’s death, city councils around Baden, as they had
done on so many other occasions, asked each other how they would mark this sad
occasion. The commemorative discourse and protocol was still not solidified, which
serves as another indication o f how citizens reevaluated it as they approached new
situations. The celebrations were quite similar in all cities and included two official
celebrations, one organized by the city and one staged by the university.41
Following these initial displays o f grief, the cities o f Konstanz, Heidelberg,
and Freiburg all organized official Traurfeiers. These events followed a similar
pattern to the ones that had taken place following the death o f Wilhelm I, with no
major differences between the cities 42 The event took place in one o f the main
banquet halls in the city, which was decorated with flowers, wreaths, busts, and

40 St. AH, HUA 219-6, Landes und Reichs-sachen. Die Tod des Fiirsten Bismarcks.
41 Ibid. See also St. AF, C3/79/2, Landessachen. Ehrung des Fiirsten Bismarck.
42 For a detailed description o f Germans’ reactions to Bismarck’s death, see Lothar Machtan, Bismarcks
Tod und Deutschlands Tranen: Reportage einer Tragodie (Miinchen: Goldmann Verlag, 1998).
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portraits o f Bismarck. It is interesting to note that all three cities also had famous
quotes from Bismarck on display, among which “We Germans fear nothing but God”
was the most popular one. Reporting on these events dominated the national-liberal
and Protestant newspapers for the next few days. Similar to the events in 1888 and in
1895, the papers focused most o f their coverage recounting Bismarck’s life while
stressing the contributions that he had made to the German fatherland. This should not
come as a great surprise, given the fact that this was standard procedure when any
dignitary passed away; however, we can also trace a different underlying motive to
these detailed accounts o f Bismarck’s death.
Among the things that many national-liberals and Protestants were concerned
about as the century drew to a close was the fact that people were beginning to forget
just how much men like Wilhelm I and Bismarck had meant to the German fatherland
and how difficult unification had been. They emphasized how Germany had failed to
unify on many other occasions throughout history and that it was not until the arrival
o f these great men that Germany had been able to achieve the goal that so many had
desired for such a long time. Hence, it was not so much the fact that the middle and
end o f the nineteenth century constituted a time when nationalism and national
unification were becoming staples o f European society, but instead the greatness of
these two men that had enabled the creation o f the Second Empire. Thus, not only did
they enhance the reputation o f Bismarck and Wilhelm I, they also tied the fates o f
these two men to the unification and subsequent rise o f Germany, which served to
further enhance the official version o f German nationalism that Protestants and liberals
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had championed ever since the unification.
The ceremony held in Heidelberg will serve as a representative illustration o f
the nature o f these events.43 After having placed a wreath on the city’s Bismarck
monument on the day o f his passing, the city council decided to hold an official
ceremony on August 2 in the main auditorium o f the university. To honor the
deceased, the room was decorated with black lace and a variety o f flower
arrangements. All o f the city’s dignitaries were present, including members o f the city
council, the rector o f the university, and a variety o f high-ranking militaries. Professor
Schafer gave the main speech, in which he emphasized that not only Germany had
suffered a great loss, but the entire world. Similarly to other speeches around the
state, Bismarck was portrayed as the most important man o f the nineteenth century,
who had always striven to preserve world order and peace. Considering Bismarck’s
career, this might seem a highly debatable argument; however, this interpretation of
Bismarck’s actions suited the official version o f nationalism very well. By stressing
that Bismarck had always wanted to preserve peace, speakers could make the
argument that a strong and unified Germany constituted the best means for Europe to
maintain its peace and harmony. Dr. Schafer even suggested that for France,
Bismarck’s actions had been a blessing, as they were better suited to modernize their
country without Alsace and Lorraine. He also noted that due to the fact that France
had always harbored revenge feelings towards Germany, Bismarck had been wise to
maintain a strong German military. As with many other commemorative events, this
43 An extensive description o f these events can be found in Heidelbergs Trauerkundgebung anlasslich
des Todes des Fiirsten Bismarck (Heidelberg: Carl Pfeifer, 1898).
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fit well into the current political context as Germany was debating whether to support
the Tirpitz naval bills. This was also a means o f trying to ensure that Bismarck’s
perceived legacy—the foundation and transformation o f the German Empire into a
major international power— was not lost on the current generation who had not lived
through the humiliating preunification years. Dr. Schafer argued that the reason why
Bismarck was such a great man was that despite what some o f his critics argued, he
had championed causes for every class, ethnicity, and confession. As in any type o f
commemorative effort, these sentiments were stressed to enhance Bismarck’s
reputation and legacy.
Although certain members o f the population were present at this ceremony, it
was not open to the public. To ensure that the German people received ample
opportunity to take leave o f their esteemed Chancellor, city councils around the
Empire organized public celebrations as well. As the century was nearing its end,
mass politics were quickly becoming the new mode o f politics, and in order to control
this discourse, liberals wanted to control the content o f the public celebrations as
well.44 Considering that Bismarck had been one o f their closest allies, they attempted
to take this opportunity to recapture some o f the political momentum. The speeches
held at these public ceremonies were dominated by the notion that when Bismarck had
been in power, things had been much more stable. To be sure, speakers stressed that
Germany was strong as it entered the new century; however, these speeches and texts
also contained a certain amount o f trepidation as new political currents were sweeping
44 See for instance Eley, Reshaping the German Right, 19-40, 203-205.
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across the country.
In Heidelberg, the public ceremony commemorating Bismarck’s death took
place on August 7. City council members asked residents to hoist flags on this date,
which many did.45 The main auditorium was decorated with flags and banners, and all
local organizations, even Catholic ones, were represented with their flags. The
ceremony began with a rendition o f Richard W agner’s funeral march, “Siegfried’s
Death,” which set the tone for the commemorative discourse.
Prof. Adalbert Rohrhurst from Heidelberg delivered the main speech, in which
he outlined many o f the same facts that had been repeated in newspapers and speeches
during the last few days. Most o f his speech was focused on the great deeds that
Bismarck had done for the fatherland rather than the struggles that he had encountered
with the Prussian Parliament, the Catholics, and the social-democrats. These
sentiments were representative o f the speeches in all o f the Badenese cities, and it is
noteworthy that they omitted Bismarck’s struggle with the Catholics, though it
constituted a sizeable part o f his political career. Thus, speakers focused on
Bismarck’s actions that everyone agreed had benefited Germany. There were several
different reasons for this. For one, both the struggles against the Catholic Church and
the social-democrats did not fit well into the commemorative discourse that the
leading members o f society were trying to propagate. After all, they were more
interested in portraying Bismarck as the great unifier and not somebody who had
fought against certain elements o f the German population, no matter how contrary
45 St. AH, HUA-219-6, record from city council meeting, August 1. For information on the
organization o f the celebrations in Konstanz, see St. AK, S II 5576; for Freiburg, see St. AF, C3/79/2.
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their ideas might have been to liberal and Protestant elites. Furthermore, towards the
end o f the nineteenth century, it had become evident especially that the Kulturkam pf
had not been a great success as it had left Catholics stronger and better organized than
before. In addition, the 1890s witnessed the rise o f the Center Party to a position o f
national prominence, and with the rapid growth o f the national Catholic Association, it
was clear that the German Catholics had not been marginalized but instead were in a
position to play important political, social, and cultural roles in the German Empire.
Turning to the Catholic responses to the death o f Bismarck and the subsequent
celebrations, their responses were measured towards the old Chancellor. To be sure,
Catholics were in general a little more reserved when it came to passing judgment on
the recently deceased; however, their apparent appreciation for the character o f
Bismarck was still remarkable, considering the antagonistic relationship between the
two sides.
In all three cities, the Catholic papers carried the news on their first page. The
Pfalzer Bote labeled Bismarck the “greatest political genius.. .the greatest statesman o f
the nineteenth century..

in their ingression.46 Although they were respectful in their

tone, the way in which they described his life was still different than to some o f the
liberal and Protestant papers. For instance, Pfalzer Bote noted that though Bismarck
had unified Germany, he did so with questionable means, especially when dealing
with the Prussian parliament. Furthermore, they took issue with the liberal and
Protestant assertion that Bismarck had been a supporter o f individual rights and
46 Pfalzer Bote, August 1, 1898.
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freedoms. They pointed to both the Kulturkam pf and the anti-Socialist laws as
examples o f the fact that he sometimes had operated outside the law. Still, these
aberrations should not divert Germans from all that he had done for them. After all,
this had been a man whose body and soul were consumed by politics, which
sometimes caused him to act against better judgment.47 Also, by linking their own
fate to the social-democrats, whom they normally were very critical of, the Catholics
seemed to be the force that worked for democratizing Germany, which was very much
a part o f the times.48
In regards to the ceremonies to honor Bismarck, the Catholic press maintained
a relatively low profile. They focused on his role in unification but also discussed the
Kulturkam pf in some detail. They now thanked Bismarck for launching this battle,
since it had helped them grow even stronger as they had to face challenges from the
state. They also claimed that the Kulturkam pf had contributed to integrate Catholics
better into the general population. They maintained that because Catholics had been
forced to organize to survive in such a hostile climate, they were better adapted to this
new and modernized world. O f course, it is questionable how much the Kulturkam pf
helped Catholics become integrated into the new German state, though there is no
question that the 1870s made them stronger and stressed the need for political,
cultural, and social representation. Catholics were still underrepresented in regards to
the sheer number o f people participating in the new social fabric in Germany, but their
47 Ibid.
48 See for instance Freiburger Bote August 2, 1898.
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increased embrace o f various forms o f associations and organizations displayed that
they were well on their way to adapting to a more modem society.
Despite all this positive attention that Catholics heaped on the recently
deceased Chancellor, there were still some signs that they were not entirely
comfortable with the commemorative discourse. On August 8, Freiburger Bote ran an
article questioning why all o f the speakers at these events were Protestant and
national-liberal. After all, if Bismarck had been such a wonderful German, would it
not be fair to assume that persons o f other political and/or religious views were
included in this discourse? They were especially critical o f the fact that the city
council in Freiburg had invited the national-liberal Dr. Fabricius, a known opponent o f
the Church, as the main speaker. Their insistence that he was not an appropriate
choice shows that they were clearly aware o f the stakes at hand. They once again
stressed that they were not opposed to honoring Bismarck; however, it should be done
in the appropriate manner.49 However, due to the fact that even such a staunch
opponent o f the church refrained from making any incendiary comments against the
Catholics during the service shows just how far removed Germany around the turn o f
the century was from the heydays o f the Kulturkampf.
Although the Catholic responses to the death o f Bismarck are illustrative in
displaying just how much they had become integrated into the national
commemorative discourse that surrounded the unification and the founding fathers o f
the German Empire, it is even better for our purposes to analyze their responses to the
49 Freiburger Bote, August 8, 1898.
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almost hysterical desire to construct Bismarck monuments in the wake o f his death.
After all, it is much easier to refrain from harsh words in a eulogy that will relatively
soon be forgotten; it is much more difficult to do so in regards to a permanent fixture
o f the commemorative landscape, which these monuments were destined to be.
The so-called Bismarck tower occupies a special place in the German
commemorative history. As Reinhard Alings has noted, these monuments were
constructed largely after the death o f the Chancellor, and like no other national
monument, they were relatively evenly distributed throughout Germany. Most o f
these monuments were located at a beautiful place, often on a hill as they were also
used as towers from which one could see far into the surroundings. Most o f these
monuments were a combination o f national and local efforts. To be sure, national
organizations had on other occasions attempted to have a particular monument
constructed in many different places throughout the country, however, none had more
success than the Bismarck towers. Hans Walter Hedinger estimates that over 700
monuments were planned and over 500 were build at an estimated cost o f almost
fourteen million Marks.50
On December 3, 1898, the German Student Organization distributed an appeal
to all cities larger than 5,000 people that they should construct one o f these towers to
honor the great statesman. In the appeal, they emphasized that these towers should
serve as symbols o f the great unity that Germany now enjoyed. These towers would
50 Alings, Monument und Nation, 139-140, 235. See also Hans Walter Herdinger, “BismarckDenkmaler und Bismarck-Verehrung,” in Kunstverwaltung. Bau und Denkmalspolitik im Kaiserreich,
ed. Ekkhard Mai and Stephan Waetzoldt (Berlin: Mann, 1981), 279-304.
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connect Germans from all different parts o f the Empire, especially on those occasions
when huge fires would be lit from them, which would connect them as dots throughout
the German landscape. This notion was concurrent with the current view o f
monuments, which should serve as focal points throughout the German landscape that
citizens could use to strengthen their ties to each other and the fatherland. They held a
competition to determine which form would be used. The architect Wilhelm Kreis
won with an entry that envisioned a tall, ten meters or higher, monument that would
have a fire pit at the top that could be used on Bismarck’s birthday as well as on the
summer solstice, which students celebrated as their national holiday. The Student
Organization placed great emphasis on the fact that these monuments should not be
too expensive to construct, which would make it easier for cities o f all sizes to comply
with this request.51 In addition, Kreis’s model was made available to all cities so that
they would ensure that all monuments had the same size, shape, and function. To
make things even easier, students suggested that if a particular city still could not
afford the monument, they could form joint ventures with neighboring towns to share
the cost.52
The city council in Heidelberg was one o f the first to get involved in this
process, though not entirely on its own behalf. In January o f 1899, even before the
announcement o f Kries’ winning entry had been made public, the National Student

51 Parts o f the text from the Student Organization can be found in Alings., 235-236.
52 The entire text can be found in St. AH, AA 79/13, Gemeinde Vermogen. Die Errichtung einer
Bismarksaule.
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Organization contacted the city council and asked that it begin a collection for this
project. Since Heidelberg was one o f the oldest and most prestigious university towns
in Germany, if it supported this project, other German cities were sure to follow.53 In
June 1899, the city council asked the city’s inhabitants for donations, stressing how
important it was that Heidelberg stood at the forefront o f this movement. In this
appeal, the organizing committee, which contained prominent members such as Mayor
Walz, claimed that over 170 German communities had already signed up to join this
project, and it was o f utmost importance that Heidelberg did not appear less patriotic
than other German cities. They also pointed out that this was not a monument that
was associated with a particular political or religious affiliation, but instead one that
would be accessible to all citizens.
The project in Heidelberg generated numerous donations from both students
and the general population. By late 1901, the organizing committee had signed a
contract with Kreis, who agreed to construct a roughly fifteen-meter-high tower at an
approximate cost o f 15,000 Marks. The only issue o f contention between Kreis and
the committee was the size o f the monument. The latter kept pushing for a taller
monument, which he argued would better serve the dignified character o f a city such
as Heidelberg.54 This o f course should come as no surprise as it was in K reis’s interest
to construct as expensive a monument as possible. This correspondence also

53 A good description o f this process can be found in Ursula Schmitt, “Die Bismarksaule von 1903 auf
den Heiligenberg,” in Heidelberger Denkmdle, 7755-1981, ed. Autoren Kollektiv an der Institut det
Universitat Heidelberg (Heidelberg: Verlag Brausdruck, 1982), 51-56. See also St. AH, AA 79/13.
54 St. AH, AA 79/13, letter from Kreis to organizing committee, October 17, 1901.
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illustrates how many factors were involved in the construction o f this monument.
These monuments were not only intended as symbols o f national unification and
strength, but there was also a business side to this that was not to be taken too lightly.
On July 29, the organizing committee and Kreis reached a final agreement, and
construction was started shortly thereafter.55 The construction proceeded without any
major problems, and it was unveiled with a torch parade from the city center to the
tower on January 19, 1903, the anniversary o f the foundation o f the Reich. The choice
o f date signifies that not only was this a monument to honor Bismarck, but it also
commemorated his greatest work: unification. The fact that so many cities
throughout the Empire were constructing these kinds o f monuments and their intent to
have them serve as unifying symbols indicate that they were closely connected to the
commemorative discourse framing unification, not just Bismarck himself. The
population’s reception o f the monument was warm, and there were no dissenting
voices in regards to the cost and/or the appearance o f the monument.56 It is
noteworthy that even Pfalzer Bote participated actively in this process. The
newspaper served as a drop-off station for donations, and the paper also did not voice
any particular criticism in regards to the construction or the reception o f the
monument.57 Once again, this instance serves as a clear indication that the Catholics
in Heidelberg had become very closely integrated into the commemorative discourse.

55 St. AH, AA 79/13, protocol from meeting o f the organizing committee, July 29, 1902.
56 See for instance the favorable account in Pfalzer Bote, January 20, 1903.
57 Noted in St. AH, AA 79/13.
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It should also be noted that this integration process sped up considerably during the
last few years o f the nineteenth century, as the city had been engulfed in confessional
rhetoric just a decade earlier.
If there were no apparent conflicts between Catholics and Protestants in
Heidelberg, the situation was slightly different in Freiburg and Konstanz. In Freiburg,
the process to collect money for a monument was quickly underway. The city was
actually ahead o f the National Student Organization, having on August 12 published in
all newspapers, including the Catholic ones, a call for donations to a proposed
Bismarck monument. The Freiburger Bote played an active role in the process,
publishing the appeal and also serving as one o f the sites where donations could be
made. Initially, the city council sought to combine the proposed monument to
Wilhelm I with the one to Bismarck. As news spread o f the students’ initiative,
however, they decided to construct a separate monument to Bismarck.58 Catholics in
Freiburg, though not opposed to constructing a monument to Bismarck, still
questioned this decision. They argued that given the great services that men such as
Wilhelm I, Bismarck, and General Helmuth von Moltke had rendered the German
Reich, it would be more appropriate to construct a monument that would honor all
these important men.59 Catholics claimed that a joint monument would be more

58 See Freiburger Bote, August 12, 1898. Also, see relevant documentation in St. AF, C3/472/6,
Errichtung eines Denkmals fur den Ehrenbtirgem Bismarck and C3/472/7. Errichtung einer Saule fur
den Ehrenbiirgem Bismarck. It should be noted that the original funds set aside for a joint monument
were never used, instead, another collection was taken up and used for the construction o f the Bismarck
tower.
59 Freiburger Bote, March 24, 1899.
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representative o f the unity o f Germans, and it would serve as a good reminder to the
younger population o f the great services that these men had rendered the fatherland.
The city council decided to proceed with the construction o f a tower, to
comply with what the rest o f Germany was doing at that time. Slightly differently
than in Heidelberg, the city council reached an agreement with the student
organization at the university. Both sides agreed that the students would receive the
property on which to build the monument, as well as the financial resources. In return,
they would be responsible for the construction. Interestingly, the Catholic Church
actually donated the property, which would have been unthinkable a few years back.60
Because the student organization had long been preparing for this moment, they had
already chosen a model constructed by the local artist Oscar Geiges. On July 22, the
groundbreaking ceremony was held, accompanied by a grand celebration in the main
Festhalle in the city. Professor Alfred Dove delivered the main speech, entitled
“Bismarck’s Importance for Old and Young.”61 The speech spanned from the
beginning o f the nineteenth century up until the foundation o f the Empire. Dove
provided his audience with a brief lecture on the course o f German nationalism and
how important Bismarck had been as the man who realized the German dream o f
national unification. He noted that Germany today would not have been so strong had
it not been for the man to whom this monument was dedicated and that especially
today’s generation would be well served in remembering the harsh preunification
60 St. AF, C3/472/7, city council records, June 27, 1899; July 5, 11, 1899.
61 Alfred Dove, Bismarcks Bedeutung fu r Alt und Jung (Freiburg: Mohr, 1899).
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times.62 According to newspaper reports, Catholics greatly appreciated this speech,
which was without political commentary.63 The speech also illustrates how important
it is for nations to be able to not only collectively remember things but also to
collectively forget certain aspects o f history. We have seen throughout this work how
extremely volatile the relationship had been between Bismarck and the Catholics in
Freiburg, yet when faced with the proposition o f joining the German Protestants in the
process o f collective forgetting, they showed no hesitancy o f doing so. Freiburger
Bote even remarked how nice it was to have such a beautiful speech at an event
designed to honor one of the most important Germans o f the nineteenth century.64
They also pointed out that no Catholic should be criticized for participating in this
event, since it was truly a patriotic one.65
The monument was quickly completed and unveiled on July 30, 1900. The
well-attended ceremony included people from all walks o f society, and Mr. Pflieger of
the student organization officially thanked the church and city for being so generous in
donating the land for this great monument. The local papers complimented the
monument, which was described as a fitting tribute to one o f the greatest statesmen o f
the nineteenth century.66 During the next few years, the students o f the city, in a

62 Ibid, esp. 6-8.
63 Freiburger Bote, July 25, 1899.
64 Ibid.
65 Freiburger Bote, July 28, 1899.
66 Heidelberger Tagblatt, July 31, 1900; Freiburger Zeitung, July 31, 1900.
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similar fashion to students in Heidelberg, used the monument on April 1 and June 21
for celebrations o f Bismarck’s birthday and their national holiday. In Freiburg, even
the Catholic student organization took active part in these celebrations as they
repeatedly asked the city council for their help in decorating the city hall, providing
money to buy torches, etc.67
If the construction o f the two monuments in Freiburg and Heidelberg
proceeded without problems, the one in Konstanz proved more difficult to complete.
As in the other cities, in 1898, the city council quickly launched an initiative to collect
money for a monument. On August 19, Mayor Weber appointed a committee to
spearhead the project.68 After some initial research into what other cities planned to
do, the members o f the committee decided to publish an appeal to the city’s
inhabitants to donate money to this project. The appeal stressed the important role that
Bismarck had played in founding the German Empire and his continued service for the
German people throughout his political career.69 It is interesting to note that though
most Badenese cities had employed Catholic papers in this venture, the people in
Konstanz did not contact Freie Stimme, nor was the appeal published in the Catholic
paper. The organizing committee was initially relatively successful in collecting
donations. They received substantial amounts from the local officer corps, some

67 The correspondence between the city council and the various student organizations is documented in
St. AF, C3/472/7.
68 St. AK, SII 5577, Staatsorganisation. Reichssachen. Errichtung eines Denkmals fur den Fiirsten
Bismarck, protocol from city council meeting August 19, 1898.
69 See for instance Konstanzer Zeitung September 25, 1898.
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business men, and local citizens.70 However, as time passed, the rate o f donations
slowed. In March 1900, the committee met and noted that to date they had only
received a little over 5,000 Marks, which would not be enough to construct the kind of
monument worthy o f a man o f Bismarck’s greatness. Still, they continued to discuss
which shape the monument would take, and they noted that it would be a good idea to
hire a local artist, which would perhaps encourage Konstanzers to provide more
donations.71 After deciding that they wanted a life-sized figure o f Bismarck, the
committee invited several local artists to submit models/plans o f their works.
Despite this initiative, Konstanzers provided little support for this project. In
January 1902, local businessman Gustaf Prym asked the other members o f the
committee why they had not met in over nine months. He also noted that people had
now forgotten about the models that were put together, so that they would have to start
from the beginning again if they were to continue this project. In October 1902, the
committee finally met again but came to no conclusion about how the project should
proceed.72 Finally, in October 1903, the city council reprimanded the committee for
its sloppy work, claiming that it was a shame for the city not to have a monument
when other German cities had been successful in honoring the old Chancellor.73 To
make matters worse, in 1904, the city council received a letter from the Alldeutscher

70 Documented in St. AK, SII 5577.
71 St. AK, SII 5577, protocol from committee meeting, March 31, 1900.
72 St. AK, SII 5577, protocol from committee meeting, October 23, 1902.
73 St. AK, SII 5577, protocol from city council meeting, October 18, 1903.
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Verband, inquiring about the project. They noted that many cities around Germany,
several o f them smaller than Konstanz, had been able to construct a monument and
that it was really a shame that such a historically important city as Konstanz was
dragging its feet when it came to producing a suitable monument.74 This letter
displays that the construction o f a local monument was a very complicated process
that did not only reflect local circumstances but national ones as well.
Spumed by this letter, the organizing committee began to contemplate building
a fountain instead. This form o f memorial would be less expensive while still
honoring Bismarck and integrating Konstanz into the national commemorative canon.
However, despite several suggestions for potential designs, it did not encourage more
donations. Around this time, news about the failings o f the committee was beginning
to cause discord in the local population. In the November 18, 1908, issue o f
Konstanzer Zeitung, an angry reader complained that it was really a shame that the
city had not been able to do anything yet. The reader argued that though not all o f the
city’s inhabitants supported Bismarck’s ideas, there should still be enough support
among locals to produce a monument that would make citizens proud o f their city.75
This letter reflects that this project, despite the official fanfare at the outset, had
generated very little support from the local population, including national-liberals and
Protestants. Compared to the heavily debated nature o f Sedan Day, the project failed
to cause any type o f reaction among the local population, negative or positive. This
74 The letter can be found in St. AK, SII 5577.
75 Konstanzer Zeitung, November 18, 1908.
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indicates that residents lacked a strong desire to commemorate Bismarck and that they
were tired o f the ongoing commemorations throughout their province. As our
discussions have revealed, there were numerous projects commemorating many
different events and people, and citizens in Konstanz seemed unenthusiastic about yet
another project.
In late 1910, Gustaf Prym donated 1000 Marks to the project and proceeded to
form his own committee, independent o f the city council. In a meeting with the latter,
he informed them that he would not stop until the city had its own monument, and it
would be a tower, similar to many other cities. Prym announced that Prof. Georg
Wikorp would build the monument on the Raitheberg, just outside the city. Being a
savvy businessman, he also informed the city council that he would construct a new
housing development right below the tower, which should make the council more apt
to support him.76 Following this sales pitch, on February 22, 1911, the city council
proclaimed that the tower would be constructed.77 In 1911, Prym and his committee
put out another appeal to locals that stressed that as a celebration o f the forty years of
peace that Germans had enjoyed as a result o f the actions o f Bismarck, they should
now donate to this monument. This appeal serves as a reminder that supporters o f
various commemorative efforts used current political, cultural, and economic contexts
to gather support for their projects.

76 St. AK, SII 13008, Gemeindeverwaltung. Gemeindevermogen. Gebaude. Die Errichtung eines
Bismarck-Turmes auf dem Raitheberg bei Konstanz, protocol from city council meeting, November 4,
1910. See also Martin Stather, ‘“Uber Alles das Vaterland.’ Wie Konstanz zu seinem Bismarckturm
kam,” Konstanzer Allmanach 34 (1988): 65-66.
77 St. AK, SII 13008, protocol from city council meeting, February 22, 1911.
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This latest appeal resonated better with the local population, and even the
Catholic Church, which owned the land where the monument was to be built, decided
to donate the property to the city.

78

Boosted by this news, Prym went hard to work to

collect money for the monument. There are several letters in the files from companies
and businesses that declared that they at first did not want to give any money, but after
a personal visit from Prym, they decided to do so anyway. This is another indication
o f the difference one person, especially if s/he is an influential member o f the
community, can make for a project o f this nature. Thus, it is important to conduct a
detailed analysis o f these projects, as their origins might not always be as simple as at
a first glance. Prym was also able to attract almost all o f the famous people in
Konstanz in this project. The famous aviator Count Zeppelin donated 1,000 marks,
and when locals witnessed these kinds o f actions, it became much easier for them to
support this venture. In late 1911, construction began, and after less than a year, the
monument was finished. Although Prym had originally told the city council that the
monument would cost about 30,000 Marks, the final tally came to over 36,000. The
city council decided after much debate to subsidize the difference.79
The monument was unveiled on October 18, 1912, with great fanfare. Most o f
the speeches proclaimed how the magnificent tower represented a symbol o f the
German unity and strength. The architect Prof. Georg Wikorp gave the plenary
speech, which was littered with references not only to Bismarck but to German history
78 Stather, ‘“Uber Alles das Vaterland,’” 66.
79 St. AK, SII 13008, protocol from city council meeting, August 26, 1912.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

386
in general. He noted that next year would be the centenary anniversary o f the Battle o f
Leipzig, where Germans took their first steps towards a unified nation-state. His
speech was steeped in references to German mythology, and Bismarck appeared as a
man o f almost god-like proportions who brought unity and happiness to the German
people. (This was not an uncommon theme, as many speakers throughout Germany
OA

portrayed Bismarck in terms o f a deity.)

He finished by noting that though Bismarck

had ensured that Germany had been strong and peaceful for many years, different
foreign powers now threatened its position. Thus, Germans could not rest on their
laurels; this was a critical time in European history, and Germans must continue the
great work that Bismarck had started.81
What is interesting about this the fiery speech at the unveiling is its positive
reception by Catholics. The Catholic Konstanzer Nachrichten noted that the
celebration had been one o f the best ever in Konstanz. They claimed that it had not
been characterized by the “Hurra Patriotismus” that the national-liberals and
Protestants had previously propagated. Instead, this was a celebration o f a true love
for the fatherland and a measure o f the respect that all Germans had for Bismarck,
who had done so much for the German people. They also claimed that this monument
was well worth waiting for since it represented a good indication o f how much locals
valued what Bismarck had done for the fatherland. These sentiments reflected an
increased Catholic acceptance o f Bismarck and his legacy, but they also illustrated that
80 Hedinger, “Bismarck-Denkmaler und Bismarck-Verehrung,” 297.
81 The speech can be found in its entirety in St. AK, SII 13008.
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Catholics were being swept up in the new and more aggressive nationalism that was
spreading in Germany at this time. Germany had recently suffered several foreign
policy setbacks, and they maintained that it was in the best interest o f Germans o f all
classes and confession to stress their own strength and unity in the face o f harsher
times.
Catholics were more receptive to the commemorative discourse to a much
greater extent towards the end o f the nineteenth century than in the immediate postunification years. On the one hand, this was because the commemorative discourse
had changed. Especially after the conclusion o f the Kulturkampf, national-liberals and
Protestants were no longer inclined to use these occasions to launch anti-Catholic
tirades. On the other, this new commemorative discourse also suggested an increased
acceptance o f Catholics in the nation-state. Catholic determination to present their
own version o f Germanness had certainly played a role here, but there were also
additional reasons for the increased acceptance o f Catholics as worthy members of
German society. As Germany entered the twentieth century, colonial ventures and a
sharp growth in the size and importance o f organizational life became two primary
staples o f their society. Catholics played important roles in both o f these
developments, which contributed greatly to their integration into German society.
Hence, to understand better Catholic changes towards the commemorative discourse
surrounding the foundation o f the German Empire, a brief analysis o f their
involvement in colonial ventures and associational life is necessary.
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Catholic Involvement in the Colonial Movement
As historian Wilfried Loth has noted, German Catholics and the Center Party
were initially reluctant to support Bismarck’s imperialistic policies.82 However, as the
Catholic bourgeoisie grew in strength, both economically and politically, their interest
in colonization increased. Beginning in the 1890s, Catholics began to view
colonialism as a religious duty as well as a vehicle to better their status in German
society. After experiencing a political backlash following its decision to reject the
1893 bill to strengthen the military, the Center Party embraced colonialism and a
military build-up. Until the 1907 elections, the Center consistently supported
increased spending on military and colonial ventures, which established them as a
more patriotic party. At the same time as the Center became more accepted on the
national level, the Badenese Center Party established itself as a government-friendly
party on the local level. Throughout this period, Badenese Center politicians went to
great lengths to portray themselves as supporters o f the Reich, the Emperor, and
Baden. Colonialism played an important role in this process as it enabled Catholics to
support these initiatives for the same reasons that the Emperor stressed: to strengthen
Germany’s presence in the colonies, make Germany a stronger world power, gain
important natural resources and markets, and promote the spread o f Christianity.
Finally, because relative confessional peace characterized this period, Catholics

82 Wilfried Loth, “Zentrum und Kolonialpolitik,” in Die Verschrankung von Innen-, Konfessions- und
Kolonialpolitik im Deutschen Reich vor 1914, ed. Johannes Horstmann (Schwerte: Katholische
Akademie, 1987), 68.
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enjoyed better relationship with the ruling national-liberals.
From the 1890s, the Center Party occupied a powerful position in German
politics. Because o f their increased strength, they alone could decide the outcome o f
votes on bills associated with the military and colonialism. Catholics assumed that
supporting these bills would facilitate integration into the Reich and increase their
chances o f eliminating some o f the remaining anti-Catholic legislation, most notably
the ban on certain religious orders. Throughout the 1890s, conservatives and nationalliberals both courted the Center, attempting to strengthen the bond between throne and
altar. Although they refused to permit the Jesuits back in the country, there was a
marked decline in anti-Catholic rhetoric.84
The Center Party, both nationally and locally, tried to convince their
constituency that supporting colonialism would also benefit Catholic missions as
missionaries attempted to convert souls. To be sure, Catholics acknowledged that
there were material reasons for supporting colonial ventures; however, they considered
these secondary to the religious purpose. Catholics also suported colonialism because
it represented an opportunity for the Catholic bourgeoisie to enhance their societal
status. By becoming involved in these projects, Catholics were able to present
themselves as driving forces in Germany’s attempt to enhance its influence around the
world. Some scholars have argued that the emphasis on the missionary element o f
colonialism only served as a way for elite Catholics to sell these ideas to the Catholic
83 Kremer, ed., M itt Gott, 54-55.
84 Loth, “Zentrum und Kolonialpolitik,” 70-71.
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Although bourgeois Catholics certainly used the missionary aspect to gam

mass support for these ideas, it was also evident that Badenese Catholics embraced the
missionary goals wholeheartedly. Throughout the 1890s and the first few years o f the
1900s, local Catholic newspapers stressed how important it was for Catholics to
support the colonial movement, as it constituted one o f the best ways to spread the
Catholic faith. At a time when both the Catholic and Protestant churches struggled
with secularizing trends in society, this became a very important topic for both
confessions.86 Another important factor here was the fact that the Catholics had fallen
behind the Protestant missions in trying to establish themselves in the colonies.87 An
analysis o f the content o f the Catholic press and the Katholikentage during the first
few years o f the twentieth century demonstrates that the colonial movement and the
need to close the Protestant gap in the colonies were topics o f great concern to many
Catholics. The local press often stressed the efforts o f local missionaries or orders,
and citizens throughout Baden were encouraged to support the efforts o f these
individuals. This approach made it easier for locals to identify with the colonial
missions and increased their appeal.
The Katholikentage also served as a tool to propagate and popularize the
missions. During the meeting in Breslau 1909, the Catholic Alois zu Lowenstein held
a speech in which he outlined the reasons why Catholics should support these

85 Ibid., 74.
86 For illuminating examples o f this, see Freie Stimme, June 9, 1899; January 22, 1907.
87 Karl J. Rivinius, “Das Interesse der Missionen an den deutschen Kolonien,” in Die Verschrankung
von Innen-, Konfessions- und Kolonialpolitik, ed. Horstmann, 46-47.
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initiatives. In addition to being a good opportunity for the Catholic faith to grow,
missionary activities were also part o f the duties that every Catholic should fulfill as
part o f their faith. Catholics needed to support missions with both people and money,
otherwise “ .. .Buddha, Mohammed, and Confucius would defeat the Catholic
Church.”88 At the end o f the congress, delegates passed a resolution in which they
proclaimed it a religious and nationalistic duty for Catholics to increase their support
for the missionaries.
Catholic papers in Baden published long excerpts from Lowenstein’s speech
and noted that all delegates had supported his ideas. Freie Stimme claimed that it was
imperative for local Catholics to follow Lowenstein’s advice, and they must not allow
the Protestants to win the race for the hedonistic souls.89 The missionary movement
made it possible for Catholics to support something close to their faith while at the
same time promoting issues that were close to the Emperor’s heart. Catholics could
now claim that their actions would strengthen the German nation. By supporting
Wilhelm II’s fervent desire to increase the number o f German colonies, Catholics were
able to present themselves as patriotic Germans. While there were some
disagreements within the Catholic camp in regards to colonialism, most Badenese
Catholics supported these projects. Although Protestant and liberal accusations o f
Catholic anti-German sentiments grew increasingly rare, they still existed, especially
in conjunction with local and national elections. During these times, Catholics often
88 Quoted in ibid., 49.
89 Freie Stimme, September 16, 1909.
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had to defend themselves against accusations o f un-German behavior, and the colonial
issue was one o f their most commonly cited defenses. To be sure, the confessional
rhetoric was weaker than it had been during the first decades o f the Second Empire,
but remnants o f K ulturkam pf arguments occasionally surfaced. Catholic support for
military build-up and colonial ventures protected them against these Protestants
accusations.
Coupled with their growing political strength, the Catholics’ support for
colonialism also increased their presence and confidence around Baden. When faced
with accusations o f un-Germanness, they could point to several positive remarks
offered by the Emperor in regards to the work o f Catholic missionaries. Center
politicians also claimed that they were involved in these ventures for noble reasons,
not just for material gains. These types o f sentiments became visible in 1905 as the
leading Center politician Mathias Erzberger uncovered many instances o f colonial
mismanagement and poor treatment o f indigenous populations. An intense debate
followed, during which Germans were alerted to some o f the more negative aspects o f
colonialism. Although the end result o f these debates that continued for two years was
that overall funding for colonialism was cut, Center politicians were still able to use
these debates as proof that they were involved in colonialism for noble reasons. In the
aftermath o f the 1907 Hottentot elections, the Center Party refused to allow more
German troops to be sent to put down the rebellions in the colonies, a decision that
Protestants criticized as un-German.90 Answering their critics, Catholics maintained

90 Loth, “Zentrum und Kolonialpolitik,” 79-80.
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that they had been among the strongest supporters o f imperialist and colonialist
policies and that they had done more during the last few years than the Protestants to
help spread the Christian faith.

The Development of Catholic Associational Life
Catholic embrace o f imperialism and colonial ventures helped establish them
as more “trustworthy” Germans in the eyes o f Protestants; however, this was not the
only way in which Catholics became more integrated into the German nation-state.
Another means o f Catholic integration was the growing strength o f Catholic
organizations, and then especially the Volksverein fiir das katholische Deutschland.
This organization was founded in 1890, largely due to the influence o f Ludwig
Windthorst, who viewed it as the most important way to combat the growing threat o f
social democracy. In Baden, this initiative came timely as it coincided with the
reconstitution o f the Badenese Center Party. The latter viewed this new organization
as a useful tool in unifying and strengthening the state’s Catholics. Catholic clergy
also supported this new initiative and as early as 1890 Archbishop Roos stressed the
importance o f this association. From the inception o f the Volksverein, leaders were
clear that it should serve to educate and teach Catholics how to become more
successful citizens.91 In addition, as Hans-Jiirgen Kremer has pointed out, the

91 Hans-Jiirgen Kremer, “Der Volksverein fur das katholische Deutschland in Baden 1890-1933. Ein
Beitrag zur Organisations-und Wirkungsgeschichte des politischen und sozialen
Verbandskatholizismus,” Freiburger Didzesan-Archiv 104 (1984): 211-212; Haider, Katholische
Vereine, 249-251.
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foundation o f this organization should also ensure that the Catholic lower classes did
not succumb to the social-democratic rhetoric.92 The formation o f a local chapter in
Baden was closely tied to the Center Party as nine o f the fifteen members o f the board
were also members o f the Badenese Parliament. The well-known Freiburger Catholic
Ludwig Marbe was elected the first president.93
Despite the support from the Archbishop and leading politicians, it took a
while before the Volksverein began to take root in Badenese society. During most o f
the 1890s, leaders in Baden were frustrated at the slow growth o f the organization, and
they blamed the lack o f success on the reluctance o f local clergy to participate. Many
o f the older clergy members who were still active during the 1890s were unwilling to
commit to this organization, often a result o f the fact that they subscribed to an
outdated version o f a more static society. It was not until the turn o f the century that
the Volksverein began to make inroads among the Catholic population, and then
largely due to the fact that many younger clergy members were appointed parish
priests. Having come o f age in the 1890s, they embraced the new mass-based society
that had developed during the last two decades. Many o f them had become members
in the Volksverein during their time at seminaries, and it was natural for them to
continue their efforts as they got out into the parishes. The lack o f much confessional
strife in the 1890s also negatively affected the movement. Because Badenese
Catholics witnessed their political party grow in strength, they were less inclined to
92 Kremer, “Der Volksverein fur das katholische Deutschland in Baden 1890-1933,” 214.
93 Ibid., 215-216.
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realize the need for these organizations. However, the controversy surrounding the
proposed re-admittance o f the Jesuits in 1901-1902 as well as an intense advertising
campaign by the leaders around the turn o f the century contributed to a strong growth
rate.94 In addition, though the Volksverein did not grow so rapidly, other Catholic
associations did. The Workers Association especially experienced strong growth in
the beginning o f the 1890s, particularly after Pope Leo XIII gave his blessing to these
organizations.95
After the turn o f the century, and especially after Josef Schofer took over the
reins o f the Volksverein in Baden in 1905, it began to grow rapidly and started to play
a very important role in local societies. The organization only had some 9,000
members in 1900, but in 1905, the number had almost tripled. By the outbreak of
World War I, the organization had about 65,000 members, which constituted the third
highest percentage o f Catholic membership among all the German states.96 The
increased cooperation among various Catholic associations also strengthened the
Volksverein. In addition, out in the communities, leading Catholics stressed how
important it was for Catholics to be members o f as many o f these organizations as
possible, and if locals could not afford membership fees, local dignitaries often
subsidized the costs.
One o f the main reasons why these organizations, and especially the

94 Ibid., 225.
95 Haider, Katholische Vereine, 267.
96 Kremer, “Der Volksverein fur das katholische Deutschland in Baden 1890-1933,” 226-227.
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Volksverein, were able to contribute to Catholic integration into Baden and the Second
Empire was their efforts to eliminate remnants o f the reactionary thinking that had
characterized many Catholics during the first few decades o f the Kaiserreich. They
emphasized that Catholics should be active participants in their nation-state, which
would enable them to shape social and cultural aspects o f society as well as help them
in the business world. The Volksverein in Baden also stressed that Catholics should
take advantage o f the progress that Germany had made since 1871.
To accomplish these goals, the Volksverein staged numerous events designed
to educate the Catholic population. Every year after 1892, the association organized
workshops in all major Badenese cities. Participants listened to speeches on how to
improve their lives. They also held courses that spanned over several days, such as the
“social courses” in which workers were taught to avoid the temptations o f the socialdemocrats and instead to be active within the Catholic associational life. In addition,
in major cities, the association would invite famous speakers on a biannual basis.
Last, in the local parishes, clergy members were encouraged to hold monthly meetings
to discuss these topics. Furthermore, in 1905, the Volksverein founded its own press,
which contributed to raising its profile. Catholics were now exposed to workshops
and speeches as well as different pamphlets which they could take home and study on
their own time. Officials encouraged Catholics to spread these pamphlets and
booklets among their neighbors so that as many people as possible would receive these
messages. The Volksverein also published a brochure for their members, which
appeared every two months. The fact that the organization in Freiburg sold two
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thousand brochures on the topic o f social education in 1912 serves as evidence that
Catholics were ready and willing to take part in this information.

07

This serves as an

illustrative example o f a formation o f an imagined community. By sharing the same
printed material, Catholics became closer connected to each other, but also better
integrated into the German nation-state. Through these meetings and pamphlets,
Catholics in Baden were kept abreast o f developments in their state and in Germany,
which enabled them to play a more active role in the cultural, social, political, and
economic affairs o f Baden and Germany.
The close cooperation between the Volksverein and the Badenese Center Party
also ensured that Catholics became more integrated into Baden. Especially after the
formation o f the Great Coalition in 1905, there were increased efforts to coordinate the
work o f the association and the party. Although the organization claimed to be non
political and only a vehicle for the cultural and social education o f Catholics, it was
evident that these two entities served each other’s interests very well. Through their
immediate contact with the Catholic population, they were able to propagate the
Center Party’s political goals, and they contributed greatly to Catholic identification
with the Center Party. This work also enabled the Center Party to homogenize their
party, which was important since their supporters stemmed from many different
classes and sometimes struggled to find common reference points. In addition, since
the Volksverein did much o f the political work for the party, it enabled members o f the
latter to focus on other important work, which constituted a distinct advantage to other
97 Ibid., 232-235.
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political parties. The Volksverein was also very instrumental in aiding the Workers
Association. There was a great deal o f cooperation between the two, both financially
as well as otherwise. As Kremer has pointed out, there was a close correspondence
between the topics that the two would discuss. As soon as the Volksverein began to
stress some kind o f topic, the Catholic Workers Association would take up these
demands in a more political way very quickly thereafter. 98
What this meant for the Catholic population is easy to see. Especially during
the latter part o f the 1890s and the first few years o f the 1900s, the importance o f the
Catholic associations for the continued integration o f Catholics into Baden and the
Reich cannot be overstated. Not only were Catholics able to take better advantage o f
economic opportunities, but they were also able to strengthen their own cause in every
way to a much greater extent than before. Even for the people who were not members
o f these organizations, they were still able to get some o f the information that was
distributed. Catholic papers reported at length about the activities o f these local
associations, and topics were repeated throughout the pages o f the Catholic press.

The Construction of Monuments to Honor Wilhelm I
Finally, we will turn to the construction o f monument honoring the late
Emperor Wilhelm I. Throughout the Second Empire, Catholics were supportive o f the
Emperor and honored his birthday and other important milestones. Thus, the
construction o f monuments to his honor were not nearly as controversial as some o f
98 Ibid., 239-241.
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the other commemorative efforts, but their prominence in Baden and the Empire
towards the end o f the nineteenth century merits a brief look at the discourse
surrounding these events. As many scholars have pointed out, the persona o f the
Emperor was perhaps more than anybody else tied to the successful unification o f the
Empire and the rise o f Germany on the international scene." Although Bismarck and
military leaders such as Moltke were considered instrumental in unifying the nation
state, Wilhelm I stood above everybody else in this category. The fact that the vast
majority o f Germans, irrespective o f class, ethnicity, or confession, appreciated his
personality, especially compared to Wilhelm II, contributed to making him a very
popular figure to commemorate. Badeners constructed monuments to his honor not
only after his death but also in conjunction with his centenary birthday in 1897, an
event that was celebrated with great fanfare throughout the Empire.
Konstanz, though it celebrated the centenary anniversary o f W ilhelm’s birth in
grand style, did not construct a monument to his honor after his death. Although in
1879 local artist Emil Einhardt had presented a bust to the city, which was placed in a
park in the center o f the city, no additional ventures were undertaken.100 As became
evident during the construction o f a Bismarck monument, the city and its locals
seemed reluctant to participate in the monument hysteria that was characterizing
Germany at the time, so the lack o f monument should not come as a great surprise.
On March 23, 1888, shortly after W ilhelm’s death on March 9, the Freiburg city
99 See for instance Alings, Monument und Nation, 105-107.
100 See St. AK, SII 2955, Gemeinde-Vermogen. Die Colossalbtiste des deutschen Kaisers Wilhelm I.
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council began collecting money for a monument honoring the man who had done so
much for the German nation.101 They encountered numerous difficulties from the
outset o f this project. To be sure, in the immediate aftermath o f W ilhelm’s death, the
organizing committee received a good number o f sizable donations, but as time
passed, donations were far and few between. In addition, the committee argued about
what type o f monument they should build. Some claimed that since the money was
not sufficient for a full-sized statue, they should just construct a bust, while others
argued that a bust was not worthy enough, especially since just about every city in
1 AA

Germany already had one o f these.

Furthermore, as the death o f Wilhelm became

more distant, people maintained that it might be a good idea to include other people
who had been instrumental in unifying Germany as well. Among the names that were
brought up, Bismarck, Moltke, and Crown Prince Friedrich were among the most
popular ones. These were not unusual sentiments, as these three figures were all tied
closely together to the unification o f the Reich. Towards the later part o f the
nineteenth century, it was not uncommon for Germans to commemorate several
different individuals in one and the same monument. Given the number o f statues that
were being constructed all over Germany, this was one o f the ways in which local
communities cut down on expenses while still ensuring that they participated actively
in the honoring o f important people and events.
Despite the initial effort o f the members o f the organizing committee, they
101 St. AF, C3/467/1, Staatsachen. Die Errichtung eines Denkmals des deutschen Kaisers Wilhelm I,
protocol from city council meeting, March 23, 1888.
102 St. AF, C3/467/1, protocol from committee meeting, May 4, 1889.
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were not able to collect enough funds to construct what they considered a worthy
monument. During the last years o f the nineteenth century, there was a new push for
creation o f a monument, largely sparked by the centenary celebrations o f Wilhelm I ’s
birth in 1897, but once again, despite a promising start, the collection drive was unable
to sustain enough momentum. From time to time over the next few years, there were
attempts to revive the project, but to no avail. Throughout the entire process,
committee members could not reach a decision on what type o f monument to construct
nor where to place it. As in Konstanz, the success o f the projects was not only
dependent on the willingness o f the people to donate money but also on the abilities o f
the organizing committee to act decisively. No doubt the slow manner in which the
committee in Freiburg was handling this manner did not make it any more enticing for
people to contribute money to this project. This also provides evidence that as
Germany was entering the twentieth century, many Germans had become rather tired
o f these commemorative efforts. Since the collective memory o f the unification had
been secured in statues, text books, and various holidays, the perceived need for new
monuments and ceremonies as means to consolidate the German nation-state was not
as immediate as it had once been. In late 1913, the committee decided to abandon the
project and instead use the money on rebuilding and strengthening local society.103
Although citizens in Konstanz and Freiburg failed to produce a monument to
Emperor Wilhelm, the people o f Heidelberg managed to do so. On March 29, 1888,
shortly after the death o f the Emperor, the city council voted to construct a monument

103 St. AF, C3/467/1, protocol from city council meeting, September 15, 1913.
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to honor the great achievements o f the late Wilhelm, especially his actions as leader o f
the great German army that unified Germany in 1871.104 They formed a committee
and began to debate what type o f monument that they should build. After the initial
collections, in which all types o f associations and organizations participated, including
the local Catholic student association, they decided on constructing a bust, which at
the time was all they could afford. On July 1, 1899, the city council published an
appeal in all major newspapers emphasizing how important it was for the city of
Heidelberg to construct a monument to W ilhelm’s honor. Not only were many other
German cities doing the same thing, but they also noted that the city had enjoyed a
prosperous economic period, so that there should not be a problem to collect enough
money for a great monument.105 The city council took a very active role in collecting
money as they helped organize concerts, plays, and other cultural events where the
proceeds would go to the fund for constructing a monument.106 Over the next few
years, donations arrived at a steady pace, and the organizing committee actually
decided that they had more money to spend than what was required for a bust.107
Throughout this whole process, the organizing committee also took great care to

104 St. AH, UA 73-1, Gemeinde Vermogen. Die Errichtung eines Denkmals fur Kaiser Wilhelm I,
protocol from city council meeting, March 29, 1888. See also Meinhold Lurz, Das Denkmal Kaiser
Wilhelm I. au f dem Ludwigsplatz in Heidelberg. Ein Symbol der wilhelminischen Gesellschaft.
Kunsthistorisches Institut der Universitat Heidelberg. Veroffentlichungen zur Heidelberger Altstadt.
Heft 11, 1975, 1; Ellen Aamot Pabst, Das Reiterdenkmal fu r Wilhelm I. au f dem Uni-Platz von K.A.
Donndorf (Heidelberg: Unpublished thesis, University o f Heidelberg, 1981), 1.
105 See for instance Heidelberger Zeitung, July 1, 1889.
106 See for instance St. AH, UA 73-1, protocol from city council meeting, March 22, 1890.
107 St. AH, UA 73-1, protocol from meeting o f the organizing committee, February 19, 1897.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

403
involve the general public. As the plans changed from a bust to a fountain with a bust,
they placed the model o f the proposed monument on display in the city, encouraging
locals to offer their opinions. This shows that this project was much more closely tied
into the daily lives o f the local population. One o f the reasons why the other two
projects failed was that they remained hidden from public view. The people in
Freiburg and Konstanz had little or no idea what the organizing committee was doing
and thus could not offer their opinions, negative or positive, on the proposed models
or places for the monument.
On April 4, 1898, Heidelberger Zeitung remarked that though it was nice to
see that the city had collected enough money to have something other than a bust
constructed, and they noted that the structure certainly was innovative, they disliked
its aesthetics, which was much too complicated.108 No doubt influenced by local
popular opinion, the organizing committee invited Professors Janssen and Schill, who
had designed the structure, to a discussion about how the model could be improved.
Although the two artists agreed to the changes that the organizing committee
suggested, the latter finally decided to reject their design at the end o f 1900. In their
justification o f their decision, the city council members noted that they did not want to
proceed with a monument that obviously did not resonate with the local population.109
The committee, bolstered by the fact that people were still donating money to
the project, now decided to construct a full-sized equestrian monument o f Wilhelm,
108 Heidelberger Zeitung, April 13, 1898.
109 St. AH, UA 73-1, protocol from city council meetings, November 13, 14.
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similar to the famous statue o f the Emperor erected on the Hohensyburg.110 They
invited Prof. Alfred Donndorf from Karlsruhe, who had constructed a Bismarck bust
in the city, to come up with a model o f the monument.111 On May 10, 1900, Donndorf
presented a model to the city council. Originally, the organizing committee wanted to
place only the top o f the monument on display; however, since they feared that people
might confuse this monument with the last model, they asked Donndorf to construct
an entire replica o f the proposed monument.

119

The monument was put on display in

city hall on October 16, presenting the public yet another opportunity to offer their
opinions on the proposed statue. This time, the local reception was much warmer,
though the organizing committee still had some minor suggestions to offer
Donndorf.

113

After some negotiations between the committee and the artist, on April

30, 1901, a contract was signed between the two parties that declared that he would
build the proposed monument on the Ludwigs Square, and that it would be unveiled
on October 18, 1901 (Figure 2). Given the short time Donndorf had to complete the
project, it should come as no surprise that the date for the unveiling was postponed to
December 5, the birthday o f Grand Duchess Luise o f Baden, W ilhelm’s daughter, a
fact that was not lost on the organizing committee.114

110 For a detailed discussion o f this monument, see Alings, Monument und Nation, 125-126.
111 Lurz, Das Denkmal Kaiser Wilhelm I, 5.
112 Ibid.
113 Heidelberger Zeitung, October 17, 1900. The proposed changes were discussed during a city
council meeting on January 7, 1901.
114 St. AH, UA 73-1, protocol from city council meeting, September 21, 1901.
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Figure 2. Emperor Wilhelm I monument in Heidelberg. (Reprinted from Erich
Marcks, Wilhelm I. Rede bei der Enthiillung des Kaiserdenkmals zu Heidelberg am 5
Dezember 1901. (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1902).
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The unveiling took place in the presence o f a number o f famous guests,
including Grand Duke Friedrich, his wife, their two sons, and a number o f important
Badenese military and political officials. The day began with a reception at the train
station as the royal family arrived in town. After locals had received an opportunity to
greet their rulers during a parade through the city, the dignitaries arrived at city hall.
Interestingly, the first piece o f music that was played was the same piece that had been
played at the peace celebration in 1871, indicating how closely the persona o f
Wilhelm I was still tied into the unification o f Germany. History professor Erick
Marcks gave the plenary speech, which was well received by those in attendance.115
His speech was divided into three parts, the first one outlined why the city o f
Heidelberg had decided to honor Wilhelm with this monument. Marcks pointed to the
fact that the city had come together admirably in the commemorative project to honor
the Emperor. He asserted that the monument should be interpreted both as a symbol
o f all o f the great things that had happened to Germany, but also as a symbol o f the
admirable characteristics that Wilhelm I had possessed. He also claimed that this
monument served as a good illustration o f the fact that Wilhelm really was the
embodiment o f the greatness o f Germany. As had become evident ever since
Germany was unified, it had acquired a more and more important position in Europe,
and much o f this was o f course due to the work o f the Emperor. Wilhelm both

115 The speech in reprinted in Erich Marcks, Wilhelm I. Rede bei der Enthullung des Kaiserdenkmals zu
Heidelberg am 5 Dezember 1901 (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1902).
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provided a good role model and personified the Empire.116
In the second part o f his speech, he outlined W ilhelm’s life. Highlighting
certain parts o f his personal history, Marcks sought to demonstrate that the Emperor
had possessed admirable characteristics such as courage, honor, dignity, and faith.
Although surrounded by many strong-minded statesmen, Wilhelm had always been
able to maintain power with a firm grip, and the Emperor was always the one who
made the final decision, though he was not above taking sound advice. Naturally,
Marcks emphasized the fact that Wilhelm I had been one o f the first people to
recognize the German desire for unification, and he was the one who enabled the
realization o f this dream. Marcks left others such as Bismarck out o f his speech and
credited Wilhelm with having single-handedly led Germany to unification.117 In the
third part o f his speech, Marcks noted that the equestrian statue was very fitting as it
provided locals with a suitable picture o f the grandiose and noble nature o f the late
Emperor, which also symbolized the German spirit.118
After the speech, people walked over to the Ludwigs Square, where the mayor
held the unveiling speech. In his remarks, Mayor Wilckens noted that it was
admirable that the city had decided to construct one o f these monuments as Germany
was now dominated by a new generation, which had not been fortunate enough to be
part of the momentous events o f 1870-71. Indeed, there was a risk that this new

116 Ibid., 4-7.
117 Ibid., esp. 10-13.
118 Ibid., 31-32.
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generation would forget the great deeds that people such as Bismarck and Wilhelm
had done for the German people if they were not reminded o f it by statues such as this
one. He furthermore noted that for the older generation, this was also nice because it
reminded them that they should be very grateful for these new and better times and
that the monument should always serve as a reminder o f how Germans had struggled
for unity for so long. Last, he noted that these types o f monuments should serve as
glue that ties the German people ever closer together, neatly summarizing what
contemporaries thought about these monuments.
After the unveiling, there was a banquet, during which even representatives o f
the Catholic Church were among those giving the many speeches. In his short
remarks, Catholic Professor Hausrath noted that this statue served the city well, and he
also thanked the mayor for being such a good leader, one who long avoided any strife
between church and state.119 In the aftermath o f the celebrations, Pfalzer Bote noted
that they approved o f the ceremony and that the monument lacked any offending
symbolism. As further proof o f how integrated the Catholics had become into the new
nation-state was the fact that the paper did not offer any type o f criticism o f the
celebrations. To be sure, the Catholics had always held more positive attitudes
towards the Emperor than other officials. It is, however, still interesting that just a few
years after Bismarck’s death, the Catholics now did not attempt to challenge the
official discourse at all. Indeed, they participated in the cementing o f the national
identity, though they were still a bit more neutral than the national-liberal papers, in a
119 Lurz, Das Denkmal Kaiser Wilhelm I, 13-15.
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fashion similar to the rest o f the German population.120
Catholic attitudes towards the efforts to honor Wilhelm I illustrate the
widespread acceptance o f the commemorative discourse surrounding the Emperor. To
be sure, there had never been a great deal o f controversy in regards to the Emperor,
but the early years o f the Kaiserrerich witnessed some minor disagreements between
Catholics and Protestants about how to celebrate him. However, as the nineteenth
century drew to a close, Catholics and Protestants were able to find sufficiently large
commemorative space to remember Wilhelm, further uniting the Germans. Catholic
acceptance o f and inclusion in the commemorative discourse relating to events and
persons associated with the unification o f the Reich also indicate that they had become
accepted as worthy members o f the German nation-state. Although other factors such
as a growing political strength and a strong presence in the colonial movement aided
Badenese Catholics as they struggled to become Germans, their refusal to be
submerged in the Protestant and national-liberal version o f nationalism in the end
helped to facilitate their integration into the German nation-state. Although the
commemorations o f the foundation o f the Reich and o f such historic figures as
Bismarck and Wilhelm I remained somewhat controversial in the 1890s and early
1900s, they were much more coherent than in previous years. Most notably,
Protestants and national-liberals usually refrained from including any anti-Catholic
rhetoric in these events. This decision reflects both their loss o f political and
economic power and their inability to shape the commemorative discourse in a way
120 Pfalzer Bote, December 6, 1901.
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that they desired. Catholic insistence on presenting and promoting their sense o f
Germanness enabled integration into the Empire as Protestants and Catholics were
forced to reconcile their competing versions o f what it meant to be German. O f
course, this did not mean that these commemorations were completely harmonious,
but compared to the first few decades o f the Second Empire, the commemorative
discourse was more homogeneous, reflecting a greater sense o f unity. Protestants
were prepared to accept Catholic versions o f patriotism while Catholics were prepared
to honor figures such as Bismarck, who had been one o f their greatest enemies for
much of the Kaiserreich. To be sure, there was still confessional conflict as World
War I erupted, but Catholics and Protestants lived in greater harmony at that time than
they had for many years.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION

In this work I have attempted to shed light on how Badenese Catholics
negotiated a complex web o f loyalties as they integrated into the Second German
Empire. Although most Catholics in Baden as elsewhere in the Empire had supported
a Grossdeutsch solution to the German question, the 1871 unification forced them to
accept a new nation-state where they constituted a minority. M any previous scholars
have characterized Catholic integration into the Kaiserreich as a gradual acquiescence
into a dominant Protestant milieu. However, this investigation o f Catholic attitudes
towards the commemoration o f the wars o f unification has illuminated how Catholics
maintained and manifested their own version o f Germanness within the larger
Protestant Germany. Despite opposition from Protestant-dominated national and state
governments, Badenese Catholics successfully preserved parts o f their pre-1871
identities. These sentiments, most notably loyalties to Catholics in Austria and the
Pope in Rome, were incorporated into the new Catholic national identity.
We have been able to reach these conclusions by analyzing how Badenese
C atholics view ed the official com m em orative discourse surrounding the u n ification o f

the Empire. By opposing parts o f the Prussian and Protestant-dominated nationalist
message that surrounded these commemorations, Catholics constructed an alternative
discourse that better represented their identities. Thus, throughout the Second Empire,
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two different versions o f German national identity coexisted, if uneasily. One o f the
central arguments o f this work is that the construction o f German national identity in
the Kaiserreich should be viewed as a continuous debate between the Protestant and
Catholic versions o f Germanness. These two versions interacted with each other and
helped shape the new national identity. The regional and religious affiliations of
Badenese Catholics were not subsumed by a Protestant and Prussian-dominated
national identity. Instead, competing Catholic and Protestant understandings o f
German national consciousness constituted national identity in Imperial Germany.
Thus, despite being politically and economically disadvantaged, Badenese Catholics
were able to exercise great influence on the construction o f identity in the new nation
state.
In the initial postunification period, liberal and Protestant elites largely
controlled the commemoration o f unification, which served as one o f the most
important building blocks for the new national identity. Because they controlled most
o f the economic, political, and cultural capital in Imperial Germany, they were able to
shape the official discourse to their liking. Already from the outset o f these
commemorations, it was evident that they would contain an anti-Catholic bias. The
fact that Protestant Prussia had defeated two Catholic powers, Austria and France, on
the road to unifying Germany was certainly not lost on Protestants in Baden.
Although Baden had sided with Austria in 1866, Protestants and liberals elected to
neglect this war in their attempt to create a homogeneous national identity based on
Protestant values. As Ernst Renan noted over a century ago, collective forgetting is
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part o f what makes up a nation, and Badenese Protestants conveniently forgot their
own pro-Austrian policies in their attempt to fit into the new national identity. In
addition, the struggles between church and state in Baden, which witnessed the first
German K ulturkam pf meant that Protestant and liberal elites utilized commemorations
o f the unification to attack the Catholic Church. Hence, these commemorations
became vehicles that Protestants and liberals used to consolidate their political,
economic, and cultural power, which is one o f the reasons why they became so
contested. These ceremonies were not just a reflection o f a community’s desire to
remember a certain event, but they also constituted means o f acquiring and
consolidating power in society.
In conjunction with most official acts o f commemorating the unification,
especially during the first decade o f the Empire, Catholics faced various anti-Catholic
sentiments. Although this discourse initially placed Catholics on the defensive, their
response was anything but conciliatory. Instead o f acquiescing to the pressures from
the Protestant and liberal elite, Badenese Catholics insisted on maintaining their own
view o f the German nation, which contained loyalties to both the Pope as well as their
fellow Catholics in Austria. By opposing much o f the official commemorative
discourse, Catholics were able to use the celebrations o f German unification to
manifest their own identities. With the exception o f Sedan Day, previous scholars
have often ignored the contested nature o f the commemorative discourse, which led to
an underestimation o f how successful Catholics were at influencing the construction o f
German national identity. For instance, by utilizing the debates surrounding the
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construction o f monuments such as the Siegesdenkmal in Freiburg, Badenese
Catholics drew attention to the plight o f veterans o f the Austro-Prussian War. By
doing so, they ensured that this war, or perhaps more importantly, Bismarck’s
behavior in the period leading up to the war, was not forgotten. In a similar fashion,
Catholic opposition to Sedan Day guaranteed that the often virulent anti-Catholic
rhetoric that was part o f this celebration never became part o f the new national
identity. By boycotting official celebrations, by keeping their children home from
school, by staging counter-celebrations, and by using the press to debate the merits o f
the celebrations, Catholics created an alternative discourse.
Throughout these debates, Catholics had to endure frequent accusations o f
harboring anti-German feelings. Rather than ignoring liberal and Protestant
allegations that Catholics were Vaterlandslose, Catholics utilized these debates to
present themselves as better Germans. Contesting the official discourse, Catholics
insisted that Protestants were lesser Germans who simply used nationalist sentiments
for other means, such as gaining political or economic power. Hence, Protestants and
liberals did not understand the true requirements o f patriotism, whereas Catholics
nurtured purer nationalist feelings. In these debates, Catholics utilized the Protestant
accusations o f anti-German sentiments to prove that they were more intent on
preserving the strength o f the German nation. In a sense, Catholics presented
themselves as being the opposite o f the stereotypical Protestant, who was allegedly
materialistic, divisive, and shallow. In fact, these debates, which most often took
place in the press, became one o f the most important means for Catholics to manifest
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their own identity. Especially during the first two decades o f the Kaiserreich,
Catholics were very adept at using the Protestant Other to construct and strengthen
their own identities.
While Catholic opposition to the official commemorative discourse
surrounding unification constituted one o f the most important means o f manifesting
their identities, they also used other ways o f exercising influence on the process o f
nation building. By publicly celebrating events such as papal anniversaries and other
religious holidays, Catholics not only staked claim to the public sphere but also to part
o f the new German identity. Catholic loyalties to the Pope and Rome constituted the
most contentious issues during the initial decades o f the Kaiserreich. Protestants were
reluctant to accept that Catholics were able to maintain loyalties to both Rome and
Berlin. To German Protestants, whose church was organized on the state level, there
was something inherently anti-German about these loyalties. However, what they
failed to understand was that these two identities were not exclusive, but
complementary. Badenese Catholics were prepared to sacrifice their lives for the
German Empire, as was evident in the Franco-Prussian War, while simultaneously
professing a genuine concern for the well-being o f the Pope. When Badenese
Catholics gathered in the streets to commemorate the twenty-fifth anniversary o f Pope
Pius IX ’s election as Pope in June 1871, they honored him, but they also engaged in
an act o f nation building. Especi ally during the first decade o f the Kaiserreich, which
was characterized by harsh anti-Catholic rhetoric, Catholic displays o f their identity
enabled them to claim an important part o f the public sphere. Considering that the
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construction o f national identity largely took place in the rapidly growing public
sphere, it became crucial for Catholics to exhibit a strong presence in the public arena.
These debates also illustrate how central confessional affiliations were to the
construction o f national identity. W hen Catholics and Protestants debated the nature
o f national identity, they most often did it in confessional terms. The great
controversy surrounding the question o f how to commemorate Bismarck’s eightieth
birthday serves as a good example o f the fact that confessional sentiments always
became a part o f the discussion. As Catholics and Protestants debated whether to
honor one o f the founding fathers o f the Empire, they were carrying out a very public
debate about the composition o f their national identity, and most o f this debate
centered on religious questions. Although Catholics agreed that Bismarck had
rendered great services to the fatherland, they still could not ignore the injustices that
he had done to the Catholic Church. By highlighting how Bismarck, who occupied
one of the central positions in the Protestant version o f national identity, had abused
Catholics, the latter presented their own view o f their identity and recent German
history. By using Bismarck and his supporters as Protestant Others, Catholics were
able to present themselves as better patriots. These very public controversies reinforce
the notion that the construction o f German identity was not very cohesive, but should
rather be viewed as a constant source o f conflict between different groups in German
society.
The debates about how to commemorate Bismarck also point to a different
Catholic interpretation o f nationalism. Supported by the recent historical events,
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Protestants and liberals viewed nationalism and nationalist sentiments as a driving
force that had unified Germany and would enable the Empire to assume the most
powerful position in European society. Thus, the Protestant and liberal version o f
nationalism did not only look backwards in history, but forward as well. Catholics on
the other hand were more hesitant about the absolute value o f the nation-state and less
optimistic about the future. To be sure, these fears stemmed partly from the
Kulturkam pf and their new minority status in the Empire, but they also reflected the
fact that Catholics based their new national identity on old cultural and religious ties
that predated the advent o f the nation-state. Although consolidation o f national states
constituted one o f the key features o f nineteenth-century European society, Badenese
Catholics still clung to older non-national aspects o f their identity, including loyalties
to the Pope. It is important to recognize that this did not mean that Catholics were
disloyal to Wilhelm I and the Empire, it simply meant that they comprised their
loyalties in a slightly different manner. No matter how fiercely Protestants opposed
this version o f Germanness, it still became part o f the national fabric.
The different Catholic and Protestant interpretations o f their national identity
also illustrate the need to reconsider the unifying effects of nationalism. To be sure, as
the nineteenth century drew to a close, Catholics and Protestants grew more integrated
into an increasingly homogeneous nation-state, but the level o f homogenization must
not be overestimated. By applying the newly popularized language o f nationalism,
Protestants and Catholics in Baden often used the commemorative discourse
surrounding unification to preserve and sometimes intensify already existing
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differences. Towards the backdrop o f an emerging fixation on the creation o f national
identity, Catholics and Protestants used the rhetoric surrounding these
commemorations to solidify their own views o f German history and society. As
scholars have demonstrated over the last decade, confessional antagonisms constituted
one o f the most important aspects o f Imperial Germany, and it would be incorrect to
assume that nationalist sentiments simply glossed over these differences. Instead, to a
large extent, confessional differences came to constitute important parts o f German
nationalism, which often meant that nationalist sentiments divided as much as they
unified.
Given the fact that Protestants and liberals controlled much o f the official
discourse surrounding unification, did this mean that Badenese Catholics were not as
integrated into the Kaiserreich as Badenese Protestants? During the first few years o f
the Second Empire, and especially during national and local Kulturkampfe, Catholics
often complained about being labeled second-class citizens. However, Catholic
refusal to be marginalized, and their determination to display their identity in a public
manner, enabled them to achieve a degree o f national integration that they would
otherwise not have been able to reach. Here it is important to note that they were not
integrated into a Protestant national identity, but into an identity that comprised both
Catholic and Protestant sentiments. Furthermore, this means that the level o f Catholic
and Protestant integration into the Second Empire needs to be reconsidered. Neither
confession was able to incorporate the other into an exclusive version o f national
identity; instead, the two versions coexisted, sometimes uneasily, throughout the
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Second Empire. To some extent, it is misleading to speak about Catholic and
Protestant integration into the new nation-state. Instead o f discussing confessional
integration into the new national identity, it would be more appropriate to analyze how
Catholic and Protestant versions o f identity interacted with and shaped each other to
comprise German national identity
Most scholars now agree that Catholic resistance towards the Kulturkam pf and
its attempt to create a nationally unified culture left them stronger and more unified
than prior to the conflict between church and state. However, what most scholars have
failed to recognize is what this meant for the creation o f a German national identity.
Because Catholics were able to maintain and manifest their version o f national identity
throughout the K ulturkam pf years, and because they were strengthened by this
experience, the K ulturkam pf to some extent divided the German nation. Rather than
eliminating the Catholic version o f Germanness from the national consciousness, the
Kulturkam pf strengthened Catholic determination to prove their worth and value to
Germany. Hence, the Kulturkam pf did not unify Germans but rather offered
Protestants and Catholics opportunities to manifest their different versions o f national
identity. Furthermore, this illustrates that the German national identity was not a
Protestant or Catholic construct, but rather comprised an ongoing debate about what
constituted “German.” This in itself does not diminish the power o f German
nationalist feeling, but it forces a reevaluation o f how national identity is composed
and recognition that competing versions o f Germanness could be part o f the national
fabric. The internal mechanisms o f the construction o f national identity were more
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complicated and divisive than scholars have previously recognized. In a similar
fashion to how Alon Confmo and Celia Applegate have shown how the Heimat
constituted an important building block for German national consciousness,
confessional differences also made up different components o f the nationalist
framework. Just as the local Heimat became a vehicle to understand the national,
Catholic and Protestant sentiments became vehicles that Badeners used to adapt to the
new national identity. If Badenese Catholics could infuse the new national identity
with enough familiar sentiments, the adjustment to a new identity would not be as
difficult as if they had to adapt to a completely new construct.
In addition to the increased strength that Badenese Catholics gained from
surviving the Kulturkampf, their increase in political power, the growing success of
Catholic associations, and Catholic support for the colonial movement all enabled
them to exercise more influence on the creation o f national identity. It has been
evident throughout this work that Badenese Catholics utilized many aspects o f a more
modem society to manifest and strengthen their identity. Although during the past
decade scholars have begun to revise the traditional view o f Catholics as backwards
and antimodem, there still needs to be more research done in regards to the Catholic
embrace o f modernity. Especially after 1890, as mass politics and a growing public
sphere increasingly defined German society, Badenese Catholics proved adept at
taking advantage o f these new conditions. The growing political power o f the
Badenese Center Party after 1888 enabled their constituents to manifest better their
view o f German national identity.
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After the first couple o f decades o f the Kaiserreich, there were not nearly as
many heated debates about the commemorations o f the wars o f unification. To some
extent, this reflected the fact that enough time had passed for Germans to become
more comfortable in their new nation-state. However, the decreased tension also
stemmed from the fact that Catholics were in a much stronger political, social, and
economic position compared to the first decade o f the Second Empire. Although still
politically, socially, and economically disadvantaged compared to Badenese
Protestants, Catholics were closing the gap, which enabled them to exercise more
influence on the construction o f national identity. O f course, this did not mean that
confessional discord was disappearing from Baden and Germany. Indeed, it is one o f
the central tenets o f this research that throughout the Kaiserreich, confessional
affiliation largely determined how citizens lived their lives. However, during the last
couple o f decades o f the nineteenth century, Catholics and Protestants were more
prepared to accept each other’s version o f national identity. This also reinforces the
idea that we have to view nationalism and national identity as a constant negotiation
between different forces. Although this negotiating process was not as conflict-ridden
by the early twentieth century, it was still fraught with tension as Catholics and
Protestants debated the nature and character o f the German nation. At the same time,
the growing political, social, cultural, and economic power o f Catholics meant that
Protestants and liberals were not in a position where they could dismiss Catholic
versions o f Germanness. Instead, by the 1890s, Catholics and Protestants had reached
more agreement on what constituted their national identity. Here, it is important to
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note that this did not mean that one confession had been subsumed by the other’s
version o f Germanness, but rather that they had agreed on the very complex and
varying nature o f national consciousness.
In this context, we should also note that the different situations that Catholics
in Konstanz and Freiburg encountered compared to the ones in Heidelberg supports
these conclusions. During the 1860s and early ‘70s, Catholics in Heidelberg were in a
situation more similar to what Catholics all around Baden were in the 1890s. They
were better established; they enjoyed more amicable relationships with the Protestants,
and political, economic, social, and cultural power was more evenly distributed. This
meant that the two different versions o f Germanness were able to coexist better. To be
sure, there were still many conflicts between Protestants and Catholics; however,
around the fin-de-siecle, they had reached an understanding that they needed to coexist
in the Empire. This understanding, though it was uneasy at times, still provided for
relatively peaceful relations between the two confessions.
Germany’s increased involvement in European diplomatic and colonial affairs,
which precipitated a slow but steady move o f nationalism to the right, also meant that
it was easier for Catholics and Protestants to overlook some o f their internal
differences. As has been already noted, they were both prepared to die for their
Emperor, and the fact that the last two decades o f the Empire were focused less on the
persecution o f internal enemies and more on external ones aided in the elimination o f
some o f the differences. O f course, the fact that the focus was more on external
enemies than internal also illustrates that the nation-state had grown more stable. By
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the 1890s, Catholics and Protestants were more inclined to agree on the purposes o f
nationalism though they still might disagree on the exact nature o f the German nation
state. As the international situation grew increasingly tense, both Catholics and
Protestants subscribed to the notion that nationalism should serve to strengthen the
German nation. Especially after some o f the foreign policy setbacks during the first
few years o f the twentieth century, both confessions utilized nationalism to strengthen
Germany’s position on the European diplomatic and political stage. These sentiments
were no more evident than in the 1912 Catholic reception o f the Bismarck statue in
Konstanz. Although this was a man whom they had refused to honor before, they now
appreciated the radical nationalist message that accompanied the unveiling o f the
statue. In the years immediately prior to World War I, both Catholics and Protestants
used nationalism to strengthen their own nation in times when the European
diplomatic climate was becoming increasingly hostile.
Although this work has mainly focused on the centrality o f confessional
loyalties to the construction o f German national identity, the research into the official
commemorative discourse surrounding unification also provided some clues about
how Badeners integrated into the Second Empire. Following the theories first
proposed by Applegate and Confmo, my research supports the notion that though
Badeners were not opposed to the unification o f the Empire, they were still intent on
preserving their own regional identities as part o f their new national identity. The
symbolism inherent in the Siegesedenkmal leaves little doubt that Badenese Catholics
and Protestants were unwilling to give up their pre-1871 identities for a new Prussian-
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dominated construct. The Grand Duchy o f Baden had enjoyed a long and illustrious
history, and it should come as no surprise, especially given Prussia’s reactionary
reputation, that Badeners were unwilling to be engulfed into the new national identity.
Intent on preserving as much o f their local and regional identity as possible, the
commemorations o f the Franco-Prussian War and the subsequent unification always
stressed the centrality o f the Badenese troops to the success o f these events. The
commemorative discourse almost seemed to indicate that had it not been for the
Badenese troops and the political efforts o f Grand Duke Friedrich, Germany might not
have unified. Although this was an invented history, the ideological message enabled
Badeners to hold on to their regional identities while negotiating the creation o f a
national identity. Naturally, this meant that they created a slightly different view o f
the German nation than existed in Saxony or Prussia. The federalist structure o f the
Empire also ensured that it was relatively easy for Badeners to maintain parts o f their
regional identities as they negotiated the integration into the new nation-state. To
some extent, the fact that the Empire was so federalized actually enabled Germans to
create a stronger sense o f national identity as they utilized regional parliaments or
royal houses as means to manifest their identities as Germans and Badeners at the
same time. Although the negotiation between the local and national was not carried
out in the same public and obvious manner as the conflict between the Protestant and
Catholic versions o f Germanness, the processes were quite similar.
Despite facing opposition and sometimes outright discrimination between
1871-1914, Catholics in Baden were able to maintain their own sense o f Germanness
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during the Second Empire. Using the commemorations o f the wars o f unification,
Badenese Catholics manifested their own view o f German history, the unification
process, and the nature o f their new nation-state. Despite accusations o f antiGermanness, Badenese Catholics were not lesser Germans, only different from their
Protestant counterparts. As the Second Empire grew more stable, and as Catholics
grew more politically, economically, socially, and culturally powerful, Catholics and
Protestants were able to reach a consensus o f what constituted national identity,
though this consensus was uneasy at times. This work has demonstrated that
confessional attitudes constituted a large part o f national identity as well as the fact
that Catholics were much more successful in maintaining their own version o f national
identity than many previous scholars have argued. By actively interacting, often in a
hostile manner, with the Protestant versions o f German identity, Catholics were able to
shape the new national identity to a great extent. Their public manifestations o f their
version o f Germanness ensured that they were able to negotiate their existence in the
new nation-state on their own terms, rather than simply being subsumed in a
Protestant-dominated national identity.
What emerges here is a multifaceted view o f nationalism. It was not simply a
cohesive force that unified several different groups in society under one ideology.
Rather, in the initial years o f the Empire, it could sometimes even intensify alreadyexisting conflicts as citizens debated these against the backdrop o f an obsession on the
construction o f national identity. However, this does not mean that nationalism was
an intrinsically divisive force. Ultimately, though they subscribed to different versions
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o f what it meant, Badenese Catholics and Protestants agreed that they were all
Germans. What we should take away here is the fact that nationalism was a force that
both pushed and pulled and that it contained many inherent conflicts. Instead o f being
forced to accept a national identity characterized by Prussian and Protestant values,
Badenese Catholics successfully infused German identity with their own
understanding o f Germanness. Thus, throughout the Second Empire, the construction
o f national identity constantly changed as the two confessions debated the meaning o f
identity. However, at the end o f the day, citizens in Konstanz, Heidelberg, and
Freiburg agreed that they were German, though their versions o f that identity might
have differed. Badenese Catholics’ resistance to the official commemorative
discourse and their success in manifesting their own identities suggest that national
identity should be considered a very fluid construct in which groups such as
Protestants and Catholics offered their interpretation o f what it meant to be German in
the Second Empire.
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